South China Sea Yes Conflict
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- No SCS conflict – China will resort to diplomacy and negotiations – expert consensus
- No SCS War — Diplomacy Solves and Tensions Don’t Cause Conflict .
- SCS states prefer stability and diplomacy – prefer data over alarmism
- No US draw-in — no military challenge and alliances remain stable
- No SCS war — the geography allows for diplomacy
DiplomacyDiplomacy solvesNye 15 - Joseph S. Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs ("Is U.S.-China Conflict Imminent in the South China Sea?." The Huffington Post, June 3, 2015.)Raam Taambe The U.S. response was designed to prevent China from creating a fait accompli that could close off large parts of the South China Sea. Nevertheless, the original policy of not becoming embroiled in the sovereignty dispute continues to make sense. The irony is that the U.S. Senate's failure to ratify UNCLOS means that the U.S. cannot take China to ITLOS over its efforts to convert reefs into islands and claim exclusion zones that could interfere with the right of free passage — a major U.S. interest. But, because China has ratified UNCLOS and the U.S. respects it as customary international law, there is a basis for serious direct negotiation over clarification of the ambiguous nine-dashed line and the preservation of freedom of the seas. With properly managed diplomacy, a U.S.-China conflict in the South China Sea can and should be avoided. No SCS conflict – China will resort to diplomacy and negotiations – expert consensusBaculinao 16 – Eric Baculinao, Reporter for NBC News, Jan 24th 2016(“China will not initiate military conflict over Island Disputes: Expert,” NBC News, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/china/china-will-not-initiate-military-conflict-over-island-disputes-expert-n501851, Accessed 6/29/16, AJ) BEIJING — China will not start a war over disputed islands in the South China Sea amid recent muscle-flexing, experts with close links to the country's government told NBC News. "We will not initiate military conflict to recover islands illegally occupied by other countries," said Wu Shicun, the former foreign affairs chief of Hainan province, an island in the South China Sea. "Our stand is to resort to negotiations [with] the countries directly involved, to resolve the territorial and maritime disputes."
China claims almost all of the South China Sea, including reclaimed coral reefs known as the Spratly Islands that sit in an area thought to be rich in oil and gas reserves. Beijing has built runways, seaports and other facilities on the Spratlys. The U.S. — as well as Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan, which have overlapping claims with China — condemn Beijing's moves in the region. Washington has vowed to defend freedom of passage through the waters. "Make no mistake, the United States will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, as we do around the world, and the South China Sea is not and will not be an exception," Defense Secretary Ash Carter said on October 13. On Oct. 27, a U.S. destroyer sailed within 12 nautical miles of the Spratlys in an open challenge to Beijing. Related: China Accuses U.S. of 'Serious Military Provocation' Shi Yinhong, a senior foreign policy scholar at Renmin University of China and foreign policy adviser to the government, agreed with Wu that Beijing was unlikely to "launch unprovoked war." "Other countries have also said the same, and this is all helpful for peace and stability in the South China Sea," he said. "There will be measures to slow things down. China will adopt a new diplomacy to try to lower tensions with the U.S. and other relevant countries." Fiery Cross reef, located in the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, on Sept. 3, 2015. Handout / Reuters While insisting that China "will not initiate hostilities," Wu stuck by Beijing's line that building on the reclaimed Spratlys was "within China's sovereign rights," denying a Pentagon report that they could extend China's military reach. "Any military facilities we build on them will be to secure the safety of Chinese personnel and installations involved," Wu said. "Any ordinary person can tell that these tiny outposts cannot play a major role in any military conflict."
According to Wu, a 1999 incident should be seen as a sign that China would not resort to violence over such disputes. That was when Philippines deliberately grounded a warship on the disputed Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratlys to claim the atoll. The Philippines keeps a handful of marines on the wrecked and rusting warship to this day. "China has been exercising great restraint," Hong Lei, the spokesman for China's Foreign Ministry told NBC News when asked about the ongoing dispute on Second Thomas Shoal. "We maintain that relevant disputes should be resolved between parties directly concerned through dialogues and consultation on the basis of historical facts and international laws. China and other countries should work together to maintain peace and stability of the region."
