CESifo Economy Studies, 2003, “Privatization and Its Benefits:¶ Theory and Evidence” (http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=36&ved=0CFcQFjAFOB4&url=http%3A%2F%2Fciteseerx.ist.psu.edu%2Fviewdoc%2Fdownload%3Fdoi%3D10.1.1.201.3522%26rep%3Drep1%26type%3Dpdf&ei=1oEFUKKSAcmR6wGRw5TyCA&usg=AFQjCNEqWF3KjOTwR7lwP0JAkDNogwH54g&sig2=zfftUVB4SiPXB1fetAHCDw)
The evidence is robust in the direction of a clearly better performance of the¶ firms after privatization. Profitability increases significantly for different specifications,¶ different periods of time and groups of countries. An interesting¶ result is that in both Boubakri and Cosset (1998) and D'Souza and Megginson¶ (1998) profitability increases more in regulated (or noncompetitive) industries,¶ whereas operating efficiency increases less in those cases. It is clear then that¶ higher profitability does not necessarily imply higher efficiency and the link¶ between the two comes from the market structure. The evidence supports the¶ idea that there is a certain degree of market power being exploited by those¶ firms. Capital expenditure (investment) systematically increases in all cases,¶ reflecting both growth and the restructuring that takes place after the sale.30¶ Employment increases in all the cases, including developing countries. This¶ evidence on employment seems to be inconsistent with that in, for example,¶ LaPorta and López-De-Silanes (1999). There are two answers to that inconsistency.¶ First, the fact that the cross-country studies analyzed here use only data¶ for firms that were sold via public offerings generates a non-negligible selection¶ bias. One would expect those firms to be the ones with higher potential for¶ profitability. Second, the country-specific study includes data from three years¶ before privatization for all the firms, which could be capturing the elimination¶ of labor redundancy before the sale. In all the cases, fully privatized firms¶ perform better than partially privatized ones.
Any investment by the government into infrastructure should simply reform regulations to encourage the private sector
Edwards. (Chris Edwards is the director of tax policy studies at Cato and editor of www.DownsizingGovernment.org. He is a top expert on federal and state tax and budget issues. Before joining Cato, Edwards was a senior economist on the congressional Joint Economic Committee, a manager with PricewaterhouseCoopers, and an economist with the Tax Foundation. Edwards has testified to Congress on fiscal issues many times, and his articles on tax and budget policies have appeared in the Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and other major newspapers. He is the author of Downsizing the Federal Government and co-author of Global Tax Revolution. Edwards holds a B.A. and M.A. in economics, and he was a member of the Fiscal Future Commission of the National Academy of Sciences.) 11
(Federal Infrastructure Investment, November 16 2011, http://www.cato.org/publications/congressional-testimony/federal-infrastructure-investment)
One implication of this data is that if Congress wants to boost infrastructure spending, the first priority should be to make reforms to encourage private investment. Tax reforms, such as a corporate tax rate cut, would increase the net returns to a broad range of private infrastructure investments. Regulatory reforms to reduce barriers to investment are also needed, as illustrated by the delays in approving the $7 billion Keystone XL pipeline from Alberta to Texas.¶ Despite its smaller magnitude, public-sector infrastructure spending is also very important to the U.S. economy. But the usual recommendation to simply spend more federal taxpayer money on infrastructure is misguided. For one thing, the government simply can't afford more spending given its massive ongoing deficits. More importantly, much of the infrastructure spending carried out by Washington would be more efficiently handled by devolving it to state and local governments and the private sector.
1NC Privatization CP – Mass Transit
CP Text: The United States federal government should initiate public private partnerships for the development of _____________________.
Federal involvement in mass transit fails – privatization is key
Randal O'Toole is a senior fellow with the Cato Institute, 11/10/10, http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/fixing-transit-case-privatization, “Fixing Transit: The Case for Privatization”; AB
America's experiment with government ownership of urban transit systems has proven to be a disaster. Since Congress began giving states and cities incentives to take over private transit systems in 1964, worker productivity — the number of transit riders carried per worker — has declined by more than 50 percent; the amount of energy required to carry one bus rider one mile has increased by more than 75 percent; the inflation- adjusted cost per transit trip has nearly tripled, even as fares per trip slightly declined; and, despite hundreds of billions of dollars of subsidies, the number of transit trips per urban resident declined from more than 60 trips per year in 1964 to 45 in 2008. Largely because of government ownership, the transit industry today is beset by a series of interminable crises. Recent declines in the tax revenues used to support transit have forced major cuts in transit services in the vast majority of urban areas. Transit infrastructure — especially rail infrastructure — is steadily deteriorating, and the money transit agencies spend on maintenance is not even enough to keep it in its current state of poor repair. And transit agencies have agreed to employee pension and health care plans that impose billions of dollars of unfunded liabilities on taxpayers. Transit advocates propose to solve these problems with even more subsidies. A better solution is to privatize transit. Private transit providers will provide efficient transit services that go where people want to go. In order for privatization to take place, Congress and the states must stop giving transit agencies incentives to waste money on high-cost transit technologies.
2NC Solvency – Mass Transit
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