On 24 February the 1st Cavalry Division crossed the line of departure and hit the Iraqi 27th Infantry Division. That was not their first meeting. General Tilelli's division had actually been probing the Iraqi defenses for some time. As these limited thrusts continued in the area that became known as the Ruqi Pocket, Tilelli's men found and destroyed elements of five Iraqi divisions, evidence that the 1st succeeded in its theater reserve mission of drawing and holding enemy units. As the ground offensive progressed, by 25 February 1991 Iraqi units' ineffectiveness became more clear. The Iraqi 12th Armored Division, in front of the 1st UK Armoured Division, was engaged with Coalition armored forces as it attempted to maintain a LOC for the 47th, 27th, and 28th Infantry divisions along the US VII Corps eastern flank.
28th Infantry Division
As the ground offensive progressed, by 25 February 1991 Iraqi units' ineffectiveness became more clear. The Iraqi 12th Armored Division, in front of the 1st UK Armoured Division, was engaged with Coalition armored forces as it attempted to maintain a LOC for the 47th, 27th, and 28th Infantry divisions along the US VII Corps eastern flank.
29th Infantry Division
When the ground offensive started on 24 February 1991, Iraqi ground forces remained in defensive positions in the KTO. There were no indications of any Iraqi troop withdrawal. Iraqi front line units, including the 7th, 14th and 29th Infantry divisions in the I MEF zone and the 19th Infantry Division in the Joint Forces Command - East [JFC-E] zone, offered sporadic, but sometimes stiff, resistance. These forces were bypassed, withdrew or surrendered. As the ground offensive progressed, by 25 February 1991 Iraqi units' ineffectiveness became more clear. The Iraqi III Corps units had suffered severe damage. CENTCOM assessed the Corps' 7th, 8th, 14th, 18th, and 29th Infantry divisions, in the I MEF and JFC-E zones, as combat ineffective. The 29th Infantry Division, withdrawing to the east, was combat ineffective.
30th Infantry Division
As the ground offensive progressed, by 25 February 1991 Iraqi units' ineffectiveness became more clear. In the Iraqi IV Corps area of western Kuwait, in front of I MEF and JFC-N, the Iraqi 20th and 30th Infantry divisions were assessed as combat ineffective by the end of the first day of the ground offensive. The 21st and 16th Infantry divisions appeared to be falling back to a defensive line south and west of 'Ali As-Salim Airfield. The 6th Armored Division, west of 'Ali As-Salim Airfield, was heavily reduced.
31st Infantry Division
As the ground offensive progressed, by 25 February 1991 Iraqi units' ineffectiveness became more clear. By the end of G + 1, five Iraqi VII Corps infantry divisions, one in US VII Corps zone in the tri-border area, were in jeopardy of being isolated on the front lines. From west to east in front of the Iraqi VII Corps, the 48th, 25th, 26th, 31st, and 45th Infantry divisions were engaged by American VII Corps armored and mechanized infantry divisions and rendered combat ineffective. By the end of G + 1, the Iraqi forward corps were assessed as combat ineffective - no longer capable of conducting a coherent defense in sector.
34th Infantry Division (90th, 502th, 504th Inf Bdes)
Accoring to some sources, during the Gulf War elements of the 34th Infantry Division served in the front line under the IV Corps covering the western Kuwait-Saudi border-Iraq border area [the presence and location of this unit is not attested by most sources].
According to Orbat.Com
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90th Infantry Brigade
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502nd Infantry Brigade
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504th Infantry Brigade
According to Cordesman
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6th Infantry Brigade
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90th Infantry Brigade
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502nd Infantry Brigade
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504th Infantry Brigade
35th Infantry Division
In the early morning darkness of 25 February 1991, General McCaffrey put his 24th Division in motion toward its first major objective. To the surprise of all, the 24th Division took three major objectives and hundreds of men in only nineteen hours while meeting weak resistance from isolated pockets of Iraqi soldiers that were suspected as being from the 26th or 35th Infantry Divisions. By the end of the day XVIII Airborne Corps had advanced in all division sectors to take important objectives, establish a functioning forward operating base, place brigade size blocking forces in the Euphrates River valley, and capture thousands of prisoners of war-at a cost of two killed in action and two missing. The American 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) had taken three major objectives and hundreds of prisoners against weak resistance from the Iraqi 26th and 35th Infantry divisions. Some sources place the 35th Infantry Division as part of the Second Line [tactical reserve] of the III Corps, deployed in the southern Kuwait-Saudi border-coast-Kuwait City area. However, none of the various published maps from Operation Desert Storm depict this division or its location
36th Infantry Division
As the ground offensive progressed, by 25 February 1991 Iraqi units' ineffectiveness became more clear. The Iraqi 36th Infantry, 1st Mechanized Infantry, and the 56th Armored Brigade established hasty defensive positions south/southwest of Al-Jahra, northwest of Kuwait City. During the Gulf War, the US 2d Armored Division's Tiger Brigade advance split the seam between the Iraqi III and IV Corps, overrunning elements of the Iraqi 14th, 7th, and 36th Infantry Divisions, as well as brigades of the Iraqi 3d Armored, 1st Mechanized, and 2d Infantry Divisions. During four days of combat Tiger Brigade task forces destroyed or captured 181 tanks, 148 armored personnel carriers, 40 artillery pieces, and 27 antiaircraft systems while killing an estimated 263 enemy and capturing 4,051 prisoners of war, all at a cost of 2 killed and 5 wounded.
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