Relations impacts and cp’s


US-Turkey relations bad: Russia



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US-Turkey relations bad: Russia



Turkish nationalism leads to genocide and war

Armenian National Institute 2010 [Young Turks and the Armenian Genocide, http://www.armenian-genocide.org/young_turks.html]
The Young Turks were the perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide. The Young Turk Movement emerged in reaction to the absolutist rule of Sultan Abdul-Hamid (Abdulhamit) II (1876-1909). With the 1878 suspension of the Ottoman Constitution, reform-minded Ottomans resorted to organizing overseas or underground. The backbone of the movement was formed by young military officers who were especially disturbed by the continuing decline of Ottoman power and attributed the crisis to the absence of an environment for change and progress. Working secretly in unconnected clusters under the watchful eye of the Hamidian secret police, the Young Turks succeeded in overturning the rule of the autocratic sultan when the Ottoman armies in European Turkey openly supported the movement. Abdul-Hamid's reinstatement of constitutional and parliamentary rule in July 1908 ushered in a brief period of legalized political activity by a panoply of reformist Turkish parties as well as Armenian political and revolutionary organizations. The Young Turks earned further public support when their intervention was required to suppress the April 1909 counter-revolution staged by the palace. At the center of the Young Turk Revolution stood the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (Ittihad ve Terakki Jemiyeti) formed in 1895. Its members came to be known as Ittihadists or Unionists. The most ideologically committed party in the entire movement, the CUP espoused a form of Turkish nationalism which was xenophobic and exclusionary in its thinking. Its policies threatened to undo the tattered fabric of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. Taking advantage of the political confusion reigning in the aftermath of the First Balkan War which the Ottoman Empire lost in 1912 to its former subject states, the CUP seized power in a coup d'etat in January 1913. As it led the empire to a partial recovery in the Second Balkan War, the CUP monopolized political power domestically by bringing the Parliament completely under its influence. It also began to steer away from the long-held Ottoman foreign policy of alliances with Great Britain and France, and forged a stronger military cooperation with Germany. Moreover, the CUP compensated for the Ottoman retreat in the Balkans by promoting Pan-Turkism, an expansionist program designed to challenge Russia in its southern tier. By the time World War I broke out in August 1914, the CUP constituted a chauvinistic band which had subordinated the Ottoman state to its Turkist ideology. It also propelled the country into war against its better interests by entering into a secret accord with Germany.

Ext. Turkish econ solves ME war

Turkish economic growth prevents war in the Middle East


Waxman, 1999 [Ph.D. Candidate in IR @ Johns Hopkins, research analyst at CSIS, Washington Quarterly Winter]


In the long term, moreover, this free trade agreement offers the possibility for many more people to have a material stake in the Turkish-Israeli relationship. Annual trade between the two countries is expected to quadruple in just a few years, from $ 450 million to $ 2 billion, with much of the increase in Turkey's favor. In 1997 alone, for example, Turkey's exports to Israel increased by 54 percent over the previous year, whereas its imports increased 19 percent for the same period. More impressive still is the fact that some 300,000 to 400,000 Israeli tourists visit Turkey each year (8 percent of the total population), spending nearly $ 3 billion. As more and more Turks reap the economic benefits from close ties to Israel, powerful interest groups, especially in business, are likely to form to protect those benefits. It is not just in the Israeli market that Turks have gained greater access thanks to the free trade accord. Since Israel has a free trade agreement with the United States, Turkish businessmen [sic] also see Israel as a "backdoor" into the American market (and thanks to the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Canadian and Mexican markets as well) and a hopping ground to the Palestinian and Jordanian markets. For its part, Israel hopes to launch Turkish-Israeli joint ventures in the newly independent Transcaucasian and Central Asian republics, making use of Turkey's cultural and historical ties there. Expanding economic ties between Turkey and Israel may also have the beneficial side effect of fostering further understanding and friendship between the two peoples as their interaction increases. This is not just wishful thinking. The Israelis have always eagerly sought friends in a region swamped with enemies. They have longed to put an end to their regional "pariah" status. Thus in the words of analyst Daniel Pipes, friendship with Turkey "breaches a wall of rejection and may even provide a model for links to other Muslim states." n3 By allying itself with a Muslim state, albeit a secular one, Israel can send the much-needed message that its conflict is not with Muslims and that Muslims and Jews can indeed be friends. For Turks, friendship with Israel carries with it accusations of treachery against their coreligionists -- but the Turks have remained unmoved. Despite a common religion, Turks, largely because of their imperial Ottoman past, feel a psychological distance between themselves and the Arabs (which, it should be noted, is reciprocated by most Arabs). Since the time of Ataturk, Turkey has looked toward Europe and away from the Middle East, emphasizing its European rather than Middle Eastern credentials -- a process hastened by Turkey's disappointment over the Arab states' lack of political support in the Cyprus dispute and by declining trade with the Arab states following the drop in world oil prices during the 1980s and the international sanctions against Iraq. In 1982 Turkish exports to the Islamic world accounted for 47 percent of its total exports; a decade later, this figure had plummeted to 12 percent. n4




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