State governments can implement audit systems to enforce the CP
Ennis 2008 (Michael, Director of the Center for Transportation at Washington Policy Center in Seattle, The heritage Foundation, Reforming State Transportation Policy: Washington State’s Efforts to Implement Performance-Based Policies, September 29th http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/09/reforming-state-transportation-policy, AS)
In Washington State, the authority to carry out performance audits was created by a state voter initiative (I-900) in 2005, which also defined follow-up steps once a performance audit is completed. These performance audits are to be conducted by the State Auditor,an elected official who operates independently of the legislature, governor, and all other state agencies. Under the new law, within 30 days of an audit's release, the governing body of the audited agency must hold a public hearing to consider the audit findings. Next, the state legislature must consider the findings through its appropriations process. The Joint Legislative Audit and Review Committee (JLARC), the legislature's audit committee, must produce an annual report that demonstrates the audited agency's progress in implementing the findings. JLARC must also explain why any recommendations are not being implemented. In addition to the initiative that authorized the performance audits, Washington lawmakers passed Senate Bill 6839 during the 2006 legislative session and directed the State Auditor's Office to conduct an independent performance audit of transportation-related agencies. The legislature allocated $4 million for the review. Before embarking on the audits, State Auditor Brian Sonntag conducted a series of town hall meetings and focus groups across the state to determine which areas in transportation were most important to citizens. Based on those results, the auditor chose to analyze four broad topics: traffic congestion, the ferry system, Washington's Department of Transportation (WSDOT) administration and overhead, and WSDOT maintenance and construction management. In 2007 and 2008, the State Auditor's Office independently audited these four facets of WSDOT operations, uncovering $110 million in potential cost savings. The Auditor estimated that implementing the recommendations on reducing traffic congestion would produce $3 billion in economic benefits.
Ennis 2008 (Michael, Director of the Center for Transportation at Washington Policy Center in Seattle, The heritage Foundation, Reforming State Transportation Policy: Washington State’s Efforts to Implement Performance-Based Policies, September 29th http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/09/reforming-state-transportation-policy, AS)
While some lawmakers are reluctant to relinquish their control over funding transportation projects to a performance-based system, other legislators and state departments of transportation should welcome the new approach. Performance audits can separate areas that are working from those that are not. This information then becomes extremely valuable when deciding how to allocate finite public resources. The current political system and the uncertainty over whether those decisions will actually reduce traffic congestion will put state leaders further behind in meeting the growing demand on their transportation infrastructure.AWashington-style performance audit, not political agendas, is the key to learning what is working and what is not, so that transportation resources are allocated in a strategic and efficient way.
AT: Fragmentation
States can overcome fragmentation
Miller 2009 (John, Virginia Transportation Research Council Office of Intermodal Planning and Investment, Virginia’s Long-Range Multimodal Transportation Plan 2007-2035 INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN TRANSPORTATION DECISION MAKING, http://www.virginiadot.org/projects/vtransNew/resources/VTrans2035_Decisionmaking_FINAL.pdf AS)
As a way to mitigate the risks of devolution, Giuliano (2007) offers the history of California’s public-private 20 mile Alameda Corridor rail line which successfully brought eight cities, three railroad companies, two ports, and two regional agencies into sufficient agreement to construct the $2.4 billion project. The existence of fragmented power threatened to prevent construction because each entity wielded the ability to stop the project: for example, a city could have refused to allow construction without compensation for adverse impacts (e.g., higher rail volumes and construction noise) or the railroad companies could have refused to sell rights of way necessary for construction. However, the project was ultimately built, with the authority providing mitigation funds to the cities in return for their expedited permits for construction. Giuliano (2007) argues that to achieve this large scale project within a devolved environment and without increasing costs substantially, several conditions were essential, four of which are: 1. Experienced personnel who had the technical and organizational skills necessary to move this complex project forward. 2. An authority (which represented the major players, such as the two ports and the largest cities) with sufficient funding and political power to “buy out” the smaller cities that could otherwise have hindered the project. 3. Clear incentives and disincentives for cooperation, such as the threat of economic harm for the region if the project failed and mitigation funds for the cities. Incentives accrue to multiple parties such as the cities (which benefit from the reduced delays and emissions due to elimination of at-grade rail crossings [Judge, 2002] and the railroads (which benefit from added rail capacity [Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority, 2009). 4. An understanding of the project’s regional benefits and an ability to communicate this importance to all stakeholders.