Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China
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- Current diplomacy is failing—emboldening North Korea and hurting the US-Chinese relationship
- Contention Two: Harms (North Korean War)
- Promising military concessions for stronger sanctions can bring North Korea to the negotiating table—solving lash out
- Contention Three: Harms (Regime Change)
- Human rights must be protected in all instances—it’s a moral and legal obligation
- Contention Four: Solvency
- Engaging China tips the balance in talks—they tame North Korea
North Korea 1ACFirst, the PLAN: the United States federal government should make military concessions to People’s Republic of China in exchange for collaborative sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.Contention One: Inherency
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016 [major international relations journal with multiple authors, “The China-North Korea Relationship”, February 8, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097] The United States has pushed North Korea to irreversibly give up its nuclear weapons program in return for aid, diplomatic benefits, and normalization of relations. But experts say Washington and Beijing, while sharing the goal of denuclearizing North Korea, have different views on how to reach it. “Washington believes in using pressure to influence North Korea to change its behavior, while Chinese diplomats and scholars have a much more negative view of sanctions and pressure tactics,” says the International Crisis Group’s Daniel Pinkston (PDF). “They tend to see public measures as humiliating and counterproductive.” The United States has also tried to pressure China to lean more heavily on North Korea. U.S. presidential executive orders (PDF) and congressional moves impose sanctions on countries, firms, or individuals contributing to North Korea’s ability to finance nuclear and missile development; some measures passed in 2005 targeted North Korean funds in Chinese banks, while more recent ones focus on its mineral and metal export industries, which make up an important part of trade with China. Washington has also been in talks with Seoul to deploy a missile defense system (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, also known as THAAD) to boost regional security, though Beijing strongly condemns its potential deployment and sees it as a threat to Chinese national security. “There’s an increasing understanding that North Korea does not provide the kind of stable neighbor and element of the neighborhood that China likes.”—former U.S. ambassador to South Korea and Six Party Talk negotiator Christopher R. Hill There were expectations in the United States at the start of Obama’s first term in 2009 that it might pursue direct talks with North Korea, but Pyongyang’s subsequent rocket tests dimmed such hopes. Washington later settled on an approach that U.S. diplomats described as “strategic patience (PDF).” A 2016 report by the nonpartisan U.S. Congressional Research Service described the policy as designed to pressure the regime in Pyongyang while “insisting that [it] commit to steps toward denuclearization as previously promised in the Six-Party Talks; closely coordinating with treaty allies Japan and South Korea; attempting to convince China to take a tougher line on North Korea; and applying pressure on Pyongyang through arms interdictions and sanctions.” Despite pursuing rounds of dialogue either bilaterally or under the auspices of the Six Party Talks, such efforts have been fruitless. After international powers reached an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program in July 2015, there was speculation over whether a similar deal could be brokered with North Korea. However, a number of regional experts have pointed to major differences between Pyongyang and Tehran, such as regime characteristics, the status of weapon development, and connections to the world economy as reasons why such a deal could not be replicated. Others claim that the Kim regime’s use of nuclear development to sustain its survival rules out the possibility of an effective deal. Contention Two: Harms (North Korean War)
International Business Times, 2016 [Global news outlet quoting military officials, “North Korea Wants Nuclear War ‘Right Now’ After United States Held Military Exercises With Seoul, Foreign Minister Warns”] North Korea is poised to start a war with the United States “right now” after Washington held joint military exercises with South Korea, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su-yong warned Monday. He said Pyongyang could not “sit idle in the face of the U.S. threat.” “At present, a situation has developed on the Korean peninsula that a war can start right now due to the activities of the United States, which conducts military drills in real conditions envisaging all methods of performing sudden military raids on the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea and views ‘a pre-emptive strike’ as a fait accompli,” the North Korean foreign minister