Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China
NC/1NR AT #1—Xi Not Pushing Reforms
Download 2.62 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- Xi is pushing political reforms to end corruption in the government
- Now is the brink—Xi has extensive political capital and can either become a great reformer or a dictator
- Political reform efforts are successful, but they require all of Xi’s political capital
2NC/1NR AT #1—Xi Not Pushing ReformsThey say Xi can’t pass reforms, but [GIVE :05 SUMMARY OF OPPONENT’S SINGLE ARGUMENT]
[PUT IN YOUR AUTHOR’S NAME] It’s much better than their Weekly Standard evidence because: [PUT IN THEIR AUTHOR’S NAME] [CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]: (it’s newer) (the author is more qualified) (it has more facts) (their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true) (their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) (it takes into account their argument) ( ) (their evidence supports our argument) [WRITE IN YOUR OWN!] [EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW] Our Naughton evidence has three examples about how Xi is reforming the economy. He changed debt laws, agriculture, and increased free trade. Their Weekly Standard evidence just says Xi can’t change the economy with little to no reasons. [EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW] This matters because: we have more facts to support our point and thus our uniqueness must be true. That means we can weigh the DA against the Aff.
Li, 2015 [Cheng, writer for the Brookings Institution, “Understanding Xi’s contradictions”, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/09/17-president-xi-chinese-leadership-li] The most astonishing political achievement of the Xi leadership is its bold and broad anti-corruption campaign. In 2013 alone, the Chinese authorities investigated 182,000 officials––the highest annual number of cases in 30 years. By September 2015, the authorities had purged about 120 vice-ministerial and provincial level leaders on corruption charges. But Xi has never linked rampant official corruption with the fundamental flaws in the Chinese political system. Instead, he asserts that the Chinese should have confidence in China’s political system. Under Xi’s initiative, the fourth plenum of the 18th Party Central Committee held in the fall of 2014 was devoted to legal reform. This was the first plenum in party history that concentrated on law. Xi, more than any previous leader, is interested in making the nation’s judicial development part of his legacy. Yet, in 2015, Chinese authorities arrested or persecuted several hundred human rights lawyers and legal professionals on charges of “endangering national security.”
Li, 2015 [Cheng, writer for the Brookings Institution, “Understanding Xi’s contradictions”, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/09/17-president-xi-chinese-leadership-li] As the leader of a rapidly changing country with contrasting views and values, as well as conflicting interests, Xi Jinping is wise to strike a delicate balance between various constituencies and socioeconomic forces. Arguably, it is Xi’s contradictions that make him a well-rounded effective leader. The increasingly complicated international environment that China confronts also leads Xi to be deliberately ambiguous about his stances and strategies. Arguably, it is Xi’s contradictions that make him a well-rounded effective leader. Self-contradictions also suggest that Xi Jinping is not a dogmatic leader, but that he can be flexible. Of course, some of Xi’s contradictions may only be temporary. If Xi hopes to be a great leader in Chinese history, sooner or later he should present a clearly articulated and coherent vision for the country’s political trajectory. It is reasonable for Xi to spend the first few years of his leadership searching for the right sequence for implementing his agenda, maximizing public support, and accumulating political capital. But when the next Party Congress convenes in the fall of 2017, Xi will have to reveal his stance on China’s political institutionalization. A comprehensive understanding of Xi’s contradictions is instrumental for foreign observers. We should not overstate any one dimension of Xi’s leadership while ignoring others. It is still premature to make a definitive judgment about his intentions, capacity, and historical legacy. It would be a huge mistake to conclude that Xi’s policy decisions—either domestic or foreign—are predetermined.
Pei, 2015 [Minxin, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, 4/11, http://www.chinausfocus.com/political-social-development/xi-jinpings-anti-corruption-campaign-enters-a-crucial-phase/] Since he became the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November 2012, Xi Jinping has invested much of his newly acquired political capital in two initiatives. One was an ambitious and far-reaching economic reform agenda, which was unveiled at the 3rd plenum of the Central Committee last November. The other was an intense drive against corruption, which was launched almost immediately after Xi settled into his office. Minxin Pei Minxin Pei Although the two initiatives are, strictly speaking, separate. In reality they are closely linked. Without market-oriented reforms that reduce opportunities for abuse of power, it is impossible to root out corruption. Similarly, a sustained campaign against corruption is a political precondition for successful economic reforms. To date, Xi’s government has made greater progress on the anti-corruption front. This fight has lasted longer while the drive for reform has barely started. Most importantly, Xi’s campaign on graft is a centralized, top-down effort. It is comparatively easy to use the power of the CCP’s in-house anti-corruption agency, the Central Discipline and Inspection Committee, to investigate and punish officials who have committed misdeeds. By contrast, economic reforms require negotiations among stakeholders with competing interests and implementations by local governments and various bureaucracies – a far more complicated, slow, and uncertain process. That is why Xi’s war on corruption has achieved initial success. Figures released by the CCP’s own anti-corruption committee show that that more than 182,000 party members, including 17 high-ranking officials at levels of vice-minister and above, were punished for various misdeeds in 2013. The sustained intensity of Xi’s campaign has caught most observers by surprise. Initially, many suspected that, like his predecessors, Xi would simply use a brief crackdown on corruption to purge political rivals and gain popular support. But today, 18 months into his administration, hardly a day passes without the fall of a tiger (a high-ranking official) or several “flies” (mid-level or junior officials). It is becoming clear that Xi’s fight against corruption is quite different from that of his predecessors. Among many things, the most critical decision Xi has made on this issue is the appointment of a very capable senior official – Wang Qishan – to the head of the Discipline and Inspection Committee. Known in China as a “fire-fighter” for his proven ability to handle crisis and deliver results, Wang, a close political ally of Xi, has not disappointed. In the past year, Wang instituted two changes that significantly enhanced the party’s ability to uncover criminal acts perpetrated by local officials. One is to dispatch a large number of “roving inspection” teams to provinces and large state-owned enterprises. Although the practice of sending inspection teams to local governments and bureaucracies was established more than a decade ago, Beijing had not sent out a large numbers in the past. However, things are different this time. The roving inspection teams sent by Wang are headed by recently retired senior officials who report directly to Wang’s committee. During their tours, these teams privately interview local officials to gather information on the misconduct of their colleagues. Thus, it has become much harder for local officials to conceal their crimes or protect each other because some of their colleagues, out of fear or spite, have incentives to denounce them to the roving inspection teams. A second important initiative credited to Wang was the requirement that any corruption investigation conducted in a jurisdiction must be reported to the anti-corruption agency at a superior level. In the past, local officials could cover up the wrongdoings of their colleagues with relative ease because they did not have to report to their superiors such investigations. Now it will be much more difficult to do so because of the reporting requirement, which was formally endorsed by the party at the 3rd plenum last November. Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> 2015 2015 -> Police Militarization 2015 -> 2015 ihbb championships: hs history Bowl Round 4 – Prelims First Quarter 2015 -> Wrtp/big step · 3841 W. Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, wi 53208 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 December 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Darton College 2015 -> Training Workshop on Planning and Implementation of Multi-Sectoral Development Programme (MsDP) in Bihar Date : 6th 2015 -> Rao bulletin 15 June 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 September 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 August 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Science, and transportation united states senate Download 2.62 Mb. Share with your friends:
|