Przykładowe Materiały Egzaminacyjne JĘzyk angielski poziom 3 Czytanie
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- In the first paragraph, the author mainly …
- Concerning Abu Nidal’s death, the author …
- The Iraqis may have killed Abu Nidal because they wanted …
- Abu Nidal started independent terrorist activities …
- In the last paragraph, “my enemy” refers to …
- The text is about Germany’s intelligence apparatus and …
- The build-up to the arrest of the couple shows ...
- Klaus Jansen is implying that the German security apparatus ...
- The fourth paragraph mainly tells the reader about …
- The word “remits” in line 21 could be best replaced with ...
- The main purpose of the last paragraph is to …
- The most preferable option for the U.S. is ...
- Turkey has withdrawn from the "deal" with the U.S. because of ...
- Opening the northern front could ...
- The Turkish military ...
- If all else fails, the U.S. can make Turkey agree by ...
- According to the first paragraph, it is NOT true that Mr Sharon and Mr Uribe ...
- During his visit to the U.S., Mr Uribe will try to ...
- According to Bert Ruiz, Colombia ...
- The majority of Colombians ...
- Boeing’s position in the global commercial jet market …
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- Subsidies for the Airbus …
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Assisted Suicide?Long before 9/11, the title of Most Dangerous Terrorist in the World belonged to Abu Nidal. Unlike Osama bin Laden, he disliked being filmed chatting about his ideology over a Kalashnikov. He almost never emerged from the turbid underworld of international crime, and he had no consistent belief system. He switched allegiances with ease. Governments actually paid him just to leave their people alone. Even so, beginning in 1974, he was responsible for 900 murders in 20 nations, according to the U.S. State Department. But Abu Nidal's legend relied as much on rumor as on his brazen acts of violence. His story is so riddled with reversals and lies, it is soap operatic, almost impossible to follow unless seen one installment at a time. Indeed, his various enemies are still arguing about whether his death, announced last week by Iraqi officials, was a murder or a suicide. The Iraqis claim that he shot himself in the head in his Baghdad quarters when they came to arrest him for spying for an undisclosed Arab nation. But Arab media reports and Abu Nidal's followers insist that he died of multiple gunshot wounds. For now, the prevailing theory is that Iraqi officials killed Abu Nidal, 65, or encouraged one of his Palestinian lieutenants to do so. In ridding themselves of their former hired gun, a man who never could be trusted, the Iraqis could have been trying to undermine U.S. criticism by demonstrating a disdain for terrorism. "Abu Nidal joined the Iraqi early-retirement program," says Dan Schueftan, a lecturer at the Israeli Defense College. Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidal was his war name) was 11 when his affluent family was forced to flee the Arab city of Jaffa, now part of Israel, ahead of Jewish forces in the 1948 war. As a laborer in Saudi Arabia in the 1960s, he latched onto politics, joining Yasser Arafat's Fatah group, which would become the backbone of the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.). Bouncing between Jordan, Sudan and Iraq, he rose through the ranks of the P.L.O. But in 1974 Abu Nidal formally broke with Arafat, protesting his old comrade's decision to consider diplomacy over violence. That year, the newly formed Abu Nidal Organization (also known as Fatah Revolutionary Council) planted a bomb on a TWA plane flying from Athens to Rome, killing all 88 people on board. Abu Nidal went on to mastermind attacks on a Jewish school in Antwerp, synagogues in Vienna and Istanbul, and a Greek tourist ship. In December 1985 his group ambushed the El Al ticket counters at Rome and Vienna airports, killing 14 bystanders. The great irony of his career was that he did more to destabilize and stigmatize the Palestinians than to cause permanent harm to Israel – his declared enemy. In the mid –’70s, Abu Nidal was sentenced to death by the P.L.O. for plotting to kill Arafat. Between 1978 and 1983, he was responsible for the assassination of six of the P.L.O.'s most moderate diplomats. In 1982 the attempted assassination of Israel's ambassador to Britain was attributed to his group – giving the Israelis a convenient pretext to invade Lebanon, in which Arafat had set up headquarters, and kick the P.L.O. out. During the past decade, the Abu Nidal Organization, splintered by internal feuds, grew quiet. Abu Nidal was said to be seriously ill. In 1998, after proving too onerous a political burden to his host, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, he resurfaced in Egypt. The next year, he moved to Iraq, relying on his fragile alliance with Saddam Hussein. Despite the questions about how Abu Nidal died, everyone seems glad to be having the debate. Rumors of his demise started circulating 18 years ago, when he was first reported to have died in Baghdad. Now that the end seems certain, "there is a collective sigh of relief everywhere that he no longer exists," says Abdul Bari Atwan, editor of the pan-Arab newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi, based in London. He adds: “Sometimes the enemy of my enemy is still the enemy.”
