A2: No nukes Terrorists can get nukes
Brill and Luongo, 2012 (Kenneth C., former U.S. ambassador of I.A.E.A, and Kenneth N., president of the Partnership for Global Security, “Nuclear Terrorism- A Clear Danger”, New York Times, March 15, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/opinion/nuclear-terrorism-a-clear-danger.html, SZ)
Terrorists exploit gaps in security. The current global regime for protecting the nuclear materials that terrorists desire for their ultimate weapon is far from seamless. It is based largely on unaccountable, voluntary arrangements that are inconsistent across borders. Its weak links make it dangerous and inadequate to prevent nuclear terrorism.
A2: No Motivation Terrorist groups looking to use WMDs
Mowatt-Larssen, 2010 (Rolf, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?”, January, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19852/al_qaeda_weapons_of_mass_destruction_threat.html, SZ)
Several terrorist groups have actively sought weapons of mass destruction (WMD) of one kind or another. In particular, the Japanese cult group Aum Shinrikyo, al Qaeda and its associates -- notably the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Jemaah Islamiya and Lashkar al Tayyib -- figure most prominently among the groups that have manifested some degree of intent, experimentation, and programmatic efforts to acquire nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. To date, however, al Qaeda is the only group known to be pursuing a long-term, persistent and systematic approach to developing weapons to be used in mass casualty attacks.
Economy XTs Solve jobs
Nagle ’11 (Kurt, CEO& President American Association of Port Authorities, Port-Related Infrastructure Investments Can Reap Dividends, Industry Today, November, 2011, http://aapa.files.cms-plus.com/AAPAArticles/Industry%20Today%20-%20Port-Related%20Infrastructure%20Investments%20Can%20Reap%20Dividends%20-%20Nov%202011%20by%20Kurt%20Nagle.pdf, JCC)
This is unfortunate at a crucial juncture. Projects to maintain these critical waterways would create jobs immediately and would provide transportation savings to benefit US businesses. With decreases in the cost of freight transportation, these sectors can enhance their global competitiveness and create more jobs. The American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) has continually and strongly urged Congress to take action to ensure that 100-percent of the annual amount collected from the Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) is utilized to maintain federal navigation channels. In addition to navigable waterways, American businesses benefit from reliable, uncongested roads, rails, bridges and tunnels. These present a competitive advantage in the global economy by providing businesses the ability to deliver products at lower costs while reaching larger markets. And the role of international trade is only projected to increase. As recently as 2005, the World Economic Forum ranked the United States as number-one in infrastructure economic competitiveness. Now, the US is ranked 15th. This drop down the charts should come as no surprise, considering that the United States spends only 1.7 percent of its domestic product on transportation infrastructure.
Global Economy on brink of collapse
Kavoussi 11. (Bonnie Kavoussi, Economics Reporter for the Huffington Post, 05 December 11, “George Soros: Global Financial System In 'Self-Reinforcing Process Of Disintegration’”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/05/george-soros-global-financial-system_n_1129210.html) AZ
Billionaire investor George Soros says that the global financial system is on the brink of collapse. Developed countries are falling into a "deflationary debt trap," in which consumer spending falls, products become cheaper, tax revenues drop, and sovereign debt grows, Soros said last week, according to the Wall Street Journal. As a result, he said, the global financial system is in a "self-reinforcing process of disintegration." "The consequences could be quite disastrous," Soros, who was born in Hungary, said at the tenth anniversary of the International Senior Lawyers Project.
The global economy is strong and robust.
