South China Sea Yes Conflict

Yes SCS war – shifting balance of power

However, some are still left wondering over China’s motives in provoking such regional conflict—including with Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines. How can one explain why China risks a major war that could potentially drag the United States in for a bunch of uninhabited rocks?

Some say they are fighting for control over major oil and gas reserves in those seas. But this seems not to be the case. After all, great powers have rarely fought one another in a major war over economic resources in modern history, if at all. Or is it because of China’s nine-dash line? For sure, one needs to differentiate the means, ways and ends of phenomena. The nine-dash line is a means that China uses to justify its policy ends. But it does not explain the endgame it wants to achieve—therefore, it cannot be used to explain its motives in the South China Sea.

Let’s take a look back at the twentieth century. World War I started when Austria-Hungary declared war on and attacked Serbia. So, does it mean that World War I was caused by Austria-Hungary’s invasion? No. Austria-Hungary did start the war, but it was certainly not caused by it. The cause of the war was the great powers’ concern about the prevalent regional order in Europe—and their wish to alter it.

Similar to World War I, World War II started with an invasion, when Hitler invaded Poland. However, Poland was not the cause of the Anglo-French and German rivalry escalating to a war in 1939. Instead, the Anglo-French were concerned over the shifting balance of power towards Germany’s favor and sought to prevent it from going further in that direction. That determination finally led to war over Poland’s survival.

Put simply, what Serbia and Poland have in common with the South and East China Seas is that they served as a venue of great-power rivalry. But they are definitely not the cause of that rivalry.

To understand the cause of the current U.S.-China rivalry, one needs to see the history and strategic picture of the Asian region. Put simply, one needs to see beyond the South China Sea. Following the defeat of Imperial Japan in World War II, the United States has been the sole great power that can project its power throughout the region. Since that day, the region has come under American-led regional order. Having only a fraction of the United States’ power, other states in the region accepted American primacy.

What is happening today is that China has gathered enough power and is becoming powerful enough to match (or even surpass) America’s ability to project power throughout much of Asia. Power means leadership throughout history and with its newly gained power, China wants a bigger role in regional leadership. For sure, though it seems weird for most people, anyone who carefully study history will concede that this is a normal—though arguably regrettable—state behavior.

One might point a finger towards Japan and Germany as comparisons—both of whose rise of power in recent times does not correspond with a regional crisis that risks regional war—and, therefore, accuse China’s behavior as not normal. However, history once again shows that both states are the anomaly—not China.

As Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew once remarked, “Unlike other emergent countries, China wants to be China and accepted as such, not as an honorary member of the West.” It is clear from his observation that China has set its sights on displacing the United States as the dominant power that will dictate the regional order in the Asia region. This is not to say that we must agree with or accept all China wants to do. We may dislike how our rival thinks and behaves, but we have to understand them. Without understanding how China thinks, a plausible solution to the current conflict will be hard to devise.

Hague ruling

Yes SCS war — island building and CCP nationalism

Louie 7/11 — Simon Louie, policy intern at the Centre for Independent Studies, July 11^th 2016 (“Haig South China Sea judgment will be momentous,” Online Opinion, available online at http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=18372, accessed 7/11/16) JL

