AC — Soft Power Advantage

1AC — Soft Power Advantage

Advantage One – US soft power

Success in finding 370 is key to the global reach of US soft power.

Chris Zappone – Foreign News editor at the newspaper The Age. Also writes for the Sydney Morning Herald. Formerly wrote for CNN. “MH 370 Malaysia Airlines search has shades of Cold War contest” – The Cold War Daily – March 25^th – http://acoldwarmentality.wordpress.com/2014/03/25/mh370-malaysia-airlines-search-has-shades-of-cold-war-contest/

Since Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 went missing, there have been moments when the mystery of the plane’s fate has been freighted with geopolitical importance. Obviously, for people in the know, the satellite and search capabilities of the countries involved must have been very instructive for the rival nations. No doubt the US, China, India, Japan, Australia have taken a lot of interest in what each other can sense via satellite and other means. But there has also been the challenge of the nations trying to achieve a task whose dimensions have been largely unknowable at times. The fact that the search relied on sensitive satellite and radar technology gives the moment a quality of geopolitical competition that has echoes of the historical Cold War. Moreover, there has been a huge, global audience following this event in real time, giving an adventure-like quality to the mystery of the plane’s whereabouts. It’s worth lingering on what a decisive find of the wreckage, or discovery of the cause of the incident could do for a country’s standing. This is the ultimate soft-power prize. Families grieve and the Malaysian elite cope with the political fallout but for a lot of the world this event is really about which nation is more capable of finding a solution to a problem whose extact nature is not readily known. It reminds me of early spaceflight efforts in a way – a nation’s narrative is about its ability to succeed in a dealing with an issue whose parameters are unknown, to step into a situation and create the reality through technology and determination. This is a subtle point – but central to the jockeying for position going on in the Indo-Pacific and more broadly globally. Any country that can prevail and succeed in such a confounding situation will gain in the global public’s eyes.

We will advance two scenarios.

First — Nuclear Materials:

US Soft power is key to minimize threats to energy transit in the Indian Ocean.

(The Australia India Institute, Task Force on Indian Ocean Security – editor and principal contributor is Dr. Dennis Rumley. He is an Associate Professor at the University of Western Australia.[1] He gained a PhD in political geography at the University of British Columbia. He is chairperson of the Indian Ocean Research Group Inc. He is also Chief Editor of The Journal of the Indian Ocean Region. “The Indian Ocean Region: Security, Stability and Sustainability in the 21st Century” – March 2013 – http://www.aii.unimelb.edu.au/sites/default/files/IndianOceanSecurityTaskforce.pdf.)

Safer energy trade in the Indian Ocean is key to check several scenarios for nuclear materials escaping onto the high seas.

A.I.I. ‘13

(The Australia India Institute, Task Force on Indian Ocean Security – editor and principal contributor is Dr. Dennis Rumley. He is an Associate Professor at the University of Western Australia.[1] He gained a PhD in political geography at the University of British Columbia. He is chairperson of the Indian Ocean Research Group Inc. He is also Chief Editor of The Journal of the Indian Ocean Region. “The Indian Ocean Region: Security, Stability and Sustainability in the 21st Century” – March 2013 – http://www.aii.unimelb.edu.au/sites/default/files/IndianOceanSecurityTaskforce.pdf.)

