Israel strikes fail – breakout capacity, bombs in the basement, North Korea will provide

Israel

Israel strikes fail – breakout capacity, bombs in the basement, North Korea will provide

Today it is no longer self-evident that Israel has the capacity to effectively strike Iran’s nuclear installations. Through deed and word, the White House has made clear repeatedly that it prefers a nuclear- armed Iran to an Israeli strike to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power. As it has done several times over the past six years, the Obama administration can be expected to continue to use the many means it has at its disposal to prevent Israel from launching such an attack. Moreover, with each passing day Iran’s nuclear sites become more and more difficult to attack successfully. And Iran’s technological capabilities have vastly expanded over the past decade. Today Iran can replace damaged or destroyed centrifuges much faster than it could in the past. Iran’s ally North Korea has also expanded its nuclear capabilities and its arsenal. Pyongyang is ready and willing to sell Iran replacements for any nuclear components that might be destroyed in a military strike. Finally, Iran recognizes the implications of growing European and US hostility toward the Jewish state. It knows that if Israel openly attacks Iran and sets back its nuclear weapons program, the EU and the US will punish Israel, and express sympathy with Iran, and so give the Iranians cover to rapidly rebuild any lost capabilities. Iran’s achievement of breakout capacity and seemingly unfettered path to a bomb in the basement, and its consequent rise to the position of regional hegemony, is the greatest Israeli foreign policy failure since the 1993 Oslo Accord with the PLO

No strikes- public opinion, risk of failure, and the Deal check.

Israel does have the military capability to strike the Islamic Republic’s nuclear installations. Nevertheless, for several reasons, it is very unlikely that Israel will unilaterally carry out strikes against Iran’s nuclear installations. First of all, Israeli leaders are cognizant of the fact that any strikes aimed at Iran’s nuclear installations will not completely thwart Iran’s nuclear program. The strikes might turn the clock a few years back and postpone the process for Iran to become a nuclear state or build an atomic bomb, but an Israeli attack will give further incentive to Iran to pursue its nuclear ambitions with more determination. Even several senior Israeli security and military officials have admitted that any Israeli attack on Iran will boost Iran’s determination to build a bomb, and will endanger Israel’s own survival. Second, an external Israeli attack on Iran will rally the Iranian people behind their government for their right of nuclear enrichment. It will also grant the hardliners firmer motive to reach the nuclear threshold with full-fledged speed. Thirdly, the Islamic Republic will likely decline to cooperate with the international community as well as pull out of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As a result, the unintended repercussions and negative consequences of an Israeli attack- such as Iran becoming more determined to accelerate its nuclear program- do outweigh the delay that the strikes might impose on Iran’s nuclear program. Difficult to predict While it might be easy to start a war or carry out strikes, it is almost impossible to know where the war will head afterwards. In case Iran responds militarily, few strikes can turn the region into a conflagration affecting many lives of ordinary civilians, the Gulf (with the price of oil skyrocketing and price of gasoline increasing in Western countries), and impacting the security of other regional countries. The war can not only endanger regional security, but also Israel’s own security, and drag in global powers, including the United States and Russia. According to polls, many Israeli citizens are against their country attacking Iran unilaterally. Finally, although Israeli leaders believe that the Obama administration has not been firm enough in terms of thwarting Iran’s ambition to reach a nuclear threshold, Israel is in fact dependent on the United States when it comes to dealing with Iran’s nuclear program

No strikes. Five warrants

Keck 15 Zachary Keck M.A. from department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University; managing editor of The National Interest; February 9, 2015 5 Reasons Israel Won't Attack Iran http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/five-reasons-israel-wont-attack-iran-9469♥Tina