said in a lengthy interview with Tass, a Russian state media outlet. “We have a powerful military might that can conduct a war with any means,” he added. The United States has made North Korea its top target and organized the military exercises as a strike against the nation, he said. The warnings mark the latest threat from North Korea, which has complained that the U.S. is preparing to invade the impoverished and unstable nation. The joint military exercises earlier this month between Washington and Seoul involved 300,000 South Korean troops and at least 17,000 from the U.S. The United Nations Command called the annual exercises “nonprovocative” in nature. “The current military maneuvers where a huge military contingent numbering several hundred thousand servicemen is involved and all possible strategic nuclear armaments whose number is twice as much as in the previous years are being held in conditions maximally close to real combat,” the North Korean foreign minister said. He dismissed complaints from global leaders in recent months over North Korea’s nuclear weapon development. North Korea claims it conducted a successful H-bomb test, put a satellite into space orbit and is capable of carrying out a missile strike against Washington. State-run media reported in early March that leader Kim Jong Un had ordered a “nuclear warhead explosion test” and test firings of “several kinds of ballistic rockets able to carry nuclear warheads.” “It was the United States that pushed us towards possessing nuclear weapons while a nuclear threat and blackmail from the U.S. have been the causes that have led to North Korea’s nuclear status,” the North Korean foreign minister told Tass. “In response to the U.S. frenzied hysteria for unleashing a nuclear war, we have fully transferred our army from the form of military response to the form of delivering a pre-emptive strike and state resolutely about the readiness to deliver a pre-emptive nuclear strike.” North Korea will continue to focus its military readiness on nuclear defenses, he said. “In a word, the Korean peninsula faces the dilemma: a thermonuclear war or peace,” he said.
Feng, February 2016 [Zhu, Executive Director of the China Center for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea and a Professor of International Relations at Nanjing University, “What New Approach Should the U.S. and China Take to North Korea?”, February 10, https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-new-approach-should-us-and-china-take-north-korea] John Delury’s article is spot on to reveal the policy inconsistency of the United States in the handling of North Korea in the past decades. It has varied remarkably from the Bill Clinton Administration to the Obama Administration, switching course explicitly between “engagement doves” and “sanction hawks.” Thus Delury calls for a “Nixon in China moment”—an historic diplomatic episode echoing the 1972 visit that successfully reopened the door for U.S.-China cooperation and dramatically left behind decades of animosity and hostility between the two powers. Delury’s call is worth a try as no one can deny the reality that the lingering standoff of denuclearization on the Korea Peninsula actually urges Pyongyang to scale up its nuclear and missile programs to desperately uphold its regime’s survival. The apathetic and inert “strategic patience” approach of the Obama Administration has failed—North Korea exploded its fourth nuclear test on January 6, 2016, and launched its sixth long-range missile test on February 8. The “engagement doves” seem unable to alter North Korean behaviors and unlikely to dissolve Kim Jong-un’s motive to pursue nuclear weapons. Pyongyang’s imperviousness to diplomatic pressures and economic sanctions stems largely from its regime type—a vicious combination of personality cult, totalitarianism, and a “military first” domestic power structure. Kim Jong-un cares little about the suffering of his people, and instead attempts, as usual, to maintain his grip on power through nuclear desperation. There is little hope that North Korea will abandon its nuclear capability as long as the regime type remains unchanged. In addition, Kim Jong-un asks for international recognition of North Korea as a “nuclear status power,” a status few other powers in the world are willing to concede. “Engagement doves” are confident their path will alter North Korea’s regime type. Perhaps. But how patient are we as Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons pose a serious threat to the region? Furthermore, a calling for “Nixon in China” moment seems less desirable and applicable given domestic and security imperatives in the United States. A leading driver behind the call for a “Nixon in China” moment around North Korea is the modern day equivalent of Nixon’s “balancing the Soviet Union”-based security policy. Nixon acutely realized the value of the “China card” vis-à-vis Moscow early in the 1970s, while Mao also saw rapprochement with Washington could greatly beef up his anti-Soviet policy. Might the presidents of America and China