Pressures aimed at maximising energy security have contributed to increased global demand for nuclear power, notwithstanding the Fukushima catastrophe in Japan. This in turn has led to a potential increase in environmental insecurity due to the requirement to attempt to safely dispose of larger volumes of nuclear waste materials. It is an interesting irony that, on the one hand, apart from South West Asia and South Asia, the Indian Ocean is surrounded by nuclear weapon free zones (Antarctic Treaty, Treaty of Bangkok, Treaty of Pelindaha, Treaty of Rarotonga) while, on the other hand, it is fast becoming a nuclear ocean206. Apart from the increasing number of regional nuclear weapons on land, as well as the indeterminate number on and under the ocean itself at any one time, the increasing global and regional demand for nuclear energy is having a significant impact on the structure of Indian Ocean uranium trade207. These impacts, in turn, raise a host of security questions linked to nuclear safety, uranium flows, the flows and storage of nuclear waste and the security of SLOCs in the IOR, as noted earlier. While Africa had the dubious distinction of being first choice for the dumping of European nuclear waste and persistent organic pollutants (POPs) in the 1980s, it was the first to respond politically to the threat of “waste colonialism”208. Prior to the ratification of the Basel Convention, many African states were especially concerned about the transboundary movement of such hazardous waste into Africa from industrialised countries and some indeed saw this process as one of the systematic dumping of nuclear waste into Africa209. At the May 1988 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Council of Ministers 48th Ordinary Session in Ethiopia, a resolution condemned the importation into Africa of industrial and nuclear waste as a “crime against Africa and the African people” and called upon member states to introduce import bans. The resolution condemned “all transnational corporations and enterprises involved in the introduction, in any form, of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa; and demands that they clean up the areas that have already been contaminated by them”210. As a consequence of this resolution, work began on an African Convention under the auspices of the OAU shortly after the adoption of the Basel Convention, since the latter excluded nuclear waste. There was therefore a concern that certain needs of African states were not properly taken into account, and thus, while the Basel Convention was a convention of the north, there was need for a convention of the south. The resultant Bamako Convention, which was adopted in Mali in January 1991, entered into force in April 1998. Of particular international concern are the five states that have neither signed nor ratified the Bamako Convention as well as a further seven that have signed but have yet to ratify. It may be that some states have stalled either signing or ratifying in order to participate in the lucrative trade in hazardous waste211. This may well be true for the six Indian Ocean littoral states of Djibouti, Kenya, Madagascar, Seychelles, Somalia and South Africa, none of which were in the original convention signatory group of twelve states. Furthermore, of these six littoral states, two have neither signed nor ratified Bamako (Seychelles and South Africa) and a further two (Djibouti and Somalia) have yet to ratify either the Basel or Bamako conventions. The Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 resulted in the washing up on Somalian beaches of many containers of nuclear and toxic waste that were illegally dumped during the early 1990s212. It has been alleged that, in at least one case, a lucrative financial agreement had been reached between the interim government headed by Ali Mahdi Muhammed and certain Swiss and Italian companies to import millions of tonnes of nuclear waste from Italy into Somalia. These companies were alleged to be under the control of the Italian mafia, and the Somalian deal was said to be only one part of so-called “ecomafia” operations213. For the Europeans, the cost per tonne (US$8) represented a fraction of the likely cost of up to US$1,000 per tonne of appropriate local treatment and disposal. Given Somalia’s strategic location and its current statelessness, such illegal or unauthorised movements of nuclear waste have potentially very significant implications not only for the human security of the Somalian population, but for the Indian Ocean environment, the Indian Ocean routes along which such flows take place, as well as the lethal prospects of the potential terrorist use of such nuclear materials. It has been noted that Somalia is a “stateless war economy”, one of the requirements of which is to engage in international “commercial complicity” since its local economy is unable to meet military expenditures. Funding the war economy is achieved in various ways, including via trade by local conflict groups with international corporations and institutions in unauthorised commodities, including nuclear waste. Indeed, Somalia currently functions as a transhipment point and a supply route for a wide variety of illegal merchandise for the whole of the Horn of Africa and beyond215. This touches on another fundamentally important security challenge for the IOR. It has been pointed out that seizures of smuggled radioactive material capable of making a terrorist “dirty bomb” have doubled in recent years. According to the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA), smugglers, mainly from the former Eastern bloc, have been caught attempting to traffic such materials on more than 300 occasions since 2002, with most of the incidents understood to have taken place in Europe216. IOR-ARC potentially has a very important role as a pressure group regionally and in international forums to try and eradicate the smuggling of radioactive materials into the region and to prevent dumping into the ocean.
(Note: IOR-ARC is an acronym standing for “Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation”. It is a regional organization. They have recently changed their name to The Indian Ocean Rim Association. The US is a dialogue partner of this organization.)

Escaped waste hurts the ocean and unsafe travel could cause an accident risking huge death tolls.