This is the case also after the SCS situation has deteriorated since late 2007, in particular between China and Vietnam and China and the Philippines. These developments do not increase the risk for more confrontations, at least if the trend continues. Their impact so far should not be overestimated. There are signs that China understands that it has pushed too far.12 It is also clear that diplomacy continues to be the preferred option among all parties, and the general commitment to cooperative approaches aimed at reducing the risk of conflict, joint development, and the protection of the marine environment remains.13 The regionalisation process has continued, with substantial progress in particularly in the economic sphere with the implementation of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) 1 January 2010. Thus, despite the increased tensions, the unstable peace continues to tilt towards a stable peace. The parties do not perceive each other as enemies, and in the short-term perspective, the U.S. continues to be a safe guard for peace. In the longer-term perspective, as long as China continues to focus on its need for economic development there are strong incentives for continuing to develop positive relations with its Southeast Asian neighbours. It should here be noted that China's assertive stance has not come as a shock for an ASEAN that has been deceived by the Chinese "charm offensive", as some analysts suggests.14 As argued by Dewi Fortuna Anwar, the ASEAN members "were and continue to be fully aware of both the inherent promises and dangers that China present", and it continues to believe "that the best course of dealing with China ... is to engage and integrate it fully into the regional order".15
(5/13, Chin-Hao, Political Science Professor-Yale, “Security Dimensions of China’s Relations with Southeast Asia,” Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Huang_Written%20Testimony_5.13.2015%20Hearing.pdf) The conventional wisdom points to China’s recent maritime actions as aggressive, revisionist, and disruptive to regional stability. To many, Beijing’s aspirations in the South China Sea mirror-image what other rising powers have done in the past: establish blue water extensions of its territorial borders to build an oceanic empire. That the claimant states in the South China Sea are taking steps to extend their sovereign jurisdiction unilaterally to guarantee their access to natural resources indicate rising tensions, competition, and confrontation that will only intensify in the years ahead. If China’s actions are clear departures from its baseline policies, then the narrative about the dangers that an increasingly aggressive and confident China portends for the region is probably accurate. For example, the sudden discovery of substantial deposits of natural resources such as oil and gas in the contested seabed could be a trigger point for rapid escalation. Or, perhaps China may unilaterally decide to hasten the “salami-slicing” strategy and use force because, put simply, it can. China could even be emboldened to stake out its own sphere of influence to counter or even undermine U.S. role in Southeast Asia, with military build-up and deterrence at the forefront in the contested seas. But, if the conventional wisdom that territoriality, resources, and power projection are all so central to China’s strategic priorities in its latest maritime adventures, it is equally important to probe deeper and further on this puzzle: why hasn’t a regional war—even if a limited one—break out between China and the other claimant states in the South China Sea? In other words, to what degree is the South China Sea—and the region more broadly—really “ripe for rivalry?” I offer a slightly different view from the standard, alarmist narrative. While lowlevel confrontations have occurred, there is no clear pattern (yet) that the clashes are escalating in lockstep to a militarized conflict and outright balancing in Southeast Asia. In fact, a closer reading of regional trends, and a comparison of observable data lead to the preliminary conclusion that even in one of the most uncertain security environments, China and the other claimant states appear to be seeking ways to manage relations with each other that emphasize restraint and reciprocity, rather than a military escalation in the South China Sea. This testimony provides an attempt to more carefully assess the developments in the South China Sea. To do so, I compare across time to see how different China’s current actions are from past behavior and analyzes them across the region. This provides one way to assess what China and the other key claimant states are actually doing, in addition to what they are saying, and the degree to which the region has heightened threat perceptions about China’s behavior in the South China Sea. In particular, I look at three common issues and claims about increasing aggression in the South China Sea, namely: (1) militarization of the conflict; (2) oil and natural resources; and (3) the likelihood of China establishing an air defense identification zone in the South China Sea. Why is this important for U.S. security interests in the Southeast Asia? Put simply, if the South China Sea presents a more limited existential security threat to any of the Southeast Asian claimant states than we commonly presume, then the strategic way forward with regards to the U.S. rebalancing strategy to the region would need to move beyond security deterrence and militarization and begin to emphasize more on political and diplomatic leadership and forging stronger economic partnerships with Southeast Asia. Equally important, as regional governments’ interests begin to converge in Southeast Asia and align ever more closely In their positions over the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Washington should support this regional effort and allow for ASEAN to come up with a unified and more powerful, collective bargaining voice vis-à-vis China. I. Restrained Militarization Direct military confrontation in the South China Sea