this is one deadly storm.
But many residents stayed behind, and that is a big reason the death toll is so
high.
Residents gave a range of reasons for making the life-and-death decision to
recent storms that didn't live up to their threat. Some were worried about
running out of money on the road. Some simply discounted the threat.
Wayne Mitchell said Wednesday. "The thinking was, they were crying wolf.
storm surge swept through his home.
"I didn't think it was going to be that bad," said a stunned Landon Williams, a
months. He lived in Quiet Water Beach apartments, where dozens of residents were
feared dead and all that remained was a mountain of debris.
reacted to the approach of Hurricane Ivan. Some 400,000 drivers swarmed through
Mississippi.
When Hurricane Dennis threatened last month, there were more jams, but
authorities noted at the time that the number of evacuees appeared to drop off.
Again, Mississippi and Louisiana were spared the brunt.
"I worry that we had a little hurricane fatigue," said Mississippi Gov. Haley
Barbour. "People boarded up for Ivan, evacuated and nothing happened. Then they
boarded up for Dennis, evacuated and nothing happened. I think until very, very
fled from Ivan to Monroeville, La.
and nothing happened," she said. "The highways are stressed. You don't have that
actions. Barbour and other officials said Mississippi authorities tried to push
people, but some just wouldn't go along.
his money had run out for the month.
his trailer home without power and his supplies down to two Gatorades. "It's not
like I'm trying to play tough. I just don't have the means to leave."
Other people said they were worried about leaving their belongings behind to be
lost or looted.
deciding to leave, but left behind neighbors who refused.
"Some of these are die-hard people," Jones said. "They say 'I'm not going to
flooded home after refusing her son's pleas to flee.
By Roy Spencer
The tragedy currently unfolding in New Orleans is in many ways unprecedented in
U.S. history, and it is tempting to think that the misery we are witnessing
could have been avoided. I would like to suggest that some level of misery and
loss of life was unavoidable. With all of the rhetoric in recent days regarding
the possible role of global warming in hurricane activity, it is useful to
examine weather disasters in general, and Katrina in particular, from both
historical and practical points of view.
Forecast Accuracy and Warnings
Everyone knows that weather forecasts are not totally accurate. For potentially
destructive and life-threatening events such as tornadoes, hurricanes, and
floods, forecasters necessarily err on the side of caution. This leads to
over-warning, which in turn results in some level of complacency on the part of
the public. While over-warning leads to a high "probability of detection" (very
few events go without warnings), it is at the expense of increased false alarms.
But there really is no other acceptable choice. The only alternative would be to
issue fewer warnings. But given the imprecision of hurricane forecasts, this
would be at the cost of numerous events for which there were no warnings. Many,
possibly most, hurricanes that hit land would either have no warnings, or would
have insufficient lead time for evacuations and property protection to take
place. This would be totally unacceptable to the public. Thus, we are left with
the unavoidable situation where some portion of the people will not heed
warnings - for example, I personally ignore most tornado warnings -- and so
people will die.
Hurricane intensity and track forecasts for Hurricane Katrina were, from a
historical perspective, pretty darn accurate. Early forecasts had the hurricane
tracking farther east in the Florida panhandle. But as of 11 p.m. Saturday night
(48 hours before high winds started reaching the coast of Louisiana) the
National Hurricane Center (NHC) was forecasting an "intense hurricane". The
forecast track issued at that time was almost dead-center on the eventual
landfall location. Katrina ended up intensifying and moving more rapidly than
normal, leading to less lead time than would have been desired for the warned
areas.
Nevertheless, warnings of a "catastrophic event" were made in time for virtually
all of the people who were willing and able to leave New Orleans and coastal
areas to do so. Most people did indeed leave the warned areas -- but not all of
them. NHC makes it a special point in the case of especially broad hurricanes
such as Katrina to tell people to not focus on the exact forecast track of the
eye since such a broad area will be impacted anyway.
How Did Katrina Rank?
From a meteorological perspective, Katrina was unusually intense and large, but
not unprecedented. At one point it had the fourth lowest recorded air pressure
for an Atlantic hurricane (902 mb, or 26.64 inches), but this statistic should
be taken with a grain of salt since we have only a few decades of good
measurements, and many systems that do not threaten land are never measured
directly. At initial landfall southeast of New Orleans, Katrina was a category 4
storm with maximum sustained winds estimated at 145 mph.