Text 49 The German operation to arrest Osman Petmezci and Astrid Eyzaguirre in September seemed to go smoothly. Acting on a tip from America's Criminal Investigation Command (CID), police arrested the pair on suspicion of plotting to bomb a U.S. military base near Heidelberg. Investigators searched their apartment and found five rudimentary pipe bombs, raw material for 18 kilos of explosive powder, and a portrait of Osama bin Laden. Petmezci and Eyzaguirre are now in custody, awaiting trial. Another victory for German law enforcement? Not quite. CID's August 29 warning wasn't the first call from CID, but the third. The first call was delivered on July 17, another was made on July 19, not to one but two separate security agencies, both of which lost the paperwork. Only when a more frantic warning came were the arrests finally made. Because of a growing risk of terrorist attacks, a growing number of German investigators are calling for complete review of the country's internal security apparatus. Klaus Jansen, an investigator with Germany's Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), says, "Everyone hears about the problems with the FBI and CIA, but that's because they are doing something about their weaknesses," who spent five years as a liaison officer in the U.S. "Our system is an even bigger mess than theirs is, and leads are falling through the cracks." Germany's fractured security system dates back to the aftermath of World War II, when law enforcement was broken down into isolated agencies to prevent the emergence of another Gestapo. Today, six different federal agencies have their own small areas of security to look after, while each of Germany's 16 states has its own local intelligence-gathering and enforcement organizations. The agencies are further divided by the extent of their remits - the BKA, for example, can't initiate investigations but can continue those started by others; the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BVfS) can conduct surveillance but isn't allowed to arrest anybody. And officers of the two agencies are only allowed to communicate via their bosses, who meet for weekly "information boards" to exchange notes. "It's a mess," says Wilfried Albishausen, a criminal investigator in the state of North-Rhine Westphalia. Jansen and Albishausen., officers of the Federation of German Criminologists (BDK) trade union, have been petitioning the Interior Ministry for more than two years to revamp the security apparatus. Even before September 11, the BDK recommended moving federal agents out of their centralized HQs and into regional offices, where they would work with local agents. The idea seems to have been mildly accepted. "We do have scattered islands of information," says BKA boss Ulrich Kersten, "but the answer is to build bridges, and we're doing that." He points to a planned upgrade of the BKA's computer system (circa 1972.) But some highly touted upgrades have fallen short. An effort to establish a common profiling system for suspects was scrapped because the database couldn't recognize that words like Turkish and Turkey meant the same thing. Something has to be done - and soon. The Heidelberg raid demonstrates why. The CID reported the couple to both the Heidelberg police and the BKA, and each agency filled out an investigation request stamped "urgent." The police report got lost in the mail twice - once on its way to the state attorney's office, and then again on its way back to the police - while the BKA request languished at the bottom of a stack of backlogged work in the BKA office. The couple were only caught because Eyzaguirre warned a friend to stay away from the compound, and that friend called the CID, which then violated protocol with a flurry of calls to various agencies. Otherwise Petmezci might have managed to detonate one of his pipe bombs.
Text 50 To fight a war against Saddam Hussein, Washington needs Turkey’s help. At the least, it wants access to air bases along Iraq's northern border. At best, it hopes for permission to launch a full-scale ground operation from Turkish soil involving 80,000 U.S. troops. The inducement is a $14 billion aid package to compensate Ankara for financial losses and the promise of continued support at the International Monetary Fund. The problem: Turkey’s new government, elected just last November, is having serious second thoughts about joining the Bush administration's war. Turkey’s surprise about-face has "stunned" Washington and could force the Pentagon to rethink its whole operations plan. U.S. diplomats and military planners thought they had a deal after the ruling AK party leader Tayyip Erdogan met with George W. Bush in December. But the Turkish government's dilemma is clear: 88 percent of its people strongly oppose war, according to a recent poll. Ducking a decision, Prime Minister Abdullah Gul has been making the rounds of Arab capitals - Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia - trying to forge a regional front urging restraint. "We will leave no stone unturned in finding a peaceful solution," he vows, even though most diplomats in the region rate his chances as "close to nil," as one bluntly puts it. Meanwhile, the pressures grow. Officials spent last week haggling over when 150 U.S. technicians can begin initial work on assessing Turkey’s ports and airfields. If there is to be a northern front, bases need to be upgraded and troops and equipment moved in before March, when sandstorms make fighting far more difficult. To win even this limited goal, the Pentagon had to drop its usual demand that the team - like all U.S. military assigned to NATO - be subject to American rather than Turkish law. Ankara dug in its heels, insisting that an Iraq invasion would not be a NATO operation. Washington will almost certainly get the first item on its wish list - the use of Incirlik, Batman, Diyarbakir and Afyon air bases. It will also have access to the ports of Mersin, Iskenderun and Tasucu for landing heavy equipment. These facilities will be beefed up to full war-making capability in short order. But the second item on the wish list - permission to actually stage a ground invasion force in Turkey - is problematic. If Ankara vetoes opening a northern front - or simply stalls long enough to make it unfeasible - the Pentagon will have to reorganize its whole war effort around an assault from Kuwait. That could make the war longer and bloodier. A U.S. assault from the north could also quickly lead to the seizure of strategically vital oil fields in Kirkuk and Mosul, cutting off the regime from its main revenue source. The north is defended by three Iraqi Army corps totaling 75,000 troops, mostly ranged along the border with the breakaway province of Kurdistan and representing fully 40 percent of Saddam’s Army. Yet the Turks now say they will allow U.S. ground forces on its soil only with a U.N. resolution authorizing war. Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff goes to Ankara this week to try to speed things up, meeting with his counterpart, Gen. Hilmi Ozkok, chief of the Turkish General Staff. The visit is raising suspicions in the Turkish capital that the U.S. is seeking to bypass the civilian government by appealing to the military, which for decades was the real power in the land. Some suspect that the Pentagon would like Ozkok to push Gul and his new government to accede to U.S. demands. So far he has refused to do so, even as he acknowledges that opening a northern front could shorten the war and make it less costly in human lives. "Turkey's role could be decisive;' says Ozkok, echoing the American line. "But the decision is up to the political authorities." Ultimately, Washington can probably bully its ally into agreeing. That would mean dropping the Mr. Nice Guy act and threatening to cut off military aid, favored-trade status, intelligence ties and backing in the IMF. But support for an American attack appears to be eroding on other fronts, as well. Last week, Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou, current holder of the rotating presidency of the European Union, announced that he would soon put together a European peace delegation to the region. In Britain, America's most stalwart ally, 100 Labour Party M.P.s delivered an ultimatum to Prime Minister Tony Blair: participate in a war without U.N. backing, and risk an open parliamentary revolt. At the United Nations itself: the Security Council has all but agreed that the arms-inspection mission to Iraq should be extended. The only unknown is how long. Turkey may be today's spoiler in Washington's war plans, but it's probably not going to be alone for long.
Text 51 He has been called a Colombian version of Ariel Sharon, a democratically elected hard-liner who will fight the enemy first and extend the olive branch later. And like his Israeli counterpart, President-elect Alvaro Uribe Velez, 49, will take office, in August, with a solid mandate to declare total war on his incoming government's main adversaries, the 18,000 guerrillas belonging to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Later this week Uribe will seek a mandate of a different order when he makes his first visit to Washington since winning a landslide victory in the May 26 presidential election. By his own account, Uribe wants a lot more U.S. aid to combat the two problems of drug trafficking and terrorism that have wracked Colombia for the past three decades. “Our natural ally in this area is the United States,” Uribe said in an interview in March. “We're talking about helicopters, trainers, technology and money because no nation can turn a blind eye to terrorist attacks against a democratic society like Colombia.” And just how far is the Bush administration willing to wade into the Colombian marsh? Significantly deeper, apparently. The State Department's top Latin American affairs official, Otto Reich, flew down to Bogota after the election for meetings with Uribe and the country's outgoing Defense minister. Most of the $1.3 billion approved by the United States two years ago for its anti-drug initiative, Plan Colombia, has been disbursed, but in the Bush era Washington is no longer confining itself to the war against drugs. The White House is asking Congress to send Colombia another $572 million aid package that includes military assistance specifically earmarked for Bogota’s counterinsurgency efforts. In fact, the administration has already gotten the go-ahead to use helicopters and other resources furnished under Plan Colombia to fight FARC and other armed groups. “It creates a demand for a dramatic expansion of our military involvement in Colombia,” warns Adam Isacson of the Washington-based Center for International Policy think tank. The rising levels of U.S.military assistance have inevitably raised questions of whether the South American country could become America's next Vietnam, which American citizens fear most. American experts dismiss the notion out of hand, and Uribe himself has ruled out the deployment of U.S. combat troops for now. Even prominent critics question the likelihood of a full-blown Vietnam-style commitment while continuing to express grave doubts about the current direction of U.S. policy. “I can't conceive of us sending tens of thousands of soldiers down there,” says Ron Paul, a Republican congressman from Texas. “But we are down there because we're determined to get involved in their civil war, and it could become a little Vietnam.” Others warn that Washington is about to pump massive sums of U.S. tax-payer dollars into a complex foreign situation without coming clean about one basic fact: there is no foreseeable military solution to the country's 38-year-old conflict. “As in Vietnam, our government thinks Colombia can defend itself and all we have to do is provide the training and equipment,” says Bert Ruiz, author of the book "The Colombian Civil War." “No one in our government has admitted that Colombian armed forces are woefully inept and incapable of defeating the FARC.” Under lame-duck President Andres Pastrana, the government has fought its civil war on the cheap, devoting a paltry 3.5 percent of Colombia's annual gross national product to military and security-related expenditures. Officials in Washington want Colombia's incoming government to spend more. “Colombia has to do some things to get on top of its own security,” said White House anti-drug czar John Waiters last month. “It's not spending at a level commensurate with a country in a state of war.” Uribe understands; he campaigned on a pledge to double the defense budget. After watching Pastrana's peace process go nowhere for three years, most Colombians who voted for Uribe concluded that “might makes right.” That line of thinking goes with the aggressive policy of the Bush administration. But skeptics worry that Colombia could become just another black hole that will eat up U.S. military aid without ever achieving any of Washington's goals.