Berman ’12 (Jeff, group news editor at Logistics Management, “Strong global trade patterns remain intact, according to Panjiva data”, Logistics Management, May 14, http://www.logisticsmgmt.com/article/strong_global_trade_patterns_remain_intact_according_to_panjiva_data/, TD)
Building off of the positive momentum from February to March, global trade activity continued heading in the right direction from March to April, according to data released by Panjiva, an online search engine with detailed information on global suppliers and manufacturers. U.S.-bound waterborne shipments continued the strong momentum demonstrated from February to March, which saw a 14 percent sequential gain. April shipments—at 108,614—were up 11 percent compared to March’s 979,954. April shipments were up 6 percent year-over-year. Panjva reported a 6 percent increase in the number of global manufacturers shipping to the U.S., with March’s 136,286 ahead of February’s 128,244 and down from January’s 145,520. Compared to March 2011, which saw 130,918 manufacturers ship to the U.S., March 2012 was up 3.9 percent. Panjva reported a 6 percent increase in the number of global manufacturers shipping to the U.S., with April’s 148,246 ahead of March’s 136,286. January and February manufacturer numbers came in at 145,520 and 128,244, respectively. “These numbers really are great news,” said Panjiva CEO Josh Green in an interview. “To be 11 percent ahead of where we were last year [for shipments] is fantastic, and if you look ignore the effects of Chinese New Year it seems clear now that we have basically had six straight months of healthy trade activity.” These numbers, said Green, reflect a healthy degree of confidence among global buyers. As for future global trade growth in the coming months, Green said companies are now placing orders for the holiday season, and at the same time many macroeconomic signs—including employment and consumer confidence—are encouraging, which could result in providing further confidence for buyers when placing orders. “All the buyers are thinking about jobs and consumer confidence when thinking about much inventory they want to keep on hand,” he said. “The numbers we are seeing now are for orders placed several months ago for merchandise that will be in stores fairly soon. Orders being placed today will show up in shipment data several months from now.” Looking ahead, jobs numbers will require a watchful eye, said Green. This is especially relevant in light of lower-than-expected April jobs numbers. If there is a swoon in future jobs number, Green said that could raise caution flags among corporate buyers. Another factor cited by Green was the tenuous economic situation in Europe, which to date has not has a major impact on trade flows into the U.S. “If Europe cannot get a grip on its financial challenges at some point, it is likely to have some spillover effects,” said Green. Should current economic patterns remain largely at current levels, Green said the lowest April to May increase recorded for shipments was in the 3 percent range at the low end and 12 percent at the high end. Anything in that range would mean things remain on track for growth, he explained, whereas anything below that would be viewed as a disappointment.
U.S. exports consistently declining
United States Bureau of Labor, 12 (“U.S. Import and Export Price Indexes”, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ximpim.nr0.htm, 7/12/12, MS)
All Exports: The price index for U.S. exports declined 1.7 percent in June, the largest monthly decline since ¶ the index fell 2.0 percent in October 2011. Falling prices for both agricultural and nonagricultural exports ¶ each contributed to the decline. U.S. export prices also fell overall for the June 2011-12 period, decreasing ¶ 2.1 percent. The decline over the past year was the largest 12-month drop since the index declined 3.6 ¶ percent between October 2008 and October 2009. ¶ Agricultural Exports: Agricultural prices fell 4.0 percent in June, the first monthly decrease since a 0.4 ¶ percent decline in February, and the largest monthly drop since a 6.5 percent decrease in October 2011. The ¶ June decrease was driven by a 9.0 percent decline in soybean prices, an 8.3 percent fall in corn prices, and a ¶ 14.3 percent drop in cotton prices. Overall agricultural prices also decreased for the year ended in June, ¶ declining 6.1 percent. ¶ All Exports Excluding Agriculture: Prices for nonagricultural exports fell for the second consecutive ¶ month in June, decreasing 1.4 percent after falling 0.6 percent in May. Declining prices for nonagricultural ¶ industrial supplies and materials prices, capital goods prices, and automotive vehicles prices more than offset ¶ rising consumer goods prices. Nonagricultural prices fell 1.6 percent over the past year, the first year-over-¶ year drop since a 2.9 percent decrease from October 2008 to October 2009.
Global trade is on the brink of collapse.