On July 12, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague is set to hand down its verdict regarding the Philippines claims against China in the South China Sea. Should the verdict go against China’s self-proclaimed interests, then the possibility of a military confrontation - particularly with the United States, as self-proclaimed guarantor of global freedom of navigation - would escalate dramatically. China claims the majority of the South China Sea as its historic waters, with a nine-dash line extending all the way down to the Natuna islands in Indonesia - more than two thousand kilometres away from the Chinese mainland. Beijing has not only rejected the authority of the Permanent Court of Arbitration to deal with the South China Sea issue, but has also expanded its territorial claims by building islands in areas falling in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. Since 2013 when the case was first filed by the Philippines, China has built seven islets by piling sand on reefs. It has constructed port facilities, military installations and airstrips on these artificial islands, and these bolster China’s foothold in the South China Sea. An influential Chinese paper, the state-run Global Times has said that China should prepare for military conflict - the Global Times is known for its strident nationalist views, and whilst it does not represent government policy it nevertheless has the effect of inflaming Chinese public opinion. At the same time American officials are concerned that the ruling could prompt Beijing to declare an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea - when China did the same thing in 2013 over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands the American response was to fly two B-52 bombers over the islands as a show of resolve. It is no surprise that Chinese President Xi Jinping is a much more nationalistic leader than his two predecessors and has been using nationalism as a means for garnering support for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The ‘China Dream’ has become the political manifesto and signature ideology of Xi Jinping’s administration. In more concrete terms the phrase refers to the rejuvenation of China - the Chinese see themselves as returning to greatness or past glory, and the various humiliations from the Opium War to the Second Sino-Japanese War as a mere blip in its long and glorious history. Behind it though, stands a China unsatisfied with the United States led global status quo. It should be noted that the post-war international order was built by the victorious Western powers without the input of China. The Chinese economy is currently undergoing a shift from an investment led economy to a consumption based one, and it is not a given that the transition will be smooth. Indeed, if anything, given China’s gargantuan debts it is indeed possible that a massive debt bust is likely. Given that the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy is predicated on economic growth and national unity it is not inconceivable that in the face of an economic crisis, the CCP will revert to raw nationalism to bolster what little legitimacy it has left. The result of this verdict, and China’s reactions to it, will have tremendous implications for not only East and South-east Asia, but also for Australia and the entire world. Currently $5 trillion of annual shipping passes through the South China Seas and whilst it appears unlikely that China would seek to disrupt this trade, a belligerent China which tries to exert its suzerainty over an international body of water has profound negative implications for the very basis of freedom of navigation through international waters - other countries could very well try to press their claims on open bodies of water too. Should China choose to ignore the ruling, and continue with its island building and blatant bullying of smaller countries, then the United States will be confronted with a dilemma - either allow China to continue to have its way, putting the whole international system of freedom of navigation of international waters into question, or confront China militarily with the risk of igniting a major conflict. Both options are distinctly unpalatable to the US - should it choose to allow China to continue to have its way, then this would signal to countries like Japan and the Philippines that US security guarantees are worthless (akin to the Western powers 1930s appeasement of the Nazis), and in such a scenario smaller regional countries may seek to acquire a much stronger military deterrent of their own. China may continue to press its claims, and it is already sending boats to Indonesian waters. Indonesian President Widodo has recently visited the Natuna Islands indicating that he will not stand by idly whilst China encroaches on its sovereignty. On the other hand, the US risks the very real possibility of war with China should it decide to confront China militarily by sending US ships into the disputed waters. Given that Chinese public opinion is already strongly in favour of using force to resolve the South China Sea issue, it would be very difficult for Chinese leaders to back down in the face of an unfavourable ruling. In part the US faces this dilemma because of the Obama administration’s unwillingness to previously confront China over the issue - had it stood up to China earlier on, it could very well have avoided this problem. Should conflict erupt between China and the United States, then it is indeed possible that it could escalate into a gargantuan conflict - both powers are nuclear armed. How China reacts in the next few days and weeks could very well determine the course of world history.

China will ignore the Philippines challenge.

Benner 6-5-16(Tom Benner, Journalist for Al Jazeera, 6-5-16, “Tensions escalate over South China Sea Claim, ” Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/tensions-escalate-south-china-sea-claims-160605065515637.html)

At the weekend-long Shangri-La Dialogue , Chinese military officials vowed to ignore a legal ruling expected in the next few weeks by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague on a Philippines' challenge to China's growing assertiveness in the key sea route between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

"We do not make trouble, but we have no fear of trouble," said Admiral Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army, who led the Chinese delegation at the summit.

