Selected comments on Hurricane Katrina (August 2005) from email lists Compiled by Ilan Kelman

Sent: Sep 2, 2005 10:56 AM

To: GENDER-AND-DISASTER-NETWORK@listserv.tamu.edu

Subject: Re: Beyond New Orleans

>contribution if in every region

>a survey is made of disasters-in-waiting AND a great deal of energy is used

>to generate publicity

>where it can be effective, possibly far away in the nations� capitals, to

>give at least some chance

>to preventive measures being undertaken by the political class.
I wish to echo this sentiment, in particular using Katrina as an excuse to raise the profile of cities which could suffer similar fates, such as London and Dhaka, New York and (I believe but I might be wrong) Kinshasa. It is too late for New Orleans. It is not too late for the others.
My concern is that, when I have tried to speak about disasters-in-waiting, little impact results. When our colleagues spoke about New Orleans as a disaster-in-waiting, little impact resulted. Even when we speak about

Darfur or Dhaka or Kinshasa as disasters-in-progress (at the appropriate times), little impact results. 300,000 people had just died in tsunamis across a dozen countries when the Chancellor of the United Kingdom offered whatever money it would take to help them and backed up his words with the staggering sum of one million ounds--the same amount of money required to fire a single cruise missile into Baghdad.

From :

Reply-To : bwisner@igc.org

Sent : September 2, 2005 3:45:47 PM

To : Ilan Kelman , GENDER-AND-DISASTER-NETWORK@listserv.tamu.edu, NATURAL-HAZARDS-DISASTERS@JISCMAIL.AC.UK, radix@ecie.org

CC : bwisner@igc.org, Haresh.Shah@rms.com, hgbohle@giub.uni-bonn.de, bogardi@ehs.unu.edu, n_okada@drs.dpri.kyoto-u.ac.jp, bruno.haghebaert@ifrc.org, david.peppiatt@ifrc.org, tomdowning.sei@gmail.com, aros@ufl.edu

Subject : Beyond New Orleans
Thinking and acting beyond New Orleans and much more politically is an excellent suggestion. I am grateful to Ilan and Tim. The suggestion brings to mind two things (and my apologies for cross posting).
First is Haresh Shah's well know lament after the earthquake in Gujarat (2001) that with so much knowledge, experience, science, and technology, professionals are still failing to "go the last mile" with implementation. Since Haresh's now famous, short paper -- one that has probably circled the globe several times electronically -- I have been involved in many discussions (in Colombia, South Africa, Japan) about the obstacles to implementing what we know. In most of these discussions my interlocutors shy away from the "political" obstacles -- such as we've seen now in the case of New Orleans. So I fully and enthusiastically support the suggestion of not just doing studies of disasters-waiting-to-happen, but expending the "great deal of energy... to generate publicity" the two previous writers suggest. Moreover, these studies have got to be participatory in nature, involving from the start civil society, and, especially, many women and young people.
Second, I would add Mumbai to Ilan's list. Although the flooding that killed more than 1,000 people a short time ago was not caused by a cyclonic storm, there are many similar aspects of that tragedy. Monsoon flooding has been getting worse and worse as the city grows and the old drainage infrastructure is not able to keep pace. Maintenance of the drainage system also seems to have been neglected.
I would be grateful if list members who know more about the Mumbai situation would enlighten us.
Flooding in cities -- whatever the natural trigger event --is a major threat to much of humanity and has enormous knock on effect at the level of regional, national, and sometimes even international economic relations. Osaka, Japan's second largest city, depends on technological systems such as flood gates to keep water from a possible earthquake-generated tsunami out of its immense underground shopping areas and transportation hubs. Will these system fail? In a New York Times article yesterday an expert was quoted as puzzled that the

point in the New Orleans levee system that failed was one that had recently been reinforced. All such systems may fail (see Charles Perrow, "Normal Accidents," 2nd edition, Princeton University Press, 1998).