has been surprisingly low. The last time an actual military battle occurred in the South China Sea was nearly thirty years ago in 1988 at the Fiery Cross Reef. Claiming that it was carrying out a scientific mission on behalf of the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 3 Organization (UNESCO), the Chinese government dispatched Chinese naval vessels to the Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea to build observations stations. Vietnam, which had previously claimed the Fiery Cross Reef, lodged formal complaints and sent armed forces to disrupt the Chinese construction of the observation towers on the reef. An armed confrontation lasting 28 minutes ensued, with 75 Vietnamese personnel killed or missing and three Vietnamese naval ships sunk or set ablaze. Since the armed confrontation, the Vietnamese Defense Ministry has gradually fortified and expanded its presence in 29 islets and reefs in the Spratly Islands, making Vietnam the claimant state with the most number of islets and reefs under its control in the South China Sea. China’s policy in the South China Sea is calculated – their focus is on stability and assertiveness is not an inherent goal, they avoid direct use of force and resort to multilateral cooperation.Zhou 6-20 – ZHOU FANGYIN, Professor and Director of the Center for China's Regional Strategies, Guangdong Institute for International Strategies, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, 2016 (“Between assertiveness and self-restraint: understanding China's South China Sea policy. International Affairs,” doi: 10.1111/1468-2346.12657” Version of Record online: 20 JUN 2016 DOI: 10.1111/1468-2346.12657 date accessed 7-11-16 EAKJ) Not only has the status of the South China Sea in the bigger picture of Chinese diplomacy shifted; China's strategic thinking on dealing with these issues has also been adjusted since 2010, especially in terms of what is the most appropriate way of realizing the nation's broad strategic goals. The shift from keeping a low profile to striving for achievement involves important adjustments to the policy and measures adopted by China in its foreign policy. Broadly speaking, the change in the strategic thinking behind the Chinese approach to dealing with the South China Sea disputes has gone through a series of stages.13 During the first stage, China adopted a principled policy of shelving disputes and seeking common development (gezhi zhengyi, gongtong kaifa). This policy, which was guided by the principle of keeping a low profile, worked well for some time and helped China to maintain friendly relations with the ASEAN countries, although in the latter part of this first stage it became increasingly difficult to sustain.14 Nevertheless, the Chinese government generally kept to this line, drawing on economic cooperation and diplomatic dialogue to ease the rising tensions and to maintain overall stability. In the second stage, as regional tensions rose, the Chinese government realized that the policy based on keeping a low profile was becoming less effective and could not calm tensions in the South China Sea. In this context, a debate emerged as to whether the priority in dealing with the South China Sea disputes should be to ‘defend [China's] sovereign rights’ or ‘maintain regional stability’. Academic discussion deepened the understanding of the relationship between the two, and a general consensus was reached that China should not allow its essential sovereign rights to be compromised for the sake of maintaining regional stability. It was also generally agreed that there was no simple and quick fix that would resolve the matter: striving to reconcile the two aims in practice would be a long and tortuous process.15 Similarly, the government departments concerned underwent a cognitive shift from the presumption that regional stability was of the highest importance to prioritizing the defence of China's sovereign rights, or at least to a realization that equal importance should be placed on both in policy-making.16 At the same time there was a surge in nationalism in China, prompted by the South China Sea disputes.17 Against this background, China's South China Sea policy gradually began to become more proactive and assertive. This trend was reflected in the Scarborough Shoal standoff of 2012, during which China took a robust approach towards the Philippines and gained full de facto control of the shoal. China's successful assertive approach to the Scarborough Shoal standoff, which ushered in the third stage, had two important implications. First, China realized that it had the necessary capacity to attain further such successes. Second, ordinary Chinese citizens came to believe that their government would not easily give up national interests, and the upsurge in nationalist sentiment dissipated somewhat as a result.18 These two factors have had a transformative effect on the Chinese government's approach to dealing with the South China Sea disputes, giving it more confidence in taking initiatives to deal with those disputes and consequently a wider choice of policy options. In the wake of the Scarborough Shoal standoff, the Chinese government chose a delicately balanced combination of assertiveness and self-restraint in dealing with the South China Sea disputes. The basic idea behind this stage has been that China could draw on a variety of methods short of military force to explore possible ways to stabilize the situation and ease tensions in the South China Sea, while being prepared to use force, if necessary, as a means of persuasion.19 During the fourth stage, with the promulgation of the ‘one belt, one road’ initiative and the preparations for the establishment of the AIIB, the focus of Chinese diplomacy shifted to development issues in the countries surrounding China, giving regional development precedence over, or at least making it of commensurate importance with, traditional security issues. Regional development is an area in which China has a clear comparative advantage. During this stage, China has become more restrained