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The Balance of Manned and Unmanned Airborne ISR Solutions
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The Balance of Manned and Unmanned Airborne ISR SolutionsAirborne ISR has become increasingly unmanned, allowing far greater endurance. This enables operators to follow adversaries persistently and confront them at the time and place chosen by themselves rather than the adversaries. The costs of operating UAVs are generally still lower than manned systems, not least due to much higher fuel efficiency. Even though the costs will rise as UAVs become increasingly sophisticated, their long endurance and low risk compared to manned assets make UAVs an attractive ISR platform for situational awareness, rapid reaction, surveillance of high-value targets, identification of IEDs, and other missions. When armed, the combination of high-tech ISR and precise air-to-ground strikes provides a crucial military capability. The limitations of unmanned solutions vary according to system and operational requirements. A single unmanned mission requires a far larger ground crew than manned assets, for example. Also, operational, technical, and legal issues must be resolved for the use of unmanned assets in shared airspaces. Despite the ascendancy of unmanned solutions, the tactical ability and agility of manned airborne ISR remains critical to support ground operations. Airborne ISR can be conducted either by specifically designed ISR manned aircraft or by aircraft whose missions are not primarily focused on ISR missions, but still have substantial ISR capabilities due to the increasing sophistication of on-board sensors. For example, stealth capable manned aircraft, equipped with ISR technologies and information-transfer mechanisms, can provide critical information particularly in a non-permissive environment where UAVs are vulnerable. Optionally piloted platforms, typically helicopters, but also fixed-winged aircraft, offer flexible operating options. Due to their low logistical footprint, they are easy to deploy and discreete, thereby complementing drones. However, there are capacity limitations related to the need to accommodate a human pilot. As levels of autonomy and trust increase, the optionally piloted variant is likely to be less attractive for complex ISR missions. Furthermore, airships or tethered balloons offer several weeks of operability, though this should be weighed up against their flaws: they lack reach and are unarmed. Due to their dependence on meteorological conditions, drones must be part of a comprehensive ISR system including satellites, ships and ground equipment. Capacities currently being developed also require developing ICS (Information and Control System) capacities in parallel. Other Technological OpportunitiesAdvances beyond improved sensor technology will provide further impetus to increase the capabilities of airborne ISR platforms. Efforts to miniaturise technology will yield ever smaller unmanned systems that will be able to operate in dense urban environments and even inside buildings. New materials can, inter alia, lighten and strengthen platforms, reduce radar visibility, provide armour, and improve engine performance. Technical advances mean that it is becoming increasingly possible to develop materials with unique properties. For example, adaptive (morphing) structures dramatically lower visibility. Such “smart materials” can be significantly changed in a controlled fashion by external stimuli and make a vehicle on an ISR mission practically undetectable. Moreover, the removal of conventional flight control surfaces can provide a dramatic improvement in electromagnetic signature or offer increased endurance through weight‑savings. Capitalising on advances from the civil sector, hybrid and alternative energy sources are being implemented in airborne ISR systems. Research is underway on solar, biomass, hydrogen, and all-electric power possibilities. Engine technologies are also capitalising on commercial developments to meet higher speed and efficiency demands. Increasing operational time from hours to days and weeks should allow continuous operations in areas without an established infrastructure to produce comprehensive intelligence. Ever-higher resolution, combined with long endurance, will enable not only to monitor upholding of agreements on arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation, and ceasefire, but also to detect illicit activities, such as human trafficking or arms smuggling. It will also enhance the chances for successful strike missions, thus having an important deterrent effect. CONCLUDING REMARKSThe risks and threats NATO is facing in both the short- and long-term are complex, coming from multiple directions and varying in characteristics. Therefore, NATO’s laudable initiatives to develop highly advanced airborne ISR capabilities need to be implemented on time and in the right way. The next time the Alliance engages in military operations, it cannot afford to learn how to do joint ISR during the operations, as happened in Libya where the usability of airborne ISR was dramatically limited, due primarily to a lack of trained