Psychoanalysis – mags neg General 1NC


The perm solves --- privacy laws allow an outlet for individual autonomy



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The perm solves --- privacy laws allow an outlet for individual autonomy


Meyers 6/16/14 --- Masters of Public and International Law candidate, University of Melbourne (Zach, “Autonomy as a Fantasy”, Taylor and Francis Online)//trepka

This article seeks to understand why, despite its deconstruction by a range of critical theorists, there remains a stubborn reliance on the concept of autonomy to justify privacy law, even among post-structuralists. It seeks to explain the connection between privacy and autonomy through psychoanalytic theory (particularly the work of Jacques Lacan). This article suggests that psychoanalytic theory can help explain why autonomy is a necessary but unachievable fantasy, and that lawʼs purpose is to support this fantasy by allowing individuals to defer confronting it as a fantasy. Using the example of Australian data protection law, this article suggests that the law facilitates an economy of personal information, which imbues personal information with value and enables individuals to attempt to ʻpractiseʼ autonomy by controlling the disclosure and use of ʻtheirʼ personal information. But the law provides only imperfect control. It therefore provides an explanation for why complete autonomy cannot be achieved. In this way, privacy law functions as a means to manage anxiety. The article concludes by suggesting that data protection laws can and should recognise this role, and offers some tentative views on how psychoanalytic work can and should inform future law reform in this area. If recent proposals for reform are any indication, the justification for privacy law in Australia is increasingly about protecting individual autonomy: ensuring that individuals do not ‘lose control over what others may do with … [their] personal data’.1 This focus has developed despite the concept of autonomy increasingly coming under critique by scholars writing from a range of perspectives, though each with the objective of deconstructing the autonomous, Cartesian subject that privacy laws are presumed to protect.2 Clearly, these critiques have not yet disrupted the ‘unsettled intuitions’3 that interlink autonomy and privacy. These stubborn intuitions are particularly interesting from an Australian perspective, given that most federal law reform in this area historically has been progressed with very different justifications, 4 which are less about autonomy than communal interests such as economic growth and national security. 5 Equally interesting is that, in the United States, autonomy has been used to justify non-intervention in management of personal information by the private sector.6 Even in Australia, the emphasis on autonomy comes almost as a cover to the erosion of the protection of personal data in other areas. 7 Autonomy is a theme that seems to resonate with popular understandings of privacy, even if it can be deployed selectively and for divergent purposes. This article seeks to explain the connection between privacy and autonomy through psychoanalytic theory (particularly the work of Jacques Lacan). Its thesis is that autonomy is a necessary but unachievable fantasy, and that privacy law’s purpose is to support this fantasy by allowing individuals to defer confronting it as a fantasy. Writing from Australia (which has to date been reluctant to protect privacy rights through the common law, and which lacks a statutory tort of privacy),8 the article applies Lacan’s work to Australian data protection laws, particularly the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).9 The article ultimately suggests that we should acknowledge privacy law’s role in supporting the fantasy of autonomy, and tentatively suggests ways in which it could better support this fantasy. The article proceeds in the following way. The first section provides a brief summary of the role of ‘autonomy’ in privacy theory to date – in particular, the traditional justification of privacy as protecting autonomy, the recent post-structuralist critiques of autonomy, and the way these critiques have been applied to reconceptualise privacy laws. The article then demonstrates how tenets of Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory explain why, despite the comprehensive deconstruction of autonomy by post-structuralist legal theorists, autonomy remains a necessary fantasy. The third section applies this understanding to data protection laws. The final section makes some tentative suggestions about how a better understanding of the psychological needs fulfilled by privacy laws can and should inform future law reform in this area.

Specifically, data protection laws are good


Meyers 6/16/14 --- Masters of Public and International Law candidate, University of Melbourne (Zach, “Autonomy as a Fantasy”, Taylor and Francis Online)//trepka

Linguistic systems structure identity and cannot represent the infant’s unstructured existence, the omnipotence it has lost69 – after all, linguistic systems are entirely constituted by divisions, which cannot express ‘wholeness’ except through further divisions. Indeed, Lacan sees the metaphoric significance the infant associates with the reel, the treatment of objects as signifiers for something else, as ‘the first mark of the subject’.70 The mirror stage (that is, the creation of a sense of self) involves the repression of this wholeness. The social order, like language or the law, is therefore useful precisely because it enables a person to both purport to be confronting a loss, while always deferring it, leaving the reel (or the repressed loss) suspended between, and requiring the constant repetition of, fort and da. The pleasure for which the infant is searching in the fort-da game is therefore a way to overcome the castration – to exceed the boundary of the cot that reminds of the absent mother, and to manage the loss of omnipotence, which existed prior to the mirror stage. The game results in pleasure from the infant’s attempt to transgress the boundaries of the self, the (social) law governing the boundaries of identity. But this pleasure is combined with pain (what Lacan refers to as a joissance), because all that can be achieved through the game is a substitute for that omnipotence, in the form of an imagined sense of autonomy. Each return of the reel to the infant functions as a reminder that the infant is still not ‘whole’ in the sense it was prior to entering the social realm. The reel itself, in this game, means nothing – it is simply an object that supports and explains the individual’s existing desire,71 an object that is imagined and treated by the individual as offering the potential to overcome its structured and split self of identity. Desire in Data Protection Laws Collectively, these aspects of Lacan’s reinterpretations of the game provide a compelling explanation of individuals’ concern with their personal information, in the context of data protection laws. In particular, Lacan’s work draws a distinction between the concepts of the (small O) ‘other’ and (big O) ‘Other’. Žižek, in his description of Lacan’s work, describes the ‘Other’ as the framework underlying interaction with ‘others’, the symbolic order that we enter into that already assumes our complicity in the fantasy of autonomy: When we speak (or listen, for that matter), we never merely interact with others; our speech activity is grounded on our accepting and relying on a complex network of rules and other kinds of presuppositions. 72


Staring with the wrong choice is key --- creates the conditions for future change --- the juxtaposition of the aff and alternative is uniquely important


Rée 12 --- writer, philosopher and historian (Jonathan, “Less Than Nothing by Slavoj Žižek – review”, http://www.theguardian.com/books/2012/jun/27/less-than-nothing-slavoj-zizek-review?newsfeed=true)//trepka

Of course he relies on a formula: to be Žižekian is to hold that Freudian psychoanalysis is essentially correct, and that its implications are absolutely revolutionary. But Žižek's Freud is not everyone's. Old-fashioned Freudians believe that we have masses of juicy secrets locked up inside us, unacknowledged by our well-ordered rational consciousness and clamouring to be set free. For Žižek, however, as for Lacan before him, Freud's great insight was that everything about us – our vaunted rationality as much as our unavowable impulses – is soaked with craziness and ambivalence all the way through. "The first choice has to be the wrong choice," as Žižek says in his monumental new book, because "the wrong choice creates the conditions for the right choice". There is no such thing as being wholly in the right, or wholly in the wrong; and this principle applies to politics as much as to personal life. Politics, as Žižek understands it, is a rare and splendid thing: no actions are genuinely political unless they are revolutionary, and revolution is not revolution unless it institutes "true change" – the kind of comprehensive makeover that "sets its own standards" and "can only be measured by criteria that result from it". Genuine revolutionaries are not interested in operating on "the enemy's turf", haggling over various strategies for satisfying pre-existing needs or securing pre-existing rights: they want to break completely with the past and create "an opening for the truly New". Authentic revolutions have often been betrayed, but as far as Žižek is concerned, they are never misconceived.




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