Saddam Army and Republican Guard From Globalsecurity
st Mechanized Division (31st, 25/32nd Mech, 41s Armd Bdes)
Download 0.72 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- 52nd Armored Division
51st Mechanized Division (31st, 25/32nd Mech, 41s Armd Bdes)During the Gulf War, some authorities indicate that the 17th Armored Division and the 51st Mechanized Division were subordinate to a II Armored Corps. Although Schwarzkopf on a number of occasions indicated his priority to destroy the Republican Guard, several air planners believe, because of corps commander insistence on moving air power south, air power was diverted from Republican Guard targets too soon. With air power strikes moved south, third echelon Iraqi units comprised of the Tawakalna Mechanized Division, Medina Armored Division, Hammurabi Armored Division and the 51st Mechanized Division, were provided respite from attack. It was these units, the best trained and disciplined in the Iraqi army that the Coalition forces would need to engage to secure Kuwait. Iraqi forces resumed military operations in south on 08 April 2000. On 13 April, the regime's forces, comprised of the infantry and mechanized infantry units of the 51st Division (The Command of the Sariyet Al-Jebel Forces), attacked the resistance headquarters in the Ali bin Al-Hussein region, from Al-Medeyna-Nahr Salih axis. The attacking forces suffered some casualties and equipment, including a BMB-1 armored vehicle and a bulldozer. In response to the artillery and mortar bombardment of civilian homes in Talha, Al-Athel, and Huweimla areas by the 51st Division, the resistance forces launched an attack on the headquarters of this division on April 9th. The resistance forces attacked the headquarters of the 2nd Battalion of the 32nd Mechanized Infantry Brigade in the Huweimla area east of the Talha district. The resistance forces also attacked the headquarters of the 20th Armored Brigade in the Al-Athel region 10 Km north of the Talha district, inflicting heavy casualties and destroying equipment. The 51st Mechanized Division's 8,000 soldiers, based around the major oil-shipment hub of Basra in southern Iraq, surrendered to coalition forces on 21 March 2003. The 51st had been one of the better-equipped army divisions, with about 200 tanks. According to Orbat.Com
52nd Armored DivisionOn the first day of the ground campaign, movement of the Iraqi heavy reserve units was on the ARCENT intelligence "watch for" list as VII Corps passed through the breach and fanned out across the desert. No matter how good the data, intelligence analysis always involves a subjective reading of objective information: the G2's professional assessment of what the enemy will do. Good intelligence requires the G2 to put himself in the mind of the enemy, requiring leaps of analytical faith based on a foundation of facts. Intelligence therefore, is not a science but an art, a large part of which involves making correct assessments from partial or flawed data. American analysts had inadvertently switched the identities of four Iraqi heavy units. As those units entered the KTO or moved around inside the theater prior to the air operation, signals intelligence analysts picked up bits and pieces of unit call signs, movement orders, and other tip-offs that said, for example, that the 12th Armored Division was moving to a new but unspecified location. If imagery showed an armor unit moving or adjusting its positions at that time, the unit was labeled the "possible" 12th Armored. As more "hits" developed on the unit's identity, the "possible" identification hardened to a "probable," and might even be confirmed by another source. The units in question were the 12th and 52d Armored Divisions in one pair and the 10th and 17th Armored Divisions in the other. Of the four misidentified units, the 12th and 52d Armored Divisions were most important to ARCENT because they were closest to VII Corps' breach. Late on February 24, intercept picked up orders to the 12th Armored Division's 50th and 37th Armored Brigades to move to unspecified blocking positions. Simultaneously, JSTARS detected 10 vehicles moving north along the pipeline road west of the Wadi al-Batin. It also detected a battalion-size convoy moving from the laager of what Stewart believed was the 52d Armored. Intelligence tracked the activity closely to determine whether the Iraqis would attempt an operational counterattack or simply move to block the US VII Corps' left-hook attack from the west. He owed that "key read" to Franks by midday on the 25th. Movement indicators in the two Iraqi divisional areas continued, reinforced by JSTARS-detected movement out of the Tawakalna laager toward Phase Line Smash. Early on February 25, the Iraqis were not counterattacking. The 52d Armored, in conjunction with the Tawakalna, was moving less than a brigade out along Phase Line Smash. JSTARS had focused on these movements, calculating the precise number of tanks and armored vehicles, their direction, speed, and location along the phase line. The 12th Armored Division, the Americans believed, was occupying similar blocking positions west of Wadi al-Batin. None of these units, therefore, was a threat to VlI Corps' attack. By late morning of 25 February 1991 Joint Forces Command North had made enough progress to allow the American VII Corps and Marine Central Command on the flanks to resume their advance. That afternoon and night in the American 1st Infantry Division sector, the Americans expanded their mine breach and captured two enemy brigade command posts and the Iraqi 26th Infantry Division command post, with a brigadier general and complete staff. Behind them, the British 1st Armored Division made good progress through the mine breach and prepared to turn right and attack the Iraqi 52d Armored Division. On 27 February 1991 on the south flank, the 1st UK Armoured Division destroyed the 52nd Armored Division, then overran three infantry divisions. The British 1st Armored Division attacked eastward through the 48th Infantry and 52d Armored Divisions and remnants of other Iraqi units trying to withdraw north. This attack marked the start of nearly two days of continuous combat for the British, some of the toughest fighting of the war. In the largest of this series of running battles, the British destroyed 40 tanks and captured an Iraqi division commander.
Download 0.72 Mb. Share with your friends:
|