Extra stuff cards random tag
Bondy 2015 (jennifer, assistant professor in the School of Education in the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences, hybrid citizenship: Latina youth and the politics of belonging, project muse, LB)
Many suppositions in educational research on immigration are premised on methodological nationalism or the tendency to accept a nation-state’s forms and borders, and binaries such as origin/destination and immigrant/citizen, as given (Khagram & Levitt, 2008). For many youth, however, their identities and experiences extend beyond the boundaries of a nation, and are forged in the overlapping intersections of origin and destination countries. Despite surveillance practices, essentialized notions of immigrant, and exclusionary conceptions of U.S. citizenship, Latina youth in this study articulated more expanded notions of belonging through performing cultural practices, and polycultural and hybrid citizenships (DeJaeghere & McCleary, 2010; Maira, 2009; Ríos-Rojas, 2011). Cultural citizenship scholars have described how Latina/o communities self-make their citizenship identities through enacting public and social performance to voice their concerns about belonging. These scholars also describe how such performances signify translocal citizenship practices that are shaped by understandings of membership in an imagined community (Flores & Benmayor, 1997). Anastasia Diana explained what it meant to be Latina/o at school: “if you’re Colombian, they know you came from Colombia because you represent it so well … represent it to a T. If you are Puerto Rican, you wear Puerto Rican chains, Puerto Rican flags, Puerto Rican backpacks.” School parades for homecoming are another space where adolescent Latinas perform their citizenship identities and voice concerns about belonging. Laura described one such parade: Impressive … the kids that were dressed up because it was really unique cultures … There were cultures that represented most of the kids in the stands … the girl that was half-Colombian, she had little banners that said “Colombia” … you would pass by the stands and you would hear people yell, “Yeah Colombia!” “Yeah Venezuela!” … it’s good that they’re expressing that they’re proud that they’re from there … It’s not like they’re hiding it … how some people had to do. Citizenship was constructed through cultural practices such as wearing jewelry, flags, and backpacks, and by chanting and waving signs to exert claims over school space to perform Colombian, Puerto Rican, and Venezuelan identities. Performing these identities entailed negotiating relationships with other students, including other Latina/o students. Rather than forming an identification with the school and conforming to assimilative practices, Anastasia Diana and Laura described how Latina youth self-make citizenship identities, resisting discourses that construct them as immigrants who should “hide” where they are from. Publicly making these statements, asserting their voices, and claiming spaces are attempts to self-make a citizenship identity as members of community and through camaraderie (Flores & Benmayor, 1997). Other youth challenged assimilationist models of citizenship by expressing an identity that straddled multiple nation-states. Carolina had this to say about the possibility of being both Colombian and American: I wasn’t born here, but I’m very Colombian. I do not want to leave my culture … [I] see how beautiful it is, the people, the languages, our nature [trees, fruits, and mountains] … I love Colombia, but I would never go live there … here in the U.S., this is where I live. This is my life. I’m as very much American as I am Colombian … They [parents] would not go back to live in Colombia. The culture and who we are, it’s beautiful but this is where we are. Carolina expresses how her belonging in Colombia is shaped by cultural boundaries, such as food, nature, languages, and people. She later explained that her family moved to the U.S. for economic opportunities, and that she preferred to stay in the U.S. for educational opportunities. On the one hand, Carolina embodies the cultural dimensions of a citizenship identity in Colombia; on the other hand, she embraces the functionalaspects, such as economic and educational opportunities, of a citizenship identity in the U.S. (Abu El-Haj, 2009; Bondy, 2014). Many Latina youth had visions and ways of understanding the world, themselves, and others that exceeded nation-state borders. According to Lucia: What does being an American mean to other people? … they were born here … feel patriotic for their country, their nation … [other] cultures are not that much welcome … in present day, there are so many people moving not just to America but everywhere … I think you have to keep ties where you were born, but also accept new cultures wherever you are because it’s just part of the world we’re living in today. Lucia was also one of the girls who articulated she could be both Venezuelan and American: I was born in Venezuela. I lived there for the first 7 years of my life … I definitely feel Venezuelan … But, I lived here for more than half of my life … I think it would almost be unfair to not consider myself part American. Yon (2000) explains that in global times, identity is no longer fixed and rooted in traditional categories of nation; rather, it is a constructed and open-ended process that takes various routes and opens up spaces for belonging. Lucia is describing how identity and belonging are simultaneously rooted in a specific location and able to expand beyond it. By suggesting that identities are already hybridized, and that there are no pure cultures, Lucia enacts a polycultural citizenship that allows for less essentialist notions of identity and belonging rooted solely in one’s nation of birth (Maira, 2009; Yon, 2000).
