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- An non-fragmented Internet enhances cyberstalking, violence against women and actually restricts freedom.
- AT: Cybersecurity Add on
- Empirical, historical evidence proves cyber-doom scenarios are highly unlikely. Threatened systems are resilient.
- Current efforts will provide effective safeguards against cyber- attacks. Security improvements are ongoing.
AT: Add-onsAT: Internet Fragmentation Add-onInternet fragmentation is irreversible. Countries have gone too far in establishing their own networks. In any case, no impact on Internet users.Kaspersky, ’13 [Eugene, chairman and CEO of Kaspersky Lab, “What will happen if countries carve up the internet?” the Guardian, 12-17-2013, http://www.theguardian.com/media-network/media-network-blog/2013/dec/17/internet-fragmentation-eugene-kaspersky] Ordinary users will hardly perceive any change while these state-run parallel networks are being built, but there is another aspect of this global trend that will affect everyone directly. Some countries are already seriously considering making sure as much of their internet traffic as possible stays within their national borders. In some countries, for example Brazil, there's talk about forcing global giants such as Google and Facebook to locate their data centres locally to process local communications. If this trend gains worldwide momentum, it will be a disaster for global IT giants and pose a threat of full-blown Balkanisation of the internet. The process would probably foster the creation of local search engines, email systems, social networks and so on – an intimidating prospect for publicly listed companies. As a result, the whole notion of netizens, or global online citizens, and of the internet being a global village could lose all practical meaning. What could emerge is a patchwork of online nation states with different rules and regulations and hindered communications. Sadly, I don't think the trend can be reversed. It feels as inevitable as the change of the seasons. But while one can't help complaining about bad weather in December, it's worth remembering that a bit of snow is not the end of the world. Alternative causality: Multiple factors generate internet fragmentation, not just surveillance: dominance of international bodies, cyber- crime and cyber war.Patrick,’14 [Stewart, Senior Fellow and Director, Program on International Institutions and Global Governance, Council on Foreign Relations, “The Obama Administration Must Act Fast to Prevent the Internet’s Fragmentation,” The Internationalist, 2-26-2014, http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2014/02/26/the-obama-administration-must-act-fast-to-prevent-the-internets-fragmentation/] Since the dawn of the digital age, the United States had consistently supported an open, decentralized, and secure cyber domain that remains largely in private hands. Even before the Snowden disclosures, that vision was under threat, thanks to disagreements among governments on three fundamental issues. First, some world leaders are questioning whether the ITU( International Telecommunications Union) ought to play a more active role in regulating cyberspace. To the degree that the Internet is “governed,” the primary regulatory body remains ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), an independent, nonprofit corporation based in Los Angeles. The outsized role of ICANN—and the widespread perception of U.S. (and broader Western) control over the Internet—has long been a sore point for authoritarian states, as well as many developing countries, which would prefer to move cyber governance to the intergovernmental ITU. A second threat to the open Internet has been a surge in cyber crime—and disagreement over how to hold sovereign jurisdictions accountable for criminality emanating from their territories. Estimates of the magnitude of cyber crime range from large to astronomical. In 2012, NSA director general Keith Alexander put the annual global cost at $1 trillion. Most cyber crime is undertaken by nonstate actors against private sector targets for motives of financial gain. But national authorities have also been involved in economic espionage, both directly and through proxies. The most infamous case involves a unit of China’s People’s Liberation Army, which allegedly has been at the forefront of Chinese hacking efforts to steal industrial secrets and technology from leading U.S. companies. Third, the growing specter of cyberconflict—even cyber war—among nations threatens a secure and open Internet. Worldwide, dozens of governments are developing doctrines and capabilities to conduct “information operations.” This includes, of course, the United States, which has established a robust Cyber Command within the Department of Defense. Meanwhile, there is no international consensus on what constitutes a “cyberattack,” what responses to these incursions are permissible, and whether and how existing laws of war might be applied to cyberconflict. U.S. surveillance isn’t the real reason for fragmentation. It’s an excuse for the real, localized motivations for national and regional networks.Lillington, ’14 [Karlin, journalist and columnist with the Irish Times focusing on technology, with a special interest in the political, social, business and cultural aspects of information and communication technologies, PhD from Trinity College; “Halting internet fragmentation tops agendas,” Irish Times, 5-8-2014, http://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/halting-internet-fragmentation-tops-agendas-1.1786657] Most sessions at the two-day event had acknowledged that the revelations by Edward Snowden of mass covert surveillance by the NSA in the US, and GCHQ in England, had accelerated proposals to localise data – often referred to as a “Balkanisation” of data – in some countries. But human rights activists had warned that such proposals were not always what they seemed. For example, Joana Varon Ferraz, of