Smith ’12 (Brandon, the founder of the Alternative Market Project, “Drop in Global Trade Signals Collapse Is Near”, CounterPsyOps, Jan 31, http://counterpsyops.com/2012/01/31/drop-in-global-trade-signals-collapse-is-near/, TD)
Much has been said about the Baltic Dry Index over the course of the last four years, especially in light of the credit crisis and the effects it has had on the frequency of global shipping. Importing and exporting has never been quite the same since 2008, and this change is made most obvious through one of the few statistical measures left in the world that is not subject to direct manipulation by international corporate interests; the BDI. Today, the BDI is on the verge of making headlines once again, being that is plummeting like a wingless 747 into the swampy mire of what I believe will soon be historical lows. The problem with the BDI is that it is little understood and often dismissed by less thoughtful economic analysts as a “volatile index” that is too “sensitive” to be used as a realistic indicator of future trends. What these analysts consistently seem to ignore is that regardless of their narrow opinion, the BDI has been proven to lead economic derision in the market movements of the past. That is to say, the BDI has been volatile exactly BECAUSE markets have been volatile and unstable, and is a far more accurate thermometer than those that most mainstream economists currently rely on. If only they would look back at the numbers further than one year ago, they might see their own folly more clearly. Introduced in 1985, the Baltic Dry Index first and foremost is a measure of the global shipping rates of dry bulk goods, mostly consisting of vital raw materials used in the creation of other products. However, it is also a measure of demand for said materials in comparison to previous months and years. This is where we get into the predictive nature of the BDI… In late 1986, for instance, the BDI fell to its lowest level on record, then, began a slow crawl towards moderate recovery, just before the Black Monday crash of 1987. Coincidence? Not a chance. From 2001 to 2002, a similar sharp collapse in the BDI preceded a progressive drop in the Dow of around 4000 points, ending in a highly suspect (Fed engineered) illegitimate recovery. In 2008, the index fell to near record lows once again just before the derivatives and credit crisis hit stocks full force. To imply that the BDI is not a useful measure of future economic trends seems like an astonishingly ignorant proposition when one examines its very predictable behavior just before major financial downturns. This is not to suggest that the BDI can be used as a way to play the stock market from day to day, or often even month to month. MSM analysts rarely look further than the next quarter when considering any financial issue, and that is why they don’t understand the BDI. If an index cannot be used by daytraders to make a quick buck in a short afternoon, then why bother with it at all, right? The BDI is not an accurate measure of the daily market gamble. It is, though, an accurate measure of where markets are headed in the long run and under extreme circumstances. Over the course of the past month, the BDI has fallen around 65% from above 1600 to 726. Mainstream economists argue that the BDI’s fall in 2008 was a much higher percentage, and thus, a 65% drop is nothing to worry about. They fail to mention that shipping rates never recovered from the 2008 collapse, and have hovered in a sickly manner near lows reached during the initial credit bubble burst. By their logic, if the BDI was at 2, and fell to 1, this 50% drop should be shrugged off as inconsequential because it is not a substantial percentage of decline when compared to that which occurred in 2008, even though the index is standing at rock bottom. Yes, the useful idiots strike again… Looking at the rate and the speed of decline this past month, it’s hard to argue that the current 65% drop is meaningless: Another subversive argument against the BDI is the suggestion that it is not the demand for raw materials that is in decline, but the number of shipping vessels out of use that is growing. A smart person might suggest that these two problems are mutually connected. An MSM pundit would not. In 2008, many ships were left to wallow in port without cargo, but this was due in large part to two circumstances. First, demand had fallen so much that too many ships were left to carry too little raw materials. Second, credit markets had sunk so intensely that many ships could not find trade financing necessary to take on cargo. In either case, the BDI still falls, and in either case, it still signals economic danger. The only way that the BDI could signal a major decline in shipping demand artificially or inaccurately is if a considerable number of ships under construction were suddenly released onto the market while there is no demand for them. There have been no mass increases or extreme changes in cargo fleets this past month, or at all since 2008, which means, the BDI’s decline has NOTHING to do with the number of ships in operation, and everything to do with decline in global demand. What is the bottom line? The stark decline in the BDI today should be taken very seriously. Most similar declines have occurred right before or in tandem with economic instability and stock market upheaval. All the average person need do is look around themselves, and they will find a European Union in the midst of detrimental credit downgrades and on the verge of dissolving. They will find the U.S. on the brink of yet another national debt battle and hostage to a private Federal Reserve which has announced the possibility of a third QE stimulus package which will likely be the last before foreign creditors begin dumping our treasuries and our currency in protest. They will find BRIC and ASEAN nations moving quietly into multiple bilateral trade agreements which cut out the use of the dollar as a world reserve completely. Is it any wonder that the Baltic Dry Index is in such steep deterioration?
