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Disad AnswersChina-Russia Relations Answers(--) Link is non-unique: 24 rounds of BIT negotiations should have caused.(--) Non-unique: Chinese-Russian relations low now:Andrew Higgins, 7/16/2016 (staff writer, “An Unfinished Bridge, and Partnership, Between Russia and China,” http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/17/world/asia/unfinished-bridge-russia-china-amur-river.html?_r=0, Accessed 7/21/2016, rwg) There is also frustration on the Russian side, particularly among businesspeople whose dreams of tapping Chinese markets and pools of cash have mostly fizzled. “What should be noted from the results of our work of the last year is that there has been a catastrophically low level of cooperation between the two countries,” said Viktor F. Vekselberg, a billionaire and the chairman of the Russian chapter of the Russian-Chinese Chamber for Commerce in Machinery and High Technology Products, at the Moscow conference. (--) Impact is empirically denied: Russian economy crashed during 08 recession.(--) Non-unique: Russian economy contracting now.Reuters, 7/13/2016 (“IMF sees Russia's economy contracting by 1.2 percent in 2016,” http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/latestnews/2016/07/13/IMF-sees-Russias-economy-contracting-12-percent-2016, Accessed 7/21/2016, rwg) In a separate report on Russia's financial stability, the IMF said the banking sector remained weak and would probably need additional capital. Many forecasters have increased their gross domestic product (GDP) forecasts for Russia: the IMF's remains relatively weak. A Reuters poll at the end of last month predicted Russia's economy would contract by 0.6 percent in 2016. "The authorities' flexible and effective policy response has cushioned the economy from the dual shocks of lower oil prices and sanctions," the IMF said in a statement, summarizing the assessment by the Fund's executive board following a recent consultation with Russia. "At the same time, the Russian economy will need to adjust to the challenge of persistently lower oil prices by reducing its dependence on oil and energy exports over the medium term," it added, calling for "fiscal adjustment anchored on a credible medium-term plan". The report also said monetary policy "normalization" would be appropriate, but the pace of policy easing should be gradual, in an acknowledgement that inflationary pressures are easing after several months of high interest rates. The Russian central bank recently cut its main policy rate for the first time in almost a year, but it is expected to remain cautious given persistent inflationary risks. In its financial stability report, the IMF put banks' capital shortage at 1 percent of GDP. "The banking sector — while currently stable — is exposed to significant risks, asset quality being the largest," the report said. (--) US-Sino relations outweigh—they solve multiple scenarios for extinction—that’s Jianmin evidence.(--) US-Sino relations do not affect Sino-Russia relationsWishnick 15 — Elizabeth Wishnick, Associate Professor of Political Science at Montclair State University and Senior Research Scholar in the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University, 2015 (“The New China-Russia-U.S. Triangle”, NBR Analysis Brief, December 16th, Available Online at http://www.nbr.org/publications/nbranalysis/pdf/brief/121615_Wishnick_ChinaRussiaUS.pdf, Accessed 07-07-216, SP) Russia and China oppose what the United States stands for, though each may cooperate with Washington on particular issues. China and Russia oppose who we are, not what we do. The Sino-Russian partnership is not the result of failed U.S. policies toward Russia or China; indeed, their unity reflects a convergence on issues they view as existentially important for regime survival. This leaves room for the United States to cooperate with the two countries on specific matters— the Sino-U.S. relationship, in particular, has continued to develop in a multifaceted way and is not adversely affected by the Sino-Russian partnership. Sino-U.S. cooperation will not create leverage for the United States over Russia. Robust Sino-U.S. relations in areas of mutual interest are unlikely to have an impact on the Sino-Russian partnership because each is driven by a distinct set of factors. The days of using triangular patterns of relations for leverage are long gone. Today’s triangle involves sets of parallel interactions in separate spheres of activity. (--) Russia has other export partners—no reason China is key.(--) Russia-China Alliance hasn’t empirically solved anything.Huasheng 2013 - Zhao Huasheng 2013, director of Russian and Central Asian Studies Center of Fudan University and director of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Research Center, 2013 (“Why "Sino-Russian alliance" lack of practical feasibility”, 7-24, Available at http://www.rmlt.com.cn/2013/0724/91927.shtml, Accessed at 7-01-16, RKim) Abstract In international and regional diplomatic pressure China faces increasing background, Chinese academics have made in view of the Sino-Russian alliance as a strategic response. This idea that China and Russia alliance to give China a series of major strategic interests. NAM principles of the Sino-Russian alliance is a realistic limit, but in theory, it is not insurmountable threshold. Positive effects of the alliance actually will not have high expectations, and