It has been accepted that Constable D upon receiving the telephone call from PP took information and recorded that a complaint had been made in regard to the breach of an apprehended domestic violence order. Constables H and C responded and it is noted in Constable H’s statement that he acknowledges that he was attending an address in response to an alleged breach of a domestic violence order. Both Constable’s H and C have made statements in relation to their attendance at the premises and have also given sworn testimony. IP has also made a statement in that regard and given sworn testimony as to the events and conversations that took place that night.
Clearly, there is a factual dispute as to the precise nature of the conversations that took place that night. IP maintains that she did inform both officers that breaches had taken place and provided details. The officers on the other hand maintain that when they attended they were asked only to explain the nature and terms of the orders. Clearly the 2 versions cannot stand side by side on the main issue of whether information in regard to the breach was communicated. There is no doubt that IP was concerned as to the ramifications of proceeding with the breach and her concerns were associated with the likelihood that PK would be arrested and she had concerns for is employment if he remained in custody. It was the Deputy State Coroner’s view following an examination of the evidence of those witnesses that it is more probable that IP’s version is the correct one. There is also no doubt that by the time Police had left her premises, she had agreed to the course of action suggested by the officers, that being that they would contact PK and speak to him about the orders. In fact, that was done, with PK attending the Police station the following day. The question must be asked, if the Police Officers maintain that their role was only to explain the orders to IP and her father, why did they see it as part of their duty to speak to PK. The only logical answer to that question is that IP had agreed not to proceed with the breach action on the assurances of the Police Officers would go and speak to PK.
The Police actions on that night, it was found, are of themselves not necessarily open to adverse criticism. There is clearly an obligation on the Police to explain the ramifications of taking breach action and the consequences of arrest, criminal record, etc. However, in providing that information, it should be considered and it should not be perceived by the Complainant as obstacles that are being presented by the Police which by implication or innuendo might be perceived as being discouraging of proceeding further. The primary role of the Police where a complaint of breach is received in to investigate, gather the evidence and proceed through the due process of law. If evidence of a breach has been established and the protected person makes a decision not to make a statement or to proceed further, strict compliance with the provisions of Section 562I(6)(b) should follow. Section 562I(6)(b) states, “that when an officer believes on reasonable grounds that a person has committed an offence and a decision is made by that officer not to initiate criminal proceedings the Police Officer must make a written record of the reasons for that decision.”
As understand by the Deputy State Coroner, the provisions of Section 562I(6)(b) and the obligation is also contained in the NSW Police Handbook.
It is also interesting to note that the COPS entry completed by Constable H makes no mention that Police contacted PK and explained the provisions of the Domestic Violence Order to him. IP has been perhaps most vocal in regard to the events of 28 August and perhaps with some legitimacy. Her view that the onus of making decisions should not have been put back onto her shoulders and that she had an expectation that having obtained the order was now reporting a breach that action would be taken. The Deputy State Coroner agreed with her.
15 September 2003, Complaint of breach of Domestic Violence Order – Police response
The events during the early morning of 15 September, the call to the Rape Crisis Centre, and the report of breach of Domestic Violence Orders to Constable G are all well documented in the brief. The attendance of Police to the property, the setting up of a crime scene, gathering of evidence and transporting IP to hospital are also fully outlined and require no further comment.
Similarly the attendance of Police at around 1.30pm when the tragic events had unfolded and the manner in which the investigation was conducted thereafter have not been the focus of this Inquest.
The one issue that does emerge in regard to the events of 15 September 2003, and as succinctly put by Counsel assisting in his closing address, is at the issue of whether action should have been taken to arrest PK at an earlier time. This aspect of this tragedy concerned the Deputy State Coroner greatly, perhaps because of the benefit of 20/20 vision in hindsight. There is no doubt that the Police had an opportunity to arrest PK well before the tragic events at 1.30pm, however, an examination of their actions must be considered, not with the benefit of hindsight, but in terms of decisions that were made at the time. Such decisions at the time, no doubt included the need to gather evidence, the need to ensure the safety and comfort of IP and an assessment of whether PK remained a risk of harm to any other persons. The decisions made that morning would no doubt have taken into account standard operating procedures in regard to arrest and no doubt factors such as staffing resources may also have been a consideration.
