Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China



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2NC/1NR Diplomacy Links

  1. China uses diplomatic relations to isolate Taiwan



Brookings Institution, 2010 [International affairs journal, “China’s Growing Strength, Taiwan's Diminishing Options”, November, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/11/china-taiwan-wang]
Increased diplomatic leverage As a rising great power, China enjoys considerable diplomatic leverage in the world and is sought after as a partner in conflict management, climate change mitigation, economic cooperation, and other world affairs. On the Korean peninsula, China, the largest supplier of North Korea's energy, was the host and a crucial actor in the Six-Party Talks attempting to denuclearize the country. In the Middle East, China is a key player in the international effort to monitor and to impose sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program. China is now an active participant in the G-20 summit meetings of leading economies. In the 2009 Copenhagen summit on global climate change, China illustrated how it can use its clout to counter initiatives of the U.S. and other countries as it helped derail a tougher accord to limit greenhouse gas emissions. On the Taiwan issue, Beijing has successfully made most countries accept, recognize, or acknowledge its “one-China” position. Today only 23 out of the 194 countries in the world recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan. China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and in the past Beijing has used its veto power to block, or threaten to block, UN peacekeeping operations in Haiti (1996), Guatemala (1997), and Macedonia (1999), ostensibly because of their diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Macedonia severed diplomatic ties with Taipei in 2000). Pressures and threats from Beijing force many countries not to have official contact with Taiwan and to oppose the island’s participation in international institutions. At one point, European officials commented that they would welcome Taiwan's participation in international organizations once Beijing dropped its opposition.[6] This international deference to Beijing's position on cross-strait issues reflects the power asymmetry between China and Taiwan: in most cases, the benefits of deferring to Beijing far outweigh the costs of shunning Taiwan. As a result, there is a high correlation between Chinese acquiescence and Taiwan’s international space. When the DPP was in power from 2000 to 2008, disagreement over the “One China” position prevented both sides from negotiating, and China blocked Taiwan’s international activities. When the KMT came to power in 2008, the spirit of the “1992 Consensus” allowed China and Taiwan to resume dialogue, based on the tacit understanding that neither side would publicly challenge the other’s interpretation of what “One China” means. To maintain the momentum of reconciliation, Beijing relaxed its opposition to Taiwan’s participation in some international organizations that do not require statehood for membership. The risk for Taiwan, however, is that because of the cross-Strait power asymmetry, Beijing can easily take back what it gives out. Intentions can change.

  1. Diplomatic Engagement emboldens China’s military



Newsham, 2014 [Grant, Senior Research Fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies., “China, America and the "Appeasement" Question”, September 8, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-america-the-appeasement-question-11226?page=2]
US policy towards China over the last 30 years, and particularly in recent times, seems familiar. The United States does its best to understand the PRC’s concerns and its resentments going back to the Opium Wars and the ‘century of humiliation’, to accommodate these resentments, and to ensure China does not feel threatened. Defense and State Department officials enthusiastically seek greater transparency and openness – especially in the military realm – as such openness is perceived as inherently good. In return, the PRC is expected to change, to show more respect for human rights and international law and to become a “responsible stakeholder” in the international community. We now have several decades of empirical evidence to assess this concessionary approach. It has not resulted in improved, less aggressive PRC behavior in the South China Sea or the East China Sea, or even in outer space. Indeed, it seems to have encouraged Chinese assertiveness as manifest in threatening language and behavior towards its neighbors. Nor has the PRC regime shown more respect for human rights, rule of law, consensual government or freedom of expression for its citizens. Serial intellectual property theft continues unabated, as does support for unsavory dictators. Nonetheless, we invite the PRC to military exercises and repeat the “engagement” mantra – expecting that one day things will magically improve. Some argue that letting the PRC see US military power will dissuade it from challenging us. Perhaps, but we are just as likely to be seen as naïve or weak. From the Chinese perspective, there is no reason to change since they have done very well without transforming and the PRC has never been stronger. Indeed, the PRC frequently claims that human rights, democracy, and the like are outmoded Western values having nothing to do with China. This is also demoralizing our allies, who at some point may wonder if they should cut their own deals with the PRC. Some revisionist historians argue that Neville Chamberlain’s 1930’s era appeasement was in fact a wise stratagem to buy time to rearm. This overlooks that even as late as 1939 when Hitler seized all of Czechoslovakia, the Western democracies still had the military advantage. One can appease oneself into a corner. And the beneficiary of the appeasement usually strengthens to the point it is too hard to restrain without great sacrifice. One worries that the Chinese seizure of Philippine territory at Scarborough Shoal in 2012 – and the US Government’s unwillingness to even verbally challenge the PRC - might turn out to be this generation’s “Rhineland”. Had the West resisted Hitler in 1936 when he made this first major demand, there would have been no World War II, no Holocaust, and no Cold War. Our choice about how to deal with the PRC is not simply between either appeasement or treating China as an enemy. Our policy must accommodate options ranging from engagement to forceful confrontation. Who would not be delighted with a China that stopped threatening its neighbors and followed the civilized world’s rules? While ensuring we and our allies have a resolute defense – both in terms of military capability and the willingness to employ it – it is important to maintain ties and dialogue with the PRC and to provide encouragement and support when it shows clear signs of transforming to a freer, less repressive society.