Many dismiss this talk as bluster, however. Over at Bloomberg View, for instance, Jeffrey Goldberg argues that the nuclear deal has “boxed-in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu so comprehensively that it's unimaginable Israel will strike Iran in the foreseeable future.” Eurasia Group's Cliff Kupchan similarly argued: “The chance of Israeli strikes during the period of the interim agreement drops to virtually zero.” Although the interim deal does further reduce Israel’s propensity to attack, the truth is that the likelihood of an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities has always been greatly exaggerated. There are at least five reasons why Israel isn’t likely to attack Iran. 1. You Snooze, You Lose First, if Israel was going to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, it would have done so a long time ago. Since getting caught off-guard at the beginning of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Israel has generally acted proactively to thwart security threats. On no issue has this been truer than with nuclear-weapon programs. For example, Israel bombed Saddam Hussein’s program when it consisted of just a single nuclear reactor. According to ABC News, Israel struck Syria’s lone nuclear reactor just months after discovering it. The IAEA had been completely in the dark about the reactor, and took years to confirm the building was in fact housing one. Contrast this with Israel’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear program. The uranium-enrichment facility in Natanz and the heavy-water reactor at Arak first became public knowledge in 2002. For more than a decade now, Tel Aviv has watched as the program has expanded into two fully operational nuclear facilities, a budding nuclear-research reactor, and countless other well-protected and -dispersed sites. Furthermore, America’s extreme reluctance to initiate strikes on Iran was made clear to Israel at least as far back as 2008. It would be completely at odds with how Israel operates for it to standby until the last minute when faced with what it views as an existential threat. 2. Bombing Iran Makes an Iranian Bomb More Likely Much like a U.S. strike, only with much less tactical impact, an Israeli air strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities would only increase the likelihood that Iran would build the bomb. At home, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei could use the attack to justify rescinding his fatwa against possessing a nuclear-weapons program, while using the greater domestic support for the regime and the nuclear program to mobilize greater resources for the country’s nuclear efforts. Israel’s attack would also give the Iranian regime a legitimate (in much of the world’s eyes) reason to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and kick out international inspectors. If Tehran’s membership didn’t even prevent it from being attacked, how could it justify staying in the regime? Finally, support for international sanctions will crumble in the aftermath of an Israeli attack, giving Iran more resources with which to rebuild its nuclear facilities. 3. Helps Iran, Hurts Israel Relatedly, an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear program would be a net gain for Iran and a huge loss for Tel Aviv. Iran could use the strike to regain its popularity with the Arab street and increase the pressure against Arab rulers. As noted above, it would also lead to international sanctions collapsing, and an outpouring of sympathy for Iran in many countries around the world. Meanwhile, a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would leave Israel in a far worse-off position. Were Iran to respond by attacking U.S. regional assets, this could greatly hurt Israel’s ties with the United States at both the elite and mass levels. Indeed, a war-weary American public is adamantly opposed to its own leaders dragging it into another conflict in the Middle East. Americans would be even more hostile to an ally taking actions that they fully understood would put the U.S. in danger. Furthermore, the quiet but growing cooperation Israel is enjoying with Sunni Arab nations against Iran would evaporate overnight. Even though many of the political elites in these countries would secretly support Israel’s action, their explosive domestic situations would force them to distance themselves from Tel Aviv for an extended period of time. Israel’s reputation would also take a further blow in Europe and Asia, neither of which would soon forgive Tel Aviv. 4. Israel’s Veto Players Although Netanyahu may be ready to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, he operates within a democracy with a strong elite structure, particularly in the field of national security. It seems unlikely that he would have enough elite support for him to seriously consider such a daring and risky operation. For one thing, Israel has strong institutional checks on using military force. As then vice prime minister and current defense minister Moshe Yaalon explained last year: “In the State of Israel, any process of a military operation, and any military move, undergoes the approval of the security cabinet and in certain cases, the full cabinet… the decision is not made by two people, nor three, nor eight.” It’s far from clear Netanyahu, a fairly divisive figure in Israeli politics, could gain this support. In fact, Menachem Begin struggled to gain sufficient support for the 1981 attack on Iraq even though Baghdad presented a more clear and present danger to Israel than Iran does today. What is clearer is that Netanyahu lacks the support of much of Israel’s highly respected national security establishment. Many former top intelligence and military officials have spoken out publicly against Netanyahu’s hardline Iran policy, with at least one of them questioning whether Iran is actually seeking a nuclear weapon. Another former chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces told The Independent that, “It is quite clear that much if not all of the IDF [Israeli Defence Forces] leadership do not support military action at this point…. In the past the advice of the head of the IDF and the head of Mossad had led to military action being stopped.” 5. A Deal is Better Than No Deal Finally, Israel won’t attack Iran because it is ultimately in its interests for the US and Iran to reach an agreement, even if it is a less than an ideal one. To begin with, an agreement is the only way to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons short of an invasion and occupation of the country. Moreover, Israel would benefit both directly and indirectly from a U.S.-Iranian nuclear deal and especially larger rapprochement. Israel would gain a number of direct benefits from a larger warming of U.S.-Iranian relations, which a nuclear deal could help facilitate. Iran currently pays no costs while benefiting significantly from its anti-Israeli tirades and actions. A rapprochement with the U.S. would force Iranian leaders to constrain their anti-Israeli rhetoric and actions, or risk losing their new partner. While Israel and Iran might not enjoy the same relationship they did under the Shah or the first decade of the Islamic Republic, a U.S.-allied Iran would be much less of a burden for Israel. History is quite clear on this point: U.S. Middle Eastern allies—notable Egypt under Sadat—have been much less hostile to the Jewish state than countries that have been U.S. adversaries. Tel Aviv would also benefit indirectly from a U.S.-Iran nuclear deal and possible rapprochement. That’s because either of these agreements would spark panic in Sunni Arab capitals. For the foreseeable future, then, Israel would enjoy some breathing room, which would obtain as these governments would be preoccupied with Iran for the foreseeable future. Indeed, just the possibility of an interim nuclear deal between the U.S. and Iran has created rumors of Saudi Arabia seeking tighter cooperation with Israel. For these reasons, the interim nuclear deal has made it less likely that Israel will attack Iran. That being said, the possibility of an Israeli attack on Iran was already remote long before Iran and the P5+1 held their talks in Geneva last month.