[bondy continues]
For Latina youth in this study, experiences with citizenship and belonging did not fit neatly into narrow conceptions of citizenship as assimilation to a national identity. Instead, affiliations across multiple contexts, cultural practices, and polycultural citizenships shaped their identities and sense of belonging (Flores & Benmayor, 1997; Maria, 2009). Although U.S. citizenship is typically framed as voting, civic literacy, participation in the nation-state, and national allegiance (Abowitz & Harnish, 2006), many adolescent Latinas used emergent political vocabulary to critique such understandings and enacted alternative ways of belonging. Because cultural citizenship attends to both the everyday embedded processes whereby youth are made into citizens of the nation-state and the practices youth engage to create spaces of belonging, it is a useful analytic for rethinking citizenship. Latina youths’ lived curricula of citizenship suggest that formal citizenship education curriculum produces impoverished meanings about what citizenship is and can be. Many participants were critical of stereotypical images that unjustly located them and their communities as criminal, invaders, and hypersexual. To counter these images, they adopted a prove-them-wrong perspective (Yosso, 2002) by working hard, succeeding in school (Chang, 2011), and distancing themselves from the sexually excessive chonga figure (Hernandez, 2008). The implied correlation between working hard, being academically successful, and sexually respectable leaves intact the coupling of academic failure with laziness and questionable moral character. Such a correlation can prove dangerous for Latina youth for whom academic success is more elusive, as well as risk suggesting that Latina youth who exhibit non-normative sexuality should feel embarrassed or ashamed. Interpretations from this study suggest that notions of citizenship and belonging must move beyond assimilation to a national identity toward a transnational understanding. For many Latina youth in this study, their citizenship identities were made in transnational spaces that were linked with macrolevel discourses on immigration and microlevel practices of exclusion. Political and cultural projects on immigration allow for opportunities to create citizenship identities that are simultaneously marked by polyculturalism and surveillance practices. This raises questions about hybridity as a liberatory, utopian project when it does not include examining the nation-state’s assimilationist strategies (DeJaeghere & McCleary, 2010; Lukose, 2007; Ríos-Rojas, 2011). In the context of transnationalism, it is important to better understand how broader, societal discourses that define and limit the necessary qualities of citizenship are enacted in the children of immigrants’ daily lived experiences.
Predictably, 5 french dudes invented racial classification about 400 years ago
Webster 2k – Prof CSU Los Angeles, http://multiracial.com/site/index.php/2000/06/01/twenty-one-arguments-for-abolishing-racial-classification/, 6/26/15 BRoche
Races derive from particular kinds of classification practices. Anatomical differences are produced by nature, but specific human practices construct races. Innumerable "natural differences" permeate the human species. Certain eighteenth and nineteenth century thinkers, among others, Francois Bernier (1620-1688), Carl von Linneaus (1707-1778), Johann Blumenbach (1752-1840), Georges Cuvier (1769-1832), and Arthur de Gobineau (1816-1882), selected some of these differences to construct races and a racial theory of history and social development. These may be called the founding fathers of racial classification and racial theory; they initiated the signifying of black skin and white skin by "inventing" white and black people. Contemporary race relations writings, including antiracist texts, are extensions of this racial theory.