its possible negative effects of long-term and stable Sino-Russian relations will have a significant impact. Alliance existence misjudgment Russian commentators, some of the argument is based on inaccurate judgments. China-Russia strategic cooperative relationship at this stage is still the most suitable form. In conclusion, a Russian scholar of the history of Sino-Russian relations found always try a different form of alliance is a major feature of China-Russia relations. ① This finding still has practical significance. In the background of the rapid development of Sino-Russian relations as a strategic option, the Sino-Russian alliance has also been put out. Sino-Russian alliance is not a Chinese academic mainstream view, nor is China's current official policy. However, China's diplomacy, whether the alliance and Russia, is a major problem. Not only will it change the Sino-Russian relations, but will also have an important impact on the international situation. If the Sino-Russian alliance, will touch the red line Chinese non-aligned principles, but also the future development direction of China's diplomacy has a special meaning. Therefore, to discuss this issue, the Sino-Russian relations and China's diplomacy have important practical and theoretical significance. Three Sino-Russian alliance history Sino-Russian history, there have been three formal alliance. June 1896, China and Russia signed the "enemies of Islam mutual assistance treaty" in Moscow, commonly known as "Sino-Russian secret treaty." This is the first time in the history of Sino-Russian alliance official. Covenant by the Russian proposal, it is an object of the defense of Japan, a period of 15 years. From Russia, its main intention is to get their way into northeast China, made in China and the Far East and Japan's competitive advantage. From China, for the time being after the failure of Sino-Japanese War, Japan, China suffered humiliation, want alliance with Russia to protect themselves. In 1895, the United Russia France and Germany forced Japan to "Treaty of Shimonoseki" ceded the Liaodong Peninsula was returned to China, but also China and Russia grateful expectations. But alliance illusory. In 1898, Russia forced the Qing government concessions Lushun. After the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, the Russian troops occupied the whole territory of the Northeast, and to participate in the attack Beijing, the Sino-Russian alliance vanished. In 1904, the Russo-Japanese War broke out, Northeast China is the main battlefield, but China remained neutral, the Russian side did not stand. According to "Sino-Russian Secret Treaty", it was built by Russia in northeast China to Russia Vladivostok railway authority, which is the Chinese Eastern Railway. Railway construction in the Middle East in order, if necessary, Russia can transport troops and material assistance to China. However, since the railway repaired, this feature does not reflect, and Russia has become the origin of contradictions and conflicts. The two countries fought in 1929 due to the occurrence of local wars in the Middle East Railway, which is the largest of the two countries since the armed conflict in the Republic of China, China fiasco. This incident caused a profound impact on the situation in the Far East, has become the Japanese occupation of northeast opportunity. Eastern Railway issues remain for half a century, until after the establishment of the new China is resolved. August 14, 1945, in Moscow, the Soviet Union signed the "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance." This is the second formal alliance between China and Russia, it is valid for 30 years. The alliance to jointly fight against the Japanese in the background, but the signing of the treaty, Japan has surrendered. Although the treaty of friendship and alliance with the name, but with Chiang Kai-shek's words, neither for the friendship treaty, nor to the alliance. ② Soviet Union signed the treaty to ensure that Mongolia's independence from China, the Soviet Union and obtain privilege in northeast China. Chinese Government's aim is to prevent the Soviet Union after the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army in the Northeast do not go left, hoping the Soviet-backed Nationalist Chinese reunification. Through this treaty, the Soviet Union so that China officially recognized the independence of Mongolia, and China jointly owned and operated by Eastern Railway, Dalian Port right to use the privileges and exemption from customs duties, and lease of Port Arthur as a naval port. Kuomintang government acknowledged in these terms, "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance" harm the interests of China. ③ The second China-Russia alliance is also short-lived. The Soviet Union abolished the "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance" in 1950. February 1950, the Soviet Union in Moscow and New China signed the "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship." This is the third formal alliance between China and Russia, and so far the last alliance treaty for 30 years. Treaty, the two countries do not enter into any alliance against each other, not against each other to participate in any activity in a country and its allies suffered from Japanese aggression, the other party will do its best to give military and other assistance. Despite the difficulties in the negotiation process, but the two