Israel wouldn’t strike- they couldn’t possibly succeed. Osirak isn’t a good empiric.

Robbins 15 James S. Robbins; senior fellow in national security affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council; Senior Editorial Writer for Foreign Affairs at the Washington Times http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2015/04/24/ending-irans-nuclear-program-would-require-more-than-a-few-airstrikes “A Grim Prognosis” April 24, 2015♥Tina

Iran learned from Israel’s successful June 1981 attack on Saddam Hussein’s Osirak nuclear facility, which followed a failed attack by Iran the previous September. Osirak was a single location, above ground, and not well defended, and Israel was able to severely cripple Saddam’s nuclear program with one strike. Iran has no such single-point, high vulnerability target, and Warden notes that Tehran has “done a nice job of camouflaging [its nuclear program], concealing it, putting it deep underground.” Israel can hit some important targets in Iran, but in Warden’s opinion not enough of them to be truly effective. Israeli forces would not be able to neutralize a sufficient number of facilities in a short enough period of time to guarantee success, and would not be able to sustain an air campaign for weeks or even days. Combat losses, international political opposition and Iranian military responses, both directly and through Tehran’s network of terrorist surrogates, would impose a time limit on any Israeli operation. Warden’s take is that, given these factors, it is unlikely Israel would mount a unilateral attack unless the situation was desperate. Even then, he has “zero optimism” an Israeli-only strike would be successful, short of Jerusalem using nuclear weapons, which opens a different, more dangerous discussion

Netanyahu’s not foolish enough to strike, and strikes would stop Iran

Larison 14 Why Israel Won’t Attack Iran (II) October 28, 2014 Daniel Larison is a senior editor at TAC, Ph. D from UChicago http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/why-israel-wont-attack-iran-ii/comment-page-1/♥Tina

Two years ago, Daniel Levy made the case that Netanyahu was too risk-averse as a politician to do anything as hazardous and potentially disastrous as starting a war with Iran. That seemed very plausible at the time, and I still find it persuasive. It has never made much sense that the Israeli government would launch an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if Netanyahu were inclined to do this, which he reportedly isn’t, starting a preventive war against Iran wouldn’t prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. On the contrary, a foreign attack would probably make the acquisition of such weapons a priority for the Iranian government. Especially if one believes the worst about the Iranian government’s intentions, it would be the height of folly to take action that would practically guarantee that Iran gets a nuclear arsenal, and that is what an Israeli or U.S. attack would do. The more important reason why such an attack didn’t make much sense is that it isn’t necessary for Israeli security. Even if Iran acquired nuclear weapons, Israel would have a much larger nuclear arsenal with which it would deter unconventional attacks. If Netanyahu is also risk-averse enough that he doesn’t want to take reckless military action against Iran, so much the better for all involved.

Current deal solves Iran- removes incentive/need for strikes.

Lewis 15, Jeffrey; Arms Control Wonk, Monterrey Institute Nuclear Professor, 4/2/15, A Skeptic’s Guide to the Iran Nuclear Deal, foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/02/a-skeptics-guide-to-the-iran-nuclear-deal-2/♥Tina

K, I admit it. I thought this framework was going to suck. Actually, it’s not bad. My main concern all along was that the P5+1 countries (technically the E3/EU+3; congratulations if you know the difference) were too focused on “breakout time” — imposing arbitrary limits on Iran’s centrifuge program to ensure that if Iran used its known nuclear infrastructure, it would take at least a year to build a bomb. The bigger worry about Iran’s nuke program, I always thought, was unknown nuclear infrastructure, such as any hidden centrifuge sites.