Nothing is real – the aff is a refusal of race as a social construct
Webster 2k – Prof CSU Los Angeles, http://multiracial.com/site/index.php/2000/06/01/twenty-one-arguments-for-abolishing-racial-classification/, 6/26/15 BRoche
Thomas' proposition – If men define a situation as real then it is real in its consequences – suggests that social phenomena that are subjectively "real," by this token, become an objective reality. This conclusion contains fallacies of ambiguity and equivocation. First, the concept "real" has perhaps the richest history of controversy in the writings of ancient, modern, and postmodernist philosophers. In the interest of clarity, no sociologist should cite Thomas' proposition without specifying the sense in which "real" is being used. Second, a close examination of the proposition would reveal that it is not clear to what "it" refers. What is "real" in its consequences- the defining, or the situation? Nevertheless, even if the logical problems in the proposition are ignored, the relevant follow-up would be an investigation of the conditions under which men define a situation as "real." Popular allusions to "reality" could be a result of lay persons being tutored within a realist theory of knowledge. This theory of knowledge, dominant in social sciences, proposes that words reflect things. Hence, to be valid, a classification or description needs no justification other than a claim on reality. However, the ascription of an ontologically representative status to concepts is roundly challenged by Richard Rorty, in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, and a host of critics of realist epistemology. Yet there is no need to embrace a postmodernist perspective in order to expose a specific effect of the realist claim. The notion that races are things in the real world, as argued by Philippe Rushton, provides an eternal foundation for "race relations" and an unending flow of explanations, since such relations unfold in political economic, cultural, psychological, and social structural contexts. Were "races" not taken as a "reality," their presence in public consciousness would be recognized as the result of continuing research on racism, past and present racial experiences, racial conditions, and race relations. However, let Thomas' proposition to be taken to mean: If social scientists define a phenomenon in a certain way, that definition has corresponding behavioral consequences. It would then be obvious that the social scientists who study and advocate policies on "race relations" are themselves the actors who give "race" social meaning and a "real" status. They then cite this status to justify the further production of "race relations." This production, as well as social scientists' collaboration with the Census Bureau's project of racial identification and enumeration, marks these scholars as perhaps unwitting agents of legislative racialization; it also indicates the interaction between social science research and government policies. In pursuit of electoral advantages, political representatives pander to the racialized divisions that "race relations" research generates and conserves. 2. The claim that race is a social construct begs the question. In society, every phenomenon is, by definition, a social construct. Why is it not said that race is an illogical construct? This refusal to notice the logical status of the race concept indicates that social scientists who endorse the racial paradigm only honorifically refer to "the social construction of race" in order to justify investigating the experiences of "black people" and "white people." Thus they themselves construct races, while claiming, in a positivist fashion, to be merely observing "the social construction of race." Advocates of social constructionism, to quote Anthony Appiah's comment on W.E.B. Dubois' vacillations on "race" ". . . lead us back into the now familiar move to substitute for the biological conception of race a sociohistorical one. And that, as we have seen, is simply to bury the biological conception below the surface, not to transcend it." (In My Father's House, p. 41). The claim that race is a social construct confirms its existence and facilitates the perennial study of "race relations." This confirmation preempts criticisms of the Census Bureau's request that citizens identify themselves racially and the Bureau's threat that to not state your race could lead to your community's loss of economic resources.
