Russia’s Strategy in the Arctic: Cooperation, not confrontation
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- Russia’s Arctic debates – the liberalist discourse
- The debate after the war in Ukraine
| Part of the realist/geopolitical discourse on the Arctic looks in some ways reactive to what the USA/NATO says and does vis-à-vis the Arctic. Especially changes (or perceived changes) in the US/NATO developments on anti-ballistic missile defence systems (BMD) in the area, seems to spark reactions. During a meeting with the Defence Ministry’s leadership on 27 February 2013, thus only a week after the adoption of the updated 2013 Russian Arctic strategy, Putin compared threats in the Arctic with more traditional threats against Russia’s national security. Here he stressed that there are “methodical attempts to undermine the strategic balance in various ways and forms. The United States has essentially launched now the second phase in its global missile defence system… and there is also the danger of militarisation in the Arctic”. (Putin, Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board 2013a) In a speech to the Russian Defence Ministry in December 2013, Putin implored the assembled chiefs to “pay special attention to the deployment of infrastructure and military units in the Arctic” because “Russia is actively exploring this promising region, returning to it, and should use all possible channels to protect its security and national interests.” (Putin, Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board 2013b) Valery Konyshev and Alexander Sergunin argues that Putin here was reacting to the US military strategy in the Arctic, which had been published in the beginning om November 2013, and which, apart from stressing the need for international cooperation in the region and a hope for peaceful development in the region, also places strong weight on missile defence in the Arctic region as part of US strategic deterrence. (Konyshev og Sergunin 2014) Thus, the US military strategy states that US national security interests in the Arctic ”include such matters as missile defence and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of the seas” (Defence 2013, 3) The view that US and UK submarine activity in the Arctic is so frequent and intense that it needs to be balanced, is also clear from statements from Nikolai Patrushev from December 2013: “Russia cannot just passively watch war preparations by foreign countries near its borders”. (Egorov 2013)
To sum up, the proponents of the realist/geopolitics discourse in essence makes a ‘security first’ argument, claiming that security issues and potential threats to national security must have top priority over other issues since the threats are so severe that they threaten the security of the state. Power is seen as relational, meaning that cooperation in the Arctic may be fine, but only if Russia gains more than the other states. The international system is essentially seen as an anarchy (in Waltzian or classical realist terms) and power between states is viewed in balance of power if not zero-sum terms. The other states in the international system are seen as adversaries, especially the other great powers and even more so, the United States. Part of the debate is inherently nationalist and patriotic, using expressions such “exploring”, “winning” or “conquering” the Arctic in order to further Russia’s “greatness”, and secure its “revival” as a great power – if not outright secure its survival as a state. Parts of the military establishment also furthers a Dugin (or Haushofer) inspired geopolitical rhetoric which sees the Arctic in light of a potential future “war over resources” as well as over “living space”. Russia’s Arctic debates – the liberalist discourse Outside Russia, Chilingarov’s planting of the Russian flag on the sea floor of the North pole in August 2007 was not well received and many in the West interpreted the media stunt as evidence of Russia’s renewed, quasi-imperial realpolitik. The Canadian foreign minister, Peter MacKay, dismissed the event as “a Russian show” and declared: “This isn't the 15th century. You can’t go around the world and just plant flags and say ‘We’re claiming this territory.’” (Reuters 2007) In contrast to the Chilingarov flag-planting event and the immediate surge hereafter of Russian patriotic statements from the realist/geopolitics side, stands the more IR-liberalism-oriented track which Russia de facto followed in its actual policies vis-à-vis the Arctic since around 2008-2009. (Laruelle, Russia's narrative on the Arctic - from patriotic rhetoric to the Arctic 'brand' 2011) (Åtland 2011) Thus, instead of following a realist/geopolitical course, Russia in 2008-2009 chose to turn to the discourse of the Arctic region as a space of international cooperation and rule-bound behaviour.20 Russia chose to support the Danish government’s initiative in the Ilulissat Declaration from May 2008, in which the