Tampa Prep 2009-2010 Impact Defense File
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- AT: Japanese Rearm
AT: Japanese NationalismNationalism doesn’t kill the alliance or cause rearm The Washington Quarterly, 2006 ("Japan’s Goldilocks Strategy", Autumn, http://72.14.235.104/search?q=cache:toRz7MYAMW8J:web.mit.edu/polisci/research/samuels/Japan%27s %2520Goldilocks%2520Strategy.pdf+Japan+soft+power+alternative+to+military&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=78 &gl=us) A third choice, the one preferred by the middle-power internationalists, would be to achieve prestige by increasing prosperity. Japan’s exposure to some of the more difficult vicissitudes of world politics would be reduced but only if some of the more ambitious assaults on the Yoshida Doctrine were reversed. Japan would once again eschew the military shield in favor of the mercantile sword. It would bulk up the country’s considerable soft power in a concerted effort to knit East Asia together without generating new threats or becoming excessively vulnerable. The Asianists in this group would aggressively embrace exclusive regional economic institutions to reduce Japan’s reliance on the U.S. market. They would not abrogate the military alliance but would resist U.S. exhortations for Japan to expand its roles and missions. open, regional economic institutions as a means to reduce the likelihood of abandonment by the United States and would seek to maintain the United States’ protective embrace as cheaply and for as long as possible. The final, least likely choice would be to achieve autonomy through prosperity. This is the choice of pacifists, many of whom today are active in civil society through nongovernmental organizations that are not affiliated with traditional political parties. Like the mercantile realists, they would reduce Japan’s military posture, possibly even eliminate it. Unlike the mercantile realists, they would reject the alliance as dangerously entangling. They would eschew hard power for soft power, campaign to establish Northeast Asia as a nuclear-free zone, expand the defensive-defense concept to the region as a whole, negotiate a regional missile-control regime, and rely on the Asian Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for security. 19 Their manifest problem is that the Japanese public is unmoved by their prescriptions. In March 2003, when millions took to the streets in Rome, London, and New York City to protest the U.S. invasion of Iraq, only several thousand rallied in Tokyo’s Hibiya Park. 20 Pacifist ideas about prosperity and autonomy seem relics of an earlier, more idealistic time when Japan could not imagine, much less openly plan for, military contingencies. Japanese nationalism isn’t militaristic Varma 7 [Lalima, is a Professor in the Japanese studies programme of the Centre for East Asian Studies, Japanese Nationalism: Response to Changing Regional and International Environment, CHINA REPORT 43 : 1 (2007): 57–68] Just as power has been described as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power, similarly nationalism can be described as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’. Countries like the US are considered ‘hard’ powers since they possess both economic and military might whereas Japan has been referred to as a ‘soft’ power since it is only an economic might and is a major source of ODA and FDI to developing countries, but has no military prowess. Providing economic and technical assistance is not sufficient to acquire a prominent role in international affairs. It is also not always an effective tool to mend or strengthen ties with countries as is evident in the case of Japan’s relations with China. Japanese nationalism which prevailed during the pre-War period can be referred to as ‘hard’ since it was aggressive, militaristic, and the Japanese people were not only proud of their traditions, culture and the purity of their race but also believed that they were superior and destined to rule over the Asians. However, the kind of nationalism that is emerging in Japan since the last one decade in particular is ‘soft’ because it does not seem to nurture the ambition of unilaterally attacking any country or imposing its culture on other countries. The Nationalism emerging in Japan is basically geared towards seeing that Japan occupies an important place in the world community which is commensurate with the status of the world’s second largest economy and a major contributor to international organisations such as the UN, World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Restoring pride in Japanese traditions and virtue is the main goal, which to a great extent was responsible for Japan’s economic success story. AT: Japanese Rearm1. No chance Japan will go nuclear—too many things prevent it Yokota 2009 (Takashi, Newsweek Journalist, “The N Word; Why Japan won't go nuclear.”, Newsweek, June 22, 2009, Lexis, Lin) Yet this is all just rhetoric. For one thing, despite North Korea's threats and China's growing military and political power, the Japanese people remain dead set against building nuclear weapons. Polls conducted over the past three years show that less than 20 percent of the public currently says it favors possessing such a deterrent. For another, Japan--a crowded island nation--lacks the space to test a bomb. Japan has large stockpiles of plutonium for its nuclear-energy industry. But plutonium-type bombs require physical testing to verify their efficacy. (Uranium bombs are considerably simpler and so may not need physical testing, but Japan doesn't have the weapons-grade uranium to make such a device.) While some experts argue that Japan could test a plutonium weapon by detonating it underground, others--including former defense chief Shigeru Ishiba--insist that there is simply nowhere to do so in such a densely populated nation. Simulations would not be sufficient; those only work after at least one actual test. Japan, moreover, now occupies the nuke-free high ground and would risk losing its innocence if it went nuclear. According to an internal 1995 study by Japan's defense establishment, reversing the country's no-nukes policy would trigger the collapse of the Nuclear Non--Proliferation Treaty regime, as the withdrawal of the world's only nuclear victim could fatally undermine confidence in the system. Such a move would also severely damage relations with Washington--Tokyo's