now acknowledge a common enemy and seek together to turn North Korea with a “smiling offense” against Kim Jong-un? A new approach is absolutely needed between China and the U.S. when confronting Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile paranoids. An essential option is to conduct tougher sanctions to wither away North Korea’s potential to develop nuclear weapons in internationally coordinated and assured ways. Washington should stop scapegoating China for its failed North Korea policy and respect China’s wide-ranging security concerns in the Asia-Pacific. For the moment, suspending THAAD deployment talks between Washington and Seoul would be helpful. Beijing, equally stuck in North Korean purgatory for two decades, needs to end its indecision and think about completely cutting-off the supply of oil it sends to Pyongyang, following the mandate of a new United Nations Security Council resolution. When China and the U.S. decide together to adopt such a big stick, the international community should simultaneously take tougher sanctions more seriously. Washington needs to lower the threshold of diplomatic engagement, and even promise security guarantees to the Pyongyang regime as North Korea simply agrees to suspend the development of the nation’s nuclear capability. Smothering North Korea for its nuclear capability seems the only workable alternative. China and the United States should not line up to meet North Korea’s exorbitant demands, and instead should jointly make clear that keeping nuclear weapons would be deadly costly. Contention Three: Harms (Regime Change)
Human Rights Watch, 2015 [Human Rights Watch is a nonprofit, nongovernmental human rights organization made up of roughly 400 staff members around the globe. Its staff consists of human rights professionals including country experts, lawyers, journalists, and academics of diverse backgrounds and nationalities, “World Report 2015: North Korea”, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/north-korea] The human rights situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) has remained dire under the control of Kim Jong-Un. The government is controlled by a one-party monopoly and dynastic leadership that do not tolerate pluralism and systematically denies basic freedoms. Tight controls on North Korea’s border with China continued in 2014, further reducing the number of North Koreans able to flee and seek refuge in third countries. A Commission of Inquiry (COI) established by the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC), chaired by retired Australian judge Michael Kirby, published a devastating report in February 2014 that concluded that the North Korea government has committed systematic human right abuses at a scale without parallel in the contemporary world—including extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions, and other sexual violence. On March 28, the HRC adopted a resolution supporting the COI’s findings and calling for accountability. In October, heavy pressure on North Korea at the UN General Assembly in New York and North Korea’s concern over the possibility of a referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC) prompted a first-ever meeting between North Korean diplomats and Marzuki Darusman, the HRC special rapporteur on human rights in North Korea. On November 18, the third committee of the UN General Assembly, rejecting an amendment by Cuba that would have stripped accountability from the text, adopted the resolution by a 111 to 19 vote, with 55 states abstaining. The resolution endorsed the COI’s conclusions and called on the UN Security Council to consider referring North Korea’s leadership to the ICC for crimes against humanity committed against the people of North Korea. Surprisingly, North Korea has ratified four key international human rights treaties and signed, but not yet ratified, another, and has a constitution that provides a number of rights protections on paper. But in practice, the government is among the most rights-repressing in the world. Political and civil rights are nonexistent since the government quashes all forms of disfavored expression and opinion and totally prohibits any organized political opposition, independent media, free trade unions, or civil society organizations. Religious freedom is systematically repressed. North Koreans who seek to assert their rights are perceived to show insufficient reverence for supreme leader Kim Jong-Un or the ruling Korean Workers’ Party. Those who act in ways viewed as contrary to state interests face arbitrary arrest, torture, and ill-treatment, detention without trial, or trial by state-controlled courts. North Koreans also face severe penalties for possessing unauthorized videos of foreign TV programs and movies or communicating with persons outside the country. The government also practices collective punishment for supposed anti-state offenses, effectively enslaving hundreds of thousands of citizens, including children, in prison camps and other detention facilities where they face deplorable conditions and forced labor.
