For completeness, the following comments relate to the controlled operations regime in various other Australian jurisdictions. The model controlled operations disclosure offence provision (clause 22, set out earlier), proposed that it would be an offence where a person:
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intentionally, knowingly or recklessly discloses information, and
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knows or is reckless as to whether the information relates to a [relevant, authorised] operation.
New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and Tasmania have implemented this wording in their controlled operation laws.
Western Australia does not include a fault element and does not have an aggravated offence but instead applies the 10-year penalty to the basic offence.
The ACT limits the offence provisions to persons who are authorised to have the information and has different penalties depending on the type of harm: two years for prejudice to the effective conduct of an operation and 10 years for endangering the health or safety of any person.
Consistently with the model provision, all of the offences referred to above use the words ‘relates to’ or ‘relating to’ an operation.
The Northern Territory does not have a controlled operations regime in place.
South Australia has a controlled operations regime (under the Criminal Investigation (Covert Operations) Act 2009 (SA)) but did not implement the model provision and does not have a specific disclosure offence in this context.
The various relevant disclosure offence provisions are as follows:
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section 20R of the Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act 1997 (NSW)
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section 36 of the Crimes (Controlled Operations) Act 2004 (Vic)
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section 266 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld)
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section 26 of the Police Powers (Controlled Operations) Act 2006 (Tas)
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section 35 of the Criminal Investigation (Covert Powers) Act 2012 (WA)
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section 26 of the Crimes (Controlled Operations) Act 2008 (ACT).
How does an SIO compare with a controlled operation?
An SIO is an operation that is carried out for a purpose relevant to the performance of one or more ‘special intelligence functions’ (see the definition of ‘special intelligence operation’ in section 4 of the ASIO Act).
A ‘special intelligence function’ means a function of ASIO under paragraph 17(1)(a), (b), (e) or (f) of the ASIO Act (see the definition in section 4 of the ASIO Act). These are, in effect, the various intelligence-gathering functions of ASIO (the functions not covered by the definition are ASIO’s advisory functions, including furnishing security assessments and providing advice relating to protective security).
ASIO’s function under paragraph 17(1)(f) of the ASIO Act is to cooperate with and assist bodies referred to in section 19A (that is, Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation (AGO), a law enforcement agency (as defined) and an authority of the Commonwealth or of a State that is prescribed by regulations—of which there presently are none) in accordance with that section. Section 19A provides that ASIO may cooperate with and assist those bodies in the performance of their functions. This may involve obtaining intelligence which (unlike under ASIO’s other relevant functions) need not be linked with ‘security’. In doing so, ASIO’s legal and policy obligations continue to apply to those activities.
ASIO’s intelligence-gathering functions are primarily directed at obtaining intelligence that will help ASIO to protect Australia and its people from specified threats to ‘security’ (as defined in, and for the purposes of, the ASIO Act). This in part involves trying to predict emerging threats to security.
As such, the purpose of SIOs differs from that of controlled operations, which are primarily for law enforcement purposes, including obtaining the evidence needed to prosecute people alleged to have committed criminal offences.
The evidence obtained during controlled operations is intended to be, and often is, used in criminal court processes in an effort to obtain a conviction. As a result, the processes by which the evidence was obtained may be subjected to judicial scrutiny. By comparison, ASIO activities are generally conducted in secrecy by necessity, due to the nature of security intelligence work, and SIOs in particular are intended, generally, to remain secret in perpetuity.
There are some circumstances in which intelligence gathered by ASIO may be used in legal proceedings, including in a prosecution (the SIO scheme contemplates this in sections 35A, 35P and 35R). Further, the Government and Parliament appear to increasingly expect ASIO to work closely with law enforcement agencies, particularly in counter-terrorism matters. Together with the tendency for the criminal law increasingly to apply to preparatory acts connected with acts of terrorism, rather than being limited to terrorist acts as such, this is one basis used to justify the SIO scheme. In other words, an SIO scheme is necessary to alleviate the increasing risk, for example, that covert conduct by ASIO employees and ASIO affiliates may expose them to prosecution.
Nonetheless, the purpose of the SIO scheme differs from that of the controlled operations scheme because the former relates to ASIO’s statutory functions. Further, ASIO’s intelligence-gathering functions extend beyond the counter-terrorism context (to include, for example, intelligence related to espionage, sabotage and acts of foreign interference). This means that SIOs may also be used in other settings. The SIO scheme is also available, for example, to counter the actions and activities of foreign state and non-state actors contrary to the interests of Australia and which may also constitute offences against Australian law. In this context also, covert conduct by ASIO employees and ASIO affiliates may involve unlawful activities.
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