eventually solve a series of major historical issues. According to relevant agreements reached by the Soviet Union and the property rights transferred gratis Chinese Eastern Railway, the Soviet Union would withdraw in Port Arthur naval base, and the Soviet Union in Dalian property referred to China. In addition, the Soviet Union provided $ 300 million loans to China. The alliance with the two previous materially different, it is a comprehensive alliance of political, economic, security, diplomatic, and even ideology. China derive enormous benefits. However, despite this alliance it lasts longer than the previous two, but failed to finish the job. By the early 1960s, due to the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, the Union actually exists in name only. Until the late 1960s and 1970s, the two countries have become the most dangerous enemy, the alliance has no meaning. In 1980, when the treaty expires, the two countries did not renew. Elections Answers(--) Plan wouldn’t be perceived—no one knew what THAAD was before camp started.(--) Turn: Plan is popular—Republicans and Democrats love cracking down on North Korea.Daniel R. Depetris 16, 7-14-2016, "," Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-r-depetris/north-korea-and-the-us-it_b_10966020.html The United States and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea haven’t had formal diplomatic relations since the bloody Korean War ended in 1953. Since that time, U.S.-North Korean relations have been about as productive and pleasant as the ties that bind Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. And for most in Washington, that’s ok; with few exceptions, sanctioning North Korea for its nuclear weapons program, ballistic missile activity, or egregious human rights abuses is something every politician can agree on. If you desire to get the most conservative Republican and most liberal Democrat together in the same room, all you need to do is mention that the madmen of North Korea’s leadership is on the chopping block. Kim Jong-un’s decision to completely sever any and all contact with U.S. officials, however, is a bold and potentially dangerous move that will not only make a bad relationship even worse, but could also contribute to heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula. A tit-for-tat between Washington and Pyongyang is nothing new for these two powers. It’s beyond understandable, after all, for the U.S. Government to shy away from any improvement in relations with a state that threatens to turn Washington, DC into a cloud of nuclear debris. History over the past two decades and through successive Democratic and Republican administrations point to a North Korean problem that is immune to every policy option on the table. Economic sanctions through the U.N. Security Council, isolation, containment, “strategic patience,” occasional negotiations, and threats of military force have all led to an equally undesirable solution: Pyongyang with an ever growing nuclear weapons stockpile. As such, Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush all left office frustrated in their dealings with the Kim dynasty. President Barack Obama will follow in their footsteps. The normal cycle of reaction-counter reaction, however, has been especially pronounced this year. With every belligerent action from the North Koreans comes a response from the west that only angers Kim and his clique further. A series of ballistic missile tests and the North’s fourth underground nuclear test explosion in January resulted in a severe round of recrimination from the U.S. For the first time in three years, the U.N. Security Council passed a strong resolution with China’s support that would mandate inspections of all cargo into and out of the DPRK. But it was the Treasury Department’s decision to slap sanctions on Kim Jong-un personally “for having engaged in, facilitated, or been responsible for an abuse or violation of human rights,” that sent Kim over the edge. Cutting off Pyongyang’s New York channel may not seem a big deal in the grand scheme of things. On the bright side, at least North Korean officials were prudent enough to refrain from violence as a form of retaliation. But Kim’s decree is in actuality highly consequential; the DPRK’s delegation at U.N. headquarters has been an effective point of contact in the past for possible nuclear talks between North Korea, the U.S. and the Six-Party group. Options have been explored, preliminary discussions and letters have been exchanged with North Korean diplomats stationed in New York, and situations that could have spiraled into something much more serious were toned down to a degree by leveraging reaching out to the DPRK delegation. At the very least, North Korea’s permanent mission in New York afforded the United States with a better understanding of a country that is frequently described by U.S. intelligence officials as a black hole. Kim has upped the ante by cutting the last point of contact between U.S. and North Korean officials. It may not be popular in a town that is used to demonizing the North Koreans, but the U.S. would be best served by signaling to Kim’s circle that Washington will not continue this round of escalation and is willing to pare back the tension if Pyongyang is willing to reciprocate. Sometimes staving off further deterioration means taking the initiative through a bold diplomatic gamble. We may be at that point now with the North Koreans. (--) Election is too far off—the plan would get drowned out by the Democratic convention.