Van Dyke ‘2

Jon M. Van Dyke is a Visiting Professor at Berkeley Law. He has taught International Law at the William S. Richardson School of Law at the University of Hawaii. He is a leading practitioner in environmental and ocean law. He served as faculty for the Environmental Law Program at the School of Law at the Univ. of Hawaii – “The Legal Regime Governing Sea Transport of Ultrahazardous Radioactive Materials” – Ocean Development & International Law – vol 33:1, 77-108 – available via Taylor & Francis Database

Although the international community has taken some steps to address the risks created by the movements of ultrahazardous radioactive cargoes, important gaps still exist in the legal regime governing these activities. An apparent consensus has been reached at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to make the Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium, and High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Flasks Aboard Ships (the INF Code) mandatory and to seek some clarification of the standards governing shipboard safety. But still lacking are agreements regarding salvage responsibilities, liability of shippers for damages, revision of transport cask safety standards to meet maritime accident conditions, obligations to consult regarding the best routes and to provide advance notification to concerned coastal states, the preparation of environmental assessments, and contingency planning to handle shore emergencies and salvage responsibilities. Until agreements are reached on these important matters, the shipment of these extremely dangerous or “ultrahazardous” materials will continue to violate fundamental norms of international law and comity because they place coastal nations that receive no benefit from the shipments at grave risk of environmental disaster without any legal protections. Because the shipments of ultrahazardous radioactive cargoes are increasing, it is highly advisable for concerned nations to negotiate regional protocols delineating the legal regime that applies to these maritime transports. A draft model protocol is attached at the end of this article which may provide guidance on this effort. It is also appropriate for concerned nations to consider bringing a claim against the shipping nations under the dispute resolution mechanisms established by the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention. Such a claim would be based on the failure of the shipping nations to comply with their obligations under the convention to prepare and distribute environmental impact assessments, consult with affected nations, prepare emergency contingency plans, and agree to an effective liability regime in the event of an accident. Because of the grave potential risks created by these shipments and because of the failure of the shippers to meet their obligations to protect coastal nations from these risks, coastal nations may be justified under international law to take unilateral or regional action to block future shipments. During the past decade, international fears have been caused by a new cycle of sea shipments of large cargoes of highly radioactive or radiotoxic nuclear materials. In November 1992, Japan shipped 2,200 pounds (one metric ton) of plutonium in a refitted freighter called the Akatsuki Maru from France to Japan, going around the Cape of Good Hope in Africa and then south of Australia and New Zealand before turning north to traverse the Pacific to Japan.1 In February 1995, the British vessel Pacific Pintail carried 28 canisters of vitrified high-level nuclear waste (HLW) in glass blocks, each weighing 1,000 pounds, going around Cape Horn at the tip of South America and then across the Pacific. In early 1997, the British vessel Pacific Teal carried 40 such canisters, going around Africa and then up through the Tasman Sea. In January 1998, the British vessel Pacific Swan carried 60 HLW canisters, going through the Caribbean and then through the Panama Canal. The Pacific Swan made a similar voyage in March 1999, carrying 40 cylinders of HLW through the Mona Passage (between Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic) and then through the Panama Canal. From July 21 to September 27, 1999, the Pacific Pintail and the Pacific Teal traveled from France to Japan carrying 446 kilograms of weapons-usable plutonium contained in 40 mixed plutonium/uranium oxide (MOX) fuel elements. This transport was routed around the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa, across the southern Indian Ocean, and then up through the Tasman Sea and the western Pacific Islands to Japan. Because each vessel was armed with three 30 mm cannons (with a 10-kilometer range), assault rifles, shotguns, hand weapons, body armor, gas masks, and a high-speed armed boat staffed by 13 U.K. Atomic Energy Authority officers,2 they were deemed to be providing armed escort for each other, although it is hard to imagine that a vessel carrying the MOX fuel could effectively protect another vessel by chasing after or interfering with an attack by a terrorist vessel. The ships “adhered to a request by the [South African] government to stay out of South Africa’s territorial waters and its larger marine EEZ.”3 One crew member suffered a damaged collarbone and a head injury when he fell during heavy seas in the South Indian Ocean and was airlifted by helicopter to Australia on August 28, 1999.4 The Pacific Swan left Cherbourg, France on December 29, 1999, carrying 104 containers of vitrified HLW and traveled through the Caribbean Sea and Panama Canal, on its way to Japan.5 A year later, the Swan again made the journey, this time with the largest cargo of nuclear waste ever carried: 192 canisters of HLW, and this time traveling around Cape Horn at the tip of South America, arriving in Japan in February 2001.6 Almost simultaneously, the Pacific Pintail and the Pacific Teal went around the world the other way, around the Cape of Good Hope at the tip of Africa, carrying 230 kilograms of plutonium and four tons of uranium contained in 28 MOX fuel assemblies.7 During this shipment, European transport officials suggested that one or two such shipments of plutonium fuel will be made each year for the next 15 years. These shipments present risks of a magnitude totally different from any previous ocean cargoes. Each of the nuclear waste canisters contains 17,000 terabecquerels in beta-gamma activity.8 The Pacific Swan, for instance, carried a staggering 96,000,000 curies of radioactivity when it traveled around Cape Horn in January 2001. The MOX fuel on the 1999 and 2001 shipments of the Pacific Teal and Pacific Pintail could be easily converted to provide the materials needed to build dozens of nuclear weapons.9 These long-lived, highly radioactive and radiotoxic nuclear materials could endanger large coastal populations or produce wide-spread, long-term radioactive contamination of the marine environment. They are extremely difficult to handle and the equipment necessary to salvage them in the event of an accident has not yet been developed.10 British representatives acknowledge that in the event of a vessel sinking “it was quite apparent that recovery from some places would not be possible.”11 But a sinking may not be the most dangerous foreseeable event. If a vessel carrying such a cargo collided with another vessel causing an intensely hot and long-lasting shipboard fire, then radioactive particles could become airborne, putting all nearby lifeforms in grave danger of catastrophic health impacts.
(Note to students: Terabecquerels are a measurement unit for radioactivity….. An example of how the Aff might solve is through agreements on safer canisters or better maritime policing security vs. illegal activity – dumping, terrorists, etc.)