Gibney, 2008 [Mark, he Belk Distinguished Professor at the University of North Carolina-Asheville. His latest book is International Human Rights Law: Returning to Universal Principles, “Responsibilities for Protecting Human Rights”, February, https://global-ejournal.org/2008/02/15/gibney/] Human rights are universal, meaning that each person possesses certain human rights by the mere fact of this person’s humanity. What does not matter – or at least what should not matter – is where a person lives, how much money a person has (or does not have), whether that person’s country has (or has not) became a party to any particular international human rights treaties, and so on. Who has the responsibility for meeting these “universal” rights? The (universal) response of states has been that each country is responsible for protecting human rights within its own borders – but that no state has human rights obligations that extend outside of its own territorial jurisdiction. But what if a country is not able or is not willing to protect the human rights of its citizens? Or what if human rights are being violated, in large part due to the actions of outside states? It is here that the silence of the international community has been deafening. Thus, notwithstanding near-universal declarations of the “universality” of human rights, the responsibility for protecting human rights has been based almost exclusively on territorial considerations. What has this territorial approach to human rights given us? Unfortunately, not nearly enough. Looking at violations of economic rights alone, we live in a world where an average of 50,000 people die every single day due to preventable causes. Yet, notwithstanding this incredible level of human rights atrocities, the territorial approach to human rights has essentially gone unchallenged. However, this has started to change and it has come from the most unlikely of sources: the “war on terror.” To state matters bluntly, the reason why “enemy combatants” are being held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and not in some location in this country is that American government officials are of the mind that U.S. obligations under international law do not extend outside the territorial boundaries of the United States. Under this (territorial) approach to human rights, the U.S. government is not bound by the Torture Convention and the Covenant on International Civil and Political Rights (both of which the U.S. is a party to) when it is operating outside the territorial borders of the United States. This same kind of rationale is behind the policy of “extraordinary rendition.” The idea is that the U.S. has not done anything wrong or unlawful when individuals outside the United States are being kidnapped and sent to some third country for “interrogation” purposes – albeit at the behest of, and under the direction and control of, American authorities. Again, the argument is that American obligations under international law are only applicable to actions within the United States. Fortunately, most people have been able to see behind this façade. That is, they have recognized that territorial considerations should not be used in this manner to demarcate where a country’s human rights obligations begin – but, more importantly, where they end. Most people seem to believe that torture is illegal whether it takes place in Fort Benning, Georgia, or Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, or at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. In that way, the “war on terror” has helped us see that territorial considerations oftentimes make little sense in the context of protecting human rights. This is not to suggest that “territory” does not matter at all or that states have the same human rights obligations outside their borders as they do domestically. Neither of these propositions happens to be true. Rather, each state has the primary responsibility for protecting human rights within its own domestic borders. However, what we have completely failed to recognize are the secondary responsibilities that the rest of the international community has when the territorial state has not been willing or able to offer human rights protection. And what also has to be said is that this is not simply a moral obligation – wouldn’t it be a nice gesture if we provided some assistance to starving children in some other land – rather, it is a legal obligation. This is most clearly seen in the language of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, one of the so-called International Bill of Rights, whereby each state party to the Covenant has (legally) obligated itself to protect the economic rights of “everyone” by means of “international assistance and cooperation.” What does “international assistance and cooperation” mean? What it means is that when children in a particular country are being denied an education (to choose one example), this not only constitutes a violation of human rights by the territorial state – but this also constitutes a human rights violation on the part of the rest of the international community, which has pledged to protect those rights. The point is that human rights are universal, but so are the duties and responsibilities to meet those rights. This is what the framers of the International Bill of Rights, and all of the other international human rights treaties, sought to achieve. This is the only way that the notion of human rights makes any sense. If human rights protection were something that individual states could (and would) do individually, there would be no need for any international conventions. Stripped to their barest essentials, what each one of these treaties represents is nothing less than this: that everyone has an ethical as well as a legal obligation to protect the human rights of all other people. Sadly enough, our inability to recognize the extent of our own human rights obligations has constituted the greatest human rights failure of all. Contention Four: Solvency