Text 52 The Bad News for Boeing Suppose you had asked, say 15 years ago, this question: what American company is most dominant in its global industry? The answer would not have been Microsoft, Dell or even IBM. It would have been Boeing. Since late 1958, when it introduced the first U.S. commercial jet (the 707), Boeing had gone from success to success. As late as 1990, Boeing sold 62% of the world’s commercial jets. Its closest rival, McDonnell-Douglas, was at 23%, and Europe’s Airbus trailed at 15%. No more. Boeing's eclipse is one of the most fascinating business stories of our time. It’s being overtaken by Airbus in the commercial-jet market, which it once dominated, and now it seems increasingly hungry for government subsidies. In 2003, Airbus is expected to win more orders than Boeing, and the gap could widen. Airbus is developing a monster jet (the A380) that will seat 555 passengers and threaten Boeing's 747. At last week's Paris Air Show, Airbus announced 64 new orders for its planes; Boeing announced four. It seems inconceivable that the U.S. government would let Boeing slowly abandon the commercial jet business. Airlines need price competition, and jets are too important for U.S. exports and new technologies (advanced materials, electronics). Herein lie the larger implications. Already, critics say that the Pentagon’s willingness to lease 100 converted Boeing 767 commercial jets as midair tankers represents a disguised rescue. Moreover, Boeing’s trouble could intensify U.S. – European tensions because Airbus’s success stems partly from massive government subsidies that still continue on a smaller scale. The story of Boeing’s distress comes in three parts: bad luck, bad management and bad government policy. Air travel – and new plane orders – suffered from the bursting of the 1990s economic “bubble”. From 1981 to 2000, global air travel rose at a 5.1 percent annual rate. In 2001 it declined by 3% and was flat last year as a result of the September 11th terrorist attack. Airlines cancelled or delayed hundreds of orders. In 1999 Boeing and Airbus delivered 914 jets (620 for Boeing, 294 for Airbus); this year they expect to deliver 580 (280 for Boeing, 300 for Airbus). Beyond bad luck, Boeing became overconfident. It fell behind in some areas. Airbus used CAD/CAM (computer-aided design and manufacturing) to build planes before Boeing. Many Airbus planes have common cockpits - a feature highly popular with airlines because it cuts training costs. According to economist Douglas Irwin, Boeing has cut down on research and development to fatten current profits. "They decided to take a product-development holiday for the last eight years;' he says. Boeing introduced its last new plane in 1995. Finally, there's government policy. Subsidies to Airbus totalled $26 billion through 1989, estimated one U.S. study. OK, early subsidies were necessary for Airbus's survival; the Europeans didn't want to depend forever on U.S. planes. But after two decades (Airbus began in 1970) the United States should have demanded their elimination. Instead, it agreed in 1992 to permit subsidized government loans to pay for a third of the development costs of new planes. Bad move. The result is the A380, whose start-up costs couldn't have been financed privately. It will hurt sales of Boeing's biggest jet (the 747). Airbus has been incredibly aggressive in discounting the A380, offering 30 to 40 per cent off list prices. Of course, Boeing isn’t in extremis. After merging with McDonnell Douglas in 1997, it has a huge defence and space business. Last year Boeing’s profits totalled $492 million on sales of $54 billion, down from $2.8 billion and $58 billion in 2001. Can Boeing now reclaim some past glory? The answer may depend on the 7E7: a new wide-body plane that would seat more than 200 and have lower operating costs than today's planes. High development costs have reportedly stirred strong internal opposition. If Boeing proceeds, it might conceivably request subsidies comparable to Airbus’s. Failing to proceed would cast doubt on Boeing’s long-term commitment to commercial jets. Asked about that recently, CEO Phil Condit said “We are going to be in commercial aircraft for a long, long, long time.” That’s an emphatic answer, but a decade ago even the question would have been absurd.
Text 53 Directory: plik -> file -> Do pobrania - Mat. Egzaminacyjne -> Angielski Angielski -> Two texts. For questions 1 to 6 plik -> March 4th-8th 2000; ustroń, poland Download 1.02 Mb. Share with your friends:
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