Ocean harm risks destroying all life on Earth.

Craig ‘3

Robin Kundis Craig has a background in several disciplines. She served as a member the U.S. National Research Council's committee to assess the effects of the Clean Water Act’s regulation of the Mississippi River. She is currently a Professor at Florida State University College of Law. She is a leading environmental law scholar who has written important works on water and ocean and coastal issues. Professor Craig is the author of The Clean Water Act and the Constitution (Environmental Law Institute 2004), Environmental Law in Context (West 2005). Professor Craig also served as a tenured professor at the Indiana University-Indianapolis School of Law.[2], Winter, “Taking Steps Toward Marine Wilderness Protection? Fishing and Coral Reef Marine Reserves in Florida and Hawaii,” 34 McGeorge L. Rev. 155, Lexis

The world’s oceans contain many resources and provide many services that humans consider valuable. “Occupying more than seventy percent of the Earth’s surface and ninety-five percent of the biosphere,” oceans provide food; marketable goods such as shells, aquarium fish, and pharmaceuticals; life support processes, including carbon sequestration, nutrient cycling, and weather mechanics; and quality of life, both aesthetic and economic, for millions of people worldwide. Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the importance of the ocean to humanity’s well-being: “The ocean is the cradle of life on our planet, and it remains the axis of existence, the locus of planetary biodiversity, and the engine of the chemical and hydrological cycles that create and maintain our atmosphere and climate.” Ocean and coastal ecosystem services have been calculated to be worth over twenty billion dollars per year, worldwide. In addition, many people assign heritage and existence value to the ocean and its creatures, viewing the world’s seas as a common legacy to be passed on relatively intact to future generations. (It continues…) More generally, “ocean ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorous, and sulfur, as well as other less abundant but necessary elements”. In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human degradation of marine ecosystems impairs the planet’s ability to support life. Maintaining biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems. Current evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem’s ability to keep functioning in the face of disturbance is strongly dependent on its biodiversity, “indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable. Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent on their biodiversity. [*265] Most ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also complex and that many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef system. n860 Thus, maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. n861 Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine wilderness. However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable force and merit." n862 At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world.We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much: If we kill the ocean we kill ourselves, and we will take most of the biosphere with us. The Black Sea is almost dead, 863 its once-complex and productive ecosystem almost entirely replaced by a monoculture of comb jellies, "starving out fish and dolphins, emptying fishermen's nets, and converting the web of life into brainless, wraith-like blobs of jelly." 864 More importantly, the Black Sea is not necessarily unique.

