All-Source Analysts & Global Experts

All-Source Analysts & Global Experts

Although the classical definition of HUMINT emphasizes clandestine collection and covert action (agents of influence, propaganda, paramilitary operations), I believe that in an age when 80-90% of the information from humans is overt, and secret intelligence provides, “at best,” 4% of a combatant commander’s information, we have to re-think HUMINT.

I respectfully submit that both CIA, with its policy of hiring very young people unproven at clandestine or analytic tradecraft, and DoD, with its policy of using enlisted personnel for many tasks that in my view require a liberal arts college education, are in error in their current approach to manning.

I believe that over the next ten years we must migrate away from putting new hires into anything other than OSINT exploitation, and emphasize mid-career hires for the senior all-source analytic positions as well as HUMINT collection and CI positions (the latter retaining their life’s pattern as legitimate cover).

At the same time, we must empower all-source analysts with the resources and the multinational social skills with which to leverage global experts regardless of nationality, and with the ability to draw on the MDSC for reach-back to all eight tribes of any given country.

As a general rule of thumb, I believe each division manager should have US$1 million a year; that each branch manager should have US$250,000 a year; and that each individual analyst, no matter how junior, should have US$50,000 to spend, on a mix of external expertise, combined travel to conferences or in-house seminars and sounding boards—anything that is legal to buy.⁹⁹

It costs less than US$1,000 to identify the top 100 published experts in any field based on citation of their work, and another US$1,000 or so to communicate with each of the published experts so as to identify the top 25-100 unpublished experts. Every analyst should such a network “on call.”

In the overt arena, clandestine case officers skilled at “tradecraft” cannot cut it. It takes a substantive expert with tangible rewards to offer in the form of legally shareable information, privileged access, unconventional insights, or straight-up modest consulting fees (at little as US$250, as much as US$5,000) to work the global overt expertise grid.

Notably absent from my thinking are beltway bandits and their costs.¹⁰⁰ I am skeptical about the value of “butts in seats,” and also a strong proponent of centralized OSINT contract management along with rigorous metrics for accountability, as well as a “buy once for all” OSINT acquisition system. I believe the U.S. Army must develop both strategists and foreign area specialists within its own ranks, not as an out-sourced function, and must nurture these individuals over the course of a career, not “one tour and out.”

Defense Attaches, Technical Liaison

This category includes every human assigned any form of inter-national or inter-agency responsibility, and I especially wish to include our officers assigned to Military Groups (MILGRP), to the schools of other nations, and to all “external” billets including fellowships at think tanks, command exchange tours, and so on. Civilian intelligence personnel distributed among the Combatant Commands are now under D/DIA oversight, and that is a good start for DoD. Country Teams remain a kludge of singleton representatives from multiple agencies that often out-number (and out-spend) the diplomats, and by no stretch of the imagination can any Embassy be considered to be “coherent” in how every person is harmonized to create a whole.¹⁰¹

In my view, we are long overdue for a top to bottom review of how DoD as a whole, and each individual service, handle the selection, assignment, and on-going oversight and exploitation of all officers as well as non-commissioned and enlisted personnel serving in external billets. The same is true for all the other agencies, most of which are incapable of addressing contingencies or fielding task forces that are trained, equipped and organized for short- to long-term operations under conditions more often than not hazardous.¹⁰²

For this group, very possibly the “center of gravity” for HUMINT as a whole, I have a few thoughts.

1. There is no substitute for continuity in-country and on the desk in Washington, D.C. We need to get serious about deep language training and repetitive area tours. Ideally I would like to see 6-8 year assignments with assured promotions, and staggered tours so the second officer arrives midway through the longer tour of the person being replaced eventually.

2. MILGRPs are a wasted asset from an IO point of view. I had an excellent talk with a MILGRP liaison officer at the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) in 1994, and learned that MILGRPs have no information sharing or sense-making responsibilities to speak of—they are there to focus on moving US military equipment into the local pipeline. That needs to change.

3. Even if the rest of the US IC and the rest of the USG are not ready for Whole of Government operations, DoD needs to take the lead. A good start would be to create a special sense-making unit within DIA/DH that deals overtly and respectfully with every single DoD body (and in the ideal, with every other USG “singleton” body” assigned to an external billet world-wide), while treating the 137 Defense Attaché (DefAtt) locations as the core mass, building from there.

Human Terrain Teams (HTT)

Rarely does one encounter a program that is at once so well-intentioned and also so very badly managed. While there must certainly be two sides to the story, and a good manager will engage in compassionate listening and a 360 evaluation before making changes, I understand from multiple sources that this program is out-of-control to the point of being dangerous to both the individuals being mis-directed into the program, and the commanders and troops ostensibly receiving this “support.” I believe this program must immediately be subordinated to D/DIA and therein subordinated to DIA/DH, which should be expanded to provide leadership and management, including resource oversight, for all fifteen slices of HUMINT.

In its own words,¹⁰³
[Human Terrain System] HTS is a new proof-of-concept program, run by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and serving the joint community. The near-term focus of the HTS program is to improve the military’s ability to understand the highly complex local socio-cultural environment in the areas where they are deployed; however, in the long-term, HTS hopes to assist the US government in understanding foreign countries and regions prior to an engagement within that region.
TRADOC is running this as an experimental program, and they don’t appear to have the knowledge— or even the network to acquire the knowledge—needed to manage this potentially valuable global grid of culturally-astute SMEs.¹⁰⁴

I am troubled by the various photographs that contrast heavily-armed, heavily-armored individuals wearing sunglasses and trying to do the “hearts and minds” deal without the skills to assimilate themselves and be effective.

Overall, program management, personnel selection, insistence on clearances, a marginal training program, and very badly managed in-country assignments and oversight appear to demand an urgent and complete re-direction of HTT.

The existing web pages are replete with known errors (e.g. this is not the first time this has been thought of),¹⁰⁵ inflated claims, and a reading list that would make any real anthropologist weep.¹⁰⁶ This program appears to need a complete make-over. ¹⁰⁷

Interrogator-Translator Teams (ITT)

I have a special affection for Interrogator-Translator Teams (ITT), and a real sense of awe at the capabilities of new forms of forward-deployed tactical analysts who among other achievements sniffed out Saddam Hussein’s final hide-out, something no national intelligence capability was able to do.

For the purposes of this monograph I want to broaden the ITT category to include Military Police (MP), Civil Affairs (CA), Combat Engineers (CE), and all the folks that come into contact with both Prisoners of War (POW), which in the Marine Corps is an S-1/Adjutant housekeeping job rather than an S-2 intelligence exploitation job, and with civilians, including our logisticians (who are constantly starved for intelligence support at the same time that they have so much to offer in terms of practical insights about access and trafficability).

In peacetime it has often troubled me that ITT as well as CI personnel tend to be farmed out to take care of all the Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) demands on a given Headquarters, and at the Battalion level, to find the least-desired Marine officers going into the S-2 job. Of course my knowledge is dated, but some things never change.

I believe the time has come to both fence all intelligence personnel from non-intelligence assignments, and to dramatically augment the assignment of intelligence personnel down to the squad, platoon, and company level. I have been enormously impressed by the initiative of some company commanders in Afghanistan, taking everyone with an IQ above 120 or whatever number needed to get at least six smarter than average individuals, to create company level ad hoc field intelligence analysis units.¹⁰⁸

I participated in two force structure studies when serving the Marine Corps as the second-ranking civilian in Marine Corps intelligence, and my arguments for reducing shooters and increasing thinkers consistently went nowhere.

Now is the time for the USD(I) and D/DIA to take a fresh look at HUMINT across the board, taking great care to define HUMINT as all humans, all minds, all the time, and working from there. HUMINT is no longer something that can be isolated as an arcane specialization—not only can the commander not delegate “intelligence,”¹⁰⁹ but the intelligence staff officer must conceive and execute a new form of HUMINT campaign plan that simultaneously educates, trains, informs, empowers, and ultimately protects every member of the inter-agency team that is being supported, and that is both conscious of—and able to exploit—every human several times removed in their respective networks.¹¹⁰

Soldier as Sensor (Patrolling, Force Reconnaissance, Covert “Hides”)

Patrolling is a fundamental element of infantry operations, and appears to rise and fall in cycles. Its companion, force reconnaissance, also tends to rise and fall. There is no substitute for a human brain attached to human eyes and ears, particularly when real-time contextual understanding and warning is needed. While Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and Forward Air Controllers (FAC) and Aerial Observers (AO) can be most helpful, it is the human on the ground that produces “ground truth,” a “360 degree” appreciation that cannot be achieved by any combination of technologies, close-in or remote. This is as true of peacekeeping operations as it is of full-spectrum hostilities.¹¹¹

Professor Richard Aldrich, whose chapter, “From Ireland to Bosnia: Intelligence Support for UK Low Intensity Operations,” has a special lesson for us with respect to the importance of placing soldiers in covert “hides.”. I quote the following from page 92, without further comment.
In both Ireland and Bosnia, units on the ground appreciated the importance of a holistic approach to intelligence. Intelligence was vital to support even the smallest units and every patrol devoted time and attention to intelligence gathering. Patrols were often high-profile affairs whose main function initially was to reassure public and to assert authority. In both environments, patrols required intelligence support from covert observation points to reinforce their security. Substantial numbers of covert observation posts had to be established in order to reduce the number of patrol incidents. In Ireland, soldiers, often trained by the members of the SAS, would lie in cover with binoculars, high-powered telescopes, and night vision devices for days or weeks on end in order to observe specific individuals or areas. Such covert observation posts could link with patrols in order to dominate an area. But the work exposed them to attack if their location was uncovered by passing civilians.¹¹²
He goes on to observe:
In both Ireland and Bosnia, tactical intelligence gathering was lent an additional importance because the flow of intelligence from the higher echelons to those on the ground was weak. Intelligence at ground level flowed up, but not down.¹¹³
I also believe that a great deal more can be done in using force reconnaissance to emplace close-in remote monitors, including webcams and live audio devices, in enemy encampments and criminal enclaves.¹¹⁴

Defensive Counterintelligence

We now cross the line from the first eleven “overt” elements of HUMINT, and move into the final four, each replete with classified sources and methods that cannot be discussed here.¹¹⁵

My first point is that CI is a completely distinct specialization, not to be confused with clandestine HUMINT. The first requires the detection, without warning, of the “in-house” suspect of illegal or even unsanctioned activities and disclosures potentially threatening to the USA.¹¹⁶
Despite the fact that Presidents (e.g. Ronald Reagan)¹¹⁷ and Senators (e.g. Durbin, Hatch, Rockefeller, and Shelby)¹¹⁸ leak and destroy sensitive capabilities overnight and without any recrimination, defensive CI is supposed to be the pro-active means by which we prevent, detect, and deceive those who seek to betray our national security enterprise from within. Contractors, in my view, are 80% of the challenge.
Aldrich Ames (CIA) and Robert Hansen (FBI) are noteworthy failures of defensive CI. Ames was driving a Jaguar and paid cash for a $450,000 house. When asked to investigate his claim that his Colombian wife inherited the money, the CIA Chief of Station (COS) in Bogota blew off the request. Hansen, a study in contradictions, from ostensibly devout Catholic to worshipping a stripper, failed to arouse any serious attention.

Defensive counterintelligence, as best I can tell, has three major failings today:

First, it is considered—at least within CIA—to be a backwater and a dumping ground, an undesirable assignment and one that I believe still lacks good leadership, not for lack of good people, but for lack of appreciation.

Second, the culture of the U.S. Intelligence Community is one of “once in, can do no wrong.”¹¹⁹ This is compounded by a lack of contractor-focused CI.¹²⁰

Third, the data access system of systems of the U.S. Intelligence Community is not designed to track individual access or specific document access across the board. Individuals receive generic “CODEWORD” clearances and then have relative carte blanche access. We are not using information technology well for CI, either defense or offensive.

To appreciate defensive CI and needed reforms, read Merchants of Treason: America’s Secrets for Sale,¹²¹ and Traitors Among Us: Inside the Spycatcher’s World.¹²² There are other books, but these two capture the essence of why defensive counterintelligence really matters.

Defensive CI is much easier if we reduce unjustified secrecy.

Offensive Counterintelligence

Offensive CI is very similar to clandestine HUMINT, but with a very special focus that is rarely taken seriously. It demands the obsessive identification of individuals responsible for penetrating our own organizations, rather than—as with defensive counterintelligence—the identification of our own nationals who might be vulnerable to recruitment for the purpose—whether witting or unwitting—of betraying secrets.¹²³

Within the CIA, this can be dumping ground, but more often than not is simply an “additional duty” and not given the emphasis that it merits. In my own case, it was one of two full-time jobs I was assigned (and gladly so, I was a real masochist in my CIA days), and I was literally the only person in CIA paid to think about penetrating the US targeting element within the clandestine service of a specific denied area country.

An emerging aspect of offensive as well as defensive CI is to be found in the cyberwar and electronic security arena. The Chinese appear to have mastered the art of riding the electrical grid into computers that are otherwise not on the Internet. Based on my own experience with the Special Communications Center (SPINTCOM) at the Marine Corps Intelligence Center (MCIA), it is all too easy to feed naïve Lance Corporals “free” games that they then insert into the SPINTCOM computers to fritter away the late night hours. The complexity of the cyberwar arena is not well understood in the US—I tried to flag this with a $1 billion a year budget in 1995, pulling together expert advice from, among others, the top NSA consultant on cyber-security. ¹²⁴ Today NSA is asking for $12 billion a year, and in all likelihood will focus more on expanding its access to every datum about every person in America, and be less successful at helping create a fireproof national grid. The situation is not made any better by the fact that virtually all of our Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are on the open Internet as a result of companies deciding in the 1980’s and 1990’s that they could save money by not having stand-alone systems impervious to hacking, doing so in part because we lack a national industrial security strategy and policy.

My personal inclination is to place Security and Defensive CI under one deputy director, while placing Offensive CI, Covert Action (CA), and Clandestine HUMINT under another Deputy Director. The third—and the principal Deputy Director— would manage the first eleven slices of overt HUMINT. I believe that managing overt HUMINT together with CI and clandestine HUMINT will add enormous value at virtually no additional cost.¹²⁵

Covert Action HUMINT

There is no finer overview on covert action that is legally available to the public than Alfred Cumming, Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions (Congressional Research Service, February 9, 2009).

Traditionally since the National Security Act of 1947, covert action has been (in theory) the exclusive province of the CIA and defined in general terms as agents of influence (pushing governments to do things against their own best interests but favored by US policymakers); propaganda (media manipulation); and paramilitary operations including coups, instability operations, sabotage of perceived threats (e.g. a nuclear or bio-chemical facility). Support activities such as Air America or Southern Air Transport, and administrative activities such as money laundering (to include the creation or complete subordination of entire banks), the acquisition of enemy weapons for use by our own “false flag” forces, and more recently, rendition and torture, all fall in this arena.

I am persuaded by my own direct experience and a lifetime of reading that US policymakers are not sufficiently informed, nor ethically grounded, and therefore should not be authorizing covert actions, with two exceptions: the capture or assassination of key terrorist or gang leaders and the interdiction of key ingredients of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons of mass destruction (WMD).¹²⁶

Covert actions violate the Geneva Convention, and harken back to the first era of national intelligence, “war by other means.”

The very definition of covert action, “an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicity,”¹²⁷ is sufficient to suggest that covert action flies in the face of reality and sustainable consensus, and is largely not achievable—the US Government cannot keep most secrets.

I include in covert action the funding of foreigners including foreign intelligence services that skim half the money and do evil in our name.¹²⁸

There is no substitute for reading Al Cumming’s brilliant nine-page unclassified information paper. The USG at this time lacks a strategic analytic model for understanding all ten high-level threats to humanity and for harmonizing Whole of Government operations across all twelve core policies, and the USG is largely incapable of competently directing or executing covert actions, a few isolated operations not-with-standing.

