Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China
AC Solvency AT #3—Six Party Talks Fail
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- Talks solve human rights abuses
- Sanctions are historically effective if done correctly
- Exchanging security assurances for strong economic sanctions bring resolves North Korean aggression
2AC Solvency AT #3—Six Party Talks FailThey say __________________________________________________, but [GIVE :05 SUMMARY OF OPPONENT’S SINGLE ARGUMENT]
[PUT IN YOUR AUTHOR’S NAME] It’s much better than their evidence because: [PUT IN THEIR AUTHOR’S NAME] [CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]: (it’s newer) (the author is more qualified) (it has more facts) (their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true) (their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) (it takes into account their argument) ( ) (their evidence supports our argument) [WRITE IN YOUR OWN!]
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ [EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW] and this reason matters because: ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Chanlett-Avery, Rinehart, and Nikitin, January 2016 [Emma, Coordinator Specialist in Asian Affairs, Ian, Analyst in Asian Affairs, Mary Beth D. Specialist in Nonproliferation, Congressional Research Service Report, “North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation”, January 15, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf] During the past decade, the United Nations has been an important forum to recognize human rights violations in North Korea. Since 2004, the U.N. Human Rights Council has annually renewed the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in North Korea. Member states have also addressed the issue through annual resolutions in the U.N. General Assembly. Led by Japan and the European Union, the U.N. Human Rights Council established for the first time in March 2013 a commission to investigate “the systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ... with a view to ensuring full accountability, in particular where these violations may amount to crimes against humanity.” The Commission of Inquiry (COI) conducted public hearings in South Korea, Japan, and the United States to collect information and shed light on the inhumane conditions in North Korea. The COI concluded in February 2014 that North Korea had committed “crimes against humanity” and the individuals responsible should face charges at the ICC. In November 2014, U.N. member states voted overwhelmingly (111 yes; 19 no; 55 abstaining) to recommend that the UNSC refer the human rights situation in North Korea to the ICC. Although it appears likely that either Russia or China (or both) will use their veto at the UNSC to prevent the ICC from taking up this case, the United Nations has become a central forum for pressuring North Korea to respect the human rights of its citizens. Commentators have credited the U.N. process for pushing the regime to engage on the human rights issue, although official North Korean news outlets and public statements continue to accuse “hostile forces” of politicizing the human rights issue in order to bring down the regime. Pyongyang officials have appeared more concerned than in the past about international condemnation of North Korea’s human rights record. When the COI results were announced, North Korea’s U.N. diplomats tried unsuccessfully to change the language in a draft resolution. They sought to drop the ICC reference in exchange for an official visit by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on human rights in North Korea. This unusually strong resistance by North Korea may indicate a genuine fear of the consequences of an ICC investigation into “crimes against humanity.” In October 2014, North Korean officials gave a briefing at the United Nations that mentioned for the first time North Korea’s detention centers and “reform through labor” policies, though stopped short of acknowledging the harsher political prison camps (kwanliso). North Korea also announced that it had ratified a U.N. protocol on child protection in an apparent attempt to push back against the scathing U.N. report. It remains to be seen whether this round of U.N.-centered diplomacy leads to sustained dialogue on human rights issues with North Korea, or whether it causes North Korea to further isolate itself from the international community.
Council on Foreign Relations, 2013 [Major international political journal, “The Six Party Talks on North Korea's Nuclear Program”, September 13, http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclear-program/p13593] The September 2005 pact saw Pyongyang agree to abandon its nuclear program, rejoin the NPT, and allow the reentry of IAEA monitors in exchange for food and energy assistance. The accord also paved the way for Pyongyang to normalize relations with both the United States and Japan and negotiate a peace agreement for the Korean peninsula. Talks hit a roadblock just one month later, however, when the U.S. Treasury Department placed restrictions on Macao-based Banco Delta Asia, which Washington suspected was laundering millions for North Korea. The Macau government subsequently froze roughly fifty accounts held by Pyongyang. As the talks fell apart, North Korea stepped up its provocations, testing a long-range rocket and holding its first underground nuclear explosion in the latter half of 2006. Beijing pressed North Korea to rejoin the multilateral framework after the nuclear crisis came to a head. During the sixth round of talks in February 2007, members hammered out a denuclearization plan involving a sixty-day deadline for Pyongyang to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for aid and the release of the Banco Delta Asia funds. The process gained momentum in the second half of 2007, when Pyongyang began disabling its Yongbyon plant, removing thousands of fuel rods under the guidance of U.S. experts. Progress continued in mid-2008 after Pyongyang made more concessions, providing the United States with extensive details of its nuclear program and further dismantling the Yongbyon facility. The Bush administration responded by easing sanctions on the regime and removing it from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. But Pyongyang failed to agree to a verification protocol for its nuclear program by the end of Bush's term, straining U.S.-North Korea relations. By the end of 2008, the regime had restarted its program and barred nuclear inspectors in an effort to pressure U.S. negotiators.