Impacts Global economic collapse causes nuclear war
Mead 09 (Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, Only Makes You Stronger, The New Republic, www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2,)
The greatest danger both to U.S.-China relations and to American power itself is probably not that China will rise too far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end China's growth miracle. In the worst-case scenario, the turmoil in the international economy will plunge China into a major economic downturn. The Chinese financial system will implode as loans to both state and private enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of Chinese will be unemployed in a country without an effective social safety net. The collapse of asset bub bles in the stock and property markets will wipe out the savings of a generation of the Chinese middle class. The political consequences could include dangerous unrest--and a bitter climate of anti-foreign feeling that blames others for China's woes. (Think of Weimar Germany, when both Nazi and communist politicians blamed the West for Germany's economic travails.) Worse, instability could lead to a vicious cycle, as nervous investors moved their money out of the country, further slowing growth and, in turn, fomenting ever-greater bitterness. Thanks to a generation of rapid economic growth, China has so far been able to manage the stresses and conflicts of modernization and change; nobody knows what will happen if the growth stops. India's future is also a question. Support for global integration is a fairly recent development in India, and many serious Indians remain skeptical of it. While India's 60-year-old democratic system has resisted many shocks, a deep economic recession in a country where mass poverty and even hunger are still major concerns could undermine political order, long-term growth, and India's attitude toward the United States and global economic integration. The violent Naxalite insurrection plaguing a significant swath of the country could get worse; religious extremism among both Hindus and Muslims could further polarize Indian politics; and India's economic miracle could be nipped in the bud. If current market turmoil seriously damaged the performance and prospects of India and China, the current crisis could join the Great Depression in the list of economic events that changed history, even if the recessions in the West are relatively short and mild. The United States should stand ready to assist Chinese and Indian financial authorities on an emergency basis--and work very hard to help both countries escape or at least weather any economic downturn. It may test the political will of the Obama administration, but the United States must avoid a protectionist response to the economic slowdown. U.S. moves to limit market access for Chinese and Indian producers could poison relations for years. For billions of people in nuclear-armed countries to emerge from this crisis believing either that the United States was indifferent to their well-being or that it had profited from their distress could damage U.S. foreign policy far more severely than any mistake made by George W. Bush. It's not just the great powers whose trajectories have been affected by the crash. Lesser powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran also face new constraints. The crisis has strengthened the U.S. position in the Middle East as falling oil prices reduce Iranian influence and increase the dependence of the oil sheikdoms on U.S. protection. Success in Iraq--however late, however undeserved, however limited--had already improved the Obama administration's prospects for addressing regional crises. Now, the collapse in oil prices has put the Iranian regime on the defensive. The annual inflation rate rose above 29 percent last September, up from about 17 percent in 2007, according to Iran's Bank Markazi. Economists forecast that Iran's real GDP growth will drop markedly in the coming months as stagnating oil revenues and the continued global economic downturn force the government to rein in its expansionary fiscal policy. All this has weakened Ahmadinejad at home and Iran abroad. Iranian officials must balance the relative merits of support for allies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria against domestic needs, while international sanctions and other diplomatic sticks have been made more painful and Western carrots (like trade opportunities) have become more attractive. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and other oil states have become more dependent on the United States for protection against Iran, and they have fewer resources to fund religious extremism as they use diminished oil revenues to support basic domestic spending and development goals. None of this makes the Middle East an easy target for U.S. diplomacy, but thanks in part to the economic crisis, the incoming administration has the chance to try some new ideas and to enter negotiations with Iran (and Syria) from a position of enhanced strength. Every crisis is different, but there seem to be reasons why, over time, financial crises on balance reinforce rather than undermine the world position of the leading capitalist countries. Since capitalism first emerged in early modern Europe, the ability to exploit the advantages of rapid economic development has been a key factor in international competition. Countries that can encourage--or at least allow and sustain--the change, dislocation, upheaval, and pain that capitalism often involves, while providing their tumultuous market societies with appropriate regulatory and legal frameworks, grow swiftly. They produce cutting-edge technologies that translate into military and economic power. They are able to invest in education, making their workforces ever more productive. They typically develop liberal political institutions and cultural norms that value, or at least tolerate, dissent and that allow people of different political and religious viewpoints to collaborate on a vast social project of modernization--and to maintain political stability in the face of accelerating social and economic change. The vast productive capacity of leading capitalist powers gives them the ability to project influence around the world and, to some degree, to remake the world to suit their own interests and preferences. This is what the United Kingdom and the United States have done in past centuries, and what other capitalist powers like France, Germany, and Japan have done to a lesser extent. In these countries, the social forces that support the idea of a competitive market economy within an appropriately liberal legal and political framework are relatively strong. But, in many other countries where capitalism rubs people the wrong way, this is not the case. On either side of the Atlantic, for example, the Latin world is often drawn to anti-capitalist movements and rulers on both the right and the left. Russia, too, has never really taken to capitalism and liberal society--whether during the time of the czars, the commissars, or the post-cold war leaders who so signally failed to build a stable, open system of liberal democratic capitalism even as many former Warsaw Pact nations were making rapid transitions. Partly as a result of these internal cultural pressures, and partly because, in much of the world, capitalism has appeared as an unwelcome interloper, imposed by foreign forces and shaped to fit foreign rather than domestic interests and preferences, many countries are only half-heartedly capitalist. When crisis strikes, they are quick to decide that capitalism is a failure and look for alternatives. So far, such half-hearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the front-runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.
