Review of Asian Studies


And, so it Begins: Phuoc Long



Download 253.95 Kb.
Page3/6
Date20.10.2016
Size253.95 Kb.
#6592
TypeReview
1   2   3   4   5   6

And, so it Begins: Phuoc Long

The first engagement in the campaign that led up to the battle of Xuan Loc, took place near Phuoc Long which was the northernmost provincial capital in the III Corps Tactical Zone. It was about 75 miles northeast of Saigon. In mid-December 1974, the NVA units deployed from their Cambodian sanctuaries to attack. It was defended by 5 Regional Battalions, 48 Popular Force platoons and 4 territorial artillery sections. The III Corps commander, Lt. Gen. Du Quoc Dong, headquartered in Bien Hoa, supplemented these forces with the ARVN 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Division, two artillery sections, and three reconnaissance companies. The battle began on 13 December when PAVN forces moved to cutoff Phuoc Long City’s overland communications and, then, destroyed the ARVN’s outlying defensive positions. Once the NVA surrounded the city, they initiated highly accurate artillery fire followed by concentrated armor and infantry attacks which began on 27 December.24


One of the biggest problems facing the Southern defenders was that many soldiers had their families with them. While this elevated their morale, it also tended to lock them in place and discourage them from moving to support other threatened positions. As the enemy closed in many of the civilians began a desperate evacuation south. Every time ARVN relief columns pushed north to relieve their counterparts in Phuoc Long, the roads were clogged with refugees. Not surprisingly, as their families left so did many of the regional soldiers. Desertion soon became commonplace as combatants sought to find and protect their wives and children. This became a pattern that would be repeated throughout the PAVN push towards Saigon.25
On 2 January 1975, with catastrophe staring them in the face, President Thieu, Gen. Dong and the Joint General Staff (JGS) met at the Independence Palace in Saigon. Dong submitted a plan to relieve Phuoc Long. Reality thwarted the proposal since there were too few reserve forces, the main land routes were either choked with civilians or controlled by the communists, and the reality that, even though they held excellent defensive positions in Phuoc Long, they did not have sufficient forces to repel two enemy divisions long enough for aid to arrive. In hopes of preserving their forces, the order was given to abandon the city and fall back to positions where they could defend more strategically important cities such as Tay Ninh and Hue. It seemed to be a reasonable plan but, when the fighting ended on 6 January and ARVN leaders took stock of things, the surrender of the first provincial capital had been a bigger disaster than they first realized. They had started the battle with roughly 5,500 troops, but only 850 made it to the safety of their own lines. They had lost 10,000 rounds of artillery shells, and the psychological blow to the South Vietnamese government was crushing. This solved the artillery ordnance issue for the NVA since they could use these shells in their captured American artillery pieces.26 In the words of ARVN Chief of Staff, Gen. Cao Van Vien, “Almost gone was the hope that the United States would forcibly punish the North Vietnamese for their brazen violations of the cease-fire agreement . . . What more encouragement could the communists have asked for?”27
The news of the PAVN victory at Phuoc Long reached Hanoi during the Politburo’s 23rd Plenum. Le Duan proclaimed that, “Never have we had military and political conditions so perfect or a strategic advantage so great as we have now.”28 Leaders immediately began planning a follow up affirming that, as they had postulated, America would not re-enter the war. Initially plans called for an attack on Duc Lap, a border outpost in II Corp’s Darlac Province. According to Tran Van Tra, as he had before, he lobbied for a more ambitious assault on Ban Me Thout, the provincial capital. While Le Duan was reluctant to take such a risk, Le Duc Tho spoke in favor of this plan. Soon, General Dung was sent south to take direct command of the new offensive, which became known as Campaign 275.29

Campaign 275 in the Central Highland

The primary field commander for this new offensive was General Van Tien Dung. He had developed an operational plan (O-plan) aimed at taking Ban Me Thout and designated “Blossoming Lotus.” In it, he determined to circumvent the ARVN’s forward positions and attack the city itself. Thus, it would be “like a flower bud slowly opening its petals.” The O-plan called for 70,000–80,000 NVA troops to isolate Ban Me Thuot by occupying key points on Highways 14, 19 and 21 to block any ARVN reinforcement efforts. The PAVN 320th Division was then to seize outposts in the north as well as Phuong Duc Airfield. Once accomplished, the soldiers of the F-10 Division were to make the main attack on the city along Route 14.30