The Galveston Hurricane of 1900, also estimated to be a category 4 storm, caused
over 6,000 deaths. This is commonly considered to be the greatest natural
disaster in U.S. history. The much lower casualty figures for modern hurricanes,
even in the face of explosive population growth in hurricane prone areas, is a
testament to current satellite, weather forecasting, communications, and
transportation technologies. Were it not for modern technology, we could well
experience what Bangladesh has endured in the not too distant past -- an
estimated 300,000 to one million dead from a 1970 tropical cyclone. Tropical
cyclone disasters with 10,000+ dead are not uncommon there.
Adjusted to 2004 dollars, Hurricane Andrew of 1992 was the costliest hurricane
on record, at about $44 billion. It remains to be seen whether the Katrina event
will exceed this record. If it does, it will be more attributable to the desire
of so many people to live and build in coastal areas than to the inherent
strength of the hurricane itself. Indeed, if we ask the question, "which land
falling hurricane in U.S. history would be the most expensive if it happened
today?" the clear front-runner would be the Great Miami Hurricane of 1926. It is
estimated that, if that hurricane occurred today, the costs would reach about
$110 billion.
Global Warming and Hurricanes
There is some recent research that suggests that of all Atlantic and West
Pacific tropical cyclones measured since the 1970's, a warming trend in sea
surface temperatures has been accompanied by stronger and longer-lived storms.
In fact, the increase in the total power generated by the storms that the study
computed was actually much larger than could be accounted for by theory,
suggesting changes in wind shear or other processes are operating in addition to
just increased temperatures. (Unpublished results by the same researcher
suggests, however, that this trend was not apparent in land falling hurricanes
since the 1970's).
Given the recent work, how should we view the role of global warming? First, we
know that category 4, and even category 5, storms have always occurred, and will
continue to occur, with or without the help of humans, as the above examples
demonstrate. Therefore, if we are prepared for what nature can throw at us, we
will be prepared for the possible small increase in hurricane activity that some
studies have suggested could occur with man-made global warming. To suggest that
Katrina was caused by mankind is not only grossly misleading, it also obscures
the real issues that need to be addressed, even in the absence of global
warming. From a practical point of view, there is little that we can do in the
near term to avert much if any future warming anyway, no matter what you believe
that warming will be, including participating in the Kyoto Protocol. So why even
bring it up (other than through political, philosophical, or financial
motivation)?
Living with the Risk
It has long been known that New Orleans was at greater risk of catastrophe than
most coastal areas, especially from flooding and the hurricane storm surge.
While the storm surge itself is not what inundated the city, it was responsible
for the levee failures that then caused flooding over the couple of days
following the hurricane.
Another geographical area of concern is the U.S. 1 evacuation route out of the
Florida keys. A rapidly approaching and intensifying hurricane in this area
could also lead to a great loss of life.
The only way to completely avoid the loss of life and property in these areas is
for people to not live there, and for businesses to not operate there. The stark
reality, however, is that this will not happen. People in these areas live at
greater risk than most of the rest of the country, and they will continue to in
the future. No human endeavor is risk-free, and coastal residents simply take
greater risks than most of the rest of us. As long as weather forecasts are not
perfect, and as long as severe weather events are (necessarily) over-warned,
weather disasters will continue to happen.
For more coverage of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath, and to learn how you
can help the victims of this disaster, please visit our special section Tragedy
on the Gulf Coast.
Copyright 2005, TCS
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-1221241,curpg-1,fright-0,right-0.cms
Vada-pav vs Katrina chaos
AFP[ MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 05, 2005 10:58:55 PM ]
MUMBAI: In New Orleans there was shooting and looting when the floods came last week. When a similar inundation struck Mumbai a month earlier, there was no violence, just free vada-pav.
Residents say street vendors passed out the vadapav to their fellow citizens wading through waist-high water in a sign that the disaster brought the city together rather than tearing it apart as appeared to happen in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.
The response seems to symbolise what South Asians say is the region’s familiarity with, and resilience in the face of, numerous natural calamities.
