Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China


AC Harms (North Korean War) AT #3—North Korea Won’t Give up the Bomb



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2AC Harms (North Korean War) AT #3—North Korea Won’t Give up the Bomb

They say __________________________________________________, but

[GIVE :05 SUMMARY OF OPPONENT’S SINGLE ARGUMENT]


  1. Extend our evidence.

[PUT IN YOUR AUTHOR’S NAME]

It’s much better than their evidence because:

[PUT IN THEIR AUTHOR’S NAME]

[CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]:

(it’s newer) (the author is more qualified) (it has more facts)

(their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true)

(their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) (it takes into account their argument)

( ) (their evidence supports our argument)

[WRITE IN YOUR OWN!]
[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

[EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW]

and this reason matters because: ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________



  1. Talks convince North Korea to end the nuclear program



KO, 2012 [Sangtu, Student at Yonsei Unversity in South Korea, https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/conference/papers/2014/six%20party%20talks(edited).pdf
Despite the failure of the Six-Party Talks, most of the concerned countries still consider the talks the only way to address the long-standing nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. China and Russia have consistently demanded that all concerned parties resume negotiations without any preconditions.2 The former North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, showed his readiness to rejoin the Six-Party Talks.3 The US wants to maintain dialogue with North Korea because there seems to be no other option for dissuading North Korea from pursuing a nuclear weapons program without the Six-Party Talks. The US, Japan, and South Korea want to return to the negotiating table once North Korea takes the key steps agreed upon.4 Because the Six-Party Talks have not lost their practical usefulness, it is worth finding the cause of the failure and elaborating on ways to improve the talks. The Six-Party Talks are a multilateral arrangement and a kind of international institution, specifically, an international security regime. In this context, this article aims to examine the reason why the talks failed from the perspective of regime theory. The existing literature deals mostly with the Six-Party Talks from the perspective of the actors, and attributes their failure to China’s support of North Korea or the fact that North Korea insists on sticking to its nuclear weapons development program. In contrast to the actor approach, this article tries to find the root causes of the failure of the Six-Party Talks from the institutional approach. The logical ground for selecting this approach lies in the fact that the Six-Party Talks represent an institutional attempt to solve the North Korean nuclear problem. International problems can hardly be solved by a single country. Even a super power often resorts to a multilateral institution to increase the effectiveness of its problem-solving capability.5 In this context, the United States started the Six-Party Talks to secure the collaboration of the Northeast Asian countries. This means the US sought a multilateral approach after the Geneva Framework had failed as a bilateral approach. The United States realized it alone could not tackle the North Korean nuclear problem and tried to gain the greatest possible assistance from the concerned countries.

  1. All countries have reachable objectives including ending the nuclear weapons program



Council on Foreign Relations, 2013 [Major international political journal, “The Six Party Talks on North Korea's Nuclear Program”, September 13, http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclear-program/p13593]
United States: For Washington, the Six Party Talks serve as a platform for the multilateral mediation of North Korea's nuclear program. The chief U.S. concern remains Pyongyang's nuclear program and the possible sale of nuclear materials and technology to hostile states and terrorist groups. As part of any agreement, Washington wants the reclusive state to consent to visits from IAEA monitors. North Korea: The regime seeks a nonaggression security pledge from the United States, which deploys 28,500 troops in South Korea and maintains a heavy naval presence in the Pacific. Pyongyang also wants normalized relations with Washington and access to economic aid from other Six Party countries. South Korea: Frozen in an unresolved conflict with North Korea, Seoul's ultimate goal is the denuclearization and reunification of the Korean peninsula. The South also wishes to liberalize North Korea's decrepit economy (PDF) through greater financial engagement aimed at mitigating the potential cost of future reunification. China: Beijing serves as Pyongyang's long-standing ally and main trade partner and has used its influence to bring North Korea to the negotiating table. Although this leverage has boosted its relations with Washington, Beijing also fears a rush of refugees across its border and has thus provided the North with energy and food assistance. In March 2013, China finally agreed to sponsor UN sanctions alongside the United States, and it has since then increased its rhetoric for the resumption of talks. Russia: Moscow's position at the table allows it to reassert its influence in Northeast Asia. Although it has traditionally joined China in warning against harsh sanctions, North Korea's recent provocations have driven it to issue condemnations against the regime's nuclear testing. Russia ultimately backed renewed UN sanctions against Pyongyang over its third nuclear test, and it has consistently expressed concerns about the North's activities. Japan: Tokyo worries that North Korea's missile tests could potentially reach Japan. But it also views the Six Party Talks as a forum for negotiating a resolution to the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korean spies in the 1970s and 1980s. The issue remains a divisive point in U.S.-Japan relations, as Tokyo had not wanted Washington to remove North Korea from its State Sponsors of Terrorism list until the issue was resolved.


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