Clandestine HUMINT

From where I sit, CIA has become useless. It refuses to abandon official cover and it has proven incapable of scaling up non-official cover despite spending tens of millions if not more on up to 21 “pseudo-companies,” 20 of which had to be shut down recently.¹²⁹ At the same time, CIA’s young case officers (C/O) and analysts (the majority of the CIA analytic population now has less than five years employment at CIA) deprive CIA of any claim to special competence in HUMINT or all-source intelligence.¹³⁰

DoD has until recently been unwilling to challenge CIA, and kept most of its clandestine activities in “hip-pocket” mode, as best I can tell from open sources. Now I believe that DoD recognizes that if it wants to achieve world-class intelligence capabilities across the board, it must create them for itself, and I write this monograph in part to help DoD get it right.

In clandestine HUMINT, something I care deeply about, one needs to nurture leaders with open minds, and ideally leaders with very strong backgrounds in unconventional and irregular operations. Nothing handicaps clandestine HUMINT more than conventional mind-sets (i.e. uniformed leaders lacking clandestine experience), combined with lawyers afraid of their own shadow.¹³¹

I helped think about the clandestine service of the future, and saw clever recommendations ignored by a succession of CIA leaders. Here are the five slices of clandestine HUMINT that I would like to help create completely apart from CIA, which I would convert into a single Classified Technical Intelligence Agency (CTIA), with one floor for each of the technical disciplines. The existing D/CIA could become the Deputy Director of National Intelligence (DDNI) for Technical Collection Management, while the D/DIA becomes the DDNI for Human and Open Source Collection Management, as well as All-Source Analysis.¹³²
1/5: Exceptionally talented entry-level citizens to serve as lifers

1/5: Mid-career US citizens who have created their cover & access

1/5: Mid-career foreign nationals who have created cover & access

1/5 Mid-career case officers from other countries on rotation

1/5 “It’s just business” one time business deals with no further ado
Although CIA counter-terrorism managers have done some very good hiring—I love the quote, “The college degree can come later” when hiring a foreigner with skills as a GS-15—on balance we need a new non-official service.¹³³

HUMINT Requirements & Collection Management

The US IC still does not have a serious requirements & collection management system (RCMS), not least because it considers the President its only “real” client; it has not trained a cadre of specialist requirements officers; and it persists is disregarding the value of OSINT while focusing on triage among the classified disciplines.

As a consultant to ICMAP,¹³⁴ I pointed out the obvious, to little effect: that the IC was asking Question #4 of the following four questions, and ignoring the first three:

1. Can we FIND our answer in what we already have?

2. Can we GET our answer from someone we know?

3. Can we BUY our answer from the private sector?

4. WHICH classified systems should we TASK?

One of the unique advantages of HUMINT is its ability to receive and act on questions that are full of nuance, ambiguity, and complexity. Whereas the technical collection disciplines have to be told “what, when, and where,” in the case of HUMINT, we only have to get three things right:
1. Understand the question.

2. Know who knows (the human source will sort out the nuances);

3. Connect the source with the client or debrief the source.
The major obstacles to HUMINT success are, in this order, our consumers, out-dated security guidelines, and ignorant lawyers.¹³⁵ To be successful, HUMINT managers must first educate all those “inside the wire.”

HUMINT costs less, requires less time, and is much more responsive than technical collection, in part because with HUMINT, “processing” is embedded all along the human chain, from source to collector to analyst to consumer.

I will end this brief overview with the very last sentence of Jim Bamford’s most recent book, Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency:¹³⁶
Eventually NSA may secretly achieve the ultimate in quickness, compatibility, and efficiency—a computer with petaflop and higher speeds shrunk into a container about a liter in size, and powered by only about ten watts of power: the human brain.

Directory: dynamaster -> file archive
file archive -> Army Military Police (ID)
file archive -> Peacekeeping intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future Chapter 13—Robert David Steele
file archive -> Page of Alleged Potential us internment Camps Where are these camps located? Alabama Illinois
file archive -> Sof osint handbook--foreword Foreword
file archive -> Douglas C. Engelbart
file archive -> Human Intelligence (humint): All Humans, All Minds, All the Time Robert David steele vivas

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