Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China
NC/1NR AT—“Xi has no Political Capital”
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- 2AC Affirmative Answers to China Politics Disadvantage
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- The US and China cooperate on other issues happen all of the time! This should have triggered the DA
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- No Internal-Link: Xi does not have to use political capital—the communist party controls all politics
2NC/1NR AT—“Xi has no Political Capital”
Huffington Post, 2015 [“What You Need To Know About China’s Strongman President”, October 5, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/chinese-president-xi-jinping_us_55fed862e4b08820d918ff14] Xi has quickly emerged as maybe the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong. China’s previous leaders largely shunned the spotlight, portraying themselves as part of a group ruling by consensus. Xi has instead built a huge personal brand by employing strongman tactics at home and abroad. In China, Xi has consolidated enormous personal power through a blistering crackdown on both corrupt officials and civil society activists. The prosecution of powerful officials (many who happen to be Xi’s political rivals) and the detention of civil rights lawyers have shocked China-watchers in their audacity and depth. Some scholars argue that the twin crackdowns reveal Xi’s vision for China’s future: not a liberal, electoral democracy, but an efficient authoritarian state with a strong leader at the helm. 2AC Affirmative Answers to China Politics Disadvantage
The Weekly Standard, 2013 [International affairs magazine, “Beijing’s New Slogan”, July 1, http://www.weeklystandard.com/beijings-new-slogan/article/736881] Nonetheless, the prospects for domestic political reform are next to nil. There is little evidence that any of the senior leaders, from Xi on down, will use their limited political capital to push for democratization. A useful index is the latest budget, which allocates more for domestic security than national defense. Other problems that Hu bequeathed to Xi include a degraded natural environment and rising ethnic tensions, with increasing numbers of Tibetan self-immolations and Uighur riots in Xinjiang. On the regional front, Xi’s references to the country’s glorious past and aspirations to return to it will likely set the neighbors’ teeth on edge, no matter how much he tries to round the hard edges of Chinese nationalism. Throughout the history of imperial China, surrounding states, all of whose ways were believed to be inferior to those of the Middle Kingdom, were expected to pay tribute. The recent report claiming that Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands were traditionally Chinese vassals is an unpleasant echo of this past—while it also indirectly challenges the United States, which has military bases on Okinawa. China has also pushed Malaysia, the Philippines, and India on territorial issues.
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Lieberthal and Jisi, 2012 [Kenneth and Wang, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and in Global Economy and Development and is Director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. Director of the Center for International and Strategic Studies and Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust”, March, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/3/30-us-china-lieberthal/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf] The issue of mutual distrust of long-term intentions— termed here “strategic distrust”—has become a central concern in US-China relations. Vice President Xi Jinping recognized this reality in giving this issue first place in his review of key problems in U.S.-China relations during his major policy address in Washington, DC on February 15, 2012. Both Beijing and Washington seek to build a constructive partnership for the long run. U.S.-China relations are, moreover, mature. The two sides understand well each others’ position on all major issues and deal with each other extensively. The highest level leaders meet relatively frequently, and there are more than sixty regular government-to-government dialogues between agencies in the two governments each year.
Ignatius, January 2016 [David, Writer for the Washington Post, “Xi’s reforms may backfire on Chinese leader”, http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20160117/OPINION04/160119241] But Xi is off to a bad new year. The Chinese economy is slowing sharply, with actual GDP growth last year now estimated by U.S. analysts at several points below the official rate of 6.5 percent. The Chinese stock market has fallen 15 percent this year, and the value of its currency has slipped. Capital flight continues, probably at the $1 trillion annual rate estimated for the second half of last year. But China's economic woes are manageable compared with its domestic political difficulties. Xi's anti-corruption drive has accelerated into a full-blown purge. The campaign has rocked the Chinese intelligence service, toppled some senior military commanders and frightened Communist Party leaders around the country. Jittery party officials are lying low, avoiding decisions that might get them in trouble; the resulting paralysis makes other problems worse. “Xi is in an unprecedentedly powerful position. But because he has dismantled the tools of collective leadership that had been built up over decades, he owns this crisis,” says Kurt Campbell, who was the Obama administration's top Asia expert until 2013. He worries that Xi will “double down” on his nationalistic push for greater power in Asia, which is one of the few themes that can unite the country. “To scale back shows weakness, which Xi can ill afford now,” says Campbell. Chinese sometimes use historical parables to explain current domestic political issues. The talk recently among some members of the Chinese elite has been a comparison between Xi's