The ARVN III Corps commander was Major General Pham Van Phu, with his headquarters in Pleiku. Existing documents indicate that Southern intelligence sources provided him with plenty of data warning him of the NVA attack plan. General Phu, probably fooled by an intricate series of false NVA messages, hesitated to move troops to meet this potential threat. Ultimately, he decided that the communist movement toward Ban Me Thuot was a diversion intended to distract him from their real target in Pleiku. As a result, only one ARVN Ranger unit and some provincial Popular and Regional Force elements totaling roughly 4,000 men were posted to defend Ban Me Thuot. Early in March, he augmented this small group with elements of the 53rd Regiment of the 23rd ARVN Division.31
The battle itself began on 10 March and ended slightly more than a week later. The opening salvo literally came from an intense artillery barrage, after which components of the 10th Division swarmed into the city and seized the ammunition depot. That same evening, the PAVN 316th Division joined the bloody fight for the heart of the city. On 13 March, with the defenders teetering on collapse, Gen. Phu had the 44th ARVN Regiment of the 23rd Division and a battalion of the 21st Ranger Group airlifted by helicopters to Phuoc An, 20 miles east of Ban Me Thuot, to form a relief force to save the beleaguered city. As they advanced, they found the roads crammed with thousands of refugees and military dependents fleeing the highlands. By the time they confronted the 10th PAVN Division, they were so dispersed it was all they could do to keep from being overrun themselves. The ARVN soon became part of the retreat.32

By 18 March, NVA units had seized Phuoc An and completely isolated Ban Me Thuot. Over the next two days, all of Darlac Province fell to the North Vietnamese forcing the ARVN to shift positions in an effort to prevent the PAVN from moving east to take the coastal lowlands. Future examination of the battle would place the primary blame for the loss of the central highlands on Gen. Phu, who over-analyzed what proved to be sound intelligence and acted too slowly in correcting his misinterpretation and in sending reinforcements into Ban Me Thuot.33