co-signatories commit themselves to abide by the provisions of UNCLOS and CLCS. (Arctic Council 2008, 1)21 In fact Russia moderated its requests to what, according to UNCLOS-rules, is possible to claim, and Russia chose to follow the practice of the CLCS, including the procedure for legitimately making claims of jurisdiction over territory beyond the 200-mile sea limit. Thus, Russia chose not to pursue the Soviet maximalist demands of past times.22 In addition to that, in 2010, Russia – after more than 40 years of standstill in the negotiations – entered into an agreement with Norway over the delineation of the border in the Barents Sea, in which Norway and Russia have divided the area equitably between them “in two parts of approximately the same size”. (The Norwegian Government 2010) Even though the agreement was not particularly popular in realist/geopolitical circles in Russia – right-wing firebrand Vladimir Zhirinovsky asked rhetorically whether Russia had “lost a battle in the war against Norway” (Rowe og Blakkisrud 2014, 74); Putin, who was prime-minister at the time, officially distanced himself from the agreement (Baev, Russia’s Arctic Ambitions and Anxieties 2013, 267); and, in the Russian media, it has since been debated what Putin can do to “get the Barents Sea back” (Hønneland 2014, 3) – Medvedev, during a visit in Oslo in April 2010, chose to announce the compromise. And Putin himself, followed by Sergei Shoigu, Sergei Lavrov and Dmitry Medvedev, started to “cultivate a discourse pointing up a ‘dialogue of cultures’ in the Arctic”.23 (Laruelle, Russia's narrative on the Arctic - from patriotic rhetoric to the Arctic 'brand' 2011) That can be seen as evidence that, in any case, a part of the foreign policy establishment in Moscow perceives that Russia, too, can have a clear interest in being a party to a well-ordered course of negotiations that result in peaceful settlement of disagreements. In 2010 (Harding 2010) and 2013 Putin publicly supported a process that is bound to the UNCLOS and the Arctic Council: “I would like to stress that this country is interested in the region’s sustainable development based on cooperation and absolute respect of international law…. Within the framework of the Arctic Council, we resolve issues pertaining to cooperation in border areas, maritime transportation ….” (Putin, Meeting of the Security Council on State Policy in the Arctic 2014) And even though the foreign policy concept from 2013 mentions scarcity of essential resources as a potential threat, as mentioned earlier, that threat is far down on the list of potential transnational threats. The document stresses, above all, “practical cooperation with Northern European countries” and development of “joint cooperation projects” for the Barents Sea and Euro-Arctic Region within “multilateral structures”. (Russian Foreign Ministry 2013, No. 65) Thus, it is underscored that Russia believes that the “existing international legal framework is sufficient to successfully settle all regional issues through negotiations, including the issue of defining the external boundaries of the continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean.” (Russian Foreign Ministry 2013, No. 73) At the same time, it stresses that it is Russian policy to strengthen the “strategic partnership with major producers of energy.” (Russian Foreign Ministry 2013, No. 34f) Cooperation is also emphasized in Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s speeches. Thus, in a speech at an Arctic Council meeting in Kiruna on 15 May 2013, he stressed that he “with satisfaction” could note that all of the Arctic coastal states’ Arctic strategies that are anchored in the Arctic Council “may be fully secured only through close cooperation with partners in the region.” Further, he underscored the Russian view that all of the topics and questions with regard to the Arctic region that are not yet handled “will be resolved by the Arctic countries based on the existing and rather sufficient international and legal basis and, of course, good will.” (Lavrov 2013) This corresponds well with the evaluation from Elana Wilson Rowe and Helge Blakkisrud, who have examined, in all, 323 articles about the Arctic in the government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta in the period from May 2008 to June 2011. Their observation is that “in our material, Lavrov has consistently argued that all problems in the Arctic can be solved peacefully and without a ‘confrontational approach’”. (Rowe og Blakkisrud 2014, 73) The UN-focused, cooperative line has also been followed by the Russian Transport Ministry, for example in a feature article in Arctic Info, in which Deputy Transport Minister Sergei Aristov repeatedly refers to UNCLOS in connection with the argumentation for why the ministry considers The Northern Sea Route to be Russian territorial water. (Aristov 2013) To sum up, the proponents of the IR-liberalism discourse in essence