The Hague court is expected to rule on the legality of the so-called "nine-dash line", China's cartographic marker that it uses to claim territorial rights over most of the resource-rich sea. China's claimed sovereignty stretches hundreds of kilometres to the south and east of its most southerly province of Hainan, covering hundreds of disputed islands and reefs.

The nine-dash line, first shown on a 1947 Chinese map, carves out an area that runs deep into the maritime heart of Southeast Asia, and overlaps claims from Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan.

China has boycotted The Hague tribunal's proceedings and instead wants bilateral talks with rival claimants, all of which lack China's economic and military prowess.

China rejects the UN court ruling

Bitzinger 6-21 – Richard Bitzinger, Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Military Transformations Program at the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Junes 21^st 2016(“China’s Militarization of the South China Sea: Building a strategic strait.” Asia Times, Available online at http://atimes.com/2016/06/chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-building-a-strategic-strait/, Accessed 6/24/16, AJ)

The UN arbitration court will soon rule on the case, brought by the Philippines against China, over who owns the Scarborough Shoal, located in the South China Sea (SCS). It is all but certain that China will reject the ruling, no matter what it says, because Beijing has already decided that the SCS is a Chinese lake, subject to its “indisputable sovereignty.” However, the issue of Chinese hegemony in the SCS is less and less about economics – oil and gas reserves, or fishing rights – and increasingly about the militarization of this body of water. The South China Sea is becoming, quite simply, a key defensive zone for China.

Miscalc

Tensions will escalate! Miscommunication and misclac! Arms race!

Symonds 16 — Peter Symonds, editor for the world socialist website, 5-30-2016 ("The danger of nuclear war between the US and China," 5-30-2016, Available Online at https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2016/05/30/pers-m30.html, Accessed 7-11-2016-- MEW)

In the campaigns currently underway for the US presidency and the Australian federal election, a conspiracy of silence reigns over the preparations for war, aimed at deadening the consciousness of the population to the rising danger of nuclear conflict. Two nuclear-armed powers are facing off not only in the South China Sea, but other dangerous flashpoints such as North Korea and Taiwan, each of which has been greatly exacerbated by Washington’s “pivot to Asia” and aggressive military build-up throughout the region. An arms race is underway that finds its most acute expression in the arena of nuclear weaponry, delivery systems and associated technologies. Determined to maintain its supremacy in Asia and globally, the US is planning to spend $1 trillion over the next three decades to develop a broader range of sophisticated nuclear weapons and means for delivering them to their targets. The unstated aim of the Pentagon is to secure nuclear primacy—that is, the means for obliterating China’s nuclear arsenal and thus its ability to mount a counter attack. The Chinese response, which is just as reactionary, is to ensure it retains the ability to strike back in a manner that would kill tens of millions in the United States. The reality of these dangers was underscored last week by the release of a report by the US-based Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS). It chillingly warned: “Twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year, the governments of the United States and the People’s Republic of China are a few poor decisions away from starting a war that could escalate rapidly and end in a nuclear exchange. Mismatched perceptions increase both the possibility of war and the likelihood it will result in the use of nuclear weapons. Miscommunication or misunderstanding could spark a conflict that both governments may find difficult to stop.” While appealing for the two sides to acknowledge the risks and heighten diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict, the UCS analysis offered not the slightest hope that such steps would be taken. The report bleakly declared: “Lack of mutual trust and a growing sense that their differences may be irreconcilable incline both governments to continue looking for military solutions—for new means of coercion that help them feel more secure. Establishing the trust needed to have confidence in diplomatic resolutions to the disagreements, animosities, and suspicions that have troubled leaders of the United States and the PRC [China] for almost 70 years is extremely difficult when both governments take every effort to up the technological ante as an act of bad faith.”

SCS conflict will escalate- Chinese aggression could spark miscalc.