(--) Trump will win—wrong track numbers:Brian Freeman, 7/17/2016 (staff writer, “Pollster McLaughlin: Trump Will Win Because He Gives Change Americans Seek,” http://www.newsmax.com/Politics/Cats-Roundtable-McLaughlin-Trump/2016/07/17/id/739075/, Accessed 7/21/2016, rwg) Pollster John McLaughlin predicts a victory for Donald Trump in the November election, because 70 percent of Americans think the United States is on the wrong track. Speaking on "The Cats Roundtable" Sunday radio show on AM 970 New York hosted by John Catsimatidis, McLaughlin said that 56 percent of Americans want a change from the policies of President Barack Obama, with only 34 percent wanting a continuation. This helps the non-politician Trump over Democrat Hillary Clinton, who was part of the Obama administration, McLaughlin said. (--) Trump can’t get his agenda passed—Congress will block him.(--) Trump can’t capitalize on the plan—he’s anti-THAADJack Kim, 7/8/2016 (staff writer, “South Korea, U.S. to deploy THAAD missile defense, drawing China rebuke,” http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-usa-thaad-idUSKCN0ZO084, Accessed 7/21/2016, rwg) THAAD is built by Lockheed Martin Corp (LMT.N) and designed to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles by intercepting them high in the Earth's atmosphere, or outside it. The United States already has a THAAD system in Guam. Each system costs an estimated $800 million and is likely to add to the cost of maintaining the U.S. military presence in South Korea, an issue in the U.S. presidential campaign. Republican candidate Donald Trump has argued that U.S. allies South Korea and Japan should pay more toward their own defense. (--) Clinton won’t get the blame—Obama does the plan.(--) Obama’s warming policies will fail to solve warming:Shikha Dalmia, 12/14/2015 (staff writer, “Why the Paris Climate Change Agreement Will Fail,” https://reason.com/archives/2015/12/14/a-happy-agreement-in-paris-wont-fix-glob, Accessed 1/4/2016, rwg) The “historic” agreement just concluded in Paris was supposed to be the humanity's last chance to save the world from catastrophic warming. If that's the case, then the world is surely doomed. Notwithstanding the giddy talk, not a single major polluter offered anything resembling an adequate plan to slash emissions. In fact, literally every country gamed the process—demonstrating, yet again, the utter folly of trying to save the world by putting it on a collective energy diet. (--) Other nations block success of warming policy—they won’t be on board.(--) Squo triggers the alliances impact – Trump campaigning.Le 16. [Tom, Assistant Professor of Politics at Pomona College, former Non-Resident Sasakawa Peace Foundation Fellow at CSIS Pacific Forum, "How Trump is already damaging US alliances" The Diplomat -- May 20 -- thediplomat.com/2016/05/how-trump-is-already-damaging-us-alliances/] Ben Carson recently gave a ringing endorsement of Trump, stating that “even if Donald Trump turns out not to be a great president…we’re only looking at four years.” Unfortunately, Trump has already done significant damage to the alliances that will take years to repair — even before the general election. As one Japanese security manager recently stated, “Trump exemplifies the worst in American stereotypes, loud, brash, and arrogant.” Even if Trump does not win, he has revealed an ugly underbelly of U.S. popular sentiment that does not care for its allies. True, the United States pays high costs for having to defend Japan and Korea, but it gains the priceless ability to project power in Asia. By spilling blood on the battlefield with the Koreans and promoting democracy and regional stability with the Japanese, Americans have been allowed to maintain tens of thousands of troops on its allies’ sovereign territory. These are allowances that should not be taken for granted. (--) Foreign policy not key to the election—decades of research shows:Elizabeth N. Saunders, 1/26/2016 (an assistant professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, “Will foreign policy be a major issue in the 2016 election? Here’s what we know” http://www.cfr.org/elections/foreign-policy-major-issue-2016-election-heres-we-know/p37480, Accessed 1/30/2016, rwg) At the last two Republican debates, the looming center-stage presence wasn’t Donald Trump; it was the Islamic State. Many news articles have suggested that 2016 will be the rare election in which foreign policy will be central to the campaign. Will those predictions come true? Not likely. But while foreign policy may only feature occasionally in the campaign, the voters’ chosen candidate will matter significantly for U.S. foreign policy. What do we mean by “foreign policy issues,” and how do voters think about it? Campaign 2016 Email Updates Get the biggest election stories in your inbox. Many international issues get mentioned in campaigns, whether in general terms or by referring to a specific country or region. Most of these issues fall under the broad categories of foreign economic policy (such as free trade, currency policy, or foreign aid) or national security issues (such as military readiness, nuclear proliferation, crisis diplomacy, and what we now call “homeland security” issues like terrorism, though terrorism concerns long predate 9/11). From decades of research, we know voters do not pay much attention to foreign policy. Some research shows that the public has stable, coherent attitudes on foreign policy, but few dispute that most voters have little concrete foreign policy information. Rather than follow debates closely, voters generally look to elites and the media for information, even for specific foreign policy issues. (--) No scenario or escalation for their military conflict scenario.