makes a ‘cooperation first’ argument, arguing that the Arctic should be seen (and kept) as a “zone of peace and cooperation”, where it is “more effective” to pursue national interests together with the other countries than “doing it alone”. Thus, the other states in the Arctic region are seen as “partners” rather than adversaries, and power and gains are seen more as absolutes rather than as relatives, thus making cooperation worth while even if the other states (or companies) receive greater benefits from a specific agreement than Russia. The discourse puts emphasis on international institutions, rules and regimes, and the rhetoric used stresses “respect for international law”, “international legal framework”, “joint cooperation projects”, “negotiations”, “development” and recommends cooperation within “multilateral structures”. The debate after the war in Ukraine As noted earlier Russia’s invasion and subsequent annexation of Crimea followed by it’s war in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 resulted in an intense international debate on how to view Russia’s foreign policy. Thus, the crisis in the relationship between the West and Russia led to a debate on possible negative “spill over” – or rather “spill in” – effects of the war in Ukraine on the Arctic region, which until then had been seen as a region or stability and cooperation. (Kristensen og Sakstrup 2016) (Zysk 2015) (Rahbek-Clemmensen 2015) The question arose whether the so-called Russian ‘hawks’ – in my essay termed proponents of the realist/geopolitical discourse on the Arctic – would come to the foreground of the Russian foreign policy elites’ debate on the Arctic, and change the course of Russia’s policy. Thus, some of the realists/geopoliticians did aggravate their rhetoric. Dmitry Rogozin in April 2015, shortly after being appointed chief of the Russian Arctic Commission – in itself a sign of shift towards a more assertive, possibly nationalistic policy to come – in an interview for Russian state TV Channel One, said: “Last year, we had the historical reunification of Sevastopol and the Crimea. This year, we present a new view and new powerful stress on the development of the Arctic. Basically, it is all about the same”. (Staalesen, Expansionist Rogozin looks to the Arctic 2015) On 19 April 2015 Rogozin tweeted from the Norwegian island of Spitsbergen: ”We arrived in Longyearbyen in Spitsbergen”...“The Arctic is Russian Mecca”. The tweet angered the Norwegians, since Norway follows the EU sanctions on Russia, and Rogozin therefore is a person non-grata on Norwegian soil.24 In the beginning of May 2015, Rogozin’s plane was denied entry over the territory of Romania – he had visited the neighbouring Transdniestria Republic – after which Rogozin tweeted: “Upon U.S. request, Romania has closed its air space for my plane”...“Ukraine doesn't allow me to pass through again. Next time I'll fly on board TU-160.” That is, in a supersonic Russian strategic bomber designed to carry nuclear weapons. (Illie 2015) On 25 May 2015 he said on national television: ”So what if they won’t give us visas and put us on sanctions list… tanks don’t need visas” after the host had asked him whether Europe and the United States are concerned about Russia's presence in the Arctic. (Rogozin 2015) This was followed in October 2015 by a call by Rogozin that Russia “should come to the Arctic and to make it hers”, arguing that Russia should not care what other countries would think of its behaviour. (Vzgljad, Rogozin: Russia should come to the Arctic and make it hers 2015) However, Russia’s official policy vis-à-vis the Arctic still follows a IR-liberalist course. Russia has consistently prioritized a pragmatic course of cooperation in the Arctic Council. (Kristensen og Sakstrup 2016) While the crisis between Russia and the West in spring 2014 was at its peak every where else, Canada, which at that point had the rotating chairmanship in the Arctic Council, decided to boycott a working group meeting in Moscow along with the U.S., (Pettersen 2014) and Canada’s Minister of the Environment, Leona Aglukkaq, chose to criticize Russia’s behaviour in the Ukraine while chairing a Council meeting – in violation with common practice. The official Russian reaction to both incidents was markedly restrained. Rogozin did not send out any anti-Western tweets. In stead Russia’s Minister for Natural Resources and the Environment, Sergei Donskoi said at the meeting: “We are sorry that Canadian chairmanship used consensus forum which the Arctic Council is, to promote its home policy agenda in the context of events in Ukraine. It creates obstacles for the promotion of international cooperation in the Arctic”...