Report No: 78283 and acs2876



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Policy recommendations


  1. A key area for policy reform will be an overhaul of the import and export restrictions that currently exist, and to review the overall trade policy environment. Attempts of removing the import bans in Nigeria, however, have to date not been successful largely due to strong opposition from the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) and large sections of government supporting mercantilist policies. Recent discussions that seem to equate food security with food self-sufficiency exemplify this thinking. There is a general need to reforming the trade policy environment in Nigeria to allow companies integrate into global supply chains, get access to lower quality intermediate inputs, and ensuring low prices for key food staples to the poorer members of society. Significant work on this has recently been undertaken by the World Bank which could give additional guidance.70

  2. As traders currently pay significantly less in customs duties as compared to full statutory rates and VAT, which would often require payments of more than 50 per cent of the product value, efforts should aim to formalize, or develop, trade schemes reflecting the realities of cross border trade, similar to those currently applied. Such schemes could establish a ceiling for duty-free trade and apply to small-scale traders using trucks to consolidate their shipments, formalizing existing procedures and better monitor them to ensure compliance and avoid subsequent additional payments to other customs brigades. They could for example apply to registered (transport) companies, which would encourage increased compliance and consolidations of loads. The formalization of such schemes would potentially demand discussions at the CEMAC and ECOWAS level to ensure these schemes are compatible with both countries’ international commitments at the regional level. Formalizing the currently applied system in Cameroon—and removing informal payments in parallel—is expected to increase formal payments to customs, reduce informal rents to individuals, while reducing overall costs to traders. Reforms are likely to face significant opposition from those currently capturing these rents. As long as traders feel that a formalization of procedures will lead to higher payments for them, they are also likely to oppose such reforms.

  3. Increasing transparency of existing procedures and regulations for product registration and services, such as cross-border trucking, will be essential to increase predictability of cross-border trade operations. An important element would be to take stock of all Non-Tariff Measures (NTM) in both countries in collaboration with standards agencies and private sector organizations, and possibly in collaboration with the African Development Bank, ITC, UNCTAD, and the World Bank under the Transparency in Trade initiative. In this context, it will be important to make more transparent and streamline the registration requirements and procedures for manufactured products that need to be registered before being traded. As other barriers to trade are gradually removed, such non-tariff barriers are likely to become increasingly important. The WB published NTM toolkit could provide guidance on such processes and help make them more inclusive.

  4. Publishing a list of all procedures and payment rates, as well as the rights and obligations of public officials and of traders, such as outlined in a Traders’ Charter that is currently being discussed in southern Africa,71 would increase the predictability of the trading environment and increase transparency. Eliminating the visa requirement, or making it cost-free, would add to facilitating trade, bringing down costs and reducing the incentives for traders to avoid official border crossings. Improvements in transparency should be complemented with training on these rights and obligations to encourage behavioral change. Impartial enforcement mechanisms will be needed as well, which could be phased in following an initial period during which infractions are only notified with clear warnings, but do not immediately result in penalties.

  5. It will be important to complement investments in hard infrastructure, such as the rehabilitation of the Enugu-Bamenda corridor, with important and difficult regulatory reforms to make sure that reductions in transport costs are passed on to consumers through increased competition and to avoid potential rent capture by transport providers or other agents. High priority should be placed on reducing unofficial payments to customs, police, and other officials at control points along the cross-border corridors. In the current situation, which would be similar to a situation where existing border arrangements were formalized, about one third of total cross-border transfer costs accrue to physical transport costs and one third are for informal payment of various kinds, with the remainder being divided between formal customs payments and the net profit margin. While it seems logical that better roads will reduce the opportunities for stopping vehicles and extracting rents as traffic becomes more fluid and control points become more accessible and controllable by central state authorities, experience from West and East Africa suggests that active policies will be needed to remove these roadblocks, and keep them from returning.

  6. Both countries have committed to reduce the number of control points along the Onitsha-Bamenda corridor from about 30 to two as part of the rehabilitation project, but a comprehensive plan to address this issue and implement the commitment is still lacking. Reviewing in detail the political economy of these road blocks, including who are beneficiaries at various levels of government, will be essential to develop a comprehensive and realistic reform plan than could subsequently be implemented. It is likely that this initiative is going to face significant push-back from current beneficiaries who often might depend on the income currently generated and perceive it as an established right. These reviews could be undertaken independently for both countries and each corridor, including assessing the political economy at border crossings in greater detail.

