China Politics Disadvantage Vocabulary

China Politics Disadvantage

Vocabulary

Chinese Communist Party (CCP): Main political party of China. They have large control over the entire country and believe in a strong government with control over the people and economy. Xi Jinping is the leader of the party.

Xi Jinping (She jin-PING): General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, the President of the People's Republic of China, and the Chairman of China's Central Military Commission. He’s like Obama, but even more powerful since China does not have the same political structure as the US. Essentially, he’s the president of China.

Political Capital: Power to influence members of a political party. It is also the ability to progress a particular issue/agenda. The DA argues that there is a limited amount that politicians can spend.

Economic and Political Reforms: These are changes to the political and economic system to make them better. In the case of China, these reforms are to make the country more “open”. Economic reforms might include reducing government involvement in businesses, reducing taxes, and increasing free trade. Political reforms might include more free speech, freedom of religion, freedom of press, gender and sexual identity freedoms, and military freedoms.

Corruption: dishonesty in a political figure. This is where someone in power takes bribes, hires friends, or simply does not try at their job. There are high-levels of corruption in China that Xi is trying to eliminate.

1NC China Politics Disadvantage Shell

1. Uniqueness: Xi pushing for economic and political reforms. These require significant political capital

Naughton, 2015 [Barry, So Kwanlok Chair of Chinese International Affairs at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego, “Is There a “Xi Model” of Economic Reform? Acceleration of Economic Reform since Fall 2014”, Winter, http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm46bn.pdf]
In fact, within the jumble of disparate policy elements in the Xi agenda, in the latter part of 2014 there was a substantial shift in relative importance. The importance of economic reforms increased palpably as, for the first time, Xi began to put considerable political muscle behind specific strands of the economic reform agenda. The economic reform program has now moved out of the earlier stages of preparation and the creation of specialized institutions to manage the reform process (as described in earlier CLMs). Earlier assessments, even when positive, have inevitably been cautious, because implementation has been slow, relative to the bold and broad declarations of the November 2013 Third Plenum.1 Today, however, we can start to see important areas where economic reforms have moved beyond rhetoric into important efforts of practical implementation. This does not necessarily mean that Xi has found an effective or reasonable “model” of reform, but it certainly changes the terms of the conversation we should be having about economic policy. Xi’s economic reforms are now serious and real, and deserve serious and careful attention.2 Oddly, so far the important measures discussed here have been presented in a somewhat understated way in the Chinese press, and have received very little press attention outside China. This shortcoming should be rectified as soon as possible. In the following, I survey three key elements of economic reform that moved into serious implementation in the October–November 2014 time frame. Each of these three is complex, and a full analysis, or even a complete description, cannot really be achieved in this short format. The first section lists all three policy areas. Sections two through four describe the policy content for each of the measures. In Section five, I present an extremely preliminary set of observations about the nature of the emerging “Xi model” of economic reform. Three Policy Measures In the space of a few months, and with little fanfare, Beijing policy-makers introduced the following three economic reform policy packages: a) A program was adopted to divorce local government finances from the corporate “local government funding vehicles” that have been piling up debt since the global financial crisis. This policy includes capping local debt and reclassifying and restructuring debt into public debt (essentially “municipal bonds”) and corporate debt (including for companies that produce public services). This is a bold and aggressive program that seeks to fundamentally shift the relationship between local governments and debt markets. At the same time, it will lead to a major short-term reduction in local government financial resources. b) A new system of property rights was introduced for agricultural land that provides protection to farmers and a clear system to support renting, leasing, and mortgaging land. c) At the APEC Leaders’ Summit in Beijing (November 9–12, 2014), China undertook new commitments in a range of international negotiations, substantively completing free- trade agreements with Korea and Australia, and moved forward in agreements with the United States. While no individual step was a game-changer, cumulatively these moves amounted to an important shift toward a more open economic regime, particularly since complementary domestic policy steps were also taken. Each of these policy initiatives addresses fundamental aspects of the economic system. In some cases—such as land rights—the new measures address contentious political or theoretical issues that have defeated efforts at resolution for a decade or more. Each of the policy initiatives has opposition, so the top political leadership must have expended political capital, either in overwhelming the opponents, or in working out political deals that would bring them on board. Let us consider each of these initiatives in turn.