Kleine-Ahlbrandt, 2014 [Stephanie, U.S. Institute of Peace Director of the Asia-Pacific Program “U.S.-China Cooperation on North Korea: What are the Options?” June 9, United States policy towards North Korea aims at achieving verifiable steps toward denuclearization -- which China says it wants, too. The U.S. believes that the best way to accomplish this is through targeted financial measures and conditional engagement. Beijing disagrees. It argues that Pyongyang needs security assurances and encouragement for economic reform, and that this might produce a willingness in the long term on Pyongyang’s part to revisit its nuclear weapons program. Meanwhile, Pyongyang’s nuclear stockpile continues to expand, missile delivery systems are being improved, the danger grows of spreading nuclear weapons technology, and the threat to U.S. allies increases. Clearly the U.S. tactic of trying to persuade China to come over to its approach isn’t having the desired effect. The idea that China can and will compel Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons cannot be the basis of sound U.S. policy. Following North Korea’s 3rd nuclear test [in February 2013], Western officials and analysts interpreted President Xi Jinping’s stronger emphasis on denuclearization as a sign of a policy shift and greater convergence between U.S. and Chinese national interests. But this shift in rhetoric did not translate into any measures to press North Korea to denuclearize or in any sense change Chinese priorities on the [Korean] Peninsula. While China does not want a nuclear North Korea, what it wants even less are scenarios such as war, the collapse of the regime, or a reunited Peninsula [that] allows a U.S. presence on [China’s] border . Even when Chinese analysts believe North Korea’s weapons buildup damages China’s strategic interests, they think that North Korea is simply trying to guarantee its security in the face of existential threats from the United States. In this regard, they cite examples such as Iraq, the NATO operation in Libya and now Ukraine as evidence that renunciation of weapons of mass destruction would only result in regime change. Beijing arguably maintains an interest in the survival of the North Korean regime for its own domestic legitimacy. At a time when President Xi is working to bolster his [Chinese Communist] Party’s standing through ambitious anti-corruption measures and a bold economic reform program, the last thing he needs is the failure or collapse of a communist regime next door. And these fears are [exacerbated] by the fact that the Chinese see the fall of Myanmar to western values as a country on China’s border that is now falling into the western camp. China sees the nuclear issue as just one component of its broader bilateral relationship with North Korea, which is based on a policy of sustaining the country to integrate it more fully into the international economy. Chinese officials see economic engagement as part of a long-term process that will ultimately change North Korea’s strategic calculations with regard to nuclear weapons. To be sure, there is not much affection left between China and North Korea. But Chinese mistrust of the U.S. remains the primary obstacle to meaningful U.S. cooperation on the Peninsula. When China looks at North Korea, it does so through a geopolitical strategic lens featuring U.S.-China competition at its core. Consensus amongst analysts in Beijing is that the U.S.-led bloc is using North Korea as a pretext to deepen its Asia rebalance, to strengthen regional alliances, move missile defense and military assets to the region and expand military exercises. As a result of this mismatch [of] strategic views between the U.S. and China, the very tools being used by both sides are arguably contradictory. Whereas Washington sees diplomatic isolation as essential, China sees diplomatic engagement and dialogue as necessary. Where Washington sees economic sanctions as the best way to deal with the Peninsula, China sees economic cooperation and support as the best way to move forward. And finally, where the U.S sees deterrence as important, China sees security assurances as necessary. So in this situation, what can actually be done? Well, there are no good options, only a series of trade-offs. The basic choice for U.S. policymakers is [among]: trying to change China’s perception of its self interest, which is highly unlikely; applying more pressure on China in return for its [reacting] more strongly to things like any new long-range missile launches or nuclear tests -- Beijing could agree, conceivably, to some new increment of punishment after any nuclear test, ballistic missile flight-test or space launch; or attempting to find a more collaborative approach that draws on China’s interest in engaging North Korea alongside continued U.S.-led multilateral pressure. 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