The second scenario is Russian Expansionism:

Waning US global image means Russian expansionism can succeed in Former Soviet States.

Lankina – April 15^th

(et al; Dr. Tomila Lankina – teaches political scientists and IR at the London School of Economics –

“What Putin gets about soft power” – a guest post at Monkey Cage, a blog run by the Washington Post – April 15, 2014 – http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/15/what-putin-gets-about-soft-power/)
Much of the commentary on Russia’s recent annexation of the Crimea has focused on Russia’s hard power—its geo-political designs in the so-called near abroad, ostensible security vulnerabilities to NATO’s eastward expansion, strategic objectives, and military capabilities. These questions are not moot and have a strong sense of urgency for leaders in Ukraine, Moldova, or even Kazakhstan nervously pondering Russia’s next moves. Yet an excessive focus on the hard aspects of Russia’s power risks obscuring the Kremlin’s skillful manipulation of soft power—a factor perhaps equally important in accounting for the swiftness of “operation Crimea” as the shady men in balaclavas appearing on the peninsula’s shores. The concept of soft power has in fact gained substantial traction in recent years in Russia’s foreign policy circles, most recently finding its way into the country’s official 2013 Foreign Policy Concept. The Kremlin ideologues’ peculiar interpretation of soft power dismayed Joseph Nye, who developed and popularized the concept. According to Nye, Moscow, like Beijing, did not understand soft power, which is the power to attract and co-opt, rather than coerce or financially induce others to do what you want. In particular, he questioned Russia’s political values; problematized the perceived legitimacy of its foreign policy; and highlighted that society, and not the government is the main instrument of a country’s soft power. Yet, over the last few years, Putin has shown himself to be a significantly more artful player in the “smart power” game, skillfully combining elements of both soft and hard power in pursuing his foreign policy objectives. Russia’s steep learning curve in manipulating soft power has important policy implications. Soft power, as Nye reminds us, is about attraction. Underestimating the true magnitude of Russia’s attraction to a variety of constituencies and audiences risks further miscalculations of Russia’s intentions by Western policy makers. One reason for the relative neglect of Putin’s brand of authoritarian soft power is the earlier assumption by many observers—including by one of the authors of this piece—of a teleological process of a gradual diffusion of democracy and associated values among post-communist nations. A growing number of observers of post-communist politics are now reconciling themselves to the reality that some states may be not only “impervious” fortresses against particular external influences, but could become western democracy “resister states,” or even active agents in their own right diffusing their own ideas and understandings as to the structuring, functions, and values of political institutions, the economy, and society. One example of such non-democratic value projection is the Kremlin ideologues’ concept of “sovereign democracy” whereby states are free to develop their own understandings of democracy, ostensibly suited to the particularities of their historical paths, culture, and tradition. Ivan Krastev maintains that this notion “embodies Putin’s Russian nostalgia for the power of ideological attraction enjoyed by the Soviet Union. . . It embodies Russia’s ideological ambition to be ‘the other Europe’ – an alternative to the European Union.” These ambitions and alternatives are not forward-looking; rather, they derive from the continued hold of Soviet-era symbols among segments of post-Soviet populations. As evidence, note the many monuments to Lenin that continue to dot post-Soviet provincial towns; Soviet-era cultural and linguistic ties binding the former Soviet republics to Russia. At the center of Russia’s strategy to exert influence in its neighborhood and promote a worldview consistent with Russia’s national interest is state control over popular media outlets and the accessibility of Russian state television channels to Russian-speaking viewers abroad. Russia’s state-controlled television channels reportedly enjoy greater popularity in Belarus and Moldova than those countries’ domestic TV outlets. Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to portray Russia’s projection of its soft power solely in top-down terms. “If not by tanks then by banks?” reads the title of a paper by a perceptive scholar of Russia’s soft power in the post-Soviet states. Russia’s large economy, fueled by petro-dollars, is highly attractive to the tens of thousands of migrants from resource poor economies in Central Asia, and indeed for those from countries in the Western part of the post-Soviet region like Moldova. The same types of societal “linkages” that arguably facilitate the spread of democracy can have the opposite effect of diffusing authoritarian values when the more economically, culturally, or socially attractive state happens to be Putin’s Russia. Russia’s soft power thus rests on a peculiar blend of state-promoted ideology of national exclusivity, manipulation of symbols and nostalgia for the halcyon days of the Soviet past, Russia’s genuine economic and political attractiveness for migrants escaping far more ghastly political and economic environments, and Russian-state media whipped up frenzy about an ostensible threat to the Russian ethnos. Underpinning soft power in foreign policy, Nye argues, are legitimacy and moral authority—resources arguably lacking in Russia’s arsenal of attractions and ostensibly found in abundance in the West. Yet, if there was one issue on which Putin would see eye to eye with many an astute observer of European or American politics, it would be the perception of the fragile and besieged nature of the Western liberal democratic order at home and of the questionable legitimacy of Western states’ policies abroad. “What’s gone wrong with democracy?” quips the cover feature of a recent issue of the Economist magazine. The extent of the demise of the West is of course a matter of debate, yet the Kremlin readily capitalizes on this sentiment to beat the drums of the superiority of his alternative vision of domestic and global order. The underlying premise in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2013 is the perception of the West as a source of instability and danger in the international system—be it through causing economic and financial crises; intervening in regional crises without a UN mandate; or meddling in the internal affairs of sovereign states in the name of democracy promotion. Joseph Nye has argued that Russia has had to resort to hard power, including military force, partly because of the weakness of its soft power. Yet, given the resonance of the Kremlin’s message—of the decay of the liberal world order, the West’s double standards in the application of international law, and its ostensibly weakening moral authority—among a variety of domestic and external audiences, Putin’s “hard power” could perversely amplify Russia’s soft power. The West should be less worried about the distorted view of reality of one man in the Kremlin, and more about the hold of the messages that he has succeeded in promoting, distorting, or amplifying among the many in the society at home and indeed abroad.
(Note to students: “The Kremlin” – as it appears in this evidence – is referring to the government of the Russia…. “Operation Crimea” – in this context – is referring to the Russian aggression to seize control of territory recognized – by most – as belonging to Ukraine. Crimea is a peninsula in Eastern Europe. As of the time of this writing, Crimea is occupied by Russia. However, most countries do not recognize the Russian occupation as legal, and classify Crimea as Ukrainian territory.)