As this catastrophe befell South Vietnam, President Thieu sent a delegation to Washington, D.C., to ask for an augmentation of economic and military aid. In addition, Graham Martin, the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, who sent several messages arguing that additional aid could still save the Republic of Vietnam, eventually made a trip to Washington to personally communicate his case to President Gerald R. Ford. While Ford, seemed moved to act, the U.S. Congress, was not inclined to divert money from America’s own economic recovery into what most Americans already saw as a lost cause. As a result, they slashed Ford’s proposed 1975 military aid package for South Vietnam from $1.45 billion to $700 million. While they probably did not believe it, the Ford administration continued to reassure Thieu that they would restore the funds Congress had cut. As historian Arnold Isaacs said, it was a “pipe dream.”34
Back in Saigon, Thieu was becoming increasingly isolated and desperate. One of his closest advisors described him as “suspicious...secretive...and ever watchful for a coup d'état against him.” This paranoia meant he no longer listened to “competent people” nor had “adequate staff work, consultation, and coordination.”35 Thieu’s military decisions were carried out by his officer corps without question. As General Vien said, “Thieu made all the decisions as to how the war should be conducted.” 36 Many choices were wrong or poorly considered.
Even before Ban Me Thuot fell, Thieu met with his key advisors including Gen. Vien and Lt. Gen. Dang Van Quang. After briefings on the military situation, the President unfolded a small-scale map of South Vietnam and reviewed the possible redeployment of the ARVN forces in an effort to “hold and defend only those populous and flourishing areas which were really most important.”37 Thieu then sketched in on the map those areas which he considered most important. This included the entire III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. He also pointed out those places then under communist control which he believed would have to be retaken. What made these territories so important was the heavy concentration of natural resources such as rice, rubber, finished goods, and other vital items. He was also convinced they had to hold the coastal areas where oil had been discovered on the continental shelf. To quote Thieu, this was to become South Vietnam’s “untouchable heartland, the irreducible national stronghold.”38
As for I and II Corps Zones, he drew a series of phase lines on the map stating that ARVN forces should hold what they could, but that they could, redeploy southward as circumstances dictated. Thieu called this new strategy “Light at the top, heavy on the bottom.” At the time, Gen. Vien told Thieu that redeployment was required. It was only later that he admitted that he was loathe to tell Thieu it was too late to redeploy and that he should have done it in early-1974 or at the latest when President Nixon left office. By the time Thieu decided to take this step, the NVA held a numerical superiority. That made it very difficult to disengage and redeploy to adequate defenses without being constantly pressed. Vien also admitted he realized, then, that any ARVN movements would be hampered, as they had at Ban Me Thuot, by the flight of masses of refugees. But, no one had the courage to disagree with Thieu.39
As Ban Me Thuot teetered on collapse, Thieu made his final decision, at Cam Ranh Bay during a meeting with General Phu. The President determined to abandon Pleiku and Kon Tum and redeploy these troops to retake Ban Me Thuot, which he believed was more strategically significant. In later years, the General recalled that he thought Thieu was joking at first. Only when he reemphasized his orders did Gen. Phu point out that the only route possible for the redistribution of forces, given the communist’s blocking actions, was little-used Interprovincial Route 7B. This, he noted, was an unkempt, narrow, rough-surfaced logging road with downed bridges all along its path. Nothing seemed to dissuade Thieu and, fearing he might be jailed, Phu set about implementing the impossible.40
With desperation taking hold in Saigon, PAVN General Dung advised Hanoi that he was redirecting his forces to attack and overrun Kon Tum and Pleiku. In turn, Le Duan urged the General Staff to take advantage of the foothold they had gained in the highlands. Two months remained before the onset of the monsoon season, when military operations would be slowed to a crawl. He argued that they could still make major strategic gains if they took bold action, especially in light of Saigon's apparent weakness and the lack of any U.S. support or actions.41
The Final Blunder
At this point, General Phu was left to move a corps-sized column of troops, equipment, and vehicles over a generally unknown road some 160 miles through the mountains and jungles of the highlands to Nha Trang for the attempted counterattack. Plans called for the force to be comprised of one battalion of the 44th ARVN Regiment, five Ranger groups, the 21st Tank Squadron, two 155 mm artillery battalions, one 175 mm battalion, and “Popular and Regional Force” troops. In support of this gaggle were the men and equipment of the 20th Combat Engineer Group and the 231st Direct Support Group. As ambitious as the plan was in the first place, Gen. Phu’s undue obsession with secrecy all but doomed the endeavor from the outset. He restricted operational planning to a few trusted subordinates who either had contributed to or knew about it. In the aftermath, the II Corps Chief of Staff revealed that not even he had been informed of the planned abandonment of Pleiku and Kon Tum. In turn, Phu directed the commander of the II Corps Rangers to take charge of the convoy itself and his primary deputy of operations to oversee the withdrawal.42 It was like a coach making a game plan and failing to tell the players or other coaches what it was.
Even with all of its foibles, on 16 and 17 March, things began well enough. Then, at Hau Bon, the column, as Phu had feared, ran into a mass of refugees and was completely bogged down. To add to the difficulty, combat engineers had to build a pontoon bridge across the Ea Pa River. On the night of the 17th, local communist forces attacked and further impeded the mass of 200,000 troops and refugees, by now known as the “column of tears.” Even though Gen. Dung was initially surprised by the ARVN withdrawal, he acted quickly sending the 320th Division to strike the flank of the column while coastal forces rushed to halt its forward progress. In addition, troops of the 968th Division pushed through Pleiku and struck the rear of the Southern forces which were, by that point, in headlong retreat.43
Over the next several days, the convoy met one NVA roadblock after another. When they reached the Da Rang River, they had to construct another pontoon bridge. The last few miles to Tuy Hoa were the worst as artillery shells, mortar rounds and rockets constantly ploughed into their ranks. Finally, on 27 March, the forward units in the column reached safety in Tuy Hoa. Throughout the RVNAF could offer only minimal air support due to extremely bad weather. While no one knew exactly how many made it through, one reliable source suggested that only 20,000 of 60,000 ARVN and 60,000 of 180,000 civilians who fled the highlands made it to Tuy Hoa.44 In his paper “The Last 55 Days,” Lt. Col. James H. Willbanks, Ph.D., stated that, “Of the estimated 400,000 civilians who had attempted to flee Kontum, Pleiku, Phu Bon, and Cheo Reo, only about 60,000-100,000 got through.45
From a strategic standpoint, the “withdrawal” proved to be a complete disaster. The combat capability of II Corps had been reduced by 75 to 80 percent, including some of their best troops and large amounts of military vehicles and supplies. It also meant that any plans to retake Ban Me Thuot had to be scrapped. As for the NVA, their confidence level was higher than ever, and their main units began an advance toward the coast. At this point, only the ARVN’s 22nd Division blocked their path. While the ARVN fought bravely and with great determination to defend the mountain passes to the coast, by the end of March, the NVA’s 3rd and 968th Divisions had taken Hue and Da Nang. In an effort to save the survivors, Southern troops were ordered to withdraw to Qui Nhon on the coast to be evacuated by sea on 1 April. The withdrawal was a bloodbath. They had to fight their way through enemy troops the entire way. Two regimental colonels committed suicide rather than evacuate. The 47th regiment was ambushed at Phu Cat and lost half their combat strength. Several soldiers, including the regimental colonel, also committed suicide. When they regrouped near Vung Tau, the Division had only 2,000 men left.46



Download 253.95 Kb.

Share with your friends:
1   2   3   4   5   6



The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2024
send message
    Main page
democratic republic
north vietnamese
central highlands
greatest chance