Economic slowdown will cause WWIII
Bearden 2000 (Lieutenant Colonel Bearden, The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How We Can Solve It, 2000, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Big-Medicine/message/642)
Bluntly, we foresee these factors - and others { } not covered - converging to a catastrophic collapse of the world economy in about eight years. As the collapse of the Western economies nears, one may expect catastrophic stress on the 160 developing nations as the developed nations are forced to dramatically curtail orders. International Strategic Threat Aspects History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China - whose long range nuclear missiles can reach the United States - attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is his side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all, is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs, with a great percent of the WMD arsenals being unleashed . The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.
The Immediate Effects of a Nuclear Explosion in a single port causes mass relocation and death
Meade, Molander 6 (Charles, Roger, Ph.D. in engineering science and nuclear engineering, University of California, Berkeley; B.S. in mechanical engineering, University of Wisconsin, technical report, “Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack,” http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR391.pdf) C.C.
For our analysis, we used and Dolan’s (1977) analysis of nuclear weapon effects, public domain software for analyzing radioactive fallout,13 and publicly available data on pop- ulation, infrastructure, and winds in the Los Angeles region. For the analysis, we calculated the direct blast effects and assessed the affected infrastructure. Considering regional wind pat- terns and velocities, we modeled the magnitude and extent of the fallout patterns. We analyzed the health Glasstone implications of these levels of radioactivity and calculated the affected populations. Finally, we considered evacuations and sheltering logistics in the Los Angeles region. The full scenario, which served as the foundation for strategic decision making games described in the next section, is presented in Appendix A. The top-level results from the scenario are presented below:
• The infrastructure and ships in the Port of Long Beach and the adjoining Port of Los Angeles are completely destroyed by the blast and fires.
• Sixty thousand people die or will die soon because of direct blast effects and radiation poisoning.
• The radioactive fallout of water and sediment from the port exposes 150,000 people to hazardous radiation levels, requiring prompt medical attention.
• Six million people will try to evacuate the Los Angeles region to avoid the radioactive fallout.
• Gasoline is in critically short supply because of the effects on refineries in the Long Beach area. Long Beach refines approximately one-third of gasoline west of the Rockies, and there is no pipeline infrastructure to import supplies to the region.
• Radioactive fallout contaminates a 500-km2 region, prohibiting residence for 10–20 years. Two to three million residents will require relocation facilities.