  7. Further analysis of the barriers to cross-border trucking should be undertaken to better understand the factors that create additional costs and prevent fully integrated transport service providers from operating across the border. This analysis should identify all regulations and their application, and more accurately quantify the impacts and costs resulting from current policies such as the unloading and reloading of goods at the border and the absence of integrated transport service providers. As overall travel time will decline with road improvements, delays generated by these policies will become relatively more important and costly. It should also try to estimate the benefits and costs of possible reforms, and try to identify potential beneficiaries and those negatively affected. Possible outcomes will likely include legal changes in both countries and could include making transport policies compatible to allow trucks cross the border and continue to their final destination without having to offload goods and transfer them to another truck at the border.

  8. The establishment of a joint border post along the Enugu-Bamenda corridor is foreseen, but the facility should only be established after procedures on both sides have been significantly simplified, and increased support to the process is needed from both governments. The post will be established under the joint leadership of the ECOWAS and CEMAC Commissions, but no meaningful progress has been made to date.72 Key issues such as the location of the joint border post have not been agreed, and a number of legal changes will have to be undertaken to allow full functionality of the joint border posts, for example because the Nigerian post currently does not have the legal status to assess duty and other taxes on imports. Recognition of documentation issued by the other authorities and exchange of information will be essential. Without comprehensively addressing the procedural aspects which currently delay customs clearance, the physical construction of a joint building will not contribute to reducing crossing times, and significant efforts should be put into first simplifying and streamlining procedures of all agencies present in each country before moving towards joint operations such as joint inspection and increased information sharing.73 Building of a joint facility or investment in processing equipment and computerization should come last in this process.74

  9. Implementation of complementary reforms could be started on a pilot basis or comprehensively where possible, but all such governance reforms at borders could serve as a first step to broader governance reforms in the two countries. For example, undertaking measures to increase transparency, or reduce corruption could be undertaken at pilot locations, while others reforms, such as regulatory reforms or the formalization of the existing trade regime could be undertaken more comprehensively. Defining the necessary control functions and responsibilities of agencies for these functions would be a first step. Consolidating these control functions in one specific location (the border) with clearly defined and well monitored mobile spot-checks based on risk assessment (for example for customs) would likely reduce legitimate resistance to such measures and would help optimize processes and identify key threats that might result from a restructuring.

  10. A key component for this policy reform would be to establish a transparent monitoring and evaluation system for the intervention, as well as to develop an impartial complaint mechanism for traders. Such a system would allow measurement of the impact in terms of prices and the flow of goods, and a complaint mechanism that traders could use to raise issues of non-compliance, informal payments, and harassment will help ensure that informal procedures, additional road blocks and control points do not reappear once the focus of policy makers turns elsewhere. Once the pilot reforms have been evaluated and their impact on streamlining and improving the current system understood, reforms should be extended to other regions, or to other agencies in the context of broader governance reforms. Reforms in the public sector and the improvement and potential simplification of procedures could be coupled with more stringent control of illegal trade that completely bypasses official border posts.

  11. To support the export of paddy rice and trade in a number of agricultural commodities in the North, it will be important to rehabilitate and upgrade the road from Mora to Limani to “all-weather” status. This major crossing point currently carries the highest volume of traded but suffers high costs and delays because of the very poor quality of the road. Trucks break down on a regular basis, often blocking the road for other road users who have to divert to secondary roads that are also of extremely poor quality. The feasibility study for upgrading this road should take potential traffic expansion in the North into account.

Table : Policy Recommendations

Overall focus

The study recommends that additional analysis, policy reforms, and monitoring and evaluation focus initially on the Enugu-Bamenda corridor due to the importance of that corridor for linking agricultural and industrial areas in both countries, and to ensure that investments in physical infrastructure are maximized by complementing them with critical policy reforms.

This recommendation is largely focused on the south in light of the current adverse security situation in Northern Nigeria, which means that trade facilitating measures are unlikely to be very successful there in the near-term.






Recommendations in bold could be priority reforms

Trade Policy

  • Review the overall trade policy framework in Nigeria, remove import bans, substituting them with tariff rates. Agree on ECOWAS CET, and remove levies and other restrictions not in line with the to-be-confirmed CET.

  • Develop/formalize preferential access scheme for small scale traders between Cameroon and Nigeria that would help keep effective trading costs constant compared to the current situation, particularly for small-scale exporters from Cameroon. In Cameroon, this could be done by clarifying the relation between the CEMAC statutory duty rates and the guidance issued by Cameroon Regional Customs offices before formalizing the existing customs procedures in Cameroon to ensure its compatibility with commitments made at CEMAC level. In Nigeria, develop and implement a simplified trade regime for traders crossing from Cameroon, while making sure that the agreement would be compatible with Nigeria’s commitments under ECOWAS.