bwisner@igc.org

From : David Crichton

Reply-To : Natural hazards and disasters

Sent : August 31, 2005 9:14:17 PM

To : NATURAL-HAZARDS-DISASTERS@JISCMAIL.AC.UK

Subject : Re: Some larger issues raised by hurricane Katrina

establishing a database of vulnerable people such as sensory impaired, elderly, infirm, parents with young children, and those dependent on electrically operated medical equipment, with contingency plans for physical assistance with evacuation to centres judged to be suitable, for example with emergency backup electricity generators and safe from flooding.

one of the biggest causes of suffering is not the loss of property which can be replaced, but the loss of sentimental items which cannot. I encourage such simple steps as making copies of photographs of sentimental value and keeping the copies in a safe place in case the originals are destroyed.

a general database of people living in hazardous areas with automatic telephone calls being made to them to give them timely warnings. the telephone keeps calling until they pick it up and dial a code to show they have heard the message.

stocks of temporary demountable flood defences which can be deployed by the homeowner or by public workers. For example "Flood Guards" is a UK product widely used by local councils in Scotland but it is also used to defend Walmart's Head Office and warehouses in Arkansas.

setting up good relationships in advance with voluntary organisations who have volunteers specially trained in listening to people in despair and helping them get over the trauma. In the UK the leading organisation is The Samaritans, which is part of Befrienders International, but there are similar organisations around the world.

None of these measures is expensive or difficult. In the longer term I believe the only really effective solution is the one they established in Ontario, Canada after Hurricane Hazel in 1964. Hazard zones are established, money is spent on evacuation routes, but not on defences. People living in the zones are not allowed to sell their property to anyone but the local council who undertake to buy the property using money saved on the flood defence budget and then the property is demolished. After 40 years, very few people still live in the hazard areas. I appreciate this would be a difficult solution in places like New Orleans or Houston.

From David Crichton, Visiting Professor, Benfield Hazard Research Centre, UCL

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From : Roger Huder

Reply-To : Natural hazards and disasters

Sent : September 2, 2005 2:30:46 PM

To : NATURAL-HAZARDS-DISASTERS@JISCMAIL.AC.UK

Subject : Re: Poverty, looters, the real looters -- the Urban Predicament

wrote:
> With all due respect, please let's be realistic. Today is Friday. The

> disaster occurred less than one week ago. 80% of an entire city was

> evacuated in

> 24 hours. Regarding the conditions at the Astrodome, conditions are indeed

> deplorable. However, there were virtually no passable roads and no

> serviceable

> airports. In third world countries such conditions have led to seasons

> passing before aid can reach disaster victims. UNHCR would most certainly

> not be able to relocate 60,000 people in this timeframe using SPHERE

> criteria within a 72 hour period where there is no access.

>

> Also, yes, poverty is deplorable. However, the vast majority of those in New

> Orleans who are poor are not looting electronics and other non-essentials.

> Forgiving shootings and theft based on greed because one is poor is morally

> indefensible.

>

> James Cohen, PE

> James Cohen Consulting, PC

> http://expertpages.com/jccpc

>

> (Apologies for the repeat posting, but there were two important

> typographical errors made.)

Having been an emergency manager in Florida for the last 20 years. None of these problems are new. None of them could not be expected. All of them were lessons learned from as far back as Hugo, and Andrew. The lack of communications, the lack of food and water are well understood. The lawlessness was seen after Andrew. What has happened is a lack of understanding those lessons learned and then building operational systems capable of responding to those problems. This is not a planning issue or a legislative issue it is an operational issue.