personnel able to coordinate the available ISR effectively as well as a level of incompatibility of US and European systems. Interoperability needs to further increase, especially as future operations are likely to be conducted in ever-more contested airspaces. As potential adversarial states increase their military power, and insurgents obtain better weaponry, NATO and individual Allies must be ready to conduct airborne ISR in Anti-Access/Area Denial environments. Improved intelligence sharing is absolutely crucial within member states, among Allies, and between the Alliance and partners. Currently, demand for airborne ISR is outpacing supply. Political will is necessary to develop needed capabilities: in short, airborne ISR platforms to collect information and analytical capacity to process, exploit, and disseminate it. Only then can NATO’s JISR initiative be successful. While there is a healthy stock of airborne ISR in the Alliance, NATO is still far too dependent on US assets. Initiatives to develop European UAVs should thus be fully supported by Allies. The Alliance has committed itself to 360° situational awareness and continued strategic anticipation. Airborne ISR is the key to delivering this. So far, Allied airborne ISR has focused too much on tactical support of ongoing operations; strategic intelligence capabilities must continue to be improved. The Warsaw Summit Communiqué rightly emphasised this point. New technologies provide still more options to surveil vast areas for days and weeks. If the Alliance learns how to effectively incorporate this capability into strategic planning and decision-making, it can gain significant advantages. To that end, a new ISR research and development effort for NATO should be considered by Allies, now that MAJIIC2 has come to a close. The constrained fiscal environment forces defence planners to prioritise, making it difficult to maintain capabilities in tactical ISR support while building up strategic ISR. However, given the strategic uncertainty in the transatlantic security environment, balancing both the tactical and strategic capabilties will be needed. The 2016 Warsaw Summit once again reaffirmed the need to increase NATO’s ISR capabilities and adapt current initiatives. Striving to live up to the Wales Defence Investment Pledge remains of utmost importance. As Lieutenant General Shanahan argued in front of the Committee, the thirst for additional ISR is always insatiable. So the important questions for the military and policy makers become: what is the purpose of ISR? What is ISR asked to do? And how how much ISR is enough? Ultimately, national parliamentarians need to answer these questions when passing defence budgets. The Rapporteur therefore hopes that this report can contribute to finding the right answers, which are so crucial for the Alliance in an age of strategic uncertainty. SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY(For further information on sources, please contact the Committee Director) Boland, Rita, “Air Force ISR Changes After Afghanistan”, Signal, 1 May 2014, http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=air-force-isr-changes-after-afghanistan Canan, James, “ISR in Today’s War”, Aerospace America, March 2010 Datla, Annand and Robert Haffa, “Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance in Contested Airspace”, Air & Space Power Journal, May-June 2014 Fransico, Mike and Deptula Dave, “Air Force ISR Operation”, Air & Space Power Journal, Winter 2010 Greenleaf, Jason R., “The Air War in Libya”, Air & Space Power Journal, March-April 2013 Joint Air Power Competence Centre, “Air and Space Power in NATO: Future Vector”, Kalkar, Germany: Joint Air Power Competence Centre, October 2014 Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Present Paradox – Future Challenge, Kalkar, Germany: Joint Air Power Competence Centre, March 2014 Kimminau, Jon, “A Culminating Point for Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,” Air & Space Power Journal, November-December 2012 Morton, Tyler, “Manned Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,” Air & Space Power Journal, November–December 2012 Odierno R., Nichoel E. Brooks, and Francesco P. Mastrachio, “ISR Evolution in the Iraqi Theater,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 50, 3rd Quarter 2008 PR Newswire, Global C4ISR Market - By Platform, Region and Vendors - Forecasts and Trends (2015-2020), PR Newswire, 9 March 2016 Directory: sites -> default -> files -> documents documents -> North Mankato Taylor Library documents -> In the Red and Brown Water documents -> - documents -> Cbp and Trade Automated Interface Requirements Appendix: pga december 22, 2015 documents -> Ace abi catair customs and Trade Automated Interface Requirements documents -> Ace abi catair customs and Trade Automated Interface Requirements documents -> Mobile audio/video recording systems documents -> The south australian government gazette documents -> All public acts appearing in this gazette are to be considered official, and obeyed as such documents -> Union interparlementaire inter-parliamentary union Download 342.92 Kb. Share with your friends:
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