"What we are seeing in USA is complete chaos," said Farida Lambe, vicepresident of the Nirmala Niketan
College of Social Work which helped in relief and rehabilitation work during the Mumbai floods.
My assessment is that many of the problems arose as the people are not used to facing calamities. They expect complete efficiency and find it difficult to cope if it does not come about."
Mumbai police commissioner AN Roy confirmed there were no cases of looting, arson or violence when the floods hit.
"Even stray cases of robbery were not heard or reported," he said.
India has regularly faced natural disasters from earthquakes, storms and floods during monsoon. As a result, it has developed rapid responses for shelter and relief that while not wholly successful for long-term rehabilitation, have enabled them to handle immediate needs quickly
See also http://o3.indiatimes.com/vinayakk
From : downing
Sent : September 6, 2005 8:56:45 AM
To : "'Whiteford, Linda'" , "'Barbara Rose Johnston'" , "'Tony Oliver-Smith'"
CC :
, , , , , , , , , , ,
Subject : RE: National Geographic article October 2004
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Whiteford, Linda [mailto:lindaw@chuma1.cas.usf.edu]
Sent: Monday, September 05, 2005 1:53 PM
To: Barbara Rose Johnston; Tony Oliver-Smith
Cc: peacock@archone.tamu.edu; allan_lavell@yahoo.com; gvbutton@earthlink.net; neil@edm.bosai.go.jp; bwisner@igc.org; ilan_kelman@hotmail.com; maureen.fordham@northumbria.ac.uk; susanna@smhoffman.com; vgarciaa@juarez.ciesas.edu.mx; Tomesches@aol.com; downing@u.arizona.edu; edward.f.fischer@vanderbilt.edu; bwisner@igc.org
Subject: RE: National Geographic article October 2004
Thanks Barbara and Tony. Has anyone heard from our NO colleagues?
=======================
Hi Linda,
Not here. We have rumors of some instructors in the Phoenix shelter - but this is lots of confusion. Most Katrina victims are arriving by plane. Apart from my official duties, I went through a Red Cross volunteer training organization at the Tucson shelter - ready for 800 victims when Phoenix reaches its capacity.
Linda, I anticipate that the annual meeting will have a strong discussion of Katina. The deadline is upon us, but we should open a session or two to go over lessons learned. I am busy reworking my original theory of social geometry (below), that drew in small part on evidence from Hurricane Andrews, based on what I am seeing in this signal event.
Ted Downing
www.ted-downing.com
Mitigating Social Impoverishment when People are Involuntarily Displaced© 1 Theodore E. Downing 2
A recent study of resettlement and development revealed that forced population displacement may lead to eight forms of impoverishment: unemployment, homelessness, landlessness, marginalization, food insecurity, loss of access to common property, erosion of health status, and social disarticulation (Cernea 1990). Reconfirmed by a wider World Bank review, (World Bank 1994), each merits preventative measures. This paper deals with the most conceptually intractable of these problems - that of social impoverishment.
Involuntary population displacement may lead to irreversible social and cultural impoverishment. Resettlement rips routine relations of social time and social space, laying bare critical, but often ignored dimensions of culture. What is less clear is "why?" Shamelessly drawing upon my colleagues' work and my experience with resettlement, I offer a prolusion of a theory of social geometry. I argue that involuntary displacement forces people to reexamine primary cultural questions which, under routine circumstances need not be considered. Key among these is "where are we?" The social geometry of a people consists of infinite intersections of socially-constructed spaces, socially-constructed times, and socially-constructed personages. And, for many cultures, the geometry also defines "who are we?" Mitigating social impoverishment begins by reconstructing, in a culturally appropriate manner, the social geometry of the displaced.