Centro de Tecnologia e Sociedade da Fundação Getulio Vargas, Brazil, noted several times during the event that Brazil’s motivations in agreeing to build new undersea broadband cables, and calling for data to be held only within its borders, were more about increasing its own access to its citizen’s data, and opportunities for internal covert surveillance. An non-fragmented Internet enhances cyberstalking, violence against women and actually restricts freedom.Lillington, ’14 [Karlin, journalist and columnist with the Irish Times focusing on technology, with a special interest in the political, social, business and cultural aspects of information and communication technologies, PhD from Trinity College; “Halting internet fragmentation tops agendas,” Irish Times, 5-8-2014, http://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/halting-internet-fragmentation-tops-agendas-1.1786657] She (Jody Liddicoat, human rights specialist with the Association for Progressive Communications) also questioned whether a completely free and unfettered internet was desirable. The arrival of new technologies, such as Google Glass, highlighted this complication, she said, as its use could contribute to cyberstalking and the ongoing problem of violence against women. “One internet isn’t one where all freedoms are unbounded. It’s one where we begin to negotiate those freedoms,” she said. “Unbounded freedom has the potential to inhibit the freedom of another.” AT: Cybersecurity Add onThere is no clear evidence of existential cyber security threat. Alarmist rhetoric constitutes an example of threat construction similar to the run-up to the Iraq War.Brito & Watkins, ’11 [Jerry, Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Center at George Mason University; Tate, Research Associate, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, ”Loving the Cyber Bomb? The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy,” Harvard National Security Journal, April 26, 2011, http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/Loving-Cyber-Bomb-Brito-Watkins.pdf] Over the past two years, there has been a steady drumbeat of alarmist rhetoric coming out of Washington about potential catastrophic cyber threats. For example, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing last year, Chairman Carl Levin said, “cyberweapons and cyberattacks potentially can be devastating, approaching weapons of mass destruction in their effects.”2 Proposed responses include increased federal spending on cybersecurity and the regulation of private network security practices. Security risks to private and government networks from criminals and malicious state actors are no doubt real and pressing. However, the rhetoric of “cyber doom”3 employed by proponents of increased federal intervention in cybersecurity implies an almost existential threat that requires instant and immense action. Yet these proponents lack clear evidence of such doomsday threats that can be verified by the public. As a result, the United States may be witnessing a bout of threat inflation similar to that seen in the run-up to the Iraq War. Additionally, a cyber-industrial complex is emerging, much like the military-industrial complex of the Cold War. This complex may serve not only to supply cybersecurity solutions to the federal government, but to drum up demand for those solutions as well. Using apocalyptic rhetoric to address cybersecurity ensures counterproductive policymaking. Further study is necessary before acting.Brito & Watkins, ’11 [Jerry, Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Center at George Mason University; Tate, Research Associate, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, ”Loving the Cyber Bomb? The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy,” Harvard National Security Journal, April 26, 2011, http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/Loving-Cyber-Bomb-Brito-Watkins.pdf] Cybersecurity is an important policy issue, but the alarmist rhetoric coming out of Washington that focuses on worst-case scenarios is unhelpful and dangerous. Aspects of current cyber policy discourse parallel the run-up to the Iraq War and pose the same dangers. Pre-war threat inflation and conflation of threats led us into war on shaky evidence. By focusing on doomsday scenarios and conflating cyber threats, government officials threaten to legislate, regulate, or spend in the name of cybersecurity based largely on fear, misplaced rhetoric, conflated threats, and credulous reporting. The public should have access to classified evidence of cyber threats, and further examination of the risks posed by those threats, before sound policies can be proposed, let alone enacted. Empirical, historical evidence proves cyber-doom scenarios are highly unlikely. Threatened systems are resilient.Lawson, ’11 [Sean, writes about science, technology, security, and military affairs. Topics of interest include cybersecurity policy, surveillance, drones, network-centric warfare, military use of social media, and the rhetoric of threat inflation. He is assistant professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Utah, “Cyberwar Hype Comes Under Increasing Scrutiny,” Forbes, April 28, 2011, Ahttp://www.forbes.com/sites/seanlawson/2011/04/28/cyberwar-hype-comes-under-increasing-scrutiny/]| My own report for the Mercatus Center, also released in January, largely echoed the findings of the OECD report. In it, I argued that current debates about cyberwar rely too much on hypothetical scenarios that imagine the worst, what I called “cyber-doom scenarios.” I demonstrated that when subjected to evaluation based on empirical evidence from history and sociology, we can conclude that cyber-doom scenarios are unlikely. Fears of vulnerabilities based in new technologies are not new. The telegraph, telephone, radio, railroads, and other new technologies have led to similar fears in the past and those fears have yet to be realized. Instead, what history and sociology show