Review of Asian Studies



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Sizing up the two sides

It is worth noting that, in the spring of 1973, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, due in large measure to the American’s “Enhance” and “Enhance-Plus Programs,” had the fourth largest military in the world. They had received new armored/tracked vehicles, helicopters, combat and transport aircraft, top of the line artillery pieces, and other weapon systems worth $753 million. In spite of the equipment, ARVN troops suffered from a lack of proper training and nearly total reliance on an American system of sustainment and logistics as well as dependence on U.S. resupplies of ordnance, spare parts, and fuel. In addition, while the ARVN outnumbered PAVN and NLF forces in South Vietnam nearly 1,500,000 to 500,000, roughly 482,000 Southern forces were “Regional or Popular Forces” which often proved to be notoriously undependable. While that still left more than a million ARVN regulars, only 250,000 were actually combat forces. The rest were in administrative and supply units which supported the front line soldiers.13


Yet another issue that faced ARVN leaders was keeping soldiers from retiring, resigning, deserting, or finding some other way out of serving the nation. The problem reached a peak between 1973 and 1975. In the critical year of 1974, only 65 percent of authorized manpower was present for duty at any one time. Legitimate promotions were scarce among the officer corps since so many generals stayed in place due to their political loyalties, not their professional abilities. Among many ARVN officers, depravity, mendacity and ineffectiveness was not just endemic; in some cases it had been raised “almost to an art form.” According to retired Col. James H. Willbanks, at this time, in an effort to appease his detractors, President Thieu dismissed several senior military leaders including Generals Nguyen Van Toan and Nguyen Van Nghi, the II and IV Corps commanders respectively. Ultimately, this had a negative effect. While both Thieu loyalists were infamous for their corruption, both were proven leaders and popular with their troops. In short, they won battles, and their absence later proved a major problem for ARVN forces in the field which would eventually lead to Toan’s recall.14
By late 1974 and early 1975, the austere reductions in direct U.S. aid began to have a major effect on ARVN military operations. For example, artillery batteries that had once been allocated 100 rounds per day were reduced to only four per day and each Southern soldier had only 85 bullets per month. Fuel shortages, and a lack of spare parts reduced the Republic of Vietnam Air Force (RVNAF) helicopter and cargo aircraft sorties by more than half. Worse still, was Thieu’s order not to surrender any ground. This over-extended the army and left them to defend a great deal of useless terrain along a 600-mile frontier. Even the nation’s strategic reserve, the Airborne and Marine Divisions, were occupied in static defensive roles. Considering the fact that ARVN soldiers had been trained by U.S. advisers in tactics focused on rapid mobility and the application of massive firepower, their inability to deliver either frustrated most of them. Lastly, at the worst possible moment in 1974-1975, the South Vietnamese economy buckled due to influx of refugees into the cities seeking food and protection. They found neither due to the spike in worldwide fuel prices caused by the Arab oil embargo of 1972 and a major reduction in rice harvests throughout Asia. On top of fighting a cleaver and dedicated enemy, they had to feed thousands more mouths some of whom were, in fact, communist operatives.15
As these events unfolded in the South, the NVA was still recovering from the devastating losses they suffered during the Easter Offensive of 1972. They recruited or commandeered increasingly younger Northern citizens. However, they also were able to obtain more modern weapons and equipment from Moscow and Beijing. In 1973 alone, North Vietnam received 2.8 million metric tons of goods, worth $330 million, from Communist-Bloc countries, or a 50 percent increase over the previous year. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), by the following year, this had grown to 3.5 million metric tons worth $400 million. In short, while the U.S. cut back on South Vietnam, the Soviet Union was increasing aide to its client state. Their artillery pieces rose to 430, including the latest 122 and 130 mm models, and tanks and armored personnel carriers to 655. Among these were the latest BTR-152 constructed in the Soviet Union. Soon, the enemy also created two army corps to mirror the South’s I and II Corps Tactical Zones. At the same time, they blended most independent NVA infantry regiments, in the South, into divisional structures. Based on these actions, the American Defense Attaché Office (DAO), established in 1973 to replace Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), reported that the PAVN had increased their strategic reserve from two divisions to seven. This meant there were 70,000 more troops available to supplement the 200,000 combat and 100,000 support troops already in South Vietnam. These support troops were mostly young, so-called “volunteer students” who maintained communist re-supply routes (Ho Chi Minh Trail) into and out of South Vietnam.16