If that expansionism takes hold, US-Russia confrontation becomes inevitable by 2015.

Goodrich ‘11

(Laura – Senior Eurasia Analyst for Stratfor and is a specialist in the former Soviet states. Ms. Goodrich lived in Russia during the Yeltsin-Putin transition. There, she worked as a professor at Tomsk University. She holds degrees in Russian language; Russian, Eastern European and Eurasian studies; Slavic literature and religious studies from both Tomsk Polytechnical University and the University of Texas. “A New Russian Empire: What Exactly Is Putin Planning?” – Economy Watch – November 7^th – fhttp://www.economywatch.com/economy-business-and-finance-news/a-new-russian-empire-what-exactly-is-putin-planning.08-11.html?page=full)

Over the past six years, Russia has pushed back to some degree against Western influence in most of its former Soviet states. One reason for this success is that the United States has been preoccupied with other issues, mostly in the Middle East and South Asia. Moreover, Washington has held the misconception that Russia will not formally attempt to re-create a kind of empire. But, as has been seen throughout history, it must. Putin announced in September that he would seek to return to the Russian presidency in 2012, and he has started laying out his goals for his new reign. He said Russia would formalize its relationship with former Soviet states by creating a Eurasia Union (EuU); other former Soviet states proposed the concept nearly a decade ago, but Russia is now in a position in which it can begin implementing it. Russia will begin this new iteration of a Russian empire by creating a union with former Soviet states based on Moscow’s current associations, such as the Customs Union, the Union State and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. This will allow the EuU to strategically encompass both the economic and security spheres. The forthcoming EuU is not a re-creation of the Soviet Union. Putin understands the inherent vulnerabilities Russia would face in bearing the economic and strategic burden of taking care of so many people across nearly 9 million square miles. This was one of the Soviet Union’s greatest weaknesses: trying to control so much directly. Instead, Putin is creating a union in which Moscow would influence foreign policy and security but would not be responsible for most of the inner workings of each country. Russia simply does not have the means to support such an intensive strategy. Moscow does not feel the need to sort through Kyrgyz political theater or support Ukraine’s economy to control those countries. The Kremlin intends to have the EuU fully formed by 2015, when Russia believes the United States will return its focus to Eurasia. Washington is wrapping up its commitments to Iraq this year and intends to end combat operations and greatly reduce forces in Afghanistan, so by 2015, the United States will have military and diplomatic attention to spare. This is also the same time period in which the US ballistic missile defense installations in Central Europe will break ground. To Russia, this amounts to a US and pro-US front in Central Europe forming on the former Soviet (and future EuU) borders. It is the creation of a new version of the Russian empire, combined with the US consolidation of influence on that empire’s periphery that most likely will spark new hostilities between Moscow and Washington.
(Note to students: The “Eurasia Union” – also called “EuU”, “EaEU”, or “EaU” – is an idea the Putin has pushed and hopes to complete by Jan 1^st, 2015. The goal is to create an economic union – similar to the European Union – that would include Russia and “Former Soviet States”… Some argue that the goal is not purely an economic Eurasian Union. This is fairly significant and recent development. On May 29^th, 2014, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia signed-on to the idea – although details are still tentative. Russia is interested in an even-larger union.)

New tensions in that region increase miscalculation risk. Nuclear escalation ensues.

Thompson – April 28^th

2014 – Dr. Loren Thompson – Prior to holding his present position, Thompson was Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and taught graduate-level courses in strategy, technology and media affairs at Georgetown. He also taught at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. He holds doctoral and masters degrees in government from Georgetown University and a bachelor of science degree in political science from Northeastern University. Thompson now focus on the strategic, economic and business implications of defense spending as the chief operating officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source Associates. He is also a contributor author for Forbes Magazine – “Four Ways The Ukraine Crisis Could Escalate To Use Of Nuclear Weapons” – Forbes – April 28^th, 2014 http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/04/24/four-ways-the-ukraine-crisis-could-escalate-to-use-of-nuclear-weapons/

