T- can’t Be qpq answers 4 t-have to Be Positive Incentives Answers 6



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Counterplans Answers

Peace Treaty Advantage Counterplan Answers

(--) Peace treaty plank doesn’t solve: their evidence is from 2010—which doesn’t assume North Korea’s recent expansion of its arsenal.

(--) Arms sales plank doesn’t solve: Zhu evidence from the 1ac post-dates and says North Korea is the key to relations between the US & China.

(--) NAPCI plank doesn’t solve South Korean middle power status, because THAAD has already destroyed South Korean-Chinese relations that’s Soon-do evidence from 1ac.


(--) Peace treaty doesn’t solve the war advantage AND recognizes North Korea as a nuclear weapon state

Jackson 2/8/2016 (Dr. Van Jackson, Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, February 8, 2016. “A New Baseline for North Korea Policy: What the Next US President Needs to Know.” http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/a-new-baseline-for-north-korea-policy-what-the-next-us-president-needs-to-know/)

North Korea Wants Peace…But Not the Kind We Seek Some things don’t change. At some point during the next president’s tenure, North Korea will dangle the possibility of negotiating a peace treaty. This wouldn’t be the first time. I think North Korea does sincerely want peace, but not the way we imagine it. It wants a peace that formalizes its nuclear weapons program, elevates its status as the “legitimate Korea” above South Korea by excluding it from the treaty, and removes U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula. As seductive and intuitive as a peace treaty sounds, in the Korea context it’s a way to get backdoor legitimation of its nuclear status and a deliberate wedge issue for the U.S.-ROK alliance. Even if these terms of peace were acceptable to the United States, which seems unlikely, it would only be a U.S.-North Korea peace; relations between North and South Korea would likely be as hostile as ever. None of this means we shouldn’t open peace treaty discussions at some point, but it’s imperative to be clear-eyed about what that means for U.S. alliances and the nuclear nonproliferation norm. Every Korea watcher is familiar with former Secretary of Defense William Perry’s famous observation in 1999: “We must deal with North Korea as it is, not as we wish it to be.” Current U.S. policy deals with the North Korea of the past; one whose nuclear weapons were negotiable, whom we could invade and occupy if necessary, and whom could be brought to heel by sanctions or other forms of pressure. That’s not the North Korea of today.

(--) Arms sales don’t produce major relations issues


Lingwall, 2015 – Noah, intern at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College (“The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It,” The Diplomat, 8/8/15, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it/ //Red)

Nor should U.S. arms sales to Taiwan be regarded as a serious barrier to U.S.-China relations. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 stipulates that the United States will provide Taiwan with arms of a defense nature. Although China often uses the United States’ periodic decision to sell arms to Taiwan as a political ploy to suspend the Chinese military’s contact with the United States and stir up nationalistic sentiments, the issue needs to be put into perspective. While all arms are technically offensive in nature, the quantity and quality of the weapons Taiwan receives from the United States do little Taiwan’s offensive capabilities. For example, Taiwan purchases short-range fighter jets, air defense systems, and older-generation weapons. In addition, U.S. authorization to sell arms to Taiwan differs from the actual delivery of weapon systems. The United States has declined to provide the quality of weapons that Taiwan has requested from time to time. Moreover, Taiwan’s legislature has often failed to appropriate the funds necessary to purchase the quantity of weapons requested. Finally, China’s periodic suspensions of its military contacts with the United States have failed to inflict significant damage on U.S.-China relations and relations are regularly quietly restored once the political storm subsides. Beijing understands that Taiwan’s weaponry does not pose a serious threat to mainland China’s military. Bearing this in mind, it seems evident that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan act as mere political pretense for China’s antagonistic behavior and are not serious obstacles.

(--) NAPCI is only a stepping stone to cooperation—it doesn’t create it.


Heajin Kim, 12/18/2015, (staff writer) Northeast Asia, Trust and the NAPCI, Retrieved June 15, 2016 from http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/northeast-asia-trust-and-the-napci/

Second, what actual impact NAPCI will have on the region remains an open question. Because the ultimate goal of NAPCI is to build trust rather than to write norms and rules that ultimately resolve issues, in its current conception NAPCI will remain only a first step towards cooperation, not the final destination. Trust certainly advances cooperation, but trust alone does not and cannot solve problems. The situation in Asia is more precarious than ever due to a rising China. Historically, rising powers have not been comfortable complying with existing rules; they eventually want to rewrite rules and norms like Germany and Japan did in the mid-20th century. If China has this ambition and challenges the status-quo, as is in the South China Sea and elsewhere, other NAPCI participants will need to consider how they could and should work with China going forward.


(--) Conditionality Bad

Time skew: they can run an argument and kick it at no cost.

Strategy skew: we can’t make our best answers to the counterplan because they’ll kick it

Voting issue: the damage has already been done.

(--) Counterplan links to elections: It engages North Korea which is a dictatorship people would get very mad.

(--) Permute: Do Both—do all of the plan and all of the counterplan.

(--) Permute: Do any combination of the plan and the counterplan planks.



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