Social Impoverishment
Why does involuntary displacement increase the risk of social disorder? When people are refugees from war, famine, or natural disasters - social chaos seems macabrely expectable. But when people are displaced by development projects, social impoverishment seems incongruous, if not grotesque. Provided that relocated persons are granted adequate compensation for lost goods, health care, housing, and humanitarian assistance, involuntary resettlement should be little more than a temporary inconvenience. Relatives, friends, and neighbors are still alive. Families are not permanently fragmented. New economic opportunities may be provided. Community infrastructure may be upgraded. Movable property may be relocated to the new environs, and exposure to natural hazards reduced. In some cases, some people may be wealthier than they were before. To their disappointment, politicians, engineers, and resettlement specialists have discovered that involuntary resettlement sometimes unravels the underlying social fabric. In resettlement after resettlement, similar patterns reappear (World Bank 1994, Cernea 1993b). Vital social networks and life support mechanisms for families are weakened or dismantled. Authority systems are debilitated or collapse. Groups lose their capacity to self-manage. The society suffers a demonstrable reduction in its capacity to cope with uncertainty. It becomes qualitatively less than its previous self. The people may physically persist but the community that was - is no more. Social scientists have not reached agreement on what to call this social phenomena which haunts involuntary resettlement, but I prefer to use Cernea's terminology - social disarticulation (Cernea 1994a).
Discomfort
Despite universal acceptance by resettlement theorists and policy makers that there are social impacts to resettlement and that the negative ones should be avoided, I am uncomfortable with the theoretical underpinnings of resettlement policy, and by extension refugee studies. So-called "social costs" and "social impacts" are mentioned again and again without clearly explaining what is meant by "social." I am equally uncomfortable with the ease with which only economic actions are proscribed to mitigate social impoverishment. Conventional wisdom is synthesized into proscriptive economic action - holding that, social impoverishment, like other forms of impoverishment, can be mitigated by re- establishing disrupted productive activities. Granted that re-establishment of the economy is indispensable to successful economic recovery and poverty abatement, I am still not convinced that destruction of a local economic order is the primary reason for social disarticulations.
Careful examination of the temporal sequencing of resettlement reveals something is amiss. Signs of social disorder appear quite early in the resettlement, often before the loss of productive activities, when relocatees are reaping benefits of the temporary employment boom and indemnifications associated with public works. Conversely, communities which are not being resettled undergo transformations of productive activities all the time without the radical social disorder associated with resettlement. Apart from the very serious socio-political consequences associated with the coerciveness of the decision, the fact that people move from one place to another should not lead to the radical social changes which have been witnessed. Nor should we anticipate social changes greater than those normally observed with voluntary migration, trips to the market, or visits to a relative. Unlike plants, people move about all the time.
My discomfort increased as I struggled with unanswered, apparently unrelated questions which keep reappearing in resettlement after resettlement, and not coincidentally, in studies of recovery from natural disaster (Oliver-Smith 1986). Why do children seem to recover more quickly than adults? Why do some resettled people return again and again to the shores of a lake covering their inundated home and feel a sense of relief from their visits? And why do disaster victims sometimes refuse to move into shelters, preferring to camp at the location of their former homes? Why don't resettlers occupy houses that architects have carefully modeled after their original houses? And why do resettlers and disaster victims often describe their experience "like a dream?" I wondered if a focus upon the political and economic dimensions of involuntary resettlement had led us to ignore subtle, important social dimensions of such events - hidden dimensions that might prove crucial to mitigating social impoverishment and, perhaps, facilitate political and economic restoration.
My discomfort could easily been assuaged if resettlement policy and practice were based on a firm theory of spatial and temporal dislocation which explained why and how social disarticulation occurred. It is not. Fortunately, the building blocks for construction of a powerful theory of social dislocation are scattered about in the form of bits and pieces of observations, concepts, and insights from every conceivable discipline and in all the cracks in between. Outside of the arena of displacement, almost every social scientists worthy of note has probably, at some point, struggled with social definitions of time and space although only a handful have worked on the dysfunctional situation where this order is disrupted.
Social Geometry
For most, culture answers what I prefer to call "primary questions." Primary questions are: Who are we? Where are we? Why do people live and die? What are our responsibilities to others and ourselves? In everyday life, the answers are routinely provided, leaving it up to the individual to focus upon tactical problems. How might I move to a more desirable location, how might I make minor adjustments within my own backyard? Life focuses upon repairing broken doors, collecting firewood, getting from one well-known place to another, gaining access to restricted places/situations by performing routine events such as going to school, paying for admissions, or working for income to facilitate tactical adjustments to life. The routine culture is what social scientists normally describe. In routine culture, people navigate within a space-time continuum in which they chart their positions I within socially-constructed time, socially-constructed space, and among socially-constructed personages. 3
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