in its approach towards the South China Sea disputes, but this has not stopped it from steadily working to enhance its physical presence in the areas under its effective control. This intention is highlighted by China's large-scale land reclamation in the South China Sea between 2014 and 2015. Land reclamation, it should be noted, is a practice that has already been commonly used by other claimants, notably the Philippines and Vietnam, in the South China Sea. The difference is that China has been doing it on a much larger scale over a much shorter period of time, evoking strong opposition from other regional countries and from the United States. It is still too early to see how this shift will affect the situation in the South China Sea. Several important points can be drawn from this outline of China's changing strategic thinking in dealing with the South China Sea territorial and maritime disputes. First, the changes in Chinese foreign policy towards these disputes have occurred in the context of the US pivot to Asia, rising tensions in the South China Sea, and China's own rapidly increasing power and capacity. China's policy shift has not come about as a result of the wishes of any particular leader, but can instead be seen as a contingent development. More specifically, having long been guided by the principle of keeping a low profile, Chinese diplomacy needs to go through a period of ‘becoming assertive’ in order to establish the level of deterrence necessary for China to be in a position to defend its sovereign rights and national interests in the South China Sea. The Chinese government has learned from experience that during a process of conflict and confrontation, a unilateral policy of moderation will not achieve stability, and may even whet the appetite of the other side. As the situation in the South China Sea has become increasingly heated, Chinese government and academic circles have gradually come to understand that although China hopes to maintain peace and stability there, this goal cannot be achieved simply by adopting a consistently moderate approach, or only by applying self-restraint in its diplomacy. The policy of self-restraint may instead encourage some countries to be more demanding in their relations with China. Second, although Chinese foreign policy during this period of transition has become more assertive, assertiveness itself is neither the goal nor an inherent characteristic of Chinese diplomacy. The priority of Chinese foreign policy in the short term is to keep the situation in the South China Sea under control and to contain the escalating provocations of certain neighbouring countries in defence of its own national interests. During this process, China has attempted to establish necessary and reliable deterrence of a kind likely to have only a very limited negative impact on regional stability.20 What is important for China is not to provoke any physical confrontation with the claimants in question, but to change the expectations of those claimants about how China will behave in a given situation, making sure that they fully understand China's firmness of purpose and resolve to defend its fundamental rights and interests. This can be achieved through adopting an approach that is consistent and reasonable and at the same time firm and assertive. In order to achieve this aim, in the short term, rather than worrying about being perceived as too ‘tough’ and ‘assertive’, China should avoid being seen as ‘not tough enough’, because that could undermine all previous efforts it has made to establish a credible deterrence. Our focus of attention during this process should be the scale of China's actions to defend its sovereign rights. Though China has more recently adopted a firmer approach to defending its sovereign rights and interests, it has been careful to avoid resorting to military measures or using simplistic and heavy-handed means in doing so. In other words, China is attempting to defend its rights without compromising regional stability, and to become more sophisticated in its use of different techniques to achieve this goal, even though it has clearly developed a stronger capacity to withstand external pressure. By the middle of 2014, China had already achieved a certain level of success in this respect.21 A major reflection of this initial success is that Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam have all stopped taking provocative measures to escalate their physical confrontation with China over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and in the South China Sea.22 From this point, without compromising the necessary deterrence it has managed to establish, the Chinese government has been trying to demonstrate a certain amount of flexibility over the issues in the South China Sea. An important indication of this flexibility can be found in the advocacy of ‘dual track thinking’, an expression first used by Wang Yi, China's Foreign Minister, on 9 August 2014. According to Wang, this means, first, that any relevant dispute should be addressed by the countries directly concerned through friendly talks and negotiations to find a peaceful solution; and second, that peace and stability in the South China Sea should be jointly maintained by China and the ASEAN countries.23 This formulation shows that China does not rule out the idea of drawing on multilateral cooperation to solve the South China Sea disputes, and that it is not opposed to the establishment of regional rules and norms. Even in a context where China clearly has a power advantage, it is not attempting to impose its will by assertion.24 Since 2012, China's behaviour in dealing with issues in the South China Sea has remained relatively consistent. In its interactions with south-east Asian countries, it has demonstrated a high level of strategic patience, and its use of strategic measures in handling specific issues has become more flexible and effective. Today, China's policy on the South China Sea disputes is more proactive and confident than it has been in the past. It is largely implemented