us is that both technological systems and social systems are more resilient than we often assume. Cases such as strategic bombing, blackouts, natural disasters, and terrorist attacks have not typically led to total or long-term collapse of social, economic, or technological systems. If these events have not led to the kinds of results that the prophets of cyber-doom predict, why would we expect that cyber-attacks would? Cybersecurity hype increases the risk of a NATO-Russia war. It constitutes a self-fulfilling prophecy.Lee & Rid, ’14 [Robert, an active-duty USAF Cyber Warfare Operations Officer who has led multiple cyberspace operations programmes in the Air Force and US Intelligence Community; Thomas, professor in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, OMG CYBER! THIRTEEN REASONS WHY HYPE MAKES FOR BAD POLICY,” RUSI Journal, October/November 2014, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03071847.2014.969932] Eleven: Hype Escalates Conflict. Government, military and industry leaders are consequently able to make wild claims without providing evidence. This has an escalatory effect. ‘We’re in a pre-9/11 moment, in some respects, with cyber,’ said John Carlin, assistant attorney general for national security in the Justice Department in Aspen, Colorado in July. 25 He did not provide concrete details to back up his claim. Just weeks after Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), USAF General Philip Breedlove, made comments about Russia’s use of cyber in doing so. He told the New York Times that cyber-warfare had been used to isolate the Ukrainian military on the Crimean peninsula.26 A month later he revisited these claims, stating that cyber was a critical part of Russia’s actions. To quote Breedlove:27 When they [Russia] took Crimea, cyber was part of a well-planned, total decapitation of Crimea from the command and control structure of Ukraine. Ukraine was absolutely disconnected from being able to do anything with their forces in that area. Cyber was one of three tools used, and used quite exquisitely. Consequently, the Atlantic Alliance is updating its cyber-defence policy – a point confirmed at the recent NATO summit in Wales. A very serious cyberattack, some in the Atlantic Alliance seem to suggest, should be treated like an invasion. ‘For the first time we state explicitly that the cyber-realm is covered by Article5of the Washington Treaty, the collective defence clause’, said Jamie Shea, NATO’s deputy assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, in June. 28 At first glance, this statement appears to be meant as a deterrent. However, deterrence does not seem to apply: to deter, a statement needs to be clear and backed by credible threat of punishment. So far, NATO is doing the reverse: ‘We do not say in exactly which circumstances or what the threshold of the attack has to be to trigger a collective NATO response,’ Shea said, ‘and we do not say what that collective NATO response should be’.29 A vague but high bar for cyber-attacks also implicitly legitimises ongoing espionage attacks as acceptable and minor. Moreover, the vast majority of cyber-attacks also do not fall into NATO’s remit in the first place: espionage and cyber-crime are problems for intelligence agencies and law enforcement, not for a military alliance. For militants and the Kremlin, the subtext is clear: cyber matters; better up your game. NATO – among others–is escalating a problem that someone else will have to solve. Current efforts will provide effective safeguards against cyber- attacks. Security improvements are ongoing.Keller, 3-3-15 [John, editor-in-chief of Military & Aerospace Electronics magazine, which provides extensive coverage and analysis of enabling electronic and optoelectronic technologies in military, space, and commercial aviation applications. A member of the Military & Aerospace Electronics staff since the magazine's founding in 1989, Mr. Keller took over as chief editor in 1995., “DARPA eyes cyber security program to safeguard private and proprietary computer information,” Military & Aerospace Magazine, March 3, 2015, http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2015/03/darpa-cyber-security.html] U.S. military researchers will brief industry on 12 March 2015 on an upcoming new cyber security research program to develop ways of protecting the private and proprietary information of individuals and enterprises. Officials of the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in Arlington, Va., will detail the upcoming program from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m. on 12 Brandeis March 2015 at the Holiday Inn, 4610 North Fairfax Drive, in Arlington, Va. The Brandeis proposers day is to familiarize participants with DARPA’s interest in privacy science; identify potential proposers; and provide an opportunity for potential proposers to ask questions about the upcoming Brandeis program. Privacy is critical to a free society, DARPA researchers say. As Louis Brandeis said in 1890, the right to privacy is a consequence of understanding that harm comes in more ways than just the physical. He was reacting to the ability of the new “instantaneous camera” to record personal information in new ways. Since then, the ability of technology to collect and share information has grown beyond all expectation. DARPA researchers are reaching out to industry for ways to continue the benefits of information sharing, while safeguarding the private information of individuals and businesses. Related: DARPA picks six companies to define enabling technologies for U.S. cyber warfare strategy The White House has made cyber security a priority and has launched initiatives to enable the safe and effective sharing of information to increase the nation’s ability to protect itself and to thwart any adversary’s ability to shut down our networks, steal trade secrets, or invade the privacy of Americans, researchers say. 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