Tampa Prep 2009-2010 Impact Defense File



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AT: Korean Reunification



1. The United Korean military will be defense based instead of war based, and will concentrate on solving internal instability

Derek J. Mitchell (a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS) 2002: A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea. http://www.twq.com/03winter/docs/03winter_mitchell.pdf



One of the first acts of a unified Korean state will be to reassess its longterm security strategy and orientation carefully. The Korean military will likely move toward a defense-oriented, crisis-management strategy and away from a war-fighting posture. Korea will be preoccupied for some time with internal instability as South Korean authorities focus on decommissioning the DPRK military and integrating its personnel productively into popular Korean society. The ROK military will need to safeguard and account for residual DPRK military equipment and material, particularly any weapons of mass destruction and the delivery systems or laboratories associated with them.
2. Unified Korea will have no interest in WMD – fears over regional arms race

Derek J. Mitchell (a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS) 2002: A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea. http://www.twq.com/03winter/docs/03winter_mitchell.pdf



A unified Korea would be expected to have no interest in WMD development or deployment as such an act would likely spur a regional arms race and create tensions with the international community, especially the United States, over nonproliferation. This calculation will ultimately depend on the state of the regional security environment at the time of unification, including the status of Korea’s alliance with the United States as well as its confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella, Korea’s relationship with Russia and China, and whether or not Japan develops nuclear weapons.
3. Unified U.S. Korean relations will remain strong – key to its economic development and regional security

Derek J. Mitchell (a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS) 2002: A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea. http://www.twq.com/03winter/docs/03winter_mitchell.pdf

Arguably, Korea’s interest will continue to lie in the retention of its alliance with the United States following unification. Despite some frictions, the alliance has served to help preserve Korea’s essential freedom of action and to facilitate its historic political and economic development over many decades. Maintaining an alliance with the United States will also help preserve the U.S.-led, alliance-based security structure in East Asia that has served as a stabilizing force in the region, hedged against the rise of an aggressive regional power, and protected Korea from becoming the political if not military battleground upon which the major Asian powers have historically sought regional advantage. Indeed, a unified Korea will need the stability and reassurance engendered by its alliance with the United States more than ever during the many years of transition following unification, particularly under collapse or war scenarios.
4. Korea will continue to host U.S. military forces on the peninsula – ensures security

Derek J. Mitchell (a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS) 2002: A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea. http://www.twq.com/03winter/docs/03winter_mitchell.pdf



A unified Korea also will arguably have a substantial interest in accepting a U.S. military presence on the peninsula following unification. This presence would serve as a key component of continued alliance relations and the overall U.S. regional military presence to preserve stability throughout East Asia. Korea’s continued hosting of U.S. forces would sustain the special relationship between the governments and armed forces of both sides, facilitate their coordination of regional strategy, and continue to serve as a deterrent to others seeking advantage on the peninsula.

AT: Kuwaiti Economy



Kuwait economy not key to world- dependent on global trends

Jamieson 6/11 [Lee, Staff Writer, Arabian Business.com, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/590034-taking-care-of-business] KLS

However, recent economic turbulence has made Kuwait acutely aware of how reliant it is on the global economic system. The Kuwait Stock Exchange experienced a loss of US $10 billion early last year, high inflation is an ongoing concern and the number of expatriate workers, which make up 50% of its overall population, has dropped for the second year in a row.


Kuwaiti economy resilient – oil

Oxford Economic Country Briefings 8 (1/18/8, “Kuwait,” Oxford Economic Country Briefings [Magazine] ) JPG

Kuwait has a relatively undiversified economy, dominated by the oil industry and government sector, with oil accounting for about half of GDP, 95% of export revenues and around 80% of government revenues. During the 1970s, the economy grew strongly on the back of rapidly rising oil prices, but in the 1980s it was hit by a securities market crash and sharply lower oil prices, followed up by the 1990 Iraq invasion. In exile during the Iraqi occupation, the government drew down over half of its US$1 OObn in overseas investments to help pay for reconstruction. The economy has enjoyed a period of prosperity since the US-led invasion of Iraq, with many companies in Iraq establishing offices in Kuwait and procuring goods through Kuwaiti companies, with banking and construction having grown particularly strongly. Sharply higher oil prices in the last few years have also given the economy another big boost, with real GDP growth jumping to over 15% in 2003 and averaging about 10% in 2004-05. The oil sector has led the way, climbing to almost 60% of GDP in 2005, but non-oil sectors, in particular services, have also been boosted by the impact of booming oil revenues. However, the pace of economic reform has been slow, hampering the growth of private sector involvement in the economy. * Crude oil reserves are officially said to be almost 10Obn barrels, or 8% of world reserves, making Kuwait a key player within OPEC and world oil markets. The Saudi-Kuwaiti neutral zone, shared by the two countries, holds an additional 5bn barrels, lifting Kuwait's total oil reserves to over 100bn barrels, enough for over 100 years of production at the 2005 level of around 2.5m b/d. Under the US$7bn Project Kuwait, the government is hoping it will reach 3.0m b/d by 2008 and 4m b/d by 2012, but these plans are thought unlikely to be met. And there have also been industry reports that proven oil reserves are only about half of the officially quoted level, which in turn would cast doubt over the sustainability of any sharp increase in production. * As a result of booming oil revenues, the country's traditional balance of payments surpluses have been swollen further in recent years, with the current account surplus rising to over US$50bn in 2006, equal to about 50% of GDP. These surpluses have enabled the government to rebuild its external assets, which were heavily depleted after the Iraq invasion but are now thought to be approaching the US$100bn level again. As well as rising external surpluses, which have helped to support the dinar (KWD, pegged to the US$ from January 2003 to May 2007 and now to a trade- and investment-weighted basket of currencies), the government has also posted rising budget surpluses, estimated at 30% of GDP in 2005 and 2006. These have enabled total gross debt to be brought down to 13% of GDP at end-2005, and the acquisition of foreign assets has made Kuwait one of the world's largest net external creditors. Along with the other states in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Kuwait is planning to form a currency union by 2010, but doubts about the feasibility of this plan have surfaced in the past year, especially following the May 2007 KWD revaluation.
Kuwait econ resilient- banking, liquidity, efficiency

Thabet 6/15 [Mokhtar, Staff Writer, 2010 Global Arab Network http://www.english.globalarabnetwork.com/201006156218/Finance/kuwait-negative-banking-outlook-weak-diversification-oil-reliance.html] KLS

Thanks to a comfortable banking sector’s aggregate equity to total assets and a good liquidity system supported by the availability of ample government funding, Kuwaiti banks are able to weather significant pressure. Nonetheless, despite some improvement, banks’ risk management practices need further enhancement, as shown by the significant portfolio concentrations on the stressed Kuwaiti investment company and real estate and construction sectors. Unlike excellent profitability undergone by Kuwaiti banks before the financial crisis (benefiting from the booming local and regional economies), Moody’s expects the yearend 2009 results to show a significant increase in system NPLs due to increased provisioning charges and adversely affecting returns. Elevated provisioning charges are likely to continue to affect some banks’ profits throughout 2010. Moody’s expects banks with higher concentrations in their loan books or weaker credit standards to report weaker results than those of their peers. The Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK) relaxing its rule on the loans to deposits ratio did not impede a loan growth slowdown since the crisis started. Eventually, the efficiency of Kuwaiti banks in terms of cost-to-income ratios is excellent in global terms, although some deterioration in efficiency ratios as a result of the weakened operating conditions could exert pressure on profits.


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