Ur arg is based in faulty logic – if they drop this they lose
Webster 2k – Prof CSU Los Angeles, http://multiracial.com/site/index.php/2000/06/01/twenty-one-arguments-for-abolishing-racial-classification/, 6/26/15 BRoche
A description of self on the basis of the nature of one characteristic of the self leads to an absurd conclusion. For example: I have white skin. Therefore, I am a White. I have olive skin. Therefore, I am an Olive. The leap from recognition of having white skin color to therefore, being white, or a white, is absurd. Someone might insist: I can be "a black human being," or "a white human being." However, the color qualification of "human being" is nonsensical. Nothing about "human" can sensibly take such a qualification. Human is an adjective and cannot have a qualifying relationship with another adjective. In the phrase, rich, black coffee "rich" describes coffee. Black, rich coffee has the same sense as rich, black coffee. In white human being, "white" describes "being" not human. I am "a white being." What can that be? The adjectives "white" and "human" cannot change places. White human being and human white being are not interchangeable. I am a human white being, or a human black being makes no sense. In sum, one cannot be a "white," or a "black," and a "human being." Logically, "white people" and "black people" are not human beings. They are nonhuman, all too nonhuman, and they feed on each other. Hence, in order to "out" whiteness it would be necessary to out blackness, and vice versa. Nor are whiteness and blackness, presented as descriptions of human selves, in relationships of privilege and oppression. As absurdities, neither "blacks" nor "whites" can pass moral judgment on each other.
No link
Reilly 13 – Writer for the Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/17/obama-nsa-surveillance_n_3455771.html, 6/26/15 BRoche
President Barack Obama further defended the National Security Agency's collection of phone and other electronic records to PBS' Charlie Rose, calling the program "transparent." In a pretaped interview set to air Monday evening, Obama gave a forceful defense of the program, saying that the NSA had not unlawfully targeted Americans. "What I can say unequivocally is that if you are a U.S. person, the NSA cannot listen to your telephone calls, and the NSA cannot target your emails … and have not," Obama said, according to a transcript provided by PBS. Rose pressed Obama on the point, according to the transcript: Rose: So I hear you saying, I have no problem with what NSA has been doing. Obama: Well, let me — let me finish, because I don’t. So, what happens is that the FBI — if, in fact, it now wants to get content; if, in fact, it wants to start tapping that phone — it’s got to go to the FISA court with probable cause and ask for a warrant. Rose: But has FISA court turned down any request? Obama: The — because — the — first of all, Charlie, the number of requests are surprisingly small… number one. Number two, folks don’t go with a query unless they’ve got a pretty good suspicion. Rose: Should this be transparent in some way? Obama: It is transparent. That’s why we set up the FISA court. Later in the interview, Obama said the program had "disrupted" terrorist plots in the United States as well as overseas. The president pointed specifically to the prosecution of Najibullah Zazi, who was arrested in 2009 as part of a plan to bomb the New York City subway system. "Now, we might have caught him some other way. We might have disrupted it because a New York cop saw he was suspicious," Obama said. "Maybe he turned out to be incompetent and the bomb didn’t go off. But at the margins we are increasing our chances of preventing a catastrophe like that through these programs." While Zazi's name has come up frequently in defense of the NSA, the Associated Press and others have thrown cold water on the talking point, stating that the email the NSA says led to the plot's disruption could have been intercepted without the PRISM program. Obama struck a similar tone during a June 7 speech in San Jose, Calif., saying that Congress has been briefed on the programs' details. "The programs are secret in the sense that they are classified. They are not secret, in that every member of Congress has been briefed," he said. "These are programs that have been authored by large bipartisan majorities repeatedly since 2006." White House chief of staff Denis McDonough also stood by the program on Sunday during an appearance on CBS' "Face the Nation," insisting that Obama "does not" have privacy concerns related to the NSA's phone records collection. "The president is not saying, 'Trust me,'" he said. "The president is saying, 'I want every member of Congress, on whose authority we are running this program, to be briefed on it, to come to the administration with questions and to also be accountable for it.'"