“Russia proceeds from the fact that the Arctic is territory of dialogue, not platform for political quarrels and settling scores”. (The Sentinel Analytical Group 2015) Lavrov, who until then had not missed a meeting in the Arctic Council since 2004, had not attended the meeting in Iqaluit due to other “prior commitments” – a fact which has made some commentators speculate whether Lavrov stayed away due to an anticipation of a tougher line from the Canadian chairmanship. (Exner-Pirot 2015) Furthermore, Russia has been supportive of a number of IGO and NGO initiatives in the Arctic. In March 2014 the members of the Arctic Council agreed on the establishment of an independent forum for economic questions and business-to-business activities, Arctic Economic Council (AEC). (Arctic Economic Council u.d.) In September 2015 the organization established a permanent secretariat in Tromsø in Norway. In 2015 Russia took part when the Council established a “Framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions”, established a “Framework Plan for Cooperation on Prevention of Oil Pollution from Petroleum” and agreed on a regulation of ”Maritime Activities in the Marine Areas of the Arctic”. (Russian Foreign Ministry 2015) Furthermore, in July 2015 the five Arctic coast states, including Russia, was able to agree on a deal prohibiting unregulated commercial fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean, until there is an international standard which regulates the fishing. (US Department of State 2015) Furthermore, Russia has kept up its cooperation with Norway concerning commercial fishing in the Barents Sea, just as it has kept up its collaboration with Norway on coast guard cooperation. (Pettersen, Norway, Russia continue Coast Guard cooperation 2016) Just as Norway and Russia has conducted joint Search and Rescue exercises in the Barents Sea. (Karlsbakk 2015) Furthermore, Russia has followed the recommendations and regulation by the UNCLOS/CLCS. Thus, on 3 August 2015, Russia sent in its final material for its application to the CLCS.25 After an expedition in 2012 and another in 2014, the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment declared that samples had been collected from the sea floor by the Mendeleev ridge and that the samples supported the Russia claim. (Associated Press 2015) ”An area of the sea floor beyond the 200-mile zone within the bounds of the entire Russian Arctic sector, including the North Pole zone and the southern tip of the Gakkel Ridge, is being claimed. This territory covers 1.2 million square kilometres with a forecast hydrocarbon resource of 4.9 billion tonnes of oil equivalent”, the Minister of Natural Resources and the Environment, Sergei Donskoi, said in a press statement. (Russian beyond the headlines 2015) And Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has continued to employ the IR-liberalist discourse while speaking on matters of the Arctic. In October 2014 commenting on the tensions between the West and Russia and on the effect of the European Union sanctions on Russia and on cooperation in the Arctic, Sergei Lavrov said: ”No sphere of a country’s international activity is immune to unilateral sanctions or the influence of events taking place outside that sphere or region. Still, I think that Arctic cooperation is fairly stable.” He then underlined the Arctic states’ experience of being mutually interdependent in the Arctic, promoted the Russian slogan of the Arctic as a ”territory of dialogue” and underlined that the littoral states in the Arctic share the same interests and goals: ”We have a shared interest in cooperating for the promotion of our bids with the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf”. (Lavrov, Remarks by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during an open lecture on Russia’s current foreign policy 2014) In an interview for the government paper, Rossiya Segodniya, Lavrov once again argued that there was no ’spill-in’ effects from the war in Ukraine on the Arctic Region: ”There is no “race to the Arctic” and cannot be in principle. The international legal regime of the marine Arctic spaces clearly sets down the rights of the littoral Arctic states and other states. That applies also to access to the development of mineral resources, oil and gas, and the management of marine biological resources. International law regulates the possible extension of external boundaries on the continental shelf of the littoral countries. The current complicated international situation does not bring any cardinal changes to the established order.” (Lavrov, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with Rossiya Segodnya 2014) Commenting on the Danish application to the CLCS in December 2015 – which surpriced most observers since it makes a claim on the under water territory all the way to the Russian 200-seamile limit – Lavrov stressed that overlapping areas would be decided upon through negotiations and according to international law: ”Possible adjoining sections of our countries’ continental shelf in the high Arctic latitudes will be demarcated on a bilateral basis, through negotiations and in line with international law. However, the CLCS should first confirm