tenure and that of Yongzheng, the emperor who ruled China from 1722 to 1735. Yongzheng waged a harsh campaign against bribery, but he came to be seen by many Chinese as a despot who had gained power illegitimately. “A lot of historical events of that period are repeating in China today, from power conspiracy to corruption, from a deteriorating economy to an external hostility threat,” comments one Chinese observer in an email. Xi's political troubles illustrate the difficulty of trying to reform a one-party system from within. Much as Mikhail Gorbachev hoped in the 1980s that reforms could revitalize a decaying Soviet Communist Party, Xi began his presidency in 2013 by attacking Chinese party barons who had grown rich and comfortable on the spoils of China's economic boom. Many of Xi's rivals were proteges of former President Jiang Zemin, which meant that Xi made some powerful enemies. David Shambaugh, a China scholar at George Washington University, was an outlier when he argued last March that Xi's reform campaign would backfire. “Despite appearances, China's political system is badly broken, and nobody knows it better than the Communist Party itself,” he wrote in The Wall Street Journal. “The endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun.” This political obituary may prove premature. But there's growing agreement among China analysts that Xi's crackdown has fueled dissent within the party and beyond, leading to further repression. Xi is a decisive strongman, so he may fare better than Gorbachev, but the structure underneath him is fragile. China's recent economic turmoil may be an inevitable result of the transition Xi is trying to steer. He wants to move China away from a debt-laden bubble economy, which depended on ever-growing exports, toward a more sustainable, consumer-driven model. His problem is that the Chinese system is bloated by inefficient, state-owned enterprises that survive on debt and subsidies. Xi has found it impossible, so far, to cut them loose. “It's no easy thing to reboot a $10 trillion economy,” says a former American official who knows the top Chinese leaders well. “Xi is trying to do it all himself,” at a time when “everything is changing at once.” This month's financial rout showed the dangers for a China caught between a truly free market and continuing government control. An ill-conceived “circuit-breaker” that kicked in when the stock market fell 7 percent, and government orders to big investors not to sell, probably accelerated the sell-off and the flight of capital. Conflicting signals on whether the central bank wanted a stronger or weaker currency shook the market's confidence. Xi has been pressing the free-market accelerator at the same time he pumps the political brake. For a China halfway pregnant with reform, the past month's turbulence showed that these fundamental contradictions may not be sustainable.
Lawrence and Martin, 2013 [Susan and Michael, specialists in Asian Affairs, writers for Congressional Research Service, “Understanding China’s Political System”, March 20, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41007.pdf] The report opens with a brief overview of China’s leading political institutions. They include the Communist Party and its military, the People’s Liberation Army; the State, led by the State Council, to which the Party delegates day-to-day administration of the country; and the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s unicameral legislature. On paper, the NPC has broad powers. In practice, the legislature is controlled by the Communist Party and is able to exercise little of its constitutionally mandated oversight over the state and the judiciary. Following its 18th Congress in November 2012, the Communist Party ushered in a new Party leadership. New State and NPC leaders took office following the opening session of the 12th NPC in March 2013. Following the overview, this report introduces a number of distinct features of China’s formal political culture and discusses some of their implications for U.S.-China relations. Those features include the fact that China is led not by one leader, but by a committee of seven; that the military is not a national army, but rather an armed wing of the Communist Party; that provincial leaders are powerful players in the system; and that ideology continues to matter in China, with the Communist Party facing vocal criticism from its left flank each time it moves even further away from its Marxist roots. Other themes include the role of meritocracy as a form of legitimization for one-party rule, and ways in which meritocracy is being undermined; the introduction of an element of predictability into elite Chinese politics through the enforcement of term and age limits for holders of public office; the Chinese system’s penchant for long-term planning; and the system’s heavy emphasis on maintaining political stability. The next section of the report discusses governance challenges in the Chinese political system, from “stove-piping” and bureaucratic competition, to the distorting influence of bureaucratic rank, to factionalism, corruption, and weak rule of law. Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> 2015 2015 -> Police Militarization 2015 -> 2015 ihbb championships: hs history Bowl Round 4 – Prelims First Quarter 2015 -> Wrtp/big step · 3841 W. Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, wi 53208 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 December 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Darton College 2015 -> Training Workshop on Planning and Implementation of Multi-Sectoral Development Programme (MsDP) in Bihar Date : 6th 2015 -> Rao bulletin 15 June 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 September 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 August 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Science, and transportation united states senate Download 2.62 Mb. Share with your friends:
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