There was a long piece on the news about police officers not knowing what to do when their radios went out. That happened in Andrew and can be planned for and then carried out. I created for my old jurisdiction for multi-departmental task forces around the city that included fire, police, EMS, public works and public utilities vehicles and personnel. When the winds stop without orders from anyone these task forces begin to move down the streets toward the center of the city clearing streets and dealing with problems as they move. This was not my idea someone else had already thought of it.
If you have ever seen a shelter during a hurricane you could have predicted the problems in the Superdome. It was too many people with too few shelter managers, law enforcement, EMS, medical personnel and National Guard to support it. Regardless of the flooding or any of the other problems there should have been help to them by now. It is about operational command and control. The running of an EOC during these events can be chaotic if good command and control procedures are not implemented to grab control the chaos. With a good Incident Action Plan priorities can be set and then accomplished. We have got to get better as a profession at operations if we are ever going to avoid the problems we are facing in New Orleans in the next big disaster. You can write all the plans you want but unless you can carry them out and adjust to rapidly changing conditions not in the plan the plans become useless.
--

Roger C. Huder CEM

rhuder@cfl.rr.com

321-217-4005

From : Suzanne Frew

Reply-To : Suzanne Frew

Sent : September 3, 2005 3:02:37 AM

To : GENDER-AND-DISASTER-NETWORK@listserv.tamu.edu

Subject : "New Orleans: A Geopolitical Prize"