that the seabed sections to which Russia and Denmark are laying claim are part of the continental shelf. This issue cannot be solved in a day or two. Considering the CLCS’s current work load, the Danish claim will be reviewed not earlier than 10 to 15 years from now, according to current estimates.” (Lavrov, Comment by the Information and Press Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry on the filing of Denmark’s claim to the Arctic continental shelf 2015) And, in a Special Issue of Shared Voices, Lavrov underlines the progress of the Arctic Council in the following way: ”The Arctic states have managed to combine their efforts in elaborating and implementing a positive, unifying and future-oriented agenda largely due to the constructive work performed by the Arctic Council, a unique forum which is not divided into ’clubs’.” (Lavrov, International cooperation for Arctic prosperity 2016) One can find the same stress on international law in the communication from Russia’s Senior Arctic Official, Vladimir Barbin. Thus, in a comment he argues, that: “The main objectives addressed by Russian foreign policy in the Arctic are intended to keep the region as one of peace and cooperation. Despite the difficult international situation, we have managed to preserve cooperation in the Arctic”.26 (Barbin, Vladimir Barbin: Russia continues to cooperate with other countries in the Arctic 2016) (Barbin, Arctic Council, Russian Federation 2015) However, the IR-liberalist discourse is – despite the official recommendation by Putin, the Foreign Ministry’s IR-liberalist line and the stated goals in the various Arctic strategies – frequently challenged by partakers in the public debate, something which has accelerated after the war in Ukraine. Thus, the patriotic influenced realism/geopolitics line, which Chilingarov presented back in 2007, is followed up on in an interview for Argumenti i Fakti in October 2014, where Chilingarov argues, that “Russia's future is inextricably linked with the fate of the polar regions” since it in the coming years will be “the basic resource base of the country”. Furthermore, in 10 or 20 years the development of the Arctic shelf will play the same role for the identity of the Russian state as the space explorations did for the Soviet Union, Chilingarov argues. (Rikin 2014) Thus, pride in Russia’s Artic achievements is still a marked feature of this part of the realist/geopolitical discourse on the Arctic. On the other hand, Chilingarov has also on several occasions towed the official line. Thus, at the Arctic Frontiers conference in Tromsø, Norway, in January 2015, Chilingarov stated: “In the Arctic there are no problems that cannot be solved on the basis of mutual understanding and constructive dialogue”. (Pettersen, Russia still open for cooperation in the Arctic 2015) The aggravated atmosphere between Russia and the West seems to have affected the security situation in the Arctic, even if in a minor way. Thus, for the first time, the Arctic is mentioned as a specific area of interest in the military doctrine from December 2014, where it is stated that it is the task of the Russian armed forces: “to protect national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic region”. (The President of the Russian Federation 2014) In line with this, Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu stated on 25 February 2015 that a “broad spectrum of potential challenges and threats to our national security is now being formed in the Arctic”. Thus, Shoigu has issued orders to further develop the Russian military infrastructure in the area.27 (Interfax 2015) Also, Shoigu in April 2015 claimed that “NATO countries are seeking to seize the geopolitical space by building military potential in eastern Europe and approaching Russia’s borders. The geographical concentration of their drills only at the alliance’s eastern flank and in the Arctic region point to the anti-Russian orientation” (Tass Russian News Agency 2015) Also the chief of the Russian navy, Admiral Viktor Chirkov, in March 2014 said that the Arctic areas “potentially can be used in order to create new security threats for the whole of the Russian territory”. (Zysk 2015, 80) The risk of a surprise nuclear attack from US forces in the Arctic, seems to have some weight in the worldview of the realist/geopolitical side of the foreign policy establishment in Moscow as well as in Putin’s public discourse on the Arctic. In a speech at the Seliger 2014 National Youth Forum for young Putin supporters, Putin reminded the listeners that the “United States’ attack submarines are concentrated in that area, not far from the Norwegian coast, and the missiles they carry would reach Moscow within 15-16 minutes, just to remind you. But we have our navy there and quite a big part of our submarine fleet.” (Putin, Seliger 2014 National Youth Forum 2014) As Pavel Baev sees it, Putin’s interest in geopolitics in the Arctic has “a pronounced