(--) The economy is key to the election.Tom LoBianco and Jennifer Agiesta 2016 (staff writers) At the starting gate: Clinton leads Trump by double-digits, May 4, 2016. Retrieved May 19, 2016 from http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/04/politics/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-poll-general-election/ Almost 9 out of 10 voters in the poll called the economy extremely or very important to their vote for president, outranking any other issue tested in the poll. (--) Americans don’t like missile defense—they’d cut it from the budget--PR Newswire, 3/9/2016 Americans Not Sold on Defense Increase, Retrieved June 15, 2016 from http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/americans-not-sold-on-defense-increase-300233039.html WASHINGTON, March 9, 2016 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ -- President Barack Obama and leading Republican presidential candidates have called for increasing defense spending. However, given the opportunity to make their own defense budget, a majority of voters (61 percent) cut defense spending in a new in-depth survey released today by Voice Of the People. Not even a majority of Republicans made increases. In the survey, a representative sample of more than 7,000 registered voters across the country were first presented detailed, nonpartisan information and competing arguments about the current defense budget. The majority trimmed annual spending by $12 billion, including ground forces by $4 billion (or 3 percent), nuclear weapons by $3 billion (13 percent), air power by $2 billion (1.5 percent), naval forces by $2 billion (2 percent) and missile defense by $1 billion (13 percent). Special operations and the marines were left untouched. No areas were increased. Japan Rearm Answers(--) Japan will prolif now—that’s RT 2016 evidence.(--) Assurance is failing now: Green et al. ’16 (Michael Green, PhD @ SAIS, is senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair at CSIS, chair in Japanese foreign policy at Georgetown, served on the staff of the NSC as the director of Asian Affairs, senior fellow for East Asian security on the Council of Foreign Relations; Kathleen Hicks, PhD in Political Science @ MIT, is senior vice president, Henry A. Kissinger Chair, and director of the International Security Program at CSIS, served as a senior civilian official in the DoD; Mark Cancian, senior advisor to the International Security Program, adjunct professor of strategic studies @ John Hopkins. TEAM LEADS: Zach Cooper; John Schaus. A ton of different contributing authors. “Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025 Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships” January 2016, CSIS, http://csis.org/files/publication/160119_Green_AsiaPacificRebalance2025_Web_0.pdf) Nevertheless, the United States will need to continue and in some cases accelerate investments in regional relationships, posture, operational concepts, and capabilities if it is to achieve the strategic goals of the rebalance. The past 14 years of war have left the military services with significant challenges in recapitalizing equipment used at a pace faster than programmed, reestablishing full-spectrum force readiness, and confronting an expanding range of challenges from state and nonstate actors globally. It is doing so while drawing down forces and structure and, the recent two-year budget deal notwithstanding, with lower long-term defense spending projections than planned even a few years ago. China’s rapidly expanding military investments and increasingly coercive actions in the region demonstrate both the long-term and near-term challenges facing the United States and its allies and partners in protecting vital regional and global interests. Although Washington seeks to cooperate with Beijing where it can, the United States must also ensure that its engagements, posture, concepts, and capabilities allow it to shape, deter, and, if necessarily, decisively defeat threats to U.S. interests. The threat of invasion by North Korea continues to decrease, but the North’s missile and nuclear programs continue unabated while scenarios for instability within North Korea appear less remote going forward. Over the last few years, the Asia-Pacific region has witnessed significant developments that require a reappraisal of U.S. strategy and force posture, as well as an assessment of the strategy and force posture of U.S. allies and partners. Many of these trends have improved prospects for regional security, but some new challenges are emerging, and some existing risks are worsening. These trends span issue areas of geopolitics, diplomacy, economics, domestic politics, and military considerations. Geopolitically, most states in the Asia-Pacific region are embracing closer security and economic ties with the United States. At the same time, however, states across the region have become more sensitive to China’s growing political, economic, and military power, and are potentially vulnerable to Beijing’s increasingly coercive behavior. Polls in Asian countries indicate strong support for the rebalance, with the notable exception of China.5 The United States is working bilaterally, trilaterally, and multilaterally to reinforce critical rules and norms that underpin a secure and prosperous regional and international order. Yet despite these efforts, there is more acrimony and tension in the U.S.