Glaser 12 — Bonnie Glaser, Bonnie Glaser is a Senior Adviser for Asia in the Freeman Chair in China Studies, where she works on issues related to Chinese foreign and security policy. She is concomitantly a senior associate with CSIS Pacific Forum and a consultant for the US government on East Asia, May 31, 2016 (“Armed Clash in the South China Sea” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883, accessed 7/11/16, AC)

The risk of conflict in the South China Sea is significant. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines have competing territorial and jurisdictional claims, particularly over rights to exploit the region's possibly extensive reserves of oil and gas. Freedom of navigation in the region is also a contentious issue, especially between the United States and China over the right of U.S. military vessels to operate in China's two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). These tensions are shaping—and being shaped by—rising apprehensions about the growth of China's military power and its regional intentions. China has embarked on a substantial modernization of its maritime paramilitary forces as well as naval capabilities to enforce its sovereignty and jurisdiction claims by force if necessary. At the same time, it is developing capabilities that would put U.S. forces in the region at risk in a conflict, thus potentially denying access to the U.S. Navy in the western Pacific. Given the growing importance of the U.S.-China relationship, and the Asia-Pacific region more generally, to the global economy, the United States has a major interest in preventing any one of the various disputes in the South China Sea from escalating militarily. The Contingencies Of the many conceivable contingencies involving an armed clash in the South China Sea, three especially threaten U.S. interests and could potentially prompt the United States to use force. The most likely and dangerous contingency is a clash stemming from U.S. military operations within China's EEZ that provokes an armed Chinese response. The United States holds that nothing in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or state practice negates the right of military forces of all nations to conduct military activities in EEZs without coastal state notice or consent. China insists that reconnaissance activities undertaken without prior notification and without permission of the coastal state violate Chinese domestic law and international law. China routinely intercepts U.S. reconnaissance flights conducted in its EEZ and periodically does so in aggressive ways that increase the risk of an accident similar to the April 2001 collision of a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a Chinese F-8 fighter jet near Hainan Island. A comparable maritime incident could be triggered by Chinese vessels harassing a U.S. Navy surveillance ship operating in its EEZ, such as occurred in the 2009 incidents involving the USNS Impeccable and the USNS Victorious. The large growth of Chinese submarines has also increased the danger of an incident, such as when a Chinese submarine collided with a U.S. destroyer's towed sonar array in June 2009. Since neither U.S. reconnaissance aircraft nor ocean surveillance vessels are armed, the United States might respond to dangerous behavior by Chinese planes or ships by dispatching armed escorts. A miscalculation or misunderstanding could then result in a deadly exchange of fire, leading to further military escalation and precipitating a major political crisis. Rising U.S.-China mistrust and intensifying bilateral strategic competition would likely make managing such a crisis more difficult.

SCS war likely – miscalc, Chinese deterrence, and recent military exercises prove

Baohui 15 —Professor of Political Science and Director of the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies at Lingnan University in Hong Kong. He is the author of 'China's Assertive Nuclear Posture: State Security in an Anarchic International Order' (Routledge 2015), 2015 (“China, US, and the Unintended Crisis on the South China Sea,” The Nation, 11-14-2015, Available to Subscribing Institutions via LexisNexis, Accessed on 7-11-2016)//CM

