Tasking: I'd like following questions answered

Sustainment            TOP

Although progress has been made, there are still concerns about the ability of the army to sustain personnel, and also concerns about logistics, equipment distribution, infrastructure maintenance and force generation.

Readiness            TOP

With the assistance of coalition advisers and mentors, the army has been developing rapid reaction capabilities, with a special focus on particular units, such as the 1st Infantry Division, formerly known as the Iraq Intervention Force, which was renamed Quick Reaction Force 1 in 2008.

Deployments, tasks and operations            TOP

Role and Deployment            TOP

When the new Iraqi Army was launched in 2003 by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), its stated role was to develop a military capability in order to provide a basis for effective, professional and non-political armed forces. The stated mission of the army was the military defence of the nation, including defence of the national territory and the military protection of the security of critical installations, facilities, infrastructure, lines of communication and supply and population.

The force would also include "participation in domestic relief operations associated with natural or man-made disasters and humanitarian relief missions". In light of the insurgency that has been undermining the stability of Iraq, the main role of the Iraqi Army has actually been internal security and counter-terrorism operations, while coalition forces fulfilled the function of protecting Iraq's borders. It is envisaged that the army will build up its capabilities to the point where it can eventually take over the function of defending the state against external aggression.

Recent and Current Operations            TOP

In March and April of 2008 the Iraqi Army, supported by coalition forces, fought the Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM, or Mahdi Army), associated with the mercurial Shia cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, in a series of clashes in southern Iraq and Baghdad. The fighting was sparked by an Iraqi Army campaign, Operation 'Charge of the Knights' (Saulat al-Fursan) launched in March, to clear militia elements from Basra through cordon/search and arrest operations.

Originally scheduled for June 2008, the gradual build-up of forces and information operations was expedited by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's decision to commence operations. Logistical preparations for the offensive were severely disrupted by the expedited timetable. Neither ammunition nor rations had been stockpiled and both had to be flown into Basra and Tallil air bases during the operation. UK and US logistics hubs in Kuwait provided ration packs for Iraqi forces. Casualty evacuation and inbound movement of around 800 Iraqi reinforcements was undertaken using UK and US aircraft.

Two Iraqi Air Force C-130E transport aircraft of the 23rd Transport Squadron deployed from Baghdad International Airport, transporting 175 tonnes of supplies to Basra. Another key shortfall in the initial phase of the operation was combat engineering support. The approach roads to militia-held residential neighbourhoods were heavily mined with conventional and explosively formed projectile roadside bombs. Throughout the operation, such devices posed a major threat to Iraqi security forces, with both General Mohan and Provincial Chief of Police Major General Jalil Khalaf surviving roadside bomb attacks on their convoys.

Particularly strong resistance was encountered within residential areas held by the Jaish al-Mahdi militia. Most of these areas were screened by Iraqi Army forces involved in securing a base of operations in the east of the city, anchored on Basra Palace. In one case, however, roadside bombings and intense urban hit-and-run operations undertaken by experienced militia fighters caused an Iraqi Army battalion to lose cohesion during the initial day of fighting on 25 March 2008. The unit in question, an element of the Iraqi Army's 52nd Brigade (14th Division), had only recently graduated from the Besmeya training facility on 13 February 2008. Raised from Basra recruits, the battalion proved unwilling to fight other Basrawis and disbanded with the loss of considerable numbers of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), many of which were later recovered while dozens of others were burnt. The battalion commander and deputy commander were later relieved.

By 27 March 2008, Operation "Charge of the Knights" was in considerably better shape. Command-and-control arrangements stabilised and the prime minister handed operational control to the chief of operations at the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, Major General Abd'al-aziz Arrawi, supported by a team of senior US advisors led by US Major General George Flynn, the deputy commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. A set of experienced Iraqi Army brigades tightened the cordon around key Jaish al-Mahdi neighbourhoods in western Basra. These included the Iraqi Army 14th Brigade (4th Division), a motorised unit of Kurdish and Arab personnel with a readiness rating of C1 - the highest possible. Alongside this unit were brigade-sized forces of Iraq's elite formations, the 1st and 9th Divisions. The 3rd Brigade (9th Division), a motorised unit, was one of the first post-Saddam Iraqi units formed and is considered an elite quick-reaction force unit. The 35th Brigade (9th Division) is a tank formation with two battalions of reconditioned T-55 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) and BMP-1 Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) plus a further battalion of motorised infantry deployed to Basra.

After three days of tightening the cordon around Jaish al-Mahdi neighbourhoods, the 3rd and 35th Brigades began to penetrate Basra's western residential neighbourhoods with armoured "thunder runs". Key bridges, junctions, ports and symbolic centres such as Iraqi Police Service stations were recaptured and held. These areas allowed Jaish al-Mahdi neighbourhoods to be isolated from ammunition resupply. Local tribes opposed to the Jaish al-Mahdi played a major role in capturing militia arms caches and outposts on the east bank of the Shatt al-Arab river and other rural areas.

Coalition aerial surveillance and embedded US Joint Tactical Air Controllers, meanwhile, bolstered the ability of Iraqi units to reach into Jaish al-Mahdi urban strongholds. In particular, US Air Force MQ-1B Predators firing low-yield Lockheed Martin AGM-114 Hellfire missiles proved adept at targeting snipers, heavy weapons emplacements, checkpoints and nocturnal roadside bomb emplacers. At the same time as large-scale operations were under way, the 400-strong Iraqi Special Operations Force in Basra undertook a range of targeted operations against key militia leaders, supplemented by the Hillah Tactical Support Unit - a company-sized US-trained Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) unit.

This operation, launched in January 2008, involved joint Iraqi and coalition division and brigade-level operations aimed at destroying Al Qaeda and other extremist elements, especially in northern Iraq and the southern areas of Baghdad.

Command and control            TOP

Minister of Defence:	Abd al-Qadir Muhammad Jasim al-Mufriji
Armed Forces Chief of Staff:	General Babakir Zebari
Ground Forces Commander:	Lieutenant General Ali Ghadan

The Iraqi Ground Forces Command is overseen by the Joint Forces Command which in turn is under the control of the Iraqi National Command at the National Operations Centre in Baghdad. This centre is under the control of the Prime Minister, who is also the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Also under the Iraqi National Command is the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Bureau, which commands the Special Operations Forces.

In 2007 Prime Minister Maliki activated a number of regional operational commands to enhance coordination between the Iraqi Army and National Police in the conduct of security operations. Regional operational commands have been set up at Baghdad, Anbar, Basrah, Diyala, Karbala, Ninawa and Samarra.