Although the Obama Administration is responding cautiously to Moscow’s annexation of Ukraine’s province of Crimea in March, its credibility is on the line with regional allies and Russian leader Vladimir Putin has not been helpful in defusing the fears of his neighbors. Having fomented revolt in eastern Ukraine, Moscow now says it might be forced to come to the aid of ethnic Russians there (it has massed 40,000 troops on the other side of the border, in what was first called an exercise). Meanwhile, the U.S. has increased its own military presence in the neighborhood, reiterating security guarantees to local members of NATO. So little by little, tensions are ratcheting up. One facet of the regional military balance that bears watching is the presence of so-called nonstrategic nuclear weapons on both sides. Once called tactical nuclear weapons, these missiles, bombs and other devices were bought during the Cold War to compensate for any shortfalls in conventional firepower during a conflict. According to Amy Woolf of the Congressional Research Service, the U.S. has about 200 such weapons in Europe, some of which are available for use by local allies in a war. Woolf says Russia has about 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads in its active arsenal — many of them within striking distance of Ukraine — and that successive revisions of Russian military strategy appear “to place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons” to balance the U.S. advantage in high-tech conventional weapons. A 2011 study by the respected RAND Corporation came to much the same conclusion, stating that Russian doctrine explicitly recognizes the possibility of using nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression. Not only does Moscow see nuclear use as a potential escalatory option in a regional war, but it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate a conflict. This isn’t just Russian saber-rattling. The U.S. and its NATO partners too envision the possibility of nuclear use in a European war. The Obama Administration had the opportunity to back away from such thinking in a 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, and instead decided it would retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe under a doctrine known as extended deterrence. Eastern European nations that joined NATO after the Soviet collapse have been especially supportive of having U.S. nuclear weapons nearby. So improbable though it may seem, doctrine and capabilities exist on both sides that could lead to nuclear use in a confrontation over Ukraine. Here are four ways that what started out as a local crisis could turn into something much worse. Bad intelligence. As the U.S. has stumbled from one military mis-adventure to another over the last several decades, it has become clear that Washington isn’t very good at interpreting intelligence. Even when vital information is available, it gets filtered by preconceptions and bureaucratic processes so that the wrong conclusions are drawn. Similar problems exist in Moscow. For instance, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 arose partly from Soviet leader Khrushchev’s assessment that President Kennedy was weaker than he turned out to be, and the U.S. Navy nearly provoked use of a nuclear torpedo by a Russian submarine during the blockade because it misjudged the enemy’s likely reaction to being threatened. It is easy to imagine similar misjudgments in Ukraine, which Washington and Moscow approach from very different perspectives. Any sizable deployment of U.S. forces in the region could provoke Russian escalation. Defective signaling. When tensions are high, rival leaders often seek to send signals about their intentions as a way of shaping outcomes. But the meaning of such signals can easily be confused by the need of leaders to address multiple audiences at the same time, and by the different frames of reference each side is applying. Even the process of translation can change the apparent meaning of messages in subtle ways. So when Russian foreign minister Lavrov spoke this week (in English) about the possible need to come to the aid of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine, Washington had to guess whether he was stating the public rationale for an invasion, sending a warning signal to Kiev about its internal counter-terror campaign, or trying to accomplish some other purpose. Misinterpretation of such signals can become a reciprocal process that sends both sides up the “ladder of escalation” quickly, to a point where nuclear use seems like the logical next step. Looming defeat. If military confrontation between Russia and NATO gave way to conventional conflict, one side or the other would eventually face defeat. Russia has a distinct numerical advantage in the area around Ukraine, but its military consists mainly of conscripts and is poorly equipped compared with Western counterparts. Whichever side found itself losing would have to weigh the drawbacks of losing against those of escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Moscow would have to contemplate the possibility of a permanent enemy presence near its heartland, while Washington might face the collapse of NATO, its most important alliance. In such circumstances, the use of “only” one or two tactical nuclear warheads to avert an outcome with such far-reaching consequences might seem reasonable — especially given the existence of relevant capabilities and supportive doctrine on both sides. Command breakdown. Strategic nuclear weapons like intercontinental ballistic missiles are tightly controlled by senior military leaders in Russia and America, making their unauthorized or accidental use nearly impossible. That is less the case with nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which at some point in the course of an escalatory process need to be released to the control of local commanders if they are to have military utility. U.S. policy even envisions letting allies deliver tactical warheads against enemy targets. Moscow probably doesn’t trust its allies to that degree, but with more tactical nuclear weapons in more locations, there is a greater likelihood that local Russian commanders might have the latitude to initiate nuclear use in the chaos of battle. Russian doctrine endorses nuclear-weapons use in response to conventional aggression threatening the homeland, and obstacles to local initiative often break down once hostilities commence. When you consider all the processes working to degrade restraint in wartime — poor intelligence, garbled communication, battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and a host of other influences — it seems reasonable to consider that a military confrontation between NATO and Russia might in some manner escalate out of control, even to the point of using nuclear weapons. And because Ukraine is so close to the Russian heartland (about 250 miles from Moscow) there’s no telling what might happen once the nuclear “firebreak” is crossed. All this terminology — firebreaks, ladders of escalation, extended deterrence — was devised during the Cold War to deal with potential warfighting scenarios in Europe. So if there is a renewed possibility of tensions leading to war over Ukraine (or some other former Soviet possession), perhaps the time has come to revive such thinking.

Directory: file -> view
view -> Western Europe after wwii
view -> Author study: paul fleischman
view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide
view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg
view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh
view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce
view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy
view -> Table of Contents Lesson #
view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad

Download 359.89 Kb.

Share with your friends: