States Counterplan 1NC
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AT: Race to the BottomClaims that states will "race-to-the-bottom" are falseCannon 7 [Michael Cannon, (Dir., Health Policy Studies, Cato Institute), CATO BRIEFING PAPERS, Sept. 13, 2007, 9] Competition among the states would drive insurance reguladon toward an equilibrium—or multiple equilibria—between too much and too little regulation. States would be unlikely to engage in a "race to the bottom" by eliminating important consumer protections: the first people to be injured by such unwise regulatory policies would be the voters in that very state, who would then punish the responsible officials. States don’t race to the bottom – their argument is theoretically and empirically bankrupt. Firms base siting decisions on other factors, federal standards don’t stop competition, and states compete to improve the environmentJonathan H. Adler, Assoc. Law Prof @ Case Western, Jan. 2005, “Judicial Federalism,” 90 Iowa L. Rev. 377, ln A common concern voiced in environmental policy debates is that lessening federal authority will lead to environmentally harmful interjurisdictional competition. Specifically, the lack of federal regulation will set off a "race to the bottom" in which state jurisdictions compete for corporate investment and economic development by reducing [*467] environmental safeguards. 598 The theory is based upon the intuitive notion, supported by some empirical evidence, 599 that firms are more likely to invest in states with less costly regulatory regimes. This concern is the "central underpinning" of federal environmental regulation 600 and has been relied upon by courts to uphold federal environmental statutes against constitutional challenges. 601 Yet on both theoretical and empirical grounds, concerns about an environmental race to the bottom seem overstated. Professor Revesz has demonstrated that the framework underlying the race to the bottom theory has several analytical failings. 602 Firms base siting and relocation decisions on a wide range of criteria, of which environmental regulation is only one, and there is ample evidence that other factors typically play a greater role in such decisions. 603 Tax rates, infrastructure, availability, cost, skill of local labor, and other regulatory policies are also important considerations for businesses. If the race to the bottom operates in the environmental sphere, there is every reason to expect it to operate to the same extent in these other contexts, suggesting that federal regulation would be necessary across the board. 604 In this way, the race to the bottom theory - if taken seriously - proves too much. In addition, the adoption of minimum federal environmental standards to prevent a race to the bottom in environmental policy would not eliminate the competitive pressures. Rather, it would shift them to other contexts, and the hypothesized welfare [*468] losses would remain. 605 Professor Revesz also points out that the same dynamic that could theoretically produce systematic environmental underregulation could also produce overregulation. 606 If states are more aggressive at competing for industry through tax policy than through environmental policy, the likely result would be suboptimal tax rates but superoptimal levels of regulation. 607 The theory persists, despite its flaws, because it is reasonable to assume that jurisdictions will seek to create a comparatively more attractive investment climate in order to better compete economically. Insofar as environmental regulations impose significant economic burdens on existing and prospective economic actors in a given area, it is also reasonable to expect jurisdictions to act so as to lessen such burdens. 608 Recent empirical work suggests that this is in fact the case as government officials acknowledge efforts to reduce the economic pinch of environmental regulation for economic purposes. 609 Yet for this to prove the race to the bottom hypothesis, it is necessary to further assume that reducing the economic cost of environmental regulation necessarily reduces the level of environmental protection. While such a conclusion may be justified in certain contexts, it cannot be assumed across the board. As not all environmental protection measures produce equivalent levels of environmental protection at equivalent costs, it should be possible for many jurisdictions to reduce the economic cost associated with environmental measures without sacrificing environmental quality. 610 In addition, it is important to recognize that many states compete for citizens by seeking to improve their environmental performance. Because many people may be more likely to move to a state with high levels of environmental quality, this [*469] creates pressure for states to adopt more protective environmental policies. 611 In practice, the race to the bottom has not been observed in environmental policy. 612 As already noted, state and local governments often regulated well before the federal government became involved. While this fact alone does not disprove the race to the bottom thesis - such state regulations could still have been suboptimal when compared to the federal alternative or some theoretical ideal - they demonstrate that competitive pressures do not preclude effective state regulation. More significantly, where the race to the bottom thesis has been directly tested in the context of wetlands, the pattern of state regulation has been precisely the opposite of what the theory would predict. AT: Links to PoliticsPresident can’t take credit for state actionDanielson ’95 (Michael, Prof PoliSci @ Princeton, Regulating Regional Power Systems, p. 57) Expansion of the national government also is a product of the natural inclination of federal officials to advance their interest by using the instrument at hand, the national government. Despite their state and local constituency base, members of Congress usually seek to use the resources of the government they can best influence, the national government, to respond to problems. The president’s perspective is national and the presidency’s prime means is the national government, regardless of fervent campaign speeches about the virtues of government close to the people. Federal agencies, like all organizations, seek more rather than less to do, bigger rather than smaller budgets, and expanding rather than contracting staffs. These natural tendencies have been amplified in the case of Congress by the growing importance in congressional elections of nationally based campaign funds raised by political action committees interested in having the federal government advance their interests. 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