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TRENDS and Challenges in Airborne ISR
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TRENDS and Challenges in Airborne ISRAirborne ISR in the Future Strategic EnvironmentThe Alliance will continue to face asymmetric threats, and the risk of a confrontation with near-peer competitors is on the rise. NATO and individual Allies must thus balance the need for airborne ISR capable of gaining tactical advantages during asymmetric operations and of gathering intelligence in conventional missions in contested airspaces. Efforts against terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and Daesh will remain a battle of intelligence. Terrorists are rapidly moving targets, often capable of blending into the local population and resurfacing only to strike. Moreover, the recent experience from the Middle East and North Africa shows that terrorists thrive in large, often inaccessible areas where they can train and plan operations without being spotted. Hence, long-endurance airborne ISR will continue to be vital, as it can provide continuous and extensive coverage. At the tactical level, the counter-insurgency environment’s decentralised nature makes it imperative that ISR assets are controlled as far forward in the field as practical, so that units that can rapidly exploit the collected information. Pushing such ISR forward also includes, at times, pushing the requisite intelligence analytical support forward too, so that intelligence analysts are able to work hand in glove with the supported commander. Supporting airborne ISR systems are often the main determinant of what a unit can or cannot do in the field. Their control at the tactical level will thus likely become even more decentralised. Furthermore, recent operational experiences have shown that platforms will increasingly need to integrate ISR with lethal capabilities, shifting from being gatherers to being hunters. The use of most current airborne ISR platforms is limited to operations in uncontested airspace. However, a number of potential adversarial states are expanding their Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) assets, increasingly closing off airspace for many ISR assets. Air defence systems could dramatically shift the balance of power in a theatre of operations and prevent projection of air power. The proliferation of missiles and their increasing precision pose challenges to ISR missions. Electronic warfare capabilities can focus on communication nodes such as satellites and ground-based stations. There are numerous, typically cheap, ways to interfere with the electromagnetic signals of airborne ISR assets and render them useless. Cyber-attacks can fatally disrupt ISR networks and command and control systems, thus paralysing even the most sophisticated ISR aircraft. To prevent vulnerabilities, future airborne ISR platforms should focus on more than just sensor capability, imagery exploitation, and aircraft endurance. Self-defence and even self-repair capabilities will be increasingly important. This can include laser warning systems, radar warning receivers, electronic attack or jamming systems, and even towed decoys. Another important requirement for survivability is low observability. Next-generation airborne ISR platforms will need to be stealthy as a number of states field integrated air defence systems that can only be penetrated by stealth platforms. Moreover, operations in A2/AD environments will not be exclusive to potential conventional conflicts with near-peer competitors. Irregular warfare will see non-state actors who possess guided rockets, artillery, mortars, and missiles. Just as the combination of persistent overhead surveillance, networks, and guided weapons puts insurgents at risk in new ways, the proliferation of these weapons will allow these groups to challenge NATO forces in new ways as well. Data Processing, Exploitation, and DisseminationOver the last 15 years, the interplay between operational requirements and technological developments has meant that sensor technologies of airborne ISR platforms have made great strides. Multiple sensors can hone in on and monitor a single target almost persistently, and wide area surveillance systems can continuously track enemy movements in an area the size of a city. Traditional technologies like electro-optical and infrared sensors continue to improve, and new technologies are emerging. For example, certain sensors in development possess multi-spectral imaging which allow one to survey ever-larger areas, while multi‑wave radars seek to pierce buildings and other structures. As a result of this evolution in sensor technology, data collection capabilities will continue to grow – and with it the need to process ever larger volumes of data. Even the most advanced collection system is of little use if it lacks the analytical infrastructure to process and exploit the data. The emergence of big data, i.e. high-volume data sets comprised of a wide range of data types and sources which are collected and distributed at a high velocity, adds to the complexity of the ISR task. As the growth in data collection capabilities currently outpaces the growth in data processing capabilities, new technologies and methods are thus needed to extract value from large datasets. This requires changes in numerous areas. First, airborne