Tampa Prep 2009-2010 Impact Defense File
Military education doesn’t increase readiness, it trades off with other vital defense spending and teaches concepts that are relics of the Cold War
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- 3. Military education fails – military culture prevents effectiveness
- AT: Military Morale
2. Military education doesn’t increase readiness, it trades off with other vital defense spending and teaches concepts that are relics of the Cold WarCarafano, Ph.D., 08 (James Jay, July 31, “On Teaching War: The Future of Professional Military Education” http://www.heritage.org/press/commentary/ed080108d.cfm) Changing a Military Saving professional military education from the relentless budgetary pressures to fund other military priorities is continuing challenge. Folding the lessons learned from the Long War into the professional military education system is another. Sustaining the education system is largely a question of maintaining adequate defense budgets--a major battle that will have to be fought in the years ahead. Institutionalizing the lessons of the Long War, however, will require both money and change.
(James Jay, July 31, “On Teaching War: The Future of Professional Military Education” http://www.heritage.org/press/commentary/ed080108d.cfm) The obstacles to making the military learn more effectively are largely cultural in origin. Therefore, changing military culture could well require a set of initiatives that cut across the services' education, career professional development patterns, and organization. To start with, the skills needed to conduct effective post-conflict tasks require "soft power," not only the capacity to understand other nations and cultures, but also the ability to work in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment. These are sophisticated leader and staff proficiencies, required at many levels of command. In the present military education system, however, much of the edification relevant to building these attributes is provided at the war colleges to a relatively elite group being groomed for senior leader and joint duty positions. This model is wrong on two counts. First, I think these skills are needed by most leaders and staffs in both the active and reserve components, not just an elite group within the profession. Second, this education comes too late in an officer or NCO's career. Virtually every other career field provides "graduate level" education to members in their mid-20s to 30s. Only the military delays advanced education until its leaders are in their mid-40s. That has to change. AT: Military Morale1. Can’t solve troop morale – operational tempo outweighs Philpott 7/8 Tom, covered the military for more than 25 years as senior editor, 2k9, What congress can and can't do for troops, families, The Progress Index, http://www.progress-index.com/articles/2009/07/08/news/military/doc4a549875a944c487453331.txt Finally, there’s growing recognition that costly personnel initiatives haven’t relieved the greatest source of strain today on service members and their families -- the tremendous pace of operations. This was emotionally described in early June by spouses called to testify before the Senate armed services subcommittee on military personnel. The spouses’ collective message was that what military families need more than anything is more time together. In that regard, perhaps the most critical initiative in the defense bill are permanent increases in end strength for ground forces, and authority to raise active Army strength by another 30,000 by 2012 if the Obama administration decides to budget for it. Sheila L. Casey, wife of Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the Army chief of staff, told senators that families are so stressed “everything is becoming an issue.” Couples who have seen their marriages deteriorate “don’t have time to get divorced,” she said. “I am…seeing signs of a force under immense strain, and this concerns me greatly,” Casey said. “These signs, these indicators, include cases of domestic violence, child neglect as well as increases in suicides, alcohol abuse and cases of post-traumatic stress.” The strain is especially acute on “our young, newly married Army families because, with repeated deployments bearing down on them, these young families don’t have enough time together to build a strong bond. So they are particularly vulnerable to be stressed by the war.” But what keeps her awake at night, Mrs. Casey said, are the cumulative effects on children of repeated deployments by parent soldiers. She recalled one soldier’s wife at Fort Drum, N.Y., “through her sobs,” sharing her fear that her two children were growing up without knowing or even attaching emotionally to their father because he was away so often. The “cumulative effects of nearly eight years of war” will not be easy to reverse, Casey warned. “My concern is that we are going to see these things appear again later when families have the time to really reintegrate.” Despite extraordinary support programs, better than any provided to past generations, she said, “Army families are sacrificing too much.”
William, Senior Fellow @ Hoover Institution, The US Military: Under Strain and at Risk, The National Security Advisory Group, January 2006, pg. National_Security_Report_01252006.pdf • In the meantime, the United States has only limited ground force capability ready to respond to other contingencies. The absence of a credible strategic reserve in our ground forces increases the risk that potential adversaries will be tempted to challenge the United States. Since the end of World War II, a core element of U.S. strategy has been maintaining a military capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating aggression in more than one theater at a time. As a global power with global interests, the United States must be able to deal with challenges to its interests in multiple regions of the world simultaneously. Today, however, the United States has only limited ground force capability ready to respond outside the Afghan and Iraqi theaters of operations. If the Army were ordered to send significant forces to another crisis today, its only option would be to deploy units at readiness levels far below what operational plans would require – increasing the risk to the men and women being sent into harm’s way and to the success of the mission. As stated rather blandly in one DoD presentation, the Army “continues to accept risk” in its ability to respond to crises on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere. Although the United States can still deploy air, naval, and other more specialized assets to deter or respond to aggression, the visible overextension of our ground forces has the potential to significantly weaken our ability to deter and respond to some contingencies. Directory: files -> documents documents -> North Mankato Taylor Library documents -> In the Red and Brown Water documents -> - documents -> I. Disaster Summary Sheet II. Tropical Cyclones documents -> Cbp and Trade Automated Interface Requirements Appendix: pga december 22, 2015 documents -> Ace abi catair customs and Trade Automated Interface Requirements documents -> Ace abi catair customs and Trade Automated Interface Requirements documents -> Mobile audio/video recording systems documents -> Cartographic Concepts for Realizing a Location Based umts service documents -> 1/ Background Statistics Human development index rank Download 2.71 Mb. Share with your friends:
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