To my surprise, the deal — at least as it is described in the fact sheet released by the White House — manages to impose measures to guard against breakout, while also providing for a number of measures that help substantially with the problem of covert facilities. All in all, it’s a pretty comprehensive framework for managing the problem. It’s certainly worth lifting some sanctions, though a crucial detail is how quickly that will happen and whether sanctions can be reimposed if things go pear-shaped. But there are still reasons to be cautious. First, all we have at the moment area White House-released fact sheet and a couple of ambiguous news conferences in Lausanne, Switzerland, and the White House Rose Garden. (Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister and lead negotiator, is already complaining about the White House’s fact sheet.) There is, after all, a reason one writes these things down. The parties will need a few more months to work out the details of the actual agreement in order to implement the “framework” that was announced Thursday, April 2. Those negotiations will be crucial because the kind of language in the statements and fact sheet — which probably seem pretty detailed to a casual observer — doesn’t provide the sort of clarity that a final agreement will need in order to work. (Ask me about long-range missiles of any kind sometime.) Second, getting a deal on paper is only the first step. The parties have agreed to do all sorts of things. This may shock you, but sometimes parties have trouble delivering on such promises. Agreements aren’t self-implementing, so a major test will be how the parties deal with the inevitable challenges that human beings pose to implementing even a beautifully written final agreement. That’s not a reason to reject agreements, just a caution about being realistic. Finally, please keep in mind that this deal makes it marginally less likely that Iran will build a nuclear weapon. That’s great. But it doesn’t solve the problem of Iran’s missile program or Tehran’s less-than-stabilizing role in the Middle East. Expectations for any written agreement should be modest. I wouldn’t let myself get swept up in loose talk about a new relationship with Tehran. We’re agreeing to not kill each other, for the moment, over this one thing. In my business, that’s pretty good! Still, the details are pretty interesting. The big-ticket item for the U.S. national security community will be the “breakout” timeline. I am not going to do a calculation, but the important parameters are about 5,000 centrifuges enriching to less than 3.7 percent and a reduction in the existing stockpile of low-enriched uranium to 300 kilograms. The fact sheet claims this extends the breakout timeline from two to three months to more than a year. I don’t see any reason to doubt the administration’s math, but I just don’t think the breakout timeline matters. So I will just step aside and let other people who are invested in this argument fight it out. The provisions against covert sites — what my friend James Acton calls “sneak-out” and what I worry about most — look very strong. The fact sheet asserts that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will have continuous access to the facilities that produce Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years. The agreement also provides access to Iran’s uranium mines and mills, as well as a dedicated procurement channel for any goods destined for Iran’s nuclear program. Iran will return to the Additional Protocol and modified Code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangements — these are improvements to the safeguards agreement and subsidiary arrangements that Iran has with the IAEA. They are an important part of verifying any agreement. And it seems Iran has agreed to certain measures to address the so-called “possible military dimensions” of the nuclear program — all the intelligence, such as the infamous “laptop of death,” that suggests Iran had a covert bomb program until 2003. Iran also agreed to limit enrichment to a single site at Natanz. Again, the details will matter here. The E3/EU+3 would be well advised to make sure the agreement includes a nice map of the Natanz facility — lest we find secret centrifuge halls in a Natanz “annex” down the road. The advantage of limiting work to a single site is that, should the U.S. intelligence community catch Iran building a centrifuge site elsewhere (again), Tehran won’t be able to make any tendentious legal excuses. Finally, there are reasonable limits on Tehran’s program to develop new generations of centrifuges. These measures can’t guarantee that Iran doesn’t have a parallel, secret program. That’s still going to depend on the capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community. But they do force Iran to ensure that any parallel program is fully parallel, from uranium mines through centrifuge workshops to the proverbial underground mountain lair. That’s an imposition, and if secrecy breaks down at any point along that chain, the whole endeavor is compromised. The fact sheet really does assert what looks to be an impressive monitoring regime. Last but not least, the agreement seems to deal adequately with Iran’s enrichment plant at Fordow and its heavy-water reactor at Arak. Fordow — the covert enrichment site under a mountain and revealed in 2009 — will be converted