ISR needs to be more tightly integrated into the full intelligence network, where analysts can rapidly process, fuse, and interpret data from multiple sources. So processed, intelligence needs to be disseminated to the right users at the right time. To achieve the desired integration, armed forces need to better link their separate national and international efforts in intelligence, operations, and command and control and move away from compartmentalised efforts. Better intelligence sharing across military branches and among Allies and partners will also be vital. A common technological architecture and a common institutional framework would facilitate collaboration. Accordingly, ISR strategies, tactics, techniques, and procedures have recently been reformed within NATO. A multinational ISR research and development programme known as MAJIIC24 has been at the forefront of developing standards for the sharing, searching, and dissemination of ISR data. MAJIIC2 completed its work at the end of 2015 and many of its results are being deployed both within NATO itself and by NATO Allies. However, there remains an enduring need to train and exercise personnel according to such new reforms. Second, improved computing will be crucial to enhance the management of the vast amount of information. Cognitive computing and artificial intelligence capable of processing volumes of data within the span of seconds promise significant improvements in processing and exploiting incoming data. Emerging technologies will enhance real-time processing of multi-source data onboard of airborne ISR platforms and thus increase their capabilities to correctly recognise objects and targets. Gradually, sensors might be capable of fully automated target recognition. In parallel, human analytical performance can be dramatically enhanced through employment of adaptive, interactive, and integrated technical systems that are revolutionising the man-machine interface. This has, for example, enabled the increasing autonomy of unmanned systems and individualisation and mobility of control systems, bringing rapid and easy access to information. The next airborne ISR research and development effort should focus on machine to machine ‘cueing and tipping’. For example, if a UAV sees a target with a wide area sensor, it can ‘cue and tip’ another UAV to automatically investigate further with a more sensitive camera. Within the context of big data, ISR exploitation also requires a degree of automation as human intelligence professionals become a scarce resource who should not be used to watch hundreds of hours of full-motion video. Third, enhanced connectivity can increase the effectiveness of ISR sytems enabling them to communicate with each other. New data links have provided high‑bandwidth connectivity for command and control of airborne ISR assets and data transfer, for example to stream full-motion video directly from ISR air support to forward-deployed ground forces. Developments in machine-to-machine communication, driven by developments of cloud computing and big data analytics, can further streamline processing, exploitation and dissemination and provide enhanced speed, and accuracy at greater volumes of information. Enhancing fast and secure connectivity of airborne and ground-based platforms will, for example, support real-time tactical intelligence, providing crucial advantages in fast-paced operational environments. The cyber domain also empowers commanders to rapidly make decisions, communicate them, and thus achieve results at speeds that were previously unimaginable. In the past, ISR tended to be mostly about platforms. Today, it is about the full ISR architecture. Robust, reliable, and secure information and communications networks are key enablers, allowing for automation (connecting data to data), and visualisation (connecting people to data). One of NATO's roles is to define the formats for the developing and sharing of information and its link to intelligence. In this context, Allies made an important decision at the 2016 Warsaw Summit. They recognised that “NATO intelligence reform must be an ongoing, dynamic process”, as the importance of intelligence in NATO activities continues to grow. Thus, Allies “agreed to establish a new Joint Intelligence and Security Division to be led by an Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security. The new Assistant Secretary General will direct NATO's intelligence and security activities, ensuring better use of existing personnel and resources, while maximising the efficient use of intelligence provided by Allies.” Directory: sites -> default -> files -> documents documents -> North Mankato Taylor Library documents -> In the Red and Brown Water documents -> - documents -> Cbp and Trade Automated Interface Requirements Appendix: pga december 22, 2015 documents -> Ace abi catair customs and Trade Automated Interface Requirements documents -> Ace abi catair customs and Trade Automated Interface Requirements documents -> Mobile audio/video recording systems documents -> The south australian government gazette documents -> All public acts appearing in this gazette are to be considered official, and obeyed as such documents -> Union interparlementaire inter-parliamentary union Download 342.92 Kb. Share with your friends:
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