RSIS On October 27, USS Lassen, a guided missile destroyer, entered the 12-nautical mile zone of one of the Chinese-controlled features in the Spratly islands, which are currently going through massive land reclamation. China immediately issued strong protests against the US act. However, the Pentagon and the US Navy have stated that the so-called "freedom of navigation patrols" will become routine in the future. Although China did not take concrete actions this time to confront the US warship, future such operations could gravely destabilise the South China Sea situation, even peace and stability of the whole region. They could touch off an unintended escalation and push the two countries towards military conflicts. The logic is quite obvious. Dynamics of escalation More actions by the US Navy will corner the Chinese leadership and force them to respond to perceived provocations to its national interests and power reputation. After all, the South China Sea constitutes an essential part of China's geostrategic interests. Moreover, China's reputation as a great power is at stake when its key interests face a direct and deliberate challenge by another great power. Further, China may feel the urge to stand firm in order to deter future escalation in US challenges to its interests and reputation. Chinese decision-makers may worry that if China does not respond to this perceived US provocation, Washington may escalate pressures on China in the future. The above strategic imperatives could result in Chinese decisions and measures to resist further US naval intrusions into the 12-nautical-mile zones around its claimed islands in the Spratly chain. Indeed, on November 2, 2015, Vice Admiral Yi Xiaoguang, PLA's deputy chief of staff, stated that China "will use all means necessary to defend its sovereignty" if the US takes similar actions. The next day, General Fang Changlong, vice president of the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party, told Admiral Harry Harris Jr, commander of the United States Pacific Command, that any future actions by the US Navy could trigger accidental escalations that harm the interests of both countries. Indeed, the Chinese are also escalating their actions. The PLA revealed that its air force conducted war games on October 30 in the South China Sea. Specifically, the photos released by the PLA suggest the war games involved Chinese J-11b jet fighters taking off from Woody Island, which has the closest airport to support military operations in the Spratlys chain of islands. Then, the PLA Air Force announced that it conducted a joint war game on November 2 that included a H-6k bomber launching cruise missiles in the South China Sea. Finally, on November 3, the PLA released rare photos of the JL-2 sea-based strategic missile, which is borne by China's Type 094 nuclear submarines, lifting out from the sea. Chinese media analyses all suggest that the unexpected release of the photos is meant to deter the US. Therefore, it is obvious that China has stepped up deterrence against a potential repeat of similar US operations in the South China Sea. Various Chinese rhetoric and measures suggest that China could resort to more concrete and forceful measures to confront the US navy. If so, a face-off between the two navies becomes inevitable. Even worse, the face-off may trigger an escalation toward military conflicts. However, the US military appears oblivious to this scenario. A logical answer lies in the current conventional military imbalance between the two countries. The vast US conventional military superiority in theory discourages China from responding forcefully to the projected scenario. It is highly likely that US decision-makers assume China would adopt of policy of inaction when facing intruding American naval vessels. This US expectation is flawed, as China is a major nuclear power. When cornered, nuclear-armed states can threaten asymmetric escalation to deter an adversary from harming its key interests. The September 3 military parade in Beijing revealed that China's new generation of tactical missiles, such as the DF-26, could be nuclear-armed. Recent information also indicates that China's air-launched long-range cruise missiles can also carry tactical nuclear warheads. Indeed, the latest photos of the JL-2 sea-based nuclear missile lifting out of the sea could be a veiled nuclear signalling by China to deter the US. The challenge for the US is that while the South China Sea concerns China's strategic interests, few would think that these Spratly islands constitute US core interests. The asymmetry in stakes would certainly give China an advantage in "the balance of resolve" over the US. If so, when a crisis situation escalates and starts to involve potential nuclear scenarios, the US faces the stark choice of either backing down first or facing the prospect of fighting a nuclear-armed China. Neither option is attractive and both exact high costs, either in reputation or human lives, for the US. Therefore, it would be imprudent for the US to challenge China. By underestimating Beijing's resolve to defend its interests, reputation and deterrence credibility, this plan could touch off a spiral of escalation that would in the end harm US interests. What is vital for peace and stability in the South China Sea is that all concerned parties should base their strategies and policies on worst-case scenarios. Both China and the US need to consider how their actions may lead to unintended consequences, especially unintended escalation toward military conflict. Prudence is very much needed at this stage of Sino-US relations, when mutual mistrust has reached an all-time high. Imprudent actions by one or both parties may well turn mistrust into bloody military conflicts. Nobody, especially countries in the region, wants this scenario. If the US claims to be the defender of world peace and regional stability, it must do everything to avoid this scenario through unintended escalations. Zhang Baohui is Professor of Political Science and Director of #124the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies at Lingnan University in Hong Kong. He is the author of 'China's Assertive Nuclear Posture: State Security in an Anarchic International Order' (Routledge 2015).