Global Times, March 2016 [Founded in April 2009, the paper is one of the most dynamic players among Chinese media, and has rapidly become the major English newspaper in the nation., March 24, http://www.globaltimes.cn/about-us/] The fact that China, the US and Russia all voted in favor of the new sanction resolution reflects a united stance in opposition to North Korea's nuclear tests. The three countries have consistent interests in opposing nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia, but they diverge on how to reach this goal. For example, China and Russia stand firmly against the planned US deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile defense system in South Korea. North Korea's nuclear test should be condemned, and so should the US' attempt to take advantage of the occasion to expand its military presence in the region. While China shows support for the new sanctions, it also emphasizes that they are just a way to persuade the North back to the negotiation table. Dialogue is the best course to resolve the North Korea conundrum. China and Russia must enhance coordination while interacting more with North Korea. Moscow, in particular, given its growing ties with Pyongyang, should play a bigger role in getting Pyongyang to realize that its current approach is leading to a dead end. There are multiple plans of how to resume negotiations under discussion in China. One suggests a three-step road map: First, Washington and Seoul suspend joint military drills in return for Pyongyang halting nuclear tests; second, should talks over a replacement of the Korean Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty commence, Pyongyang freezes its nuclear programs; and finally, after the normalization of the US-North Korea ties and the opening-up of North Korea, the North totally abandons its nuclear programs. Many other plans are also being debated in China. The underlying principle is that the problem should be resolved through negotiations. It's noticeable that the US has its own bottom line over the North Korean nuclear issue. The US currently deems the North Korea nuclear abilities no harmful to its interests. But once the North crosses the nuclear threshold by arming a warhead, the US will not hesitate to take military actions to sabotage its nuclear capabilities. There are three possibilities on the peninsula. The first one is what I expect most. That is, the North will soften its attitude and return to talks six months later. It's estimated that as long as China and Russia take seriously suspending exports of oil, especially aviation fuel, to North Korea, the North will be hard hit in four or six months. Resolution 2270 is the toughest set of sanctions yet and if it is well implemented, it will inflict unbearable pain on North Korea and force it back to the negotiation table. The second possibility is that the North will continue its tough gestures. The belligerent gestures of the North may be a show driven by domestic political pressure. In that case, it's a political game, but if it becomes too vehement, a military conflict may be inevitable. The last one is that the impasse will last five to six years and finally the North crosses the nuclear threshold. It must be brought back to the negotiation table before the worst-case scenario happens.
Chanlett-Avery, et al, January 2016 [Emma, Coordinator Specialist in Asian Affairs, Ian Rinehart, Analyst in Asian Affairs, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Specialist in Nonproliferation, Congressional Research Service Report, “North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation”, January 15, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf] U.S. policy to pressure North Korea depends heavily on China’s influence. In addition to being North Korea’s largest trading partner by far—accounting for about 70% of North Korea’s total trade—China also provides food and energy aid that is an essential lifeline for the regime in Pyongyang. China’s overriding priority appears to be to prevent the collapse of North Korea. Analysts assess that Beijing fears the destabilizing effects of a humanitarian crisis, significant refugee flows over its borders, and the uncertainty of how other nations, particularly the United States, would assert themselves on the peninsula in the event of a power vacuum. Beijing is supporting joint industrial projects between China’s northeastern provinces and North Korea’s northern border region. Some Chinese leaders also may see strategic value in having North Korea as a “buffer” between China and democratic, U.S.-allied South Korea. However, since 2010 an increasing number of Chinese academics have called for a reappraisal of China’s friendly ties with North Korea, citing the material and reputational costs to China of maintaining such ties. The rhetorical emphasis Chinese leaders now place on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula—reportedly even in meetings with North Korean officials—may suggest that Beijing’s patience could be waning. In what is viewed by many observers as a diplomatic snub, Chinese President Xi Jinping has had several summits with South Korean President Park Geun-hye but has yet to meet with the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Despite this apparent cooling in relations, Beijing remains an obstacle to many U.S. policy goals. Imposing harsher punishments on North Korea in international fora, such as the United Nations, is hindered by China’s seat on the UNSC. However, Chinese trade with and aid to North Korea is presumed to be a fraction of what it might be if Beijing decided to fully support Kim Jong-un. This assumption is a key factor driving the U.S. and South Korean approach, which seeks to avoid pushing China to a place where it feels compelled to provide more diplomatic and economic assistance to North Korea. Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> 2015 2015 -> Police Militarization 2015 -> 2015 ihbb championships: hs history Bowl Round 4 – Prelims First Quarter 2015 -> Wrtp/big step · 3841 W. Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, wi 53208 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 December 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Darton College 2015 -> Training Workshop on Planning and Implementation of Multi-Sectoral Development Programme (MsDP) in Bihar Date : 6th 2015 -> Rao bulletin 15 June 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 September 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 August 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Science, and transportation united states senate Download 2.62 Mb. Share with your friends:
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