2. Link: The plan spends Xi’s political capital—It’s controversial to work with the US

Lieberthal and Jisi, 2012 [Kenneth and Wang, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and in Global Economy and Development and is Director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. Director of the Center for International and Strategic Studies and Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust”, March, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/3/30-us-china-lieberthal/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf]
In a major policy address in Washington on February 15, 2012, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping placed the need to enhance mutual trust at the top of the list of challenges that the two sides must address more successfully.5 He was right to give the issue such priority. His paper’s coauthors have spent many years deeply engaged in U.S.-China relations, and they feel that mutual understanding is critical to achieving the outcomes that are in the interests of each country. But they also worry that at a time of far reaching change, each side is increasingly uncertain about the other side’s real perceptions and long-term intentions in this relationship. Does the other side seek and expect to develop a normal, pragmatic major power relationship, where the two countries cooperate where they can and seek to limit disagreements where their interests differ? Or does the other side see its success as necessitating concerted actions to constrict and reduce its opponent’s long-term capabilities and influence? Will the top leadership of the other side be willing and able to spend enough political capital to overcome domestic obstacles to establishing a more cooperative relationship? is paper terms distrust of ultimate intentions in the bilateral relationship “strategic distrust.” Here, “strategic” means expectations about the nature of the bilateral relationship over the long run; it is not a synonym for “military.” “Strategic distrust” therefore means a perception that the other side will seek to achieve its key long term goals at concerted cost to your own side’s core prospects and interests. A major concern is that it appears as of 2012 that strategic distrust is growing on both sides and that this perception can, if it festers, create a self- fulfilling prophecy of overall mutual antagonism.

3. Internal Link: These political and economic reforms prevent country collapse

Zhiyue, 2015 [Bo, Director of New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre (NZCCRC) and Professor of Political Science at Victoria University of Wellington, 3/30, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/the-end-of-ccp-rule-and-the-collapse-of-china/]
By world communist standards, the CCP has indeed entered its endgame. After 70 years, for instance, communist rule in the Soviet Union ended on December 26, 1991. In six months, the Chinese Communist Party will have ruled the People’s Republic of China for 66 years. With rampant corruption at all levels of the party and the government — where a typist has taken bribes in the amount of four million yuan and a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission took cash bribes weighing more than one ton — the CCP seems unlikely to outlive its Soviet counterpart by a large margin. Nevertheless, by Chinese dynastic standards, the CCP’s rule is not in its endgame. Instead, it might very well be in its beginning. The last dynasty, the Qing, lasted for 267 years; by that standard, CCP rule is still in its infancy. In 1710, 66 years into the Qing Dynasty’s rule in China, the country was at its peak as a prosperous and powerful nation under the wise leadership of Emperor Kangxi. The dynasty would last another 200 years. As a ruling dynasty, the CCP has had a mixed record so far. While it is true that the CCP under Mao Zedong unified most of the country, Mao’s policies did not make China more prosperous and stronger. Tens of millions perished in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward, and the entire population suffered during the decade-long power struggles of the Cultural Revolution. Deng Xiaoping heralded a new era of economic prosperity, but his GDP-oriented policies have severely strained China’s environmental capacities. China witnessed the best performance in terms of economic growth in the decade from 2002 to 2012 under the leadership of Hu Jintao. Yet corruption and environmental degradation worsened in the same period, in spite of Hu’s signature slogan of a “scientific outlook on development.” In the past two and a half years, Xi Jinping’s leadership has been long on anti-corruption campaigns but short on anti-pollution efforts. One hundred officials at the rank of vice minister and above have been investigated for corruption, but there is no sign that the central leadership is taking environmental issues more seriously. A series of new leading small groups have been created to manage national security, internet issues, reforms, and military modernization, but no central leading small group on environmental protection has been set up. Given these mixed results, Xi Jinping could very likely be the last ruler in China as a communist. Yet he could also start another new era of prosperity and strength as a new emperor of the CCP Dynasty. Whether the People’s Republic of China will end up like the Soviet Union or follow the footsteps of Manchus on its way to international prominence will depend on what this new leadership will do (or will not do) in the next seven years.

4. Impact: Country collapse sparks nuclear lash out

Rexing, 2005 (San Epoch Times International “ 8/3 http://www.theepocht...8-3/30931.html)
Since the Party’s life is above all else it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The speech free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the speech. The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCPs bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million

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