military-security character”. (Baev, Russia’s Arctic Policy and the Northern Fleet Modernization 2012, 4) One reason could be that Putin, along with other supporters of the realist/geopolitics discourse in the foreign and security policy establishment, fears a situation, where an ice-free Arctic lets the US/NATO permanently deploy nuclear submarine fleet and sea-based anti-ballistic missile defence systems close to the northern border of Russia, possibly undermining Russia’s second strike capability.28 (Zysk 2015, 80) This is supported by the military analyst, Viktor Murakhovsky, editor-in-chief of the Arsenal Otechestva (Arsenal of the Fatherland) magazine: “According to US plans drafted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, one of the main strikes is to be dealt across the Arctic”...”The United States is currently working on a so-called Prompt Global Strike concept, and the Arctic region will be one of the main areas of operations. Also, the US Navy’s submarines are invariably present in the region”. (Tass Russian News Agency 2015) On the other hand, Putin, in some of his other statements on the Arctic, stresses the need for international cooperation in the region: “I would like to stress that this country is interested in the region’s sustainable development based on cooperation and absolute respect for international law. With this goal in view, we maintain a constant exchange with our partners on issues pertaining to the Arctic, and we fully comply with international requirements for enhancing environmental security in the region” (Putin, Meeting of the Security Council on State Policy in the Arctic 2014) Rogozin also toes the IR-liberalism line in some of his public statements. Thus, in commenting upon the setup of the Russian federal Arctic Commission, Rogozin said that “our objective is not the militarization of the Arctic, (but rather, J.S.) a full fledged realization of Russia’s economic interests in the Arctic”... “(t)he consequent objective for our Armed Forces is to protect these interests”.29 (Staalesen, Arctic policy up for remake 2015) Conclusion The trend towards a steadily narrowing and increasingly one-sided circle of political confidants around President Vladimir Putin who takes part in deciding on all or most of the central issues on a personalized rather than institutions-based and rule-governed foundation, seems not to be the standard decision making process concerning Arctic affairs. Here, the policy process seems much more institutionalized and rule-based. Furthermore, the circle of officials and institutions involved is large, and the policy is to a large extent written down in ‘white papers’ or documents of strategic importance. The overall strategic lines on the Arctic are furthermore embedded in an institutionalised cooperation between the Presidential Administration, the National Security Council, the Defence Ministry and the Foreign Ministry and thus seem less exposed to the ‘turf wars’ of the often factionalized and conflicted administrative regime of Russia. Discourse theory would therefore argue that this institutionalisation makes Russia’s Arctic policy less prone to change, since sedimented discourses are harder to politicise and change. Furthermore, as the article has tried to demonstrate, Russia’s foreign policy elite’s debate on the Arctic can be divided up in two overall discourses. These two overall discourses are based on the basic assumptions of – or at least assumptions that are very similar to – the two theoretical schools of thought within international relations (IR), namely: IR-realism/geopolitics and IR-liberalism. The IR-realism/geopolitics discourse generally makes a explicit or implicit security first argument, seeing power as relational and the international system as anarchic. Thus, the other states in the Arctic, especially the great powers, are seen as potential adversaries – the more patriotic or geopolitically focused see the other great powers, especially the USA, as inherent adversaries. The discourse forwards an unilateralist approach and focuses on balance of power, zero-sum game logic, and is often patriotic, nationalist, and some of its proponents seeks to further Russia’s “greatness” and “revival”, and talks of “exploring”, “winning” or “conquering” the Arctic. This side of the debate is supported by official announcements of the need for an increased Russian military build-up in the Arctic – due to a perceived threat from the US/NATO military build-up in the Arctic or due to a general perception of an inferior Russian position in the overall global competition, which must be overcome if Russia is to become a regional (or even extra-regional) great power in a multipolar international system – which is one of the stated goals of Russia’s foreign policy elite. If the Arctic is mentioned in connection with a discussion of relations with the West, the realist/geopolitical discourse is frequently influenced by anti-Western