Space Weaponization – 4 Week
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- COC – SOlvency – a2: Definitions
- COC – Solvency – a2: Cheating
COC – Solvency – ChinaChina opposes space weaponization – the counterplan is key to establish peaceful precedent for space policy Baofu 7 [Wang, Research Fellow and Deputy Director of the Strategic Studies Institute, Outer space not let to overcast with "war clouds, People’s Daily Online, 4-3 (http://english.people.com.cn/200704/03/eng20070403_363411.html)] The United States is a nation of decisive influence with its future outer space exploration and development. In fact, what the global community is concerned about is not its development trend with its outer space technology but "unilateral hues" of its outer space policy. In August of 2006, the US government promulgated the new "National Space Policy", with an allegation that any country or individual "hostile to the US interest were not allowed to enter into the outer space", indicating its mood or intention to access to outer space resources exclusively. The growth of modern space technology has opened wide prospects for the humankind to know about the outer space and have access to it peacefully. In the meantime, it should also be acknowledged that there has been a tendency of capitalizing on a nation's advantages in its space technology to pursue its own absolute security. For years, many countries have done a lot for the attainment of a grand goal for the peaceful use of the outer space. Since the late 1950s, the UN General Assembly has listed the outer space issue on its agenda and signed a couple of documents, including the "Outer Space Treaty", the "Partial Test Ban Treaty" and the "Moon Treaty", contributing positively to the restrictions on and prevention of weaponization in the outer space. China, with a certain spaceflight capability, has kept to its principled stance of opposing the weaponization of space. Since 1985, its government has time and again reiterated at conferences for disarmament at the UN its firm opposition to the deployment of weaponry system and armed races of any form in the outer space. Furthermore, in view of loopholes in the spheres of outer space weaponization in the existing international treaties, China has for years proposed negotiating agendas at the UN Conference for Disarmament and actively pressed ahead with the formation of a new banning treaty on outer space weaponization along with Russia. As the outer space is the common property of the humankind, it represents a universal aspiration of the international community to use it for peaceful purposes. It remains a thorny issue whether or not the outer space of the future will be a realm of peace to bring happiness to people or be turned into the fourth dimensional battleground of fierce fighting next to those on the land and in maritime waters and blue skies. This tough issue is now indeed at the crossroad with a pressing demand for a quick solution. Either out of its "capabilities" or of its strategic intentions", the United States, beyond any doubt, has a special accountability and obligations in this regard. Faced with severe challenges, it is possible to make the outer space a new sphere or a new realm to benefit the humankind only with pooled consensuses and joint efforts made by the entire global community. COC – SOlvency – a2: DefinitionsA Code of Conduct creates a discussion – solves definitional problems Manzo 8 [Vince, Center for Defense Information, U.S. Policy Brief: The Need for a Strategic Dialogue with China (http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/StrategicDialoguePolicy.pdf)] In the meantime, the United States should double its efforts to draw the Chinese into a discussion on space warfare, including communicating its willingness to discuss China’s concerns about space-based missile defense and the recent U.S. interception of its USA 193 spy satellite. This dialogue should initially have two objectives: establish a common vocabulary and negotiate a code of conduct for the use of space. The United States and China lack a common set of definitions for space weapons. At this point, a U.S.-China agreement on a specific definition is not necessary; it is more important that officials from Washington and Beijing meet fact-to-face and discuss their positions. Even if the discussion yields nothing more than a mutual acknowledgment of different definitions, it will begin to create a shared vocabulary for issues related to space warfare. This discussion will also help diplomats work through the inevitable complications that arise when two countries with very different languages discuss highly complex issues.40 The United States and China should discuss a set of rules to govern space activity. Hitchens and David Chen suggest several provisions for such an agreement. For instance, one provision could require states to agree not to destroy satellites during a conflict; another could establish protective borders, or “zones of control,” around satellites. As they explain, “These provisions would establish norms of behavior…Such interactions and mutually agreed upon norms may help provide escape ramps in future crisis escalation scenarios.”41 Ideally, this will infuse the U.S.-China relationship with a dose of predictability and shared expectations. Elucidating “appropriate” and “inappropriate” behavior will reduce the likelihood of serious miscalculations by either country. Even if the formal agreements are largely symbolic, both countries will have a better sense of what measures the other country will find threatening and destabilizing. COC – Solvency – a2: CheatingRisks of cheating are low – it would be easily detectable Blazejewski 8 [Kenneth, Master’s Degree in Public Affairs form the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, J.D. from New York University School of Law, “Space Weaponization and US-China Relations, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring] A third reason for the United States to agree not to launch weapons into outer space is that such an agreement need not threaten two stated US interests— protection of satellites and the development of a limited BMD system. Before turning to each of these issues, it is necessary to note two potential problems with a decision to forgo space weaponization. First, as stated above, there is no guarantee that China does not plan to develop its own robust ASAT and space weapons programs regardless of US activity in this area. “Space racers” doubt that a US commitment not to place weapons in space will influence China’s policy on space weaponization. Ultimately, cheating is a risk that countries run whenever they agree to be bound by a shared international agreement. However, certain factors significantly reduce this risk. First, while the secret development of space weapons technology might be possible, any effort to deploy or test space weapons will be clearly visible to the international community.57 Without the capacity to test, any space weapons program will be stifled at an early stage of development. Second, there is little reason to think that in the foreseeable future the technological capacity of the United States would fall far behind that of any state planning to launch space weapons. A commitment not to deploy weapons does not mean that all research and development must cease immediately. Once it becomes clear that a state is preparing to launch space weapons, the United States could respond by executing its own space weapons contingency plan. Third, as stated above, space weapons are relatively easy targets for ASAT attack, a feature that can work in the interests of the United States if others deploy first. Fourth, a universal ban on space weapons would engender a normative frame- work that would justify a swift reaction by the United States, such as the deploy- ment of its own space weapons or ASAT attack if another country violated the ban first. Finally, if the United States is able to negotiate for greater transparency in Chinese military planning, as sugof a surprise Chinese launch. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. 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