Japan A2 – No rearm The impact happens fast – Japan could re-arm in a few days
Brumfiel 2004
Geoff, Cites Paul Leventhal, Head of the Nuclear Control Institute, “Nuclear proliferation special: We have the technology”, Nature 432, 432-437 (25 November 2004) | doi:10.1038/432432a; Published online 24 November 2004, http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v432/n7016/full/432432a.html)
Paul Leventhal, head of the Nuclear Control Institute, a non-profit watchdog in Washington, says that Iran is taking the path followed by one of the United States’ most steadfast allies: Japan. Since its first nuclear-power plant became operational in 1966, Japan has developed a large civilian nuclear programme that has produced several tonnes of plutonium-239, the other metal commonly used for nuclear bombs. Leventhal says that many consider Japan to be little more than “a screwdriver away” from a nuclear weapon. “Most think it could get a bomb in a matter of weeks to months, if not days,” Leventhal says.
Full re-arm isn’t even necessary – preemptive wars will still happen
Friedberg 2015
PhD, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton (Aaron, “The Debate Over US China Strategy,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 57.3)
If it were to happen overnight, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by current US security partners in East Asia (perhaps including Taiwan, as well as Japan and South Korea) might improve their prospects for balancing against Chinese power. But here again, there is likely to be a significant gap between theory and reality. Assuming that Washington did not actively assist them, and that they could not produce weapons overnight or in total secrecy, the interval during which its former allies lost the protection of the American nuclear umbrella and the point at which they acquired their own would be one in which they would be exposed to coercive threats and possibly pre-emptive attack. Because it contains a large number of tense and mistrustful dyads (including North Korea and South Korea, Japan and China, China and Taiwan, Japan and North Korea and possibly South Korea and Japan), a multipolar nuclear order in East Asia might be especially prone to instability.48
Their defense doesn’t assume the link – decline of confidence in the U.S. is the one development that could flip Japan’s security calculations
Curtis 2013
(Gerald, Burgess Professor of Political Science, Columbia University, “Japan's Cautious Hawks”, Foreign Affairs. Mar/Apr2013, Vol. 92 Issue 2, p77-86)
It is worth noting that Japan's opposition to becoming a leading military power cannot be chalked up to pacifism. After all, it would be an odd definition of pacifism that included support for a military alliance that requires the United States to take up arms, including nuclear weapons, if necessary, to defend Japan. Most Japanese do not and never have rejected the use of force to protect their country; what they have resisted is the unbridled use of force by Japan itself. The public fears that without restrictions on the military's capabilities and missions, Japan would face heightened tensions with neighboring countries and could find itself embroiled in foreign wars. There is also the lingering concern that political leaders might lose control over the military, raising the specter of a return to the militaristic policies of the 1930s. Furthermore, the Japanese public and Japan's political leaders are keenly aware that the country's security still hinges on the United States' dominant military position in East Asia. Some on the far right would like to see Japan develop the full range of armaments, including nuclear weapons, in a push to regain its autonomy and return the country to the ranks of the world's great powers. But the conservative mainstream still believes that a strong alliance with the United States is the best guarantor of Japan's security. ISLANDS IN THE SUN Given Japan's pragmatic approach to foreign policy, it should come as no surprise that the country has reacted cautiously to a changing international environment defined by China's rise. Tokyo has doubled down on its strategy of deepening its alliance with the United States; sought to strengthen its relations with countries on China's periphery; and pursued closer economic, political, and cultural ties with China itself. The one development that could unhinge this strategy would be a loss of confidence in the U.S. commitment to Japan's defense.
A2 – rearm good Miscalc and accidents
Mizokami 2015
(Kyle, defense and national security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and The Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch, “China’s Ultimate Nightmare: Japan Armed With Nuclear Weapons,” The National Interest, October 31, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china%E2%80%99s-ultimate-nightmare-japan-armed-nuclear-weapons-14214?page=2)
Still, it’s an interesting proposition. Nuclear phobias and the lack of a pressing need aside, there’s certainly no reason why Japan,the third largest economy in the world, couldn’t build nukes. What would a Japanese nuclear deterrent look like? Let’s examine the traditional nuclear triad of land-based ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and ballistic missile submarines and each leg of the triad’s suitability for Japan’s circumstance. For the sake of argument, let’s say Japan can choose just one leg to invest in. We’ll also set the number of nukes at roughly 300. Japan’s high population density would mean that the destruction of just a handful of cities could kill or injure the majority of the country’s civilian population. Against an adversary such as Russia or China, Japan must be able to inflict similar losses. Land-based missiles Japan could invest in a small arsenal of land-based missiles, each carrying one or more nuclear warheads. The missiles could be stationed in hardened silos, like the American Minuteman III, or on mobile launchers like the Russian RS-24 Yars. A Japanese ICBM would be smaller, not needing the range and fuel to reach North America. The ability to reach all of China, European Russia and the Middle East would be sufficient. Eventually, Japan might settle on a force of 100 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, each equipped with three 100 kiloton warheads. The missiles could be based in hardened silos in eastern Hokkaido, Japan’s northernmost island, or moved around on mobile launchers. This is the least survivable of the three ideas. Japan’s close proximity to China means that in the event of a nuclear attack from the latter it would need to have a “launch on warning” doctrine to ensure the missiles survived. That would considerably increase the possibility of accidental nuclear war, as a hardware or software malfunction in Japan’s early warning system could be incorrectly interpreted as an attack.
Even reconsideration triggers the collapse of the NPT and regional prolif
Bakanic 2008
Elizabeth Bakanic, Department of Homeland Security Graduate Fellow for Science and Technology, 2008. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, “The End of Japan’s Nuclear Taboo,” http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-end-of-japans-nuclear-taboo
So why should the world be concerned about Japan's fading nuclear allergy? Because Tokyo's attitude toward nuclear weapons is incredibly important to Japan's neighbors and the nonproliferation regime, meaning subtle changes in its attitude could carry serious security consequences for both. Historically, Japan has maintained complicated relations with many of its neighbors--specifically China, North Korea, and South Korea. While functional relationships do exist, deep mistrust and suspicions persist, creating a paranoid security environment where an innocuous change from an outside perspective sets off alarm bells in the region. So what may seem like a natural shift in Japan's nuclear attitudes may be a destabilizing change for those less trustful and less objective. Therefore, if discussing nuclear weapons becomes more acceptable in Japan, China and the Koreas might perceive this as a dangerous development and use it as an excuse to increase their military capabilities--nuclear or otherwise. In terms of the teetering nonproliferation regime, a change in Japan's attitude toward nuclear weapons would be a serious blow. To date, Tokyo has been a foremost advocate of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, campaigning against proliferation and rejecting the idea of developing nuclear weapons despite possessing the best nuclear capability of any non-nuclear weapon state and having two nuclear weapon states near its borders. The binding nature of international agreements relies on such attention and support from its signatories. So although Japan may never violate the treaty, if Tokyo is perceived as being less supportive as it opens up domestically on the nuclear issue, the effect on NPT morale could be dire, which speaks directly to the NPT's current vulnerability. Some element of the changing attitude toward nuclear weapons in Japan must be due to discomfort with the status quo and a security need that the NPT or the country's other security partnerships isn't satisfying. Therefore, a disturbing factor of Japan's nuclear normalization is what it may symbolize for the NPT overall.
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