A2 Diplomacy

International Diplomacy fails on the South China Sea – wavering support, feasibility, and US engagement prove

Parameswaran 15(Prashant Parameswaran, Journalist for the Diplomat, 4-10-15, “A New Way to Resolve Disputes in the South China Sea?,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/one-new-way-to-resolve-the-south-china-sea-disputes/)

While it is not uncommon to hear versions of such an idea floated as potential options publicly and privately, it is certainly not one of the more orthodox approaches usually featured in the headlines. It would also seem at first glance to make some sense, if achieving some clarity as soon as possible is the overriding objective. But the proposal would also likely face several formidable challenges if actually attempted. First, even leaving China aside — given its allergic reaction to ‘internationalizing’ the issue — it is unclear how much support there would be among the remaining South China Sea claimants for such a public way to resolve differing claims. A few may not even wish to attend the conference, as they may prefer more low-profile or quieter ways of handling disputes. Much of this will also depend on form rather than substance. Heavy involvement by outside actors including the United States might appeal to bolder claimants like the Philippines or Vietnam but be less appealing to Malaysia, for example — particularly if it is read as external interference by China and places these states in a rather awkward position between Washington and Beijing. And let’s not even mention the diplomatic minefield of inviting both Taiwan and mainland China to participate in an international dialogue on sovereignty issues.

Second, assuming the conference is convened and most of the claimants do attend, resolving claims between parties is likely to be notoriously difficult in practice. For all the attention paid to China’s nine-dash line and its challenge to other claimants, several Southeast Asian states have unresolved disputes amongst themselves as well. Blair suggested that some of these issues might be more negotiable than other, fiercer disputes because they do not involve lost homelands, large populations, or even significant economic resources (depending on how one estimates potential hydrocarbon resources). Instead, the South China Sea disputes are largely about national pride and politics. To be fair, incremental efforts have been made to at least resolve some of these disputes over the years, including Malaysia’s quiet resolution with Brunei in 2009. But as the recent controversy between Malaysia and the Philippines over issues related to the South China Sea and Sabah during the past few weeks has illustrated, some of these disagreements are tough nuts to crack.

Third and lastly, even if the conference did leave with some resolution of the disputes between claimants, it is unclear how exactly these claimants, along with other outside actors, would implement this new reality on the ground, as Blair proposed, and whether they have both the capabilities and the willingness to do so. This is particularly the case if China is not part of how that reality is shaped; Beijing has so far aggressively demonstrated that it is serious about altering the status quo in its favor – including through coercion if necessary. Would the Philippines or Malaysia, or even ASEAN countries collectively, be expected to challenge Beijing over areas that lie within the nine-dash line following the conference, and, if so, how much would they be willing to risk? I have noted more specifically some of the challenges inherent in even slightly more forward-leaning individual and regional approaches in the maritime realm and the South China Sea, let alone overt challenges to China there (see, for instance, here, here and here).

As for outside actors, taking the example of the United States, how much would Washington be willing to commit to operationalize this new reality given its nuanced policy of not taking a position on the disputes themselves but being concerned about how they are resolved and their broader consequences for the region? Blair, for his part, believes that U.S. policy in the South China Sea thus far has been “tentative and quite weak” and does not adequately recognize key American interests. But that still leaves the more difficult question of how far America is willing to go – including committing assets and risking a downturn in the U.S.-China relationship – to see a proper resolution to conflicting claims in the South China Sea.

China and ASEAN say no.

