South China Sea Yes Conflict



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CCP Collapse

No SCS conflict – CCP won’t risk collapse and points of conflict will never be strong enough to cue escalation


Kausikan 16 Bilahari, ambassador-at-large, the Institute of Policy Studies' 2015/16 S R Nathan Fellow for the Study of Singapore, 2016 (“US, China closer on South China Sea issues than they appear,” The Straits Times, May 21, Available Online at http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/us-china-closer-on-south-china-sea-issues-than-they-appear, Accessed 07-11-2016, AV)

President Xi Jinping has termed the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) role as leading the "Great Rejuvenation" of the Chinese nation after a century of weakness and humiliation. But the outcome of the second phase of reforms, even if completely successful, will be slower growth, as the CCP has itself acknowledged. The "Great Rejuvenation" must therefore be as much, if not more, outwardly than internally directed. Externally, it is increasingly an essentially revanchist narrative. Herein lies the importance of the South China Sea (SCS) to China. Put simply, it is the least risky way of putting some shreds of meat on the bare bones of the historical narrative by which the CCP justifies its right to rule.¶ The United States defines its interests in the SCS in terms of upholding international law and freedom of navigation (FON). These are important interests but not of the same order as the CCP's primary interest, which is existential: the legitimacy and ultimately the survival of the CCP. The US has made clear that the US-Japan alliance covers the Senkakus; it has been ambiguous about the US-Philippines alliance, and hence in effect made clear that it does not cover the disputed areas in the SCS. War in support of the principal US East Asian ally is credible, if unlikely. War over rocks, shoals and reefs would be absurd. I doubt that China can be deterred from continuing its reclamation activities and deploying military assets on the artificial islands it is creating. But I doubt too that China can deter the US from operating in the SCS. Military assets that cannot be used are a weak deterrent. To use them to deny access must evoke a US response. This confronts the CCP with Hobson's choice: escalate and risk war or at least serious conflict which will jeopardise CCP rule; or respond weakly, which will expose the hollowness of the "Great Rejuvenation", which will also shake confidence in CCP rule. The CCP will not willingly place itself in such an invidious position.China's bluster masks this dilemma. Beijing has carefully kept each action in the SCS below a threshold that must draw a response from even the most reluctant of US administrations. Miscalculations and accidents can of course happen. If an accident occurs, the highly nationalistic public opinion that the CCP both cultivates and fears could lead Beijing down a path it does not want to travel. But the probability of accidents can be minimised. China has of late taken a more positive attitude towards rules of engagement for unplanned encounters at sea and in the air. If we look past the chest-thumping by both sides, the probability of US-China competition in the SCS becoming ritualised is not to be discounted.¶ I think the process is already under way. In my view, there are less differences between the US and China on FON than immediately meets the eye. I think differences over what military activities are acceptable in another country's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) reflect differences of capability rather than irrecon- cilable differences of concept. China says that it has not and will never impede FON in the SCS. This is credible in so far as the merchant marine is concerned because China, too, is a trading nation. The US riposte is that there is a difference between FON granted by the leave and favour of a major power and FON as a right enshrined in international law. This is true. But the US is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) and says it considers Unclos largely customary international law and abides by it on that basis. It does not take an extreme sceptic to consider this a gentler way of saying that the US too grants FON by its leave and favour, because of a particular calculation of American national interests and not an obligation it must fulfil irrespective of such calculations. Some American interpretations of FON have been questionable, for example, when it tried to assert the right to stop and search vessels on the high seas under the Proliferation Security Initiative after 9/11. One may have more trust in one major power's leave and favour than another's, but that is a matter of political choice and not international law. There is at present a difference of interpretation between the US and China over what military activities are permissible under Unclos in another country's EEZ. But is this an irreconcilable difference of concept or does the apparent difference of concept reflect only a difference of capability? I am not so sure


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