according to China's own strategic design and thinking, and is not easily influenced by international opinion or external pressure. No US draw-in — no military challenge and alliances remain stableTaylor 14 — Brendan Taylor, Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, 2014 (“The South China Sea is Not a Flashpoint,” The Washington Quarterly, March 12th, Available Online at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2014.893176, Accessed 7-11-16) U.S. Vital Interest? Some commentators suggest that the South China Sea constitutes a vital U.S. interest because it is a litmus test for China's challenge to U.S. primacy in the Western Pacific. Patrick Cronin and Robert Kaplan observe that “the South China Sea will be the strategic bellwether for determining the future of U.S. leadership in the Asia–Pacific region.” In their view, it is in this body of water “where a militarily rising China is increasingly challenging U.S. naval preeminence—a trend that, if left on its present trajectory, could upset the balance of power that has existed since the end of World War II.”40 To be sure, the balance of military power between China and the countries of Southeast Asia is clearly shifting in Beijing's favor. Although Vietnam and the Philippines have recently embarked upon their own military modernization programs—and while Southeast Asian claimant states have geographical advantages over China given their proximity to the disputed waters of the South China Sea—Beijing's military modernization commenced during the mid-1990s, giving China a substantial head start over its southern neighbors. Moreover, Beijing has not had to deal with the fiscal constraints which periods of economic downturn and political unrest have created for a number of Southeast Asian governments over the past two decades.41 That said, it is equally important not to exaggerate the pace and scope of China's military modernization, conflating trends in the Southeast Asian distribution of power with a potential Chinese challenge to U.S. primacy in the broader Western Pacific. China currently does not possess the capability to project substantial power into the South China Sea, and will likely remain unable to do so for at least another two decades, its ongoing experimentation with aircraft carriers notwithstanding. As Dan Blumenthal has observed, “the PLA lacks a sustained power projection capability associated with asserting full control over the area, including sufficient at-sea replenishment and aerial refueling capabilities, modern destroyers with advanced air defense capabilities, and nuclear submarines, as well as regional bases to support logistical requirements.”42 Added to this, questions have risen regarding the as yet largely unproven ability of PLA Navy crews to undertake prolonged operations at sea, particularly under conditions of high-intensity conflict.43
Yet, despite the fact that Washington ultimately refused to side with the Philippines during the April 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, there is little evidence to suggest any such crisis of confidence amongst America's closest Asia–Pacific allies. In its May 2013 Defense White Paper, for example, Canberra characterizes Australia's alliance with the United States as being “our most important defence relationship” and “a pillar of Australia's strategic and security arrangements.”44 The United States was certainly swift to demonstrate the credibility of its alliance commitment to Seoul following the March 2010 sinking of the Cheonan, undertaking a series of high-profile military exercises with South Korea in waters proximate to China and in the face of strong opposition from Beijing.45 Likewise in November 2013, Washington sent a strong signal of support for Tokyo by flying two B-52 bombers through China's newly announced “Air Defense Identification Zone” without informing Beijing in advance.46 U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel backed up this show of defiance with unequivocal confirmation that Article V of the U.S.–Japan Mutual Defense Treaty extends to the Senkaku Islands.47 These examples call into question the connection that some commentators draw between U.S. strategy toward the South China Sea and the continued viability of the United States' Asian alliances. What they instead appear to demonstrate is that U.S. alliance relationships with Australia, Japan, and South Korea are simply in a different category than those it has with the Philippines and Thailand. No SCS war — the geography allows for diplomacyTaylor 14 — Brendan Taylor, Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, 2014 (“The South China Sea is Not a Flashpoint,” The Washington Quarterly, March 12th, Available Online at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2014.893176, Accessed 7-11-16) The strategic geography of the South China Sea also militates against it being a genuine flashpoint. Throughout history, large bodies of water have tended to inhibit the willingness and ability of adversaries to wage war. In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, for instance, John Mearsheimer refers to “the stopping power of water,” writing of the limits that large bodies of water place on the capacity of states to project military power—relative, at least, to when they share common land borders.17 Even when clashes at sea do occur, history suggests that these generally afford statesmen greater time and space to find diplomatic solutions. As Robert Ross observes, in such cases “neither side has to fear that the other's provocative diplomacy or movement of troops is a prelude to attack and immediately escalate to heightened military readiness. Tension can be slower to develop, allowing the protagonists time to manage and avoid unnecessary escalation.”18 Directory: file -> view -> SCS-ECS-Impact-Core-HSS-2016.docx view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad SCS-ECS-Impact-Core-HSS-2016.docx -> South China Sea Yes Conflict Download 0.84 Mb. Share with your friends:
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