-China relationship, a general deterioration in relations with Russia, and increasing bellicosity from North Korea. In preparing this study, the authors heard a consistent refrain from U.S. allies and partners that, despite their appreciation for the goals of the rebalance, many regional observers worry that U.S. efforts to manage the Iran nuclear negotiations, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have distracted it from fully implementing the rebalance. The administration has taken important steps to reinforce the rebalance strategy, beginning with the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and recently, the August 2015 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy prepared for Congress.6 The authors also found that the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) is well aligned with the rest of DOD in its various lines of effort, including theater campaign planning. Much progress has been made since 2012, when CSIS scholars found significant disconnects across the U.S. government and with allies and partners. Nevertheless, the implementation of the rebalance may be insufficient to secure U.S. interests. Actions by countries in the region routinely challenge the credibility of U.S. security commitments, and U.S. capability development is not keeping pace with challenges by potential competitors, resulting in the balance of military power in the region shifting against the United States. First, the Obama administration still has not articulated a clear, coherent, or consistent strategy for the region, particularly when it comes to managing China’s rise. The language used to explain the rebalance in administration speeches and documents has varied substantially over the last four years.7 The 2012 CSIS independent assessment highlighted this shortcoming, but it remains a problem in terms of reassuring allies and partners and sustaining congressional support. Second, cuts to the defense budget from 2009–2015 have limited the Defense Department’s ability to pursue the rebalance. The October 2015 budget agreement notwithstanding, long-term budget uncertainty and the large cuts already implemented represent major changes from the environment that existed when CSIS scholars conducted the 2012 review. Third, while the U.S. military has instituted major posture changes and is developing new military capabilities to strengthen the rebalance, the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenge is increasing and concerns are growing about the ability of potential adversaries to hold at risk forward-deployed and forward-operating forces throughout the region. Chinese military strategy places a premium on investments in A2/AD capabilities. Its A2/AD umbrella includes long-range cruise and ballistic missiles, advanced integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) systems, and submarines. The goal of these systems is to restrict or outright deny an attacker freedom of entry or maneuver. Chinese investments in cyber; electronic warfare (EW); a blue-water navy; missiles; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities serve as powerful reminders of China’s plans to push the United States out of the region in a conflict. These capabilities give China the ability to hold at risk U.S. installations and naval assets in the Western Pacific, U.S. allies and partners, and the freedom to use international air and waterways on which the U.S. economy depends. Absent major operational or technology breakthroughs by the United States and its allies and partners, substantial risk remains that China’s strategy could undermine the U.S. military’s ability to defend U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific. Fourth, China’s tolerance for risk has exceeded most expectations—as demonstrated by Beijing’s increased operational tempo and construction of military airfields and facilities on seven features in the Spratly Islands. This risk tolerance requires the United States to reassess its China policy, and may lead allies and partners to do the same. (--) Extend our Brooks 13 card that says Japan and South Korean proliferation risks nuclear conflict because if these powers proliferate, their regional competitors will do so as well.(--) Turn: North Korean nuclear expansion causes Japanese prolif:Michael Crowley, 5/21/2016 (staff writer, “Obama's Asian nuclear nightmare,” http://www.politico.com/story/2016/05/obama-nuke-223412, Accessed 7/17/2016, rwg) North Korea is expanding its nuclear arsenal and upgrading its ballistic missiles. China is growing and modernizing its stockpile. Most strikingly, Pentagon planners worry that Japan and South Korea might for the first time explore developing nuclear arms of their own — promoted in part by the recent conclusion by U.S. and South Korean intelligence agencies that North Korea’s bizarre regime can now mount a small nuclear warhead on missiles capable of striking Japan and South Korea. (--) US is deeply engaged with China now – Japan should already be freaked out, with ever expanding trade.(--) Turn: Plan helps the alliance—increases perception of U.S. involvement in the region—constructive engagement is keyTanaka 2015 (Hitoshi, senior fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange and chairman of the Institute for International Strategy at the Japan Research Institute, Ltd., previously served as Japan’s deputy minister for foreign affairs Hitoshi, “The next step for the US-Japan alliance,” Aug 4, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/08/04/the-next-step-for-the-us-japan-alliance/) This evolution in US-Japan alliance relations has taken place as the regional balance of power shifts. Emerging economies such as China, India, and ASEAN countries are rising; Asia’s middle class is growing; and US defence spending shifting toward a more sustainable, ‘lean-but-mean’ posture. Thus as the Abe administration struggles over the next couple of months to pass legislation to expand Japan’s security role, structural shifts in East Asia are making it clear that the next step for Japan and the US must be to transform the alliance into a more multifaceted partnership. Japan must strengthen regional trust. The 70th anniversary of World War II offers an opportunity to affirm Japan’s peaceful postwar identity and to mend ties with South Korea and China. In his anticipated August statement, Abe must unequivocally face up to Japan’s historical wartime transgressions without dropping any of the key elements of the Murayama Statement. At the same time, Abe should set out Japan’s defence policy in a forward-looking way — clearly stating that it is aimed solely at defending Japan and contributing to the peaceful enhancement of the regional security environment — to dispel any misperceptions in China and South Korea that the revised US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines or Japan’s new security legislation to allow limited forms of collective self-defence represent a return to a more aggressive regional posture. A change in the US mindset is needed so it may truly act as a resident power in East Asia. Current projections are that Asia will be home to two-thirds of the global middle class by 2030 and will account for more than half of global GDP by 2050. As the regional order evolves to reflect these shifts, it is critical that the US become more intimately and directly involved in the order-building process. This requires the US to move away from its tendency to act as an external balancer and toward a more engaged day-to-day involvement and leadership role in the region across political, security and economic dimensions. One channel for the US to project such political leadership would be to spearhead the establishment of a four-party China-Japan-ROK-US confidence-building mechanism. Such a mechanism would be well positioned to foster reassurance diplomacy regarding the evolving role of the SDF and the US-Japan alliance, and to promote agreements on military-to-military hotlines and crisis management procedures to reduce the risk of accidental collision and to mitigate damage in the event of a crisis. The US and Japan should strengthen trilateral security cooperation with partners such as South Korea, Australia, India, and the ASEAN nations. In particular, deeper US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation, including contingency planning, is urgent given the uncertain situation on the Korean Peninsula. Trilateral cooperation directed toward North Korea should take into account the need to engage China and Russia, make preparations to steer the situation toward a soft-landing unification, and utilise Track 2 diplomacy to inject fresh ideas from academia to ensure the long-term stability of the Korean Peninsula. The forward deployment of US troops throughout East Asia needs to be re-examined regularly — through intensive consultation with alliance partners — to ensure it is politically sustainable and able to meet contemporary challenges. While the US forward deployment is a critical regional public good, it must be re-considered whether maintaining US forces in such a high concentration in one area of the region, as they currently are in Okinawa in the face of strident local opposition, is the best strategy over the long term to fulfil US-Japan alliance goals. Advances in new military technologies and the changing nature of regional security challenges make it increasingly desirable to establish a broader and more dynamic forward deployment posture where US soldiers are more evenly distributed and rotated across the region — a trend that is already underway with increased cooperation with partners such as Australia, India, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam. At the same time, as the SDF continues to expand its roles and functions to engage in limited collective self-defence, there will be greater potential for joint US-Japan basing arrangements, which should be utilised as an opportunity to deepen US-Japan security cooperation. Finally, Japan and the US would be wise to complement their security cooperation with more vigorous efforts to constructively engage with China in key areas, including on multilateral financial institutions, mega-regional trade agreements, and energy and the environment. (--) Relations Not Zero SumCossa, 1999 (Ralph A. Executive Director Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies “U.S.