Report on the impact on journalists of section 35P of the asio act


The DSMA-Notice System in the United Kingdom



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The DSMA-Notice System in the United Kingdom


The purpose of the DSMA-Notice System is to prevent inadvertent disclosures of information that would compromise United Kingdom military and intelligence operations and methods, or put at risk the safety of those involved in such operations, or lead to attacks that would damage the critical national infrastructure and/or endanger lives.

The DSMA-Notice System in its present form is the product of revisions made to a pre-existing system following a recent review. The website for the DSMA-Notice System (www.dsma.uk) explains the recent and longer-term history of the system, which commenced in the lead-up to WWI. It also explains various further details of the system and how it operates. The following material is taken from the website (the reference to the MOD is to the Ministry of Defence, the reference to the DPBAC is to the superseded Defence Press, Broadcasting Advisory Committee and the reference to the DA Notice System is to the superseded Defence Advisory Notice System):

In June 2014, the Permanent Secretary of the MOD sponsored an Independent Review to examine the purpose, utility and effectiveness of the DPBAC and the DA Notice System, from the perspectives of the government, the media and the wider public, in the contemporary context of 24/7 global media, and to make recommendations.

The Defence and Security Media Advisory (DSMA) Committee oversees a voluntary code which operates between the UK Government departments which have responsibilities for national security and the media. It uses the Defence and Security Media Advisory (DSMA)-Notice System as its vehicle. The objective of the DSMA-Notice System is to prevent inadvertent public disclosure of information that would compromise UK military and intelligence operations and methods, or put at risk the safety of those involved in such operations, or lead to attacks that would damage the critical national infrastructure and/or endanger lives.



General introduction to DSMA-Notices

1. Public discussion of the United Kingdom’s defence and counter-terrorist policy and overall strategy does not impose a threat to national security and is welcomed by Government. It is important however that such discussion should not disclose details which could damage national security. The DSMA-Notice System is a means of providing advice and guidance to the media about defence and counter-terrorist information the publication of which would be damaging to national security. The system is voluntary, it has no legal authority and the final responsibility for deciding whether or not to publish rests solely with the editor or publisher concerned.

2. DSMA-Notices are issued by the Defence and Security Media Advisory Committee (DSMA Committee), an advisory body composed of senior civil servants and editors from national and regional newspapers, periodicals, news agencies, television and radio. It operates on the shared belief that there is a continuing need for a system of guidance and advice such as the DSMA-Notice System, and that a voluntary, advisory basis is best for such a system.

3. When these notices were first published under their new title of Defence Advisory Notices in 1993, they reflected the changed circumstances following the break-up of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The 2000 revision has allowed an overall reduction of the scope of the notices while retaining those parts that are appropriate for the current level of threat that involves grave danger to the State and/or individuals. In 2015 the title of the standing Notices was changed to DSMA Notices. The wording, but not the ambit, of the Notices is currently under review, but the existing wording remains in force for the present. Compliance with the DSMA-Notice system does not relieve the editor of responsibilities under the Official Secrets Act.

4. The Secretary DSMA Committee (the DSMA-Notice Secretary) is the servant of the Government and the Press and Broadcasting sides of the Committee. He is available at all times to Government departments and the media to give advice on the system and, after consultation with Government departments as appropriate, to help in assessing the relevance of a DSMA-Notice to particular circumstances. Within this system, all discussions with editors, publishers and programme makers are conducted in confidence.

The 5 standing DSMA-Notices are as follows…



DSMA-Notice 01: Military Operations, Plans & Capabilities

DSMA-Notice 02: Nuclear & Non-Nuclear Weapons & Equipment

DSMA-Notice 03: Ciphers & Secure Communications

DSMA-Notice 04: Sensitive Installations & Home Addresses

DSMA-Notice 05: United Kingdom Security and Intelligence Services and Special Services

DSMA-Notice 05 compares most closely to the SIO scheme in terms of subject matter and is set out in full below for that reason:

1. Information falling within the following categories is normally regarded as being highly classified. It is requested that such information, unless it has been the subject of an official announcement or has been widely disclosed or discussed, should not be published without first seeking advice:

(a) specific covert operations, sources and methods of the Security Service, SIS and GCHQ, Defence Intelligence Units, Special Forces and those involved with them, the application of those methods*, including the interception of communications, and their targets; the same applies to those engaged on counterterrorist operations;

(b) the identities, whereabouts and tasks of people who are or have been employed by these services or engaged on such work, including details of their families and home addresses, and any other information, including photographs, which could assist terrorist or other hostile organisations to identify a target;

(c) addresses and telephone numbers used by these services, except those now made public.

2. Rationale. Identified staff from the intelligence and security services, others engaged on sensitive counter-terrorist operations, including the Special Forces, and those who are likely targets for attack are at real risk from terrorists. Security and intelligence operations, contacts and techniques are easily compromised, and therefore need to be pursued in conditions of secrecy. Publicity about an operation which is in train finishes it. Publicity given even to an operation which has been completed, whether successfully or not, may well deny the opportunity for further exploitation of a capability, which may be unique against other hostile and illegal activity. The disclosure of identities can prejudice past, present and future operations. Even inaccurate speculation about the source of information on a given issue can put intelligence operations and, in the worst cases, lives at risk and/or lead to the loss of information which is important in the interests of national security. Material which has been the subject of an official announcement is not covered by this notice.

* even when used by the National Crime Agency (NCA). This is intended purely to protect national security and not to inhibit normal reporting on law enforcement.




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