  1. Diplomacy provides no benefits on Taiwan and only appeases China



Roy, 2014 [Denny, Writer for The Diplomat and Senior Fellow at the East-West Center, “Taiwan: A Status Upgrade Is Now Affordable”, October 3, http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/taiwan-a-status-upgrade-is-now-affordable/
In order to establish and maintain a constructive relationship with the People’s Republic of China beginning in 1979, it was necessary for Washington to sever official diplomatic relations with Taipei. In accordance with Beijing’s demand, the U.S. government does not officially recognize Taiwan as an independent country and denies Taiwan some of the main symbols of statehood. Although unfair to Taiwan, this is a necessary part of the U.S. deal with China. In some instances, however, Washington has taken this policy too far. It is not necessary to proscribe every prospective connection with Taiwan simply because Beijing might interpret it as implying statehood. While it is advisable to avoid gratuitously antagonizing the PRC where possible, overindulging Chinese sensitivities will never be a sound basis for U.S. policymaking. It is enough that Washington has accommodated the Chinese on several large issues involving Taiwan, such as the “one China policy.” China should not have veto power over every aspect of U.S.-Taiwan relations. One wonders if U.S. policy has tried too hard to please Beijing, with the cost paid by Taiwan’s people not only in the countless indignities of not being treated as a real country, but also in economic opportunities, health, safety, and military security. If these restrictions have bought goodwill from China, that is not apparent in current U.S.-China relations. After decades of U.S. attempts to minimize hurting the feelings of the Chinese Communist Party leadership, here is where we find ourselves today. The Chinese president publicly calls for an end to U.S. military alliances and the start of a new arrangement in which Asia manages its own security. Beijing shelters rogue state North Korea from international pressure because China prefers a nuclear DPRK to a collapse of that odious regime. China makes an expansive and illegal claim over most of the South China Sea and attempts to enforce it by ramming, detaining and sabotaging foreign vessels. The Chinese government demands that Japan recognize China’s claim over the disputed Senkaku Islands and increases tensions by flooding the area with ships and aircraft, while simultaneously Beijing ignores Vietnam’s claim over the Paracel Islands, which the Chinese seized by military force. Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the Chinese government denies complicity in a massive cyber theft campaign that goes beyond strategic intelligence gathering to include industrial espionage. Finally, China continues to insist that Taiwan must submit to rule by the authoritarian government in Beijing, regardless of the will of the people of Taiwan, and backs up that insistence with a standing threat to unleash war. Clearly, despite U.S. attempts to not treat China as an adversary, China is in important ways behaving as an adversary anyway.

  1. Diplomatic and military concessions only make China stronger



Forbes, February 2016 [“Sanction China For Its Support Of North Korea...And So Much More”, February 13, http://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2016/02/13/sanction-china-for-its-support-of-north-korea-and-so-much-more/#45c625fd316a]
It’s time to stop excusing China’s aggression (including against its own people, and those of North Korea) with yet more diplomacy and talk. A dual strategy of military and economic sanctions that impose real costs on not only North Korea, but also its sponsor China, will work if we have the political will. These costs should continue until the end of: 1) North Korea’s nuclear program, 2) China’s cyber-attacks on the U.S., and 3) China’s territorial destabilization of Asia. Anything less threatens quickened nuclear proliferation in Asia and continued weakening of the U.S. in the Pacific and generally. Intercontinental ballistic missile technology, and terrorists seeking weapons of mass destruction, mean nuclearization of Asia threatens the entire world, including cities in North America and Europe. China doesn’t care whether North American or European cities get destroyed by terrorists. China might lose some markets in the U.S. as a result, but the absence of the U.S. could help China expand its military and diplomatic influence, and global market share. We are at an inflection point in history. Do we allow dictators like Xi Jinping of China and Kim Jong Un of North Korea to unilaterally promote territorial and nuclear destabilization, and thereby incent neighbors to go nuclear as well? Should we accept the attendant dangers to urban areas around the world, and our global ecosystem? Or, do we bite the bullet and put a stop to it? If we want to stop nuclear proliferation, we need to take tough action, including against the sponsors of proliferation and dictatorship, like China. The good news is that the military pivot to Asia is happening. U.S. troops have mostly pulled out of Iraq and Afghanistan, and troops, hardware, and new military development are reorienting to protect democracies from China. The U.S. and South Korea have already quickened talks on putting advanced Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile defense systems on the peninsula. This is a logical military cost the U.S. and South Korea can impose on China and North Korea for their irresponsible missile launches. A South Korean THAAD deployment can be integrated into existing systems in Japan and on U.S. naval ships to plug holes in our defense. Those holes could be traversed by a Chinese or North Korean ballistic missile on its way to Los Angeles, Chicago, or New York. North Korea, Russia and China will complain about a THAAD deployment, but they have no leg to stand on for threatening us in the first place, and any additional threats will be nothing but baseless cheap talk. Deployment of THAAD demonstrates our lack of fear in the face of their threats, and shows that we will match their moves. We must defend ourselves to retain ground, by at the very least matching the military pressure emanating from China and its allies, Russia and North Korea. Demonstration of military force is essential to stop China’s threat, but China’s main pressure point is its massive $10 trillion gross domestic product — second only to the U.S. economy of $17 trillion. China’s economy depends on about $3.8 trillion of annual exports and imports, much of which is with developed democracies and therefore vulnerable to sanctions. China knows this, and has been trying to convert its trade from dollars to renminbi, and to create new international bank transfer systems that don’t rely on the U.S. or E.U. They haven’t fully succeeded yet. Most of China’s non Hong Kong international trade is still in dollars. Money will still move China. Economic sanctions are justified, and we have a window of opportunity in which they will still work.


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