New Orleans: A Geopolitical Prize

By George Friedman

The American political system was founded in Philadelphia, but the American nation was built on the vast farmlands that stretch from the Alleghenies to the Rockies. That farmland produced the wealth that funded American industrialization: It permitted the formation of a class of small landholders who, amazingly, could produce more than they could consume. They could sell their excess crops in the east and in Europe and save that money, which eventually became the founding capital of American industry.
But it was not the extraordinary land nor the farmers and ranchers who alone set the process in motion. Rather, it was geography -- the extraordinary system of rivers that flowed through the Midwest and allowed them to ship their surplus to the rest of the world. All of the rivers flowed into one -- the Mississippi -- and the Mississippi flowed to the ports in and around one city: New Orleans. It was in New Orleans that the barges from upstream were unloaded and their cargos stored, sold and reloaded on ocean-going vessels. Until last Sunday, New Orleans was, in many ways, the pivot of the American economy.
For that reason, the Battle of New Orleans in January 1815 was a key moment in American history. Even though the battle occurred after the War of 1812 was over, had the British taken New Orleans, we suspect they wouldn't have given it back. Without New Orleans, the entire Louisiana Purchase would have been valueless to the United States. Or, to state it more precisely, the British would control the region because, at the end of the day, the value of the Purchase was the land and the rivers - which all converged on the Mississippi and the ultimate port of New Orleans. The hero of the battle was Andrew Jackson, and when he became president, his obsession with Texas had much to do with keeping the Mexicans away from New Orleans.
During the Cold War, a macabre topic of discussion among bored graduate students who studied such things was this: If the Soviets could destroy one city with a large nuclear device, which would it be? The usual answers were Washington or New York. For me, the answer was simple: New Orleans. If the Mississippi River was shut to traffic, then the foundations of the economy would be shattered. The industrial minerals needed in the factories wouldn't come in, and the agricultural wealth wouldn't flow out. Alternative routes really weren't available. The Germans knew it too: A U-boat campaign occurred near the mouth of the Mississippi during World War II. Both the Germans and Stratfor have stood with Andy Jackson: New Orleans was the prize.
Last Sunday, nature took out New Orleans almost as surely as a nuclear strike. Hurricane Katrina's geopolitical effect was not, in many ways, distinguishable from a mushroom cloud. The key exit from North America was closed. The petrochemical industry, which has become an added value to the region since Jackson's days, was at risk. The navigability of the Mississippi south of New Orleans was a question mark. New Orleans as a city and as a port complex had ceased to exist, and it was not clear that it could recover.
The Ports of South Louisiana and New Orleans, which run north and south of the city, are as important today as at any point during the history of the republic. On its own merit, POSL is the largest port in the United States by tonnage and the fifth-largest in the world. It exports more than 52 million tons a year, of which more than half are agricultural products -- corn, soybeans and so on. A large proportion of U.S. agriculture flows out of the port. Almost as much cargo, nearly 17 million tons, comes in through the port -- including not only crude oil, but chemicals and fertilizers, coal, concrete and so on.
A simple way to think about the New Orleans port complex is that it is where the bulk commodities of agriculture go out to the world and the bulk commodities of industrialism come in. The commodity chain of the global food industry starts here, as does that of American industrialism. If these facilities are gone, more than the price of goods shifts: The very physical structure of the global economy would have to be reshaped. Consider the impact to the U.S. auto industry if steel doesn't come up the river, or the effect on global food supplies if U.S. corn and soybeans don't get to the markets.
The problem is that there are no good shipping alternatives. River transport is cheap, and most of the commodities we are discussing have low value-to-weight ratios. The U.S. transport system was built on the assumption that these commodities would travel to and from New Orleans by barge, where they would be loaded on ships or offloaded. Apart from port capacity elsewhere in the United States, there aren't enough trucks or rail cars to handle the long-distance hauling of these enormous quantities -- assuming for the moment that the economics could be managed, which they can't be.
The focus in the media has been on the oil industry in Louisiana and Mississippi. This is not a trivial question, but in a certain sense, it is dwarfed by the shipping issue. First, Louisiana is the source of about 15 percent of U.S.-produced petroleum, much of it from the Gulf. The local refineries are critical to American infrastructure. Were all of these facilities to be lost, the effect on the price of oil worldwide would be extraordinarily painful. If the river itself became unnavigable or if the ports are no longer functioning, however, the impact to the wider economy would be significantly more severe. In a sense, there is more flexibility in oil than in the physical transport of these other commodities.
There is clearly good news as information comes in. By all accounts, the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port, which services supertankers in the Gulf, is intact. Port Fourchon, which is the center of extraction operations in the Gulf, has sustained damage but is recoverable. The status of the oil platforms is unclear and it is not known what the underwater systems look like, but on the surface, the damage - though not trivial -- is manageable.
The news on the river is also far better than would have been expected on Sunday. The river has not changed its course. No major levees containing the river have burst. The Mississippi apparently has not silted up to such an extent that massive dredging would be required to render it navigable. Even the port facilities, although apparently damaged in many places and destroyed in few, are still there. The river, as transport corridor, has not been lost.
What has been lost is the city of New Orleans and many of the residential suburban areas around it. The population has fled, leaving behind a relatively small number of people in desperate straits. Some are dead, others are dying, and the magnitude of the situation dwarfs the resources required to ameliorate their condition. But it is not the population that is trapped in New Orleans that is of geopolitical significance: It is the population that has left and has nowhere to return to.
The oil fields, pipelines and ports required a skilled workforce in order to operate. That workforce requires homes. They require stores to buy food and other supplies. Hospitals and doctors. Schools for their children. In other words, in order to operate the facilities critical to the United States, you need a workforce to do it -- and that workforce is gone. Unlike in other disasters, that workforce cannot return to the region because they have no place to live. New Orleans is gone, and the metropolitan area surrounding New Orleans is either gone or so badly damaged that it will not be inhabitable for a long time.
It is possible to jury-rig around this problem for a short time. But the fact is that those who have left the area have gone to live with relatives and friends. Those who had the ability to leave also had networks of relationships and resources to manage their exile. But those resources are not infinite -- and as it becomes apparent that these people will not be returning to New Orleans any time soon, they will be enrolling their children in new schools, finding new jobs, finding new accommodations. If they have any insurance money coming, they will collect it. If they have none, then -- whatever emotional connections they may have to their home -- their economic connection to it has been severed. In a very short time, these people will be making decisions that will start to reshape population and workforce patterns in the region.
A city is a complex and ongoing process - one that requires physical infrastructure to support the people who live in it and people to operate that physical infrastructure. We don't simply mean power plants or sewage treatment facilities, although they are critical. Someone has to be able to sell a bottle of milk or a new shirt. Someone has to be able to repair a car or do surgery. And the people who do those things, along with the infrastructure that supports them, are gone -- and they are not coming back anytime soon.

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