South Korea Aff – 0



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NPT fails


NPT enforcement is impossible—sanctions fail without support from actors too worried about short term costs

Kittrie 7 (Orde, Prof of law, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 28:337, http://students.law.umich.edu/mjil/article-pdfs/v28n2-kittrie.pdf?q=averting) my
To the extent sanctions help prevent nuclear proliferation—and experience with Iraq, Libya, and 1974–98 India shows that they do— sanctions help prevent future costs. Sanctions serve as investments in averting the costs of nuclear 9/11s—more than half a million lives and over one trillion dollars in damage per bomb detonated in a major city— as well as averting the costs of arms races that ensue as a proliferant’s neighbors feel compelled to develop their own nuclear arsenals and enhance their conventional militaries and homeland security defenses. Sanctions also help prevent the costs to the sender state, target state, and broader international community of military intervention designed to prevent nuclear proliferation before it occurs. Unfortunately, key members of the international community, including such potential sanctions-imposing bodies as the Security Council and EU, have been failing to appropriately balance present lost profits against the future costs of arms races, catastrophic nuclear attacks, and military intervention. In practice, when future dangers of a somewhat uncertain magnitude and timing compete against the present costs of sanctions, the present certain costs too often hold sway. The voice of businesspersons who stand to lose contracts now tends to outweigh the interests of unknown, perhaps even as yet unborn, persons who will lose their lives and livelihoods to nuclear proliferation later. This is particularly true in situations where sender states with the most to lose in shortterm profits are not the states that would reap the greatest long-term benefits from sanctions imposition. For example, while strong sanctions against Iran would cost Russia and China much more than they would the United States, the United States is considered to be at far greater risk from an Iranian nuclear arsenal. Thus, sanctions that would benefit the entire international community in the long term might not be imposed because of the particular countries which would have to bear their shortterm costs. This tendency to sacrifice long-term benefits in favor of short-term profits undermines the efficacy of the collective security system on which the UN Charter is based. Under the collective security system, states renounce the temptation to take unilateral, preventive forceful action against a potential aggressor in return for a guarantee that the collective will come to their rescue if they are attacked.538 This bargain is particularly tenuous with respect to nuclear weapons, where an attack could cause enormous and indeed irreparable damage before any rescue could occur.539 The rescue must therefore come before the attack, in the form of sanctions sufficient to coerce or contain the potential proliferant. If such sanctions are not forthcoming, the proliferant’s foremost potential victims will be very tempted to take preventive forceful action. Thus, the Russian and Chinese veto of serious sanctions against Iran may force the United States and Israel into a choice between a preventive strike or facing the risk of an Iranian nuclear arsenal.

North Korea Won’t Give Up Nukes


Not even a security guarantee—much less the NPT—will convince North Korea to abandon its nukes

Lee 9 (Sunny, The National Foreign Correspondent, 10/26, http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20091026/FOREIGN/710259855/1002) my
“I hope that if the North Koreans declare a willingness to return to the six-party talks that people won’t break out the champagne. The question is whether North Korea will denuclearise, not whether it will return to the six-party talks,” Ms Glaser said. “North Korea will never, in any circumstances, give up its nuclear weapons,” said Zhang Liangui, a Chinese expert on North Korea at the Central Party School, an elite institute in Beijing for Communist Party cadre. According to Mr Zhang, the reason that North Korea enters into a negotiation with the US is only to gain some practical benefits, not because it is considering renouncing its nuclear weapons.Even though the US will satisfy North Korea’s various demands, the North will still never, never give up its nukes,” said Mr Zhang. Koh Yu-hwan, an expert on North Korea at Seoul’s Dongguk University, disagrees, saying North Korea’s position on nuclear weapons is fluid. “It’s not that clear cut. The Korea War [1950-53] ended with an armistice. Technically the war is not yet over. The North wants nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the US. So, if the US offers a security guarantee, pledges that it wouldn’t try a ‘regime change’ and sign a peace treaty with North Korea, the goal of denuclearisation is still possible,” Mr Koh said. “That’s a naive view,” counters Mr Zhang, pointing out that the North’s motivation to own nuclear weapons is multifarious. “Actually, Pyongyang has multiple reasons to develop nukes,” he said. “North Korea publicly says it is developing nukes because of the US threat. But actually, North Korea has multiple reasons, including domestic needs, arms-race against its rival South Korea, to take upper hand in case of unification with South Korea, and also to raise its strategic position in the region, particularly against Japan. “All these issues will not be solved by the US guaranteeing its security. Therefore, despite all kinds of security guarantees from the US, North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons,” Mr Zhang said. Mr Klingner said the task will be arduous. “Actually, there is very little optimism among US analysts that North Korea will actually give up its nuclear weapons,” he said, adding this very rationale is pushing the Obama administration to implement a ‘two-track’ approach on North Korea, which is designed to maintain pressure on Pyongyang, but also leave a door open for negotiation.


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