most important ally--and the alarm in Beijing and Seoul could set off a nuclear race across East Asia. Japan would get the blame. The consequences for Japan's energy supplies and economy could be equally catastrophic. If Japan broke out of the NPT, the countries that now supply it with nuclear fuel, including Canada, Australia and the United States, would surely hold back their shipments, which are currently conditioned on the fuel's peaceful use. That would be a nightmare for Japan, which relies on nuclear energy for nearly a third of its electricity. There's one other roadblock to consider: Japan's top nuclear hawks have seen their power weaken considerably in recent years. Abe lost most of his clout after abruptly resigning as prime minister two years ago. In February, Nakagawa resigned as finance minister in disgrace after appearing drunk at a news conference. And Aso is practically a lame duck these days, with little room for bold moves. Of course, the political environment may change if North Korea continues to act belligerently or if China proves to be a real threat, as Japanese hawks fear. But even then, most Japanese experts believe that their country would stop short of building a bomb of its own. At most, it might temporarily allow the United States to base nukes on Japanese territory. Another option would be to develop the means to stage a conventional strike against North Korea's launchpads. But even the strike plan won't become reality anytime soon, as senior lawmakers and experts say current proposals are "amateurish" and poorly thought out. And any revision of the non-nuke policy would be a much greater stretch, given the weakness of the hawkish wing of the ruling LDP. There are still many good reasons to try to rein in North Korea's nuclear program, and its attempts to build missiles that could deliver those weapons to the U.S. and Japan. But the risk that Japan will go nuclear is not one of them. 2. No risk of your aggression arguments – Japan would opt for a limited re-arm Carpenter (Ted Galen Carpenter, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) 1995 ( November 1“Paternalism And Dependence: The U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship” http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-244.html) Moreover, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Japan can probably protect its security interests without a massive rearmament effort. A modest increase in military spending, say to 1.5 percent of GDP, might well be sufficient--and only the most paranoid would be alarmed by a buildup of that magnitude.(39) Such an increase would produce decidedly more potent air and naval capabilities sufficient for a more credible, wide-ranging Japanese security role. But it would hardly be enough for a new wave of imperialism--especially if Japan was careful not to greatly expand its ground forces. Without a potential army of occupation, Tokyo would clearly lack the ability to subjugate its neighbors, and the existing ground Self-Defense Force, some 150,000 active duty personnel, is obviously far from being such a force. The most worrisome development would be a decision by Tokyo to acquire nuclear weapons. That possibility cannot be ruled out in the long term--especially if North Korea or other aggressive or unstable regimes develop nuclear arsenals--but it is not inevitable. The Japanese public has a pronounced dislike of nuclear weapons, and the memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are not likely to fade soon. In addition, given the technological sophistication that Japan can bring to bear on the development of its military forces, Tokyo might conclude that an arsenal of precision-guided weapons, together with appropriate aircraft and missile delivery systems (and comprehensive air and missile defenses), would be sufficient to counter the nuclear arsenals of its neighbors. As the Persian Gulf War demonstrated, precision-guided conventional weapons can be extremely effective.
Prompted by US President Barack Obama's call in April for a nuclear-free world and then by North Korea's May 25 nuclear test, the resolution says Japan, as the only country attacked by atomic bombs, "has the responsibility of spearheading the campaign to eliminate nuclear weapons." It warns that "such threats as development of not just nuclear weapons, but also missiles that can carry nuclear bombs, outflows of nuclear materials and nuclear technologies, and nuclear proliferation are rather increasing even in this post-Cold War era." Against this backdrop, Japan should "put forth efforts on nuclear arms reduction and non-proliferation, and work proactively towards establishing an effective inspection system," it says. The resolution was proposed by the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan after President Obama, in his speech in Prague on April 5, pledged that the United States will take "concrete steps" to help realize a nuclear-free world. As for North Korea's second nuclear test last month, it says the UN Security Council presented "steadfast refusal" by adopting Resolution 1874 to impose a broad range of additional sanctions. Taking these opportunities, the Japanese government "should strive to develop the drive for eliminating nuclear arms, particularly regional responses on the matter including the nuclear issue of North Korea, into a global trend," it says. The House of Councillors is expected to endorse a similar resolution during a plenary session Wednesday. This is not the first time the Japanese parliament has adopted a resolution seeking government efforts towards nuclear abolition, as it did so, for example, in 1982 before a special UN disarmament conference. Directory: files -> documents documents -> North Mankato Taylor Library documents -> In the Red and Brown Water documents -> - documents -> I. Disaster Summary Sheet II. Tropical Cyclones documents -> Cbp and Trade Automated Interface Requirements Appendix: pga december 22, 2015 documents -> Ace abi catair customs and Trade Automated Interface Requirements documents -> Ace abi catair customs and Trade Automated Interface Requirements documents -> Mobile audio/video recording systems documents -> Cartographic Concepts for Realizing a Location Based umts service documents -> 1/ Background Statistics Human development index rank Download 2.71 Mb. Share with your friends:
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