rhetoric, anxiety about isolation, fear of outright Western containment and coloured by disappointment about the lack of international (Western) recognition of the (desired) Russian status as a great power. On the other hand the IR-liberalism discourse generally makes a cooperation first argument, viewing the other Arctic states as “partners” and the proponents speaks of the Arctic as a “zone of peace and cooperation”. Indeed, one political actor, argues that it is “more effective” to pursue national interests in the Arctic together with the other Arctic states than alone. Power and political or economic gain is seen as an absolute, there is an emphasis on “respect for international law”, “multilateral structures”, rules and regimes, and its proponents highlight “international legal framework”, “joint cooperation projects” and “negotiations” as valuable instruments in Arctic affairs. The proponents of this discourse often underline a Russian need for market economic modernization and optimization of Russian companies – including emphasis on involvement of international (Western) companies with technology and know-how with regard to developing the hard-to-access resources in the Arctic. So far, the overall Russian foreign policy course has been guided by the IR-liberalist discourse since around 2008-2009. And this has not changed after the war in the Ukraine in 2014. The Russian Foreign Ministry has been tasked by the President and the Security Council to lay out the policy lines regarding the Arctic – presumably because of Putin’s pragmatic acknowledgement that the UN track is the most productive way to secure support for the Russian desires to obtain jurisdiction over expanded underwater territory out to the 350 sea mile limit. This is possible if CLCS, under the terms of UNCLOS, recognizes that the Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges are extensions of the Siberian continental shelf, and if Russia is subsequently able to enter into bilateral agreements with the other Arctic coastal states that claim parts of the same territory – the USA, Canada and Denmark (Greenland) respectively. When Putin, who is the most important foreign policy actor in Russia, supports the IR-liberalism course, even though he primarily speaks about the world within the framework of an IR realism/geopolitical worldview, it is not, however, only because of a pragmatic acknowledgement of which means best serve the Russian goals. It is also because the two foreign policy discourses in the Kremlin – of which Putin is the ultimate judge – despite their disagreement on the means, are quite in agreement about the objective: that the Arctic is to become the main resource base of the Russian economy. A resource base, which shall make the continuation of Russia’s restoration as an internationally-acknowledged great power possible. Thus, Russia’s ambition in the Arctic – as stated in Russia’s public policy papers, directives and strategies on the subject and constituted and legitimized in speeches and public statements – is first and foremost of an economical nature. On the one hand, there is a desire to develop the enormous natural resources expected to be found in the region – especially oil and gas. The development of the natural resources has thus enjoyed first priority since they shall guarantee Russia’s future position as an energy superpower when the capacity in the existing oil and gas fields in Siberia diminishes in the coming years. On the other hand, Russia, at least on paper, sees great potential in opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense in saving up to nearly 4,000 sea miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so that Russia can make money servicing the ships and permitting passages through what Russia considers Russian territorial waters. Another reason for the prevalence of the choice of the IR-liberalist discourse is, as Russia’s former Senior Arctic Official, now Ambassador to Iceland, Anton Vasiliev, argued: “According to Danish experts, up to 97% of proven reserves are located in the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic States. In other words, there's nothing to divide, everything has been already divided”.30 (Vasiliev 2013) Therefore, firstly it is “much more effective pursue national interests in the Arctic together as compared to doing it alone”. Secondly, if 97% of the proven reserves are located within the EEZ, Russia has a clear interest in securing the other Arctic states’ backing of the UNCLOS regime which regulates and legitimizes the EEZ. Another reason for the choice of the UN track is obviously that Russia, in doing so, hopes to secure support from the other Arctic coastal states regarding UNCLOS’s recognition of Russia’s request for a 350-mile sea limit. Yet another reason for following the IR-liberalist track is that it in the eyes of Putin apparently is bearing fruit. Thus, on 22 April 2014, Putin could announce that CLCS had