A control of racial populations was a product of the census
Thompson, 10 – PhD candidate (poli sci) at University of Toronto (Debra Elizabeth, “Seeing Like a Racial State: The Census and the Politics of Race in the United States, Great Britain and Canada” A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science, 2010)//jml
The political development of racial categories in the US census reveals both a historic obsession with miscegenation and racial mixture and a contemporary difficulty conceptualizing how mixed-race people fit into American racial taxonomies, both of which signify the changing nature and role of the census throughout American history. The census of the 19th and early to mid-20th centuries was embedded in state-driven racial projects intent on making the population legible in accordance with dominant (state-supported) norms and practices. Making populations “legible” in the American context has worked to solidify racial discourse and the imposition of a racialized social order; in other words, counting by race in order to dominate and control racial populations, including the management of the boundaries of whiteness. The instability of census categories, particularly in the period between 1850 and 1920, is marked by numerous state strategies and practices of race-making, reflecting dominant ideational and political discourses of the day. The classification schema crystallized after 1930; it is no coincidence that Jim Crow segregation, miscegenation regimes and the rule of hypodescent 99 became solidified around the same time. The census and other related social, political and legal forces coalesced in support of the principles and ethos of the racial state. In the contemporary era, the nature and role of the census changed as a direct result of civil rights legislation. What was once an instrument of regulation and control now possessed a new emancipatory power to combat, rather than reinforce, racial discrimination and disadvantage. Census data and racial statistics found a powerful new purpose by the mid-1960s and it took very little time for those both inside and outside the state to recognize the importance of being counted and seize opportunities to push for the alteration or maintenance of the status quo. Unlike Britain’s policy makers, who recognized that mixed-race people posed a problem for their classificatory schemes in the late 1960s, discussions of multiraciality did not figure prominently into the discussions of Directive 15 in the late 1970s in part because of the legacy of Jim Crow and anti- miscegenation laws, which acted to reinforce social and political perceptions about discrete racial boundaries and intra-racial homogeneity. Why, then, did the United States decide to change its standards of racial classification in the late 20th century? The secondary literature identifies and (at times) triangulates three critical factors: social mobilization, demography and civil rights legislation. Each has been demonstrably important to the evolution of American census categorizations since 1970, though none alone or in tandem can claim to have actually “driven” census policy. Though civil rights legislation gave the census a new purpose and role in American politics as it did in both Canada and Great Britain, unlike these latter cases the American census has consistently asked a question on race. Rather than shaping the decision to ask a question on race, which is a foregone conclusion, it seems that institutional consistency with civil rights legislation plays an important role in the determination of which racial categorizations should be counted. As demonstrated above, a good deal of the discussion in the congressional committee concerned 100 the extent to which mixed-race people could claim they were victims of discrimination because of their multiracial identities. However, evidence that points to a group’s circumstances of racial disadvantage may be a necessary but insufficient cause. For example, in spite of persuasive data that people of Arab or Middle Eastern descent faced discrimination even in the pre-9/11 context, the OMB recommended against adding a separate Arab/Middle Eastern ethnic category because of conceptual issues surrounding whether this category would be based on geographic, religious or linguistic determinants, the limited space on federal forms and the lack of federal requirements for information on this population group (OMB, 1997a: 36940). Furthermore, many argued that the evidence demonstrating that mixed-race people were discriminated against by virtue of their multiraciality – as opposed to their ancestral linkages with historically disadvantaged groups – was far from concrete. Race is indeed a set of practices, as these circumstances speak to the ways in which signifiers such as “Arab” and “mixed-race” did and did not align with the schematic state’s conception of what race and racial disadvantage meant in the American context. Most of the secondary literature on the political development of American census categories posits a combination of demography and social mobilization as key drivers. These explanations make intuitive sense, particularly after controversy emerged over the significant undercounts of racial minority populations in the 1970 census (Choldin, 1994). Minority groups mobilized and the Census Bureau became an “embattled organization,” (Robbin, 2000b: 444) subject to and greatly criticized through congressional oversight. From the 1970s onwards, minority groups have lobbied for additions or changes to the American racial classification system. For example, the lobby efforts to include a means of enumerating America’s Hispanic population began while the census form was being printed in 1968 and lasted until the newly formed and institutionalized Census Advisory Committee on the Spanish Origin Population was 101 successful in getting a specific question on Hispanic identity on the 1980 census (Choldin, 1986).
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