On the one view, strongly put by the representative of the Commissioner and supported by Chief Inspector L, the Officer in Charge of the Investigation, was that the Police methodology and prioritisation of tasks was appropriate and in accordance with the procedure for professional investigations of a serious indictable offence. The argument appears to be based on the premise, that as IP had now indicated that she would be prepared to make a statement in regard to a serious indictable offence, that action to arrest PK would not be considered in isolation in regard only to a breach of the Domestic Violence Order. It has been suggested that the breach of the Domestic Violence Order, was the offence of aggravated sexual assault and until such time as sufficient particulars of that offence could be obtained from IP it would be unwise to arrest PK.
The Deputy State Coroner respected the experience and views of Chief Inspector L and take on board the submissions made on this point and it may be the case that we will simply agree to disagree. It has been submitted that this Court should not substitute its view to the experience and views expressed by Chief Inspector L and the views expressed by Detective Inspector P as the reviewing Officer. He accepted that there is merit to the argument and that this Court should not impose its views over the weight of the evidence or opinion on this point. However, the one fundamental flaw in that argument is that it would appear that this ignores the views expressed by the P family on this very issue. Coroners Courts are often seen as Courts of public opinion and in the public opinion, if it was known that a report of an aggravated sexual assault was given to Police at 6.30am, followed by a visit to the crime scene by Police, the location of a knife and knowledge of an enforceable Domestic Violence Order and the location of the Offender was known. Public opinion, notwithstanding the need to secure exhibits, obtain a more detailed version from IP, etc, would be that the alleged offender should have been taken into custody earlier.
As far as standard operating instructions are concerned and or the Police handbook under the section titled Domestic Violence, Police Powers, Power to Arrest, it states, “when satisfied an offence has occurred, however, as the first option, strongly consider exercising your power of arrest to immediately ensure safety”. It has been put to in these proceedings that the Police followed those directions on the basis that they were satisfied that IP was in a place of safety and that there were no concerns for the welfare of the children or PP as no previous threats or harm had ever been made to them. Perhaps this is true. However, it would seem to that the words, “to ensure safety” should not be construed only in regard to a possible victim, but in this case to ensure the safety of the offender as well. Access to information on the COPS system and information and knowledge known to other officers would have highlighted that PK was at risk of self harm.
It was also noted that the Commissioner’s notice dated 5 August 1996, (The Deputy State Coroner was not sure how current this is) states under the heading “Domestic Violence charge and arrest practice”… “when officers are satisfied that a domestic violence offence has been committed, as your first option, the strongest consideration is to be given to exercising your powers in favour of arresting alleged offenders.” This direction appears to echo, perhaps in stronger language the standard operating procedures.
The central issue, in the Deputy State Coroner’s view was whether the Police either singularly or in combination had sufficient evidence to be satisfied that a Domestic Violence Offence had taken place. It would seem that in the early part of the morning it was known to Police that a Domestic Violence Order was in place with the standard conditions of not assault etc, not to attend premises etc, there was evidence that PK had entered the premises and there was certainly evidence, albeit not in statement form, that a serious indictable offence had been committed. Police were aware that the offender had entered the premises from which he was restrained from entering and at the time was armed with a knife.
It would have been open for the Police to immediately take action to arrest PK, and charge him with breaching the Domestic Violence Order on the grounds that he had attended the premises armed with a knife. Again with the benefit of hindsight, this would have allowed Police to examine in more detail the previous COPS entries and as IP spoke to Detective S some time between 11.30am and 1.00pm, further information would have been elicited to place in any fact sheets before the presiding Magistrate for a bail determination. There is no doubt that all the Police performed their duties to the best of their ability and that they placed considerable weight on the welfare of IP which was admirable. It would appear however, that no serious consideration was given to the likelihood of PK returning to the premises. Again, perhaps with the benefit of hindsight, his possible return to the premises was a possibility that could have been considered. Bearing in mind that IP had calmed him down, perhaps with the assurance that their relationship might continue, it would not be unreasonable to expect that PK, having committed a serious offence only hours earlier, might be anxious as to IP’s well being and movements. Clearly he was, as he tried to ring her on 2 occasions and phoned the residence as well. Again, with the benefit of hindsight, consideration should have been given to moving the children and PP until such time as PK’s arrest was completed.
All these issues were raised, not for the purpose of personal criticism of any Police Officers, but hopefully and in the same manner as the P family, to draw attention to possible windows of opportunity that may have existed which could have turned or changed the course of events. In some respects one could well understand if IP was bitter in regard to her experience with the Domestic Violence legislation and those who are empowered to enforce it. She is not however, bitter, but hopes the tragedy of 15 September 2003, when she lost her children, her father and her husband, and the circumstances leading to those deaths, are not in vain.
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