recommended that Russia had obtained the right to a 52,000 square kilometre area in the Sea of Okhotsk in the western Pacific Ocean between the Kurils and the Kamchatka Peninsula. The recommendation from Putin was absolutely clear: “Our experts should act in the exact same way while conducting bilateral and multilateral consultations with the governments of the Arctic nations.” (Putin, Meeting of the Security Council on State Policy in the Arctic 2014) However, although some of the proclamations of intent from the IR-realist/geopolitical discourse on ‘making the Arctic Russia’s’ in the eyes of Ieva Berzina in their essence are discourses for ‘internal consumption’ or discourses for domestic audiences rather than for international audiences (Berzina, Foreign & Domestic Discourse on the Russian Arctic 2015, 290) – please note that I do not distinguish between discourses for internal versus external audiences – the pressure from them could have an effect on overall stability of the IR-liberalist discourse. Especially due to the fact that the IR-realist/geopolitical discourse is closer to the way Putin usually expresses himself. And in a situation, where the Kremlin believes that there is nothing to be gained from cooperating with the West, or believes it to be more useful to push the patriotic forces forward, the IR-realist/geopolitical discourse could become dominant again. In other words, the IR-liberalist discourse is not inherently stable, even if it is rather institutionalized and sedimented and the IR-liberalist side may claim strong, economic interests in the region – resources in the underground as well as the Northern Sea Route. But, concerns for national security could lessen the importance of these interests, thus undermining the stability of the IR-liberalist discourse. One could ask what it would take to disrupt this apparent status quo. One subject, which seems to have an effect on the Russian elite’s feeling of security is the US/NATO plans for anti-ballistic missile defence (BMD). As noted in the article, parts of Putin’s nuclear rethoric may be linked to developments (or percieved developments) of BMD. And it would be logical to expect a strengthening of the realist/geopolitical discourse on the Arctic and a subsequent strengthening of Russia’s military posture in the area, if US/NATO BMD developments leads to an enhanced presence of US/NATO forces in the area. Furthermore, one could ask under what circumstances would the Kremlin decide that Russia no longer had enough to gain from cooperating with the West in the Arctic, no longer had an interest in securing a backing of its territorial claims through the UNCLOS procedure and/or through bilateral aggreements with the litoral states? Well, reversing the logic of the chosen theoretical framework, one could speculate and imagine a situation where Putin chose to de-institutionalize the decisionmaking process and sidestep most or all of the central institutions and persons involved in Arctic policy making and instead narrow the group down to a few close siloviki-confidants – like Shoigu, Patrushev, Bortnikov – not unlike the decision to go to war in Ukraine. This would most likely be highly contested, since it would sidestep the carefull balance of the different elite groups, ministries and influential individuals which at present have a say and an interest in Arctic policy. Thus, it would most likely only happen if the regime would feel serverely threatened from internal forces and needed a public ‘diversion’, that could enhance regime security, and could not come up with a better place to ‘start a fire’. Or, if Russia would feel existentially threatened, for example by extensive US/NATO military buildup in the area or elsewhere and military planners deemed it nescessary to take precautions to secure the Northern flank and Russia’s nuclear forces in the area. Otherwise, Russia has in the view of the present elite too strong interests in securing the status quo in the Arctic and in following the IR-liberalist line. Directory: papers papers -> From Warfighters to Crimefighters: The Origins of Domestic Police Militarization papers -> The Tragedy of Overfishing and Possible Solutions Stephanie Bellotti papers -> Prospects for Basic Income in Developing Countries: a comparative Analysis of Welfare Regimes in the South papers -> Weather regime transitions and the interannual variability of the North Atlantic Oscillation. Part I: a likely connection papers -> Fast Truncated Multiplication for Cryptographic Applications papers -> Reflections on the Industrial Revolution in Britain: William Blake and J. M. W. Turner papers -> This is the first tpb on this product papers -> Basic aspects of hurricanes for technology faculty in the United States papers -> Title Software based Remote Attestation: measuring integrity of user applications and kernels Authors Download 158.45 Kb. Share with your friends:
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