Readiness da mgw 2010 / Pre-Camp
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- Readiness Link – Overstretch
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Readiness Link – GenericForce shifts create budget constraints that crush readiness – prefer our evidence – DOD estimates are overstated GAO, 2009 (Government Accountability Office, “Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have Increased While Savings Estimates Have Decreased Since Fiscal Year 2009”, Letter to Congress, November 13th, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1098r.pdf) Our review of DOD’s fiscal year 2010 BRAC budget indicates that DOD plans to spend more to implement BRAC 2005 recommendations compared to last year’s BRAC budget. DOD’s estimated one-time costs to implement this BRAC round increased by almost $2.5 billion from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2010, bringing the total implementation cost estimate for this BRAC round to $34.9 billion. To place this increase in perspective, in September 2005, the BRAC Commission estimated that it would cost DOD about $21 billion over the 6-year implementation period whereas this estimate is now about $35 billion—an increase of nearly 67 percent.6 Our analysis shows that over 80 percent of the estimated $2.5 billion in cost increases are associated with 10 recommendations. Military construction costs accounted for the majority of the increase, although other factors such as information technology requirements also contributed to some of the expected cost increases. After DOD implements all of the BRAC 2005 recommendations, which the department is required to do by the statutory deadline of September 2011, our analysis of DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget estimates shows that net annual recurring savings for fiscal year 2012 and beyond will have decreased by almost $94 million to about $3.9 billion, compared to DOD’s estimates in fiscal year 2009. As we have previously reported, we believe DOD’s net annual recurring savings estimates may be overstated because they include dollar savings from eliminating military personnel positions without corresponding decreases in end-strength. DOD disagrees with our position. The $3.9 billion estimate is calculated using DOD’s method, which we nonetheless believe overstates savings. However, we included these estimates for consistency. Our calculations also show that BRAC savings DOD expects to generate over a 20-year period from 2006 through 2025 have declined to $10.9 billion in constant fiscal year 2005 dollars, compared to $13.7 billion that we reported based on the previous year’s BRAC budget.7 To place this decrease in perspective, in September 2005 the BRAC Commission estimated that DOD would save about $36 billion—nearly 70 percent more—over the same 20-year period. Readiness Link – OverstretchOverseas basing is critical to prevent overstretch which guts military effectiveness Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995 Overextension is a mistake that some of the big powers have made in the past. Such a development can occur if the United States is not judicious in its use of force and gets involved in protracted conflicts in non-critical regions, thereby sapping its energies and undermining support for its global role. And when the United States uses force in critical regions, its preference should be to have its allies and friends contribute their fair share. Having the capability to protect U.S. vital interests unilaterally if necessary can facilitate getting friends and allies of the United States to participate -- especially on terms more to its liking. It is quite possible that if the United States cannot protect its interests without significant participation by allies, it might not be able to protect them at all. For example, in the run-up to the Gulf war, several allies did not favor the use of force to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait. If the military participation of these allies had been indispensable for military success against Iraq, Saddam Hussein's forces might still be in Kuwait and Iraq might now possess nuclear weapons. Readiness Link – JapanJapanese bases are key lillypads to sustain military readiness Shimoji, 2010 (Yoshio, M.S. Georgetown University, “The Futenma Base and the U.S.-Japan Controversy: an Okinawan perspective”, Asia-Pacific Journal, May 3rd, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Yoshio-SHIMOJI/3354) Obviously, the U.S. Marines or the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force, to be more specific, are stationed in Okinawa not to defend Japan as ballyhooed but simply to hone their assault skills in preparation for combat elsewhere. It's a cozy and easy place to train, with Tokyo providing prodigious financial aid, which Washington demands in the name of “host nation support.” I liken it to turf dues exacted by an organized crime syndicate, which offers protection from rival gangs. In 2003, for example, Japan's direct "host nation support" amounted to $3,228.43 million or $4,411.34 million if indirect support is added. Compare these figures with Germany's and Korea's support. Germany's direct host nation support in the same year was $28.7 million (1/112th that of Japan) and indirect support $1.535.22 million. Korea's direct host nation support in that same year was $486.31 million (about 1/7th that of Japan) and indirect support $356.5 million [4]. For ten years from 2001 through 2010, Japan shouldered an average annual sum of $2,274 million for host nation support [5], which incidentally is known as "sympathy budget" as if Japan were voluntarily doling out money out of compassion for those U.S. service members who are deployed in this far-away country. The amount Japan has financed to support USF Japan operations since the system started in 1978 totals an astounding $30 billion. That the Marines are based in Okinawa not to defend Japan but mainly to strengthen U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific and beyond is widely recognized, as the following quotation from GlobalSecurity.org suggests: “The Regiment (3rd Battalion 6th Marines) continues to support the defense of the Nation by maintaining forces in readiness in support of contingency operations and unit deployments to the Mediterranean, Pacific rim and around the globe.”(Italics mine) Pundit Kevin Rafferty is more direct saying, "some of the bases (in Japan) are staging-posts for deployment in Afghanistan and elsewhere [6]." When Marine contingents were compelled to move out of Gifu and Yamanashi Prefectures in mainland Japan in the face of mounting anti-U.S. base demonstrations and moved to Okinawa in the 1950's, a number of Pentagon strategists are reported to have cast doubt on the wisdom of such a shift. The U.S. Army was the major element in the U.S. Forces in Okinawa during the occupation period which ended in 1972 with reversion. Apparently, the Army recognized the limited value of being stationed in Okinawa and so withdrew, leaving behind only a few hundred troops. The Marines grabbed this chance to expand their role and function, taking over everything from the departing Army. They are not, however, deterrents against outside "threats" as they boast. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. 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