Space Weaponization – 4 Week
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COC – a2: PermUnilateral space programs are viewed as starting points for space weaponization – collapses any chance of international agreements on the peaceful use of space Shixiu 7. Senior fellow of ministary theory study’s and relations at the Academy of military Sciences in china. http://www.wsichina.org/%5Ccs5_1.pdf The latest U.S. National Space Policy (NSP) poses a serious threat to the national security of China. This new policy, released in October of 2006, sets out the George W. Bush administration’s vision for defending America’s security in space.1 It reinforces a unilateral U.S. approach to space security which is compounded by the U.S. opposition to any international treaties that limit its access to or use of space.2 Aggregately, Bush’s space policy pursues hegemony in space and poses a significant security risk to China that cannot be left unaddressed. The NSP presents a number of challenges to China’s security environment. First, it grants the United States with exclusive rights to space: the right to use any and all necessary means to ensure American security while at the same time denying adversaries access to space for “hostile purposes.” This sets up an inequitable environment of “haves” and “have-nots” in space, raising suspicion amongst nations. For instance, the NSP declares that U.S. space systems should be guaranteed safe passage over all countries without exception (such as “interference” by other countries, even when done for the purpose of safeguarding their sovereignty and their space integrity). With its significant space assets and military space capabilities, this situation gives the United States an obvious and unfair strategic advantage in space. Second, it refutes international restrictions and undercuts potential international agreements that seek to constrain America’s use of space. This effectively undermines any potential initiatives put forth by the international community to control space weaponization– initiatives that China supports. This U.S. position leads the global community to suspect U.S. unilateralist intentions in space. Lastly, while the policy may not state it explicitly, a critical examination of its contents suggest its intention to “dissuade and deter” other countries, including China, from possessing space capabilities that can challenge the United States in any way– a parameter that would effectively disallow China to possess even a minimum means of national defense in space. The resultant security environment in space is one with one set of rules for the United States and another set of rules for other nations. In such a context, only U.S. security concerns are taken into account with a result of the reinforcement of a zero-sum dynamic to which space is already prone and threatens to pressure others into a military space race. The United States denies that its position on space, as represented by the NSP, will inevitably lead to conflict in space. First, officials in the defense establishment argue that the United States is not opposed to others exploiting space commercially.3 Rather, it only opposes the utilization of space in a way that puts at risk U.S. dominance in space and its military capabilities. In this context, it is argued that if China has purely civilian and commercial interests in space, it should have no problem with U.S. policy in space. Put another way, implicit in much of American thinking regarding China’s intentions in space is a view that if China has no plan to militarize space or has no intention to develop space weapons, U.S. ambitions in space shouldn’t be considered inimical to China’s interests. This position operates on several faulty premises. The first is that the United States is the only country that has national interests at stake in space, implying that China does not have deep national security interests in space or that China’s space assets do not need to be protected. The Chinese government has expressed its desire to develop space peacefully on many occasions, and has pursued treaties to ban weapons and weapon-testing in space. But China also has deep interests, both now and in the future, to exploit space, which are vital to its comprehensive national power and its economic and scientific development and therefore its greater national security. Leaving aside the issue of using space for military purposes, China cannot entrust the protection of its interests in space to another country, no matter their rhetoric or intentions. If the security of the United States requires the absence of that same security for China, then the logic is inherently imbalanced, unfair and one that China cannot accept. The peaceful use of space should not be confused with a lack of national security interests or the deep underlying need to protect them. As a sovereign state, China has an equal right to access space. As the 1967 Outer Space Treaty clearly articulates: Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access all areas of celestial bodies.4 China cannot accept the monopolization of outer space by another country. For that reason, the U.S. administration’s penchant for “exceptionalism” in space policy poses a serious threat to China both in terms of jeopardizing its national defense as well as obstructing its justified right to exploit space for civilian and commercial purposes. The U.S. position makes another faulty assumption that national space programs and space assets can be effectively dissected into commercial and civilian uses versus military uses and capabilities. This is out of tune with technological developments and military inevitabilities. China’s space program. US-China space cooperation possible – but suspicions will kill progress Manzo 8 [Vince, Center for Defense Information, U.S. Policy Brief: The Need for a Strategic Dialogue with China (http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/StrategicDialoguePolicy.pdf)] What is to be done? The United States should avoid adopting a sole interpretation of China’s behavior. States rarely act for a single purpose and this case is no exception. China’s decision to develop and test ASAT technology was probably motivated by a variety of factors. Although the United States is not the sole driver of China’s decisions, China’s security strategy and force posture are certainly influenced by those of the United States. What is more, China is not a monolith: there is likely an ongoing debate within the Chinese government and military about the strategic necessity of ASAT weapons. The U.S. response to China’s ASAT test will influence this debate. This is good news. The United States and China can still attempt to cooperate and prevent an arms race in space. However, cooperation between nations is difficult; uncertainty and suspicion can sour relations even when both countries have incentives to work together. China’s ASAT test was not helpful in this regard. It has aggravated U.S. suspicions about China’s military modernization programs and long-term intentions. For its part, China is concerned with U.S. missile defense, conventional long-range strike capabilities and the U.S. decision to shoot down a failing spy satellite in February 2008. If coupled with further negative developments in U.S.-China relations, both countries may come under increased domestic pressure to adopt more confrontational policies towards each other. This could prompt either China or the United States to alter its strategic forces in ways that are perceived as threatening and provocative by the other, igniting a tit-for-tat cycle of deployment-counter-deployment that contributes to a more competitive U.S.-China relationship. No one knows how a strategic competition between the United States and China would play out. However, the coupling of a fierce security competition with newly deployed and poorly understood weapon systems could be highly destabilizing. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. 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