Psychoanalysis – mags neg General 1NC



Download 1.71 Mb.
Page9/53
Date20.10.2016
Size1.71 Mb.
#5994
1   ...   5   6   7   8   9   10   11   12   ...   53

Link – Internet Freedom

Legal reform cannot resolve the hypocrisy of the United States’ internet freedom agenda – addressing the complexities and ideological underpinnings of surveillance are a prerequisite to solve the aff


Mozorov, 13 – Visiting Scholar, Liberation Technology Program, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University and Schwartz Fellow, New America Foundation (Evgeny, “The Price of Hypocrisy,” Frankfurt General Newspaper, 7/24, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/ueberwachung/information-consumerism-the-price-of-hypocrisy-12292374.html?printPagedArticle=true#pageIndex_2)//SY

This is the real tragedy of America’s “Internet freedom agenda”: it’s going to be the dissidents in China and Iran who will pay for the hypocrisy that drove it from the very beginning. America has managed to advance its communications-related interests by claiming high moral ground and using ambiguous terms like “Internet freedom” to hide many profound contradictions in its own policies. On matters of “Internet freedom” – democracy promotion rebranded under a sexier name – America enjoyed some legitimacy as it claimed that it didn’t engage in the kinds of surveillance that it itself condemned in China or Iran. Likewise, on matters of cyberattacks, it could go after China’s cyber-espionage or Iran’s cyber-attacks because it assured the world that it engaged in neither. Both statements were demonstrably false but lack of specific evidence has allowed America to buy some time and influence. These days are gone. Today, the rhetoric of “Internet freedom agenda” looks as trustworthy as George Bush’s “freedom agenda” after Abu Ghraib. Washington will have to rebuild its policies from scratch. But, instead of blaming Snowden, Washington must thank him. He only exposed the shaky foundations of already unsustainable policies. These policies, built around vaporous and ambiguous terms like “Internet freedom” and “cyberwar” would have never survived the complexities of global politics anyway. All objects and appliances turn “smart” and get connected What is to be done? Let’s start with surveillance. So far, most European politicians have reached for the low-hanging fruit – law – thinking that if only they can better regulate American companies – for example, by forcing them to disclose how much data and when they share with NSA – this problem will go away. This is a rather short-sighted, naïve view that reduces a gigantic philosophical problem – the future of privacy – to seemingly manageable size of data retention directives. If only things were that simple! Our current predicaments start at the level of ideology, not bad policies or their poor implementation. This is not to oppose more regulation of technology companies – Europe should have done this a decade ago instead of getting caught in the heady rhetoric of “cloud computing” – but only to point out that the task ahead is far more intellectually demanding. Assume, for a moment, that Europe forces all the laws it wants on US technology companies. It’s a very unlikely hypothetical – not with their growing lobbying power in Brussels– but let’s forget this for a moment. What will happen in five years, as all objects and appliances turn “smart” – i.e. they suddenly have a cheap but sophisticated sensor built into them – and become connected to each other and to the Internet? Many such objects are already commercially available and many more will be soon: smart forks that monitor how fast we eat; smart toothbrushes that monitor how often we brush our teeth; smart shoes that tell us when they are about to get worn out; smart umbrellas that go online to check when it will rain and warn us to take them with us on leaving the house. And then, of course, there’s that smartphone dangling in your pocket and – soon – Google Glasses adoring your face.

Link – Iran



Denying Iran the right to nuclear weapons is a racist, unnecessary proposal founded in the construction of Iran as the “hostile Other” who could launch a nuclear attack at any corner --- this framing risks pre-emptive strikes which are actually bad


Nath 12 --- Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India (Sanghamitra, WHAT MILITARY DETERRENCE CANNOT DO, CYBER DETERRENCE CAN DO TO IRAN: EXPLORING THE IMPLICATIONS OF MANIPULATIVE INCESSANT USAGE OF THE TERM ‘PREEMPTIVE’, http://sosbilko.net/journal_IJSS/arhieves/2012_1/sanghamitra_nath.pdf)//trepka

2. A Problematic Paradigm: The Unspoken Truths An objective view of the conventional deterrence paradigm discloses that it is value-loaded from the beginning. The deterrence paradigm is conceptualised from the perspective of the defending state. To deter a state is to already presume that a hostile state is planning to launch a military attack against another state. Therefore, the deterrence paradigm recalls the Freudian psychoanalysis---‘me’/ defending state and ‘not me’/‘other’ state. The ‘me’ is purposively defined in opposition to the ‘other’. The function of such a deliberate distinction between the ‘me’ and the ‘other’ in international relations is to legitimise why one should and the ‘other’ should not have nuclear weapons. Within this problematic framework of deterrence paradigm, Iran’s status is that of the hostile ‘other’ vis-a-vis the defending states of Israel and the United States (US). Iran’s nuclear program is viewed as an offensive capacity build-up to harm them in the near future and therefore, it needs to be deterred (through economic sanctions and maybe even air strikes at the sites of nuclear program). The fact that Israel and US seek ‘to deter’ Iran from carrying on its nuclear program overshadows equally relevant facts like:  Nuclear Weapon States of Israel and the US: Real Threat to Peace and Security Though the Iranian President Ahmadinejad announced, "We do not need an atomic bomb” (BBC, 6 March 2012) and declared its present uranium enrichment program was meant purely for peaceful purposes, the West (especially the US), Israel and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) refused to accept the same. Their underlying rationale for this opposition is that the mere possession of nuclear weapons by Iran will threaten international peace and security. If possession of nuclear weapons itself threatened international peace and security, Israel and the US should be the ‘hostile’ states. It is an open secret that Israel possesses nuclear weapons at the Negev Nuclear Research Centre near the desert town of Dimona. (The Guardian, 23 May 2010) (Cohen 1998) As for US, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) permits the US to retain nuclear arsenals as well as recognizes it as a legitimate NWS. In contrast, Iran still does not have the N-bomb. In the IAEA report (November 2011), it mentioned that “Under its Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency fifteen nuclear facilities and nine locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs)” and these facilities and sites were “nevertheless under Agency safeguards”. (IAEA, 24 February 2012:3) If Iran actually pursued nuclear weaponisation program, it would have been detected by the watchful eyes of IAEA. In the exceptional case of Parchin, Yukiya Amano, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said that the IAEA and Tehran were near to signing an agreement wherein greater cooperation will be achieved for inspection of the nuclear sites and that inspection of the Parchin military site had been included in this agreement. (BBC, 18 May 2012)


Download 1.71 Mb.

Share with your friends:
1   ...   5   6   7   8   9   10   11   12   ...   53




The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2024
send message

    Main page