AC Regime Collapse DA (3/)

2AC Regime Collapse DA (3/)

While the current administration understandably devotes enormous amounts of time to Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and the Middle East conflict, the defining strategic challenge of our age is unfolding in a different region. The emergence of China in the context of a rapidly changing Asia is arguably the most important strategic development on our agenda. This view is endorsed by authoritative sources. For example, a report by the U.S. National Intelligence Council 2020 project suggested that the emergence of China resembles the advent of a united Germany in the 19th century and a powerful United States in the early 20th century, with the potential to dramatically transform the geopolitical landscape. However, the U.S.-China bilateral relationship and U.S. relations with Asia more generally, may not be receiving the kind of senior-level attention that their strategic importance requires. It is critical that senior leaders in the U.S. government find the time to provide thoughtful stewardship of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship. Although the United States may have more important bilateral relationships in the world (Japan and the United Kingdom come to mind), there is no other bilateral relationship that, if managed poorly, could carry as many regional and global costs. In other words, because the stakes are so high and the consequences of failure so global, the U.S.-China relationship is perhaps the most significant bilateral relationship in the world. There is strong cause for concern that the relationship will falter and burden us with the afore- mentioned consequences. Considering the degree of uncertainty in the present U.S.-China relationship, the current trend seems to be moving toward greater strategic distrust. Perhaps most notably, the problems that will emerge over the near- to medium-term are likely to be exception- ally challenging. All country-to-country relationships experience problems, but as this paper seeks to convey, the future of the U.S.-China relationship will almost certainly be turbulent. Although the frequency and magnitude of the expected perturbations would be difficult to manage in any <>

Looking ahead, a continued deterioration of Sino-US ties does not bode well for the regional stability of the very large and equally important Asia Pacific. Yet this regional stability might be negatively affected for a long time if Washington and Beijing fail to bounce back from this fiasco and assiduously work to improve their strategic relations. In the meantime, the issue of immediate concern for the USA is nuclear non-proliferation. Immediate work has to be done by both sides to minimize damages on this issue. The PRC, armed with the knowledge of America's premier nuclear programs, is likely to be a much more sought after sources for nuclear proliferation than it has ever been in the past by those countries keenly interested in enhancing the sophistication of their extant nuclear programs and by those who have not yet developed indigenous nuclear know-how but desire to purchase it. China, along with Russia, has an established record proliferating nuclear technology. This reality is not likely to change in the foreseeable future, much to the continued consternation of now-nuclear India. The increased nuclear sophistication on the troubled subcontinent carries with it the risk of a potential nuclear holocaust. The Kashmir issue still remains unresolved and very explosive given the continued intransigence of both India and Pakistan to amicably resolve it.

With protests that forced a policy change, a sanctions regime that has so far deprived Kim of at least $18 million, and uncertainty about the Dear Leader's succession plan, it may well be that this time around Kim is truly running out of money and possibly control. Rather than bail him out, Washington should let Kim fall. It's the best chance the U.S. has of achieving its twofold objectives: denuclearization in North Korea and the eventual unification of the peninsula. After all, the Kim clique has made it clear after decades of negotiations that no amount of aid will suffice to induce them to end their nuclear program. The relatively conciliatory response to Special Envoy Stephen Bosworth's mission earlier this month—the North Koreans declared that "differences" have been "narrowed"—was a classic North Korean negotiating ploy, not an eleventh-hour acceptance of a nuclear-free world. Some might argue that a desperate Kim may really make a deal this time—and Pyongyang certainly needs the bailout it is sure to receive during a new round of talks. But history suggests a dying regime is far less likely to make lasting concessions. Successful disarmament has occurred in places like the Ukraine and South Africa only after a new regime one looking for assistance and legitimacy, came to power. The question is which course is riskier: Letting Kim fall while planning for Korean unification, or attempting to prop up a dangerous regime with a growing arsenal of nuclear weapons? If Washington and its allies plan well, the former has the better chance of succeeding.