-Japan-China Relations: Can Three Part Harmony Be Sustained?” The Brown Journal of World Affairs Accessed 6/22/16 JJH) When we look at the three bilateral relationships today, the U.S.-China link appears the most challenging. It is also the one that is most likely, if not given proper attention, to plunge the region into another bipolar confrontation which would serve no one’s long-term security interests. But if in our effort to improve Sino-U.S. relations we put U.S.-Japan relations at risk, we end up worse off than we started, since this long-standing alliance relationship provides the basis for both Washington’s and Tokyo’s broader-based national security policies. Despite the central role of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, the broader, all-encompassing relationship is not, and should not be viewed as, a “zero-sum” game. When one side of the three-way relationship improves, all three sides can potentially benefit. The goal is to identify and build upon the common interests and objectives shared by all three nations to avoid misunderstandings or conflict and to deal better with potential regional crises. Equally important is an examination both of current points of contention and potential varying long-term objectives which, if not properly addressed, could undermine future harmony (--) Troops would still be in Japan providing assurance—plan isn’t the necessary internal link.(--) U.S-Japan relations low nowDonnelly 2015 — Thomas Donnelly, author of the weekly standard, 2015 (“America's Collapsing Alliances”, Weekly Standard, 5/11, Available online at http://www.weeklystandard.com/americas-collapsing-alliances/article/943617, RKim) It was a long time ago and a galaxy far, far away: In July 2008, presidential candidate Barack Obama made big, bold news by travelling to Berlin to – as The New York Times triumphantly recorded – “restore the world’s faith in strong American leadership and idealism.” With 200,000 Berliners waving campaign-provided American flags, Obama called for renewing America’s alliances and undoing the cowboy unilateralism of George W. Bush and Obama’s 2008 opponent Sen. John McCain. The events of recent months are an indication of how spectacularly Obama has failed to fulfill his 2008 promise. This week comes the news that Saudi Arabia’s newly installed King Salman and three of the other six Gulf monarchs are boycotting Obama’s Camp David summit – a meeting called by Obama to reassure the Arab states that the forthcoming nuclear deal with Iran was not a betrayal of their longstanding security relationship with the United States. Beyond their fears of Iran’s nukes, the Gulf states see the rise of an aspiring Persian hegemon – in Yemen, in Syria, in Iraq – taking advantage of, if not actively conspiring with, a retreating America. In this case “no show” means “no confidence.” While the Middle East is where Obama has done the most damage to traditional U.S. alliances, the situation in Europe is not much better. The failure to respond to Vladimir Putin’s land grabs – which, to be fair, began with Georgia in the twilight of the Bush years – exposes NATO’s senility. The story of the post-Cold War Atlantic alliance, its late and limp performances in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan, and now in Europe itself, is one of continuous decline. Even with the victory of David Cameron’s Tories, Britain continues to shed whatever elements of greatness it retains; with the nationalists wiping out all opposition in Scotland, another secession vote is more than possible, and Britain’s army is on course to be smaller than the NYPD. While Europe deserves most of the blame for its disarmament and indecision, the Obama Pentagon is pressing forward with plans to further reduce America’s military posture in Europe. The president came to office figuring the peace of Europe was eternal and self-sustaining, and thus there was no need to maintain the alliance that has been the key vehicle for U.S. global leadership since World War II. It is no wonder that Eastern Europeans doubt the credibility of NATO’s Article V, collective-defense guarantees. Which brings us to East Asia and Obama’s supposed “rebalance” or “Pacific Pivot.” To say that things aren’t quite so bad there would be the soft bigotry of low expectations, except it was the president who raised expectations of more energetic American leadership there. Further, as expressed in the 2012 Defense Guidance, the pivot marks the sole “doctrinal” bit of Obama thinking; it was more than a reaction to Bush-era policies. Our East Asian allies cheered the initiative but now regard more as rhetoric than a strategic reality. It’s not just that the administration’s efforts – such as the repositioning of Marines to northern Australia, the attempt to build a strategic partnership with Burma or to revive the stalled partnership with India – have been underwhelming. Indeed, since trumpeting the rebalance to Asia the administration has distanced itself from allies’ enthusiasms. Obama’s pledge of a “new era” in U.S.-Japan relations barely survived the departure of Prime Minister Abe for Tokyo. The visit of reformist Indian leader Narendra Modi was a decidedly low-key affair. More tangibly, the Chinese have resumed their various encroachments into the South China Sea. At the end of the day, the U.S. position in the region is no better now than in 2008, and arguably worse: an empty pivot is worse than no pivot. 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