Ports key to trade-and terror attack would jack world trade
Abt 03 (Clark C. PhD, Dr. Abt is an Associate of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University and Distinguished Professor of Management at Cambridge College in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He is also the founder of Abt Associates, The Economic Impact of Nuclear Terrorist Attacks on Freight Transport Systems in an Age of Seaport Vulnerability, Abt Associates, April 30, http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/es-economic_impact_of_nuclear_terrorist_attacks.pdf, AJ)
1.0 Executive Summary¶ 1.1 The Importance of Seaport-Based Transport Systems to the ¶ U.S. and the World Economy¶ Today a third of the world economy, and a quarter of America’s, depends on safe international ¶ commerce and trade, most of which since the last thirty years is transported across the oceans and ¶ land borders in standardized steel cargo containers carried by ships, trucks, and rail. ¶ Thirty percent of the world economy and 20 percent of the U.S. economy¾-$2 trillion-depend on ¶ trade. The transport of world trade is absolutely dependent on the shipping portals at seaports, land ¶ borders, and airports. These major seaport cities, together with their usually co-located international ¶ airports, constitute both the most valuable and vulnerable targets of catastrophic nuclear terrorism. ¶ The world’s seaports have some 72 million containers moving through them every year (7 million in ¶ the United States alone), in any one of which a 60-to-600-pound nuclear weapon could be delivered ¶ to the seaport and detonated before unloading.
Ports are key structures in our economy. If ports are shut down, the economy will shut down.
Lundquist, 11 (Edward H. communications director for the Anteon Corporation’s Center for Security, Strategies, and Operations, International Port Security Program, Defense Media Network, March 17, http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/international-port-security-program/, AJ)
America pays close attention to maritime security. The nation’s Marine Transportation System, which includes our ports, waterways, and vessels, handles more than $900 billion in international commerce every year. Shut down our ports and you shut down our economy. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) knows that port security at home depends on secure ports with our trading partners abroad. “The Coast Guard employs a holistic layered approach to maritime security that is designed to detect, deter, and prevent the methods of terror and terrorists as early as possible in the event chain,” said Adm. Robert J. Papp, the commandant of the Coast Guard. “An example of a ‘far-from-the-homeland’ element of this layered security system is the International Port Security (IPS) Program, which verifies that effective anti-terrorism measures have been instituted in foreign ports to help reduce the risk to U.S. ports.” The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 mandates the USCG to assess anti-terrorism measures in foreign ports. From that congressional mandate the IPS Program was born and became responsible for assessing and in some cases strengthening port security in the ports of the United States’ foreign trading partners. “Our area of responsibility encompasses all of the world’s maritime trading nations – roughly 150 countries. We are the foreign port component of the United States’ global supply chain security efforts,” said Lt. Cmdr. Bryan Ulmer, who works from the IPS Program’s Atlantic Area office. The Coast Guard began conducting port security assessments in 2004. Since then, security assessments have been completed in more than 150 nations that conduct maritime trade with the United States. In fact, most of these countries have actually been formally assessed more than once and visited several times by IPS Program personnel. “We attempt to visit the country to observe the security conditions,” said Cmdr. Tanya Schneider of the IPS Program’s program management office in Washington D.C., “We meet with the people who are responsible for port security for our maritime trading partners and verify that their ports comply with international security regulations.” After 9/11, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) amended the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea to include new “Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Safety.” This included the International Ship and Port Facilities Security Code (ISPS Code), which provides a framework for governments, agencies, and the shipping industry for conducting risk management between potential threats and vulnerability of ships and port infrastructure. The ISPS Code requires that governments carry out security assessments to “identify and evaluate important assets and infrastructures that are critical to the port facility as well as those areas or structures that, if damaged, could cause significant loss of life or damage to the port facility’s economy or environment.” It also requires security plans to be prepared to address a variety of issues involving the protection of the ship-port interface. The ISPS Code applies to “passenger ships and cargo ships of 500 gross tons and upward, including high speed craft, mobile offshore drilling units, and port facilities serving such ships engaged on international voyages.” Because it is the internationally accepted standard, the ISPS Code is the primary benchmark against which the Coast Guard measures effective anti-terrorism measures in foreign ports.
Port security is key to protect shipping routes.