Kuok 15 – Lynn Kuok, fellow at Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies, a visiting fellow at the Harvard Law School, and a senior visiting fellow at the Centre for International Law, May 2015(“Tides of Change: Taiwan’s evolving position in the South China Sea,” Brookings, Available online at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/05/taiwan-south-china-sea-kuok/taiwan-south-china-sea-kuok-paper.pdf, Accessed on 6/22/16, AJ)

Taiwan’s recent moves and approach notwithstanding, very little has been made of the role Taipei can play in contributing to better management of the dispute and overall stability in the South China Sea. At the root of this is China’s “one-China” principle, namely, “there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.”4

The principle has cast a long shadow over Taiwan and has resulted in Taiwan’s exclusion from regional negotiations and forums relating to the South China Sea, such as negotiations on a code of conduct, as well as cooperative activities with claimants. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states are worried about being seen to fall foul of China’s one-China principle. Moreover, they see little benefit in including Taiwan in the fray. To them, Taiwan’s claims are virtually indistinguishable from China’s and there are lingering concerns about cross-strait co-operation to defend claims in the South China Sea, despite clear statements from Taipei that this is out of the question.

China is cautious about Taiwan’s involvement in the South China Sea as it regards this as a slippery slope toward recognition of ROC sovereignty. Beijing also appears to have linked flexibility on Taiwan’s regional and international participation to Taipei demonstrating a greater willingness to discuss the island’s political relationship with the mainland. Till then, China’s default position is to stand firm against it. This, however, is counterproductive insofar as it is resented by Taiwan and undermines cross-strait relations.

Goes Nuclear

Conflict goes nuclear – conventional and nuclear forces are linked and indistinguishable.

Talmadge 16 – Caitlin Talmadge, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at Elliot School of International Relations at George Washington University, February 2016(“Preventing Nuclear Escalation in U.S.-China Conflict”, Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/china_policy_brief_talmadge_0.pdf, Accessed 7-1-16, AJ)

Conventional war between the United States and China remains a low-probability event. But if such a war were to break out, the risk of nuclear escalation—that is, actual detonation of nuclear weapons— likely would be higher than many observers realize. Some aspects of a likely U.S. campaign in a conventional war against China could look to China like an attempt at conventional counterforce, pressuring China to escalate to nuclear use while it still could.

This escalation scenario is distinct from other possible pathways to nuclear use. For example, in the Cold War the classic scenario for escalation was pre-emption, the notion that one side might try to use its nuclear weapons to pre-emptively destroy the arsenal of the other. Other scenarios for nuclear escalation include mistaken launch based on faulty warning information, and unauthorized launch by a commander who is physically able to use nuclear weapons but does not have political permission to do so. In addition, some states develop doctrines that deliberately threaten to escalate to the first use of nuclear weapons in the event of rapid conventional losses.

Nuclear escalation in response to an opponent’s perceived attempt at conventional counterforce constitutes an alternative pathway to nuclear escalation. It can arise when one side’s conventional military campaign infringes or appears poised to infringe on the other side’s ability to use or control its nuclear arsenal. For example, conventional military attacks by one side against the other’s command and control networks, air defenses, early warning radars, submarines, and missile sites have the potential not only to degrade that side’s conventional capabilities but also its nuclear capabilities. After all, command and control networks for conventional forces may also be relevant to the control of nuclear weapons; air defense systems may protect both conventional and nuclear assets; early warning radars are relevant to both conventional and nuclear operations; attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines share shore-based infrastructure, with the former often protecting the latter; and the same sites can house both conventional and nuclear missiles (called co-location).

For all of these reasons, a state subject to attack on these targets may have a difficult time distinguishing whether the adversary is merely conducting a normal conventional campaign, or is seeking to neuter the state’s nuclear capabilities. If the state fears the latter, it may wish to escalate to nuclear use while it still has the ability to do so. Such fears also could lead the state to engage in behaviors that make other pathways to escalation more likely. For example, the state could opt for more decentralized control of nuclear weapons, which would reduce vulnerability to conventional counterforce but heighten the danger of unauthorized launch.

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