By this time, leaders in Hanoi had committed significant resources to improving their extensive logistics network throughout Vietnam and Laos. It afforded an increase in the shipment and deployment of food, weapons, ordnance, troops, and other equipment required for the all-out campaign they were planning. Soon after the Paris Peace Accords were signed, the 559th Transportation Group (559 TG), which managed and sustained the Truong Son Strategic Transportation Route from North Vietnam to southeastern Laos, received a directive to expand this infiltration net east of the Truong Son Mountains directly into South Vietnam. During 1973 and 1974, the thousands of young members of the 559 TG labored on this ambitious project. Known as Corridor 613, the new route crossed the DMZ into South Vietnam and ran all the way to Loc Ninh. Not only was it tactically important but the 559th built all-weather, hard-surfaced roads to accommodate the modern mechanized army that the NVA had developed since the Paris Peace Accords. This new pathway into the South reduced the transport time of personnel from North Vietnam to the southernmost combat zones from four months to only three weeks.17
Even as the road network progressed, Northern workers enhanced their air defenses. This new network was focused on artillery and missile systems established in South Vietnam. By early 1975, it was composed of 22 NVA regiments equipped with radar-controlled anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) systems in addition to SA-2 Guideline and SA-7 Grail shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles. According to former U.S. Air Force commander in South Vietnam, Lt. Gen. William E. “Spike” Momyer, in his book on the RVNAF, these new structures “posed a major deterrent to the South Vietnamese Air Force, since its aircraft were not equipped to deal with such threats.”18 Many of the aircraft were older models with a lack of radar and sensor capabilities, which American crews had used on more modern aircraft although they had not left them for the South Vietnamese. For example, the Air Force gave the RVNAF AC-47 and AC-119 gunships with less capability but not AC-130s with more modern sensors and radar systems. Besides, even with these more modern weapons and aircraft, the U.S. had not defeated the NVA.
The General also noted that even though the U.S. provided hundreds of U.S.-built aircraft to the RVNAF, they were “relatively unsophisticated aircraft.” They did this, partly, because they reasoned that “better aircraft would tempt the South Vietnamese to initiate operations over North Vietnam and U.S. leaders hoped to “keep the fighting at a relatively lower level, enhancing the possibility of negotiations.”19 While this is probably overstated, the fact was that by late 1974, RVNAF aerial interdiction of the NVA’s supply build-up had become almost impossible. Reconnaissance flights were also limited, thus, restricting the ARVN’s ability to collect adequate intelligence data and estimate NVA strength and/or operational plans.20
In one ironic twist, sometimes the PAVN had deficiencies in armored and heavy artillery forces, which were essential for attacks on heavily fortified ARVN regimental and divisional base camps. In the later stages of the war with the French, the Viet Minh had plenty of excellent artillery. At Dien Bien Phu, the abundance of superior artillery was a key factor in the communist victory.21 However, at this point, the vast expenditure of artillery ordnance during the 1972 Spring Offensive and slowdown in Soviet and Chinese resupplies due, in part, to improving relations between these “super powers” and the U.S., left leaders in Hanoi to worry about what kind of a plan they could formulate. General Staff planners who drew up the plan presented to the Politburo in October 1974 where particularly focused on this issue. Many who have examined the collapse of the ARVN, suggest that one factor in their defeat was a lack of ammunition. Recent research demonstrates that that North experienced similar shortages. The reduction in Soviet and Eastern Bloc resupplies also effected NVA armored units which were in poor condition and desperately needed spare parts. Most communist units in the South were still equipped only with light mortars, single-tube rocket launchers and recoilless rifles. Leaders in COSVN reported that in their area of operations, consisting of the southern half of the country, they had only five artillery battalions to support the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th infantry divisions and the 4th corps headquarters. Two of the battalions were mainly equipped with captured U.S.-made weapons with little ordnance or spares.22
By 1974, NVA’s entire stock of heavy artillery and tank ordnance, including that for combat units and strategic reserves, totaled just 100,000 rounds. For this reason, many leaders replaced their larger weapons with obsolete 76.2mm and 57mm artillery pieces drawn out of storage for which there still were ample shells. Indeed, the initial notion by many U.S. analysts that the American withdrawal gave the North an advantage in rounds of ordnance would appear to have been exaggerated. The fact is that most of the ARVN troopers were hard-bitten veterans, and they had maintained significant stores of ammunition and equipment--a fact illustrated by the large amount of U.S.-made war materiel captured by the PAVN at the end of war. The ultimate fall of the South may well have had more to do with the psychological effect the NVA 1974 campaign had. It was audacious in both its planning and execution. It was well led, and the unexpected strategy dealt President Thieu a shock from which he did not recover.23


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