  • In the long term, a preferential access scheme could be negotiated as part of a bilateral trade agreement that could eventually lead to a Free Trade Area between West and Central Africa.

  • In both countries, take stock of all Non-Tariff Measures (NTM), possibly in collaboration with the African Development Bank, ITC, UNCTAD, and the World Bank under the Transparency in Trade initiative with a view of assessing their importance on cross-border trade. Work with standards agencies and private sector organizations in both countries to make more transparent and streamline the registration requirements and procedures for manufactured products that need to be registered before being traded. As other barriers to trade are gradually removed, such non-tariff barriers are likely to become increasingly important. The WB published NTM toolkit could provide guidance on the process.

Trade Facilitation:

Short-term priorities



  • Increase transparency at borders by taking stock of all procedures and payments at border posts, identify duplicating procedures, and publishing all procedures and payments, as well as rights and obligations of traders and government officials (Trader’s Charter), possibly starting with one pilot crossing (Ekok/Mfum, which is the location of the future joint border post along the corridor under rehabilitation)

  • Complement this initiative with training to encourage behavioral change, at the same pilot crossing.

  • Develop and establish an impartial, and anonymous, complaint mechanism where traders can raise issues of non-compliance, informal payments, and harassment

  • Prepare inventory of all transport regulations affecting cross-border trade, and undertake more detailed analysis of the reasons for the lack of cross-border trucking

  • Develop Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for subsequent impact assessment at the pilot crossing

  • In collaboration with ECOWAS and CEMAC, and following a political economy analysis, develop a comprehensive and realistic strategy to reduce the number of control points along the Enugu-Bamenda trade corridor from 30 to 2. Remove unofficial control points and informal payments, and ensure that no new unofficial control points are set up spontaneously, other than legitimate spot checks

  • Set up a, or strengthen the existing but largely dysfunctional, mechanism for bilateral discussion around trade policy issues that could serve as a focal point for discussing compliance issues at borders, and could serve as an entry point for more formal negotiations between the two economic blocs.

  • Undertake feasibility study for upgrading Limani-Mora road

Trade Facilitation:

Medium-term priorities



  • Define the necessary control functions and identify which agency should be responsible for each function, including considering partial delegation of responsibilities to other agencies with a view of reducing the number of agencies at border crossings and the number of interactions between agencies and traders

  • Revise and simplify procedures and documentation requirements on both sides of the border in a coordinated manner and with extensive exchange between customs and other border agencies in both countries, to prepare for the subsequent establishment of the joint border post

  • Support ECOWAS and CEMAC Secretariats in their work on developing and implementing the joint border post on the Enugu-Bamenda corridor, including technical support for information exchange and interaction between both countries to agree on simplified joint procedures, necessary legal changes, and their implementation: Work with the Nigerian Customs Administration in Abuja and Calabar (regional command) to upgrade the legal status and decision making powers at Mfum border post

  • Start a policy dialogue to investigate whether immigration legislation could be amended to allow smoother cross-border trade, for example by removing the visa requirement (or simplifying procedures, or removing payments) for cross-border traders

  • Pass legislation in both Nigeria and Cameroon that will facilitate cross-border trucking

  • Review the allocation of trading licenses for eru to allow smaller traders to access them

Trade Facilitation:

Long-term priorities



  • Extend computerized system to the border posts, but only following improvements in procedures of how data are actually recorded to ensure accurate data will be transmitted

  • Upgrade Limani-Mora road and start of similar policy reforms as on the Enugu-Bamenda corridor

Key counterparts for policy dialogue

Policy dialogue in Cameroon should start with presenting the findings of this report to a wide range of stakeholders, including the private sector, to get a better understanding of potential responses to formalizing trade flows, which is likely to increase official payments but not necessarily all overall payments.

Policy dialogue in Nigeria will have to focus on agencies at the federal level (customs, standards agencies), as well as agencies at the state level. It will also be critical to involve the governors of the states in Nigeria and regions in Cameroon along the border, most initial work will focus because of corridor rehabilitation and the adverse security situation in northern Nigeria.



Work on taking stock, simplifying, and publishing border procedures and payments will have to be undertaken with all involved agencies in a joint process that will demand significant investment of manpower and dialogue. Experience has shown that having customs take the lead in such exercises is unlikely to deliver good results, as other ministries are effectively not under line-control of customs. The dialogue, which should include the police forces, will therefore have to be anchored at a higher level of government, or count on high-level support.




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