Their demands to create a world without surveillance reproduce a form of anxiety that risks nuclear conflict
Elliot and Frosh 95 --- Research Fellow in the Department of Political Science at the
University of Melbourne AND Senior Lecturer in Psychology at Birkbeck College, University of London,
and is Consultant Clinical Psychologist at the Tavistock Clinic (Anthony and Stephen, “Psychoanalysis in Contexts”, http://samples.sainsburysebooks.co.uk/9781134862306_sample_516195.pdf)//trepka
Hanna Segal’s essay, ‘From Hiroshima to the Gulf War and after’ (Chapter 10) opens the discussion on the contribution of psycho-politics to the study of contemporary culture in this volume. After locating her analysis of the socio-political field in the context of Freud’s cultural writings, from Totem and Taboo to Civilization and its Discontents, Segal elaborates Freud’s psychoanalytic conception of the complex, contradictory relations between self and society. She then links this to a broader discussion of post-Freudian psychoanalysis, especially as concerns the phenomena of psychosis, splitting, and destructiveness in group functioning. In the second section of the essay, Segal uses psychoanalytic theory to interpret and question the potential risks of nuclear conflict or disaster in the late modern age. She contends that modern societies, with their technological and industrial forms, generate intense anxieties as regards the wishes and terrors of people’s self-destructive drives. Following Klein and Bion, she suggests that splitting and projection have become institutionalized in modern nation-states and the industrialization of war. This, in turn, has led to a global spread of psychic dehumanization (the other as enemy) and denial (the failure to treat the danger of nuclear war seriously). Against this psychoanalytic backdrop, Segal develops a series of interesting and innovative interpretations about the role of anxiety and guilt in the reproduction of massively destructive warfare this century, and concludes by considering the possibilities for collective disinvestment from these life threatening institutional dangers.
Impact – Terror
The myth of effective security fosters a violent project that necessitates the creation of terrorists to be sacrificed on the altar of society
McGowan 2013 --- Associate Professor at the University of Vermont (Todd, Enjoying What We Don’t Have, Project Muse)//trepka
The fundamental barrier to the establishment of an authentic social bond is the resistance to avowing the traumatic nature of that bond. We use the pleasure that accompanies the bombing of Afghanistan to disguise the shared enjoyment we experience through the traumatic experience of loss. But this pleasure inevitably disappoints us and triggers the belief that someone has stolen the complete pleasure that we expected to experience. This is why there can properly be no end to the War on Terror, no end to the list of countries that the United States plans to invade to attain complete security, no end to the number of terrorist leaders executed.31 Complete security, like complete pleasure, is mythical. It attempts to bypass the one experience that cannot be bypassed — the foundational experience of loss — and it is this experience that holds the key to an authentic social bond. The structure of society (which is the result of the structure of signification) is such that it blinds the subject to the possibility of shared sacrifice and the social bond that results from it. No matter how often children hear the ideology of sharing or how many times we repeat to them the gospel of fairness, they will inevitably believe that their sacrifice has enabled others to enjoy more than their proper share or unfairly.
Impact – Identity/Being Surveillance devastates the gap between the Self and our informaticized bodies – the total knowledge it provides deprives one of the ability to function as a subject, eradicating one’s identity – this results in complete annihilation
Friesen et al. 12 – Dr. Norm Friesen is Canada Research Chair in E-Learning Practices at Thompson Rivers University. His academic credentials include a PhD in Education from the University of Alberta. Andrew Feenberg, School of Communication, Simon Fraser University. Grace Smith, Arapiki Solutions, Inc. (Norm Friesen, Andrew Feenberg, Grace Smith, and Shannon Lowe, 2012, “Experiencing Surveillance”, pp. 82-83, (Re)Inventing The Internet, http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-94-6091-734-9_4 // SM)
Students of surveillance have been so impressed by the ever-growing completeness of this data image that they animate it as though it were an actual person. Identity is seen as coeval with an assemblage of traces rather than with actual presence. Thus, van der Ploeg writes of “the inability to distinguish between ’the body itself’ and ’body information”’ (van der Ploeg, 2003, p. 69). Haggerty and Ericson similarly write, the surveillance assemblage standardizes the capture of flesh/information flows of the human body. It is not so much immediately concerned with the direct physical relocation of the human body (although this may be an ultimate consequence), but with transforming the body into pure information, such that it can be rendered more mobile and comparable. (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000, p. 613) There is something right about this turn in surveillance theory, and yet it is obvious that we are still able to distinguish the real person from the traces that person leaves behind. The trace is bound to us by its origin and often by internal signs of various sorts, so we do not quite leave it behind after all. And yet we do not want to drag along every trace of our passage through life. We count on the erasure of most traces. It is this erasure that enables us to face the world afresh each day and to face it with a self-image we construct at least partially anew for each new situation in which we find ourselves. In existential–phenomenological terms, privacy and secrecy are centrally constitutive of self and selfhood. Holding something private or secret emphasizes the difference between self and other, and confirms the autonomy of one’s interiority and individuality. “Secrecy secures, so to speak, the possibility of a second world alongside of the obvious world,” as Simmel (1906, p. 462) puts it. In contemporary conditions of surveillance and dataveillance, subjectivity itself is dependent on maintaining the gap between our embodied selves and our informaticized bodies. It would be intolerable for everyone to have full access to our salary, the details of our relations to our family, our medical histories, sexual proclivities, and so on. Such knowledge would completely objectify us and force us to live up to (or down to) the image of ourselves implied in this knowledge. Like Sartre’s spy at the keyhole, himself espied, we would be evacuated of those aspects of identity and interiority concealed within us, frozen in the objectifying gaze of the other, and essentially deprived of our ability to function as a subject. We could no longer choose to project an identity appropriate to our inclination and situation as everything having to do with our identity would have been pre-empted. Truly, to be completely “outed” is to be annihilated.
The gaze of surveillance invades and traps one psychologically, rendering one enslaved
Vaz 95 – (Angelina, Fall 1995, Dalhousie French Studies Vol. 32, Mises en scène du regard (Fall 1995), pp. 37-38, “Who's Got the Look? Sartre's Gaze and Foucault's Panopticism”, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40837004 // SM)
This grand formula is even applicable at the level of an encounter between two individuals where the theme of “subjection by exposure” is dominant. As Sartre says, “being-seen constitutes me as a defenseless being for a freedom which is not my freedom […]. I am a slave to the degree that my being is dependent at my center of a freedom which is not mine and which is the very condition of my being” (Being, p. 358). In this sense, the gaze does not just create and invade physical spaces; there is a sense in which the gaze invades and traps me psychologically. As a temporal-spatial object in the world, being locked at forces me to apprehend myself as the object of the Other’s unknowable appraisals-of value judgments. And these value judgments affect me. Thus, as the “object of values which come to qualify me without my being able to act on this qualification, or even to know it, I am enslaved” (p. 358).
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