Watts ’05 (Robert, 1985 graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy and has served six tours at sea conducting drug/migrant operations. He is currently assigned as the chief of drug and migrant interdiction at Coast Guard Headquarters, and he is a 2006 graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security, he has advanced degrees from the Naval War College, Old Dominion University, American Military University, and is a doctoral candidate at the Royal Military College of Canada, “Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection: Multi-Agency Command and Control in an Asymmetric Environment”, Homeland Security Affairs, http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=1.2.3, TD)
An unprecedented amount of trade — both imports and exports — relies on shipment by sea. A successful attack on maritime infrastructure would affect this trade in far greater proportion than the actual damage. It is likely that an attack on one port would have a cascade effect on others as increased security measures are applied nationwide. The recent impact of the London bombings can be seen as illustrative of this effect; although there was no indication of additional terrorist activity, security measures were increased at transportation hubs worldwide. Increasing security alerts at a train station is one thing; closing a huge economic entity such as a port is quite another. Delay of shipping in loading and offloading cargo is one of the most costly elements of the shipping process. We must also consider the impact to the shipping industry itself. During the Persian Gulf re-flagging operations of the late 1980s, for example, analysis showed the greatest impact to the shipping of oil was not the damage to tankers inflicted by the warring Iraqis and Iranians (which was, in fact, minimal), but the increased insurance costs of operating in that area. 3 An attack on a U.S. port could have a similar, if not larger, effect.
Ports are a place where shipping could be disrupted.
IMO ’02 (“IMO adopts comprehensive maritime security measures”, International Maritime Organization, 9-13 December, http://www.imo.org/blast/mainframe.asp?topic_id=583&doc_id=2689, TD)
Speaking at the end of the conference, IMO Secretary-General William O'Neil strongly urged all parties concerned to start putting in place all the necessary legislative, administrative and operational provisions needed to give effect to the decisions of the Conference as soon as possible. In a call for continued vigilance, he added, "In the meantime, all involved in the operation of ships and ports should continue to be aware of the potential dangers to shipping through acts of terrorism and the need to be extremely vigilant and alert to any security threat they might encounter in port, at offshore terminals or when underway at sea."
Terrorists are capable of smuggling in nuclear bombs into our ports
Abt 3(Clark Professor of management at Cambridge College in Cambridge Massachusetts, founder of Abt Associates, ph.D. , executive summary “The Economic Impact of Nuclear Terrorist Attacks on Freight Transport Systems in an Age of Seaport Vulnerability,” April 30 http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/es-economic_impact_of_nuclear_terrorist_attacks.pdf) C.C.
International terrorists have asserted their intention to acquire nuclear weapons, and have an increasing capability of secretly purchasing, stealing, or making a nuclear fission weapon from fissile material stolen or bought from the many insufficiently secured stockpiles, today primarily in Russia but also increasingly in several other nuclear-capable countries. Currently a Hiroshima-scale 10-20 kilotons, fission weapon could be smuggled undetected into a major U.S. seaport (NY, LA) or the DC Capital in any one of millions of cargo containers shipped or trucked into the into the United States every year and thousands every day, and detonated dockside or after being trucked into the city center.
Gamma Ray Scanners can fix big terrorist problems
Abt 3(Clark Professor of management at Cambridge College in Cambridge Massachusetts, founder of Abt Associates, ph.D. , executive summary “The Economic Impact of Nuclear Terrorist Attacks on Freight Transport Systems in an Age of Seaport Vulnerability,” April 30 http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/es-economic_impact_of_nuclear_terrorist_attacks.pdf)
C.C.
The technology and the organizational and procedural designs exist which could greatly reduce the risk of deaths and damages from nuclear terrorist attack on seaport-based transport. The key technology is the shielded pulsed-active neutron interrogation device, or scanner, augmenting the currently partially deployed gamma ray scanners. Expertise in this technology exists in government labs, university research labs, and private industry firms. An effective system of defenses built around this technology would include:¶ • Forward deployment of customs inspection to foreign container ports of embarkation for the United States, 100 percent external scanning of all U.S.-bound containers, using fixed drive-through installations, mobile truck-mounted scanners, and scanners on container lift cranes¶ • Augmented container transport intelligence information systems, including the use of tamper-resistant electronic reporting seals on containers¶ • Strengthened personnel security¶ The annual cost of a solution for effectively screening 100 percent of U.S.-bound containers at Ports is estimated to be about $100 Million per major port, or $10 billion for 100 ports. The likelihood of a successful nuclear terrorist attack using cargo container transport can be greatly reduced by an improved defense system. Analysis shows that the improved defenses can reduce the terrorist’s chances of evading detection of this means of weapon delivery at the port of embarkation to 9 percent, and the chances of successful container transshipment to an inland target to 1 percent.
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