Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China


NC/1NR AT #5—No Political Capital Loss



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2NC/1NR AT #5—No Political Capital Loss

They say __________________________________________________, but

[GIVE :05 SUMMARY OF OPPONENT’S SINGLE ARGUMENT]


  1. Extend our evidence.

[PUT IN YOUR AUTHOR’S NAME]

It’s much better than their evidence because:

[PUT IN THEIR AUTHOR’S NAME]

[CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]:

(it’s newer) (the author is more qualified) (it has more facts)

(their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true)

(their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) (it takes into account their argument)

( ) (their evidence supports our argument)

[WRITE IN YOUR OWN!]
[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

[EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW]

and this reason matters because: ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________


  1. Xi’s political capital is key to reforms – Perception of international strength is critical to holding off nationalist challenges to his domestic agenda



Lieberthal, 2013 (Kenneth Lieberthal, 3/14, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development on PBS News Hour, interview with Judy Woodruff, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june13/china_03-14.html)
KENNETH LIEBERTHAL: Well, he's already tried to change the style by being much more of a kind of lively politician than his predecessor was. But I think Gordon is right. We have to look to see whether he can forge the kind of consensus to make deep structural reforms in China that the country deeply needs if it's going to move forward. JUDY WOODRUFF: For example? KENNETH LIEBERTHAL: For example, they need to shift from an export-oriented and investment-focused economy to one that's much more focused on domestic consumption as a driver of economic development, which requires expanding the services sector, increasing incomes and so forth. That runs against huge vested interests in China. So the question is whether he's going to be able to really rework incentives through this system so that he can build the services sector, build incomes, reduce huge capital-intensive infrastructure projects and reduce dependence on exports. JUDY WOODRUFF: So, looking at him, Gordon Chang, from the United States, what will we see that looks different, do you think? GORDON CHANG: I think the one thing we have been concerned about is all that, although he's been in power for only a few months, since last November, when he became general-secretary of the party, China has engaged on some very provocative maneuvers against the Japanese, because the Chinese claim sovereignty over the Senkaku islands in the East China Sea. People say that Xi Jinping is actually leading China's foreign policy on this issue, and if so, we're in trouble, because this is a very troubled area. JUDY WOODRUFF: And do you believe, Ken Lieberthal, that that's a primary priority of his? KENNETH LIEBERTHAL: I think his real priority is domestic. What he needs is stability abroad in order to undertake reform domestically. But his big problem is that he -- that the Communist Party has really nurtured very ardent nationalism domestically, and he can't allow himself to get on the wrong side of that or he won't have the political capital to carry out reforms. So he's trying to walk a tightrope. He has to be seen as strong in international affairs. But I don't think he's looking for trouble internationally. He'd rather avoid if it if he can.

  1. Xi must use all of his political capital to fix corruption



Foreign Policy, 2012 [Major international news organization, “Xi Jinping’s Challenge Why China's new president has a much tougher job than Barack Obama.” November 8, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/08/xi-jinpings-challenge/
A key obstacle is that the old way of doing business is now built into the DNA of the leaders of the roughly 40,000 political jurisdictions outside of Beijing, from the province to the city to the county to the township level. These officials, rewarded primarily on the basis of producing rapid GDP growth while keeping a lid on social unrest, have used their political power to nurture infrastructure building and other capital-intensive projects. This in turn has generated short-term GDP growth and employment, along with massive flows of bank loans and other funds from which they can skim. The results have been clear: breakneck growth, huge infrastructure and manufacturing development, enormous corruption, massive environmental devastation, growing inequality of wealth, and rising social tensions. If they wish to change the behavior of these local leaders, Xi and his colleagues must expend enormous political capital to do so. And local officials are hardly the only impediments to reform. Beijing has fostered "national champions" — state-owned corporate behemoths, many of which are seen as key to the party’s grip on power and are closely tied to elite political families. This marriage of wealth and political power presents major obstacles to effective changes in economic strategy. Corruption at all levels, moreover, makes reforms even more difficult to implement through China’s massive bureaucracy. And the fear that reform itself can generate expectations that may get out of hand adds to the hurdles to making necessary changes. Thus, there are no simple solutions to China’s challenges, almost all of which are more difficult than those confronting the United States. In the United States, the core issue is one of gaining a political consensus on federal revenues and expenditures. For China, the challenges require major structural overhaul of the economy and wide-ranging changes in the political system. The complexity of both the problem and the necessary corrective measures are massively more daunting in Beijing than in Washington. The reforms China knows it should undertake are very much in America’s interests — reducing Beijing’s need to resort to unfair trade practices, while at the same time further opening its economy, increasing the role of the market, and allowing greater opportunities for U.S. investments in sectors (such as financial services) in which the United States is highly competitive. In addition, putting China on a path of more sustainable, less environmentally damaging growth increases the chances that its government will be more confident, outward-looking, and constructive internationally. China, in turn, has a major interest in U.S. success in getting its deficit under control, given how heavily Beijing has invested in the health of the U.S. dollar and the American economy. U.S.-China relations, in short, will almost certainly experience less strain if both Beijing and Washington deal more effectively with their need to undertake significant reforms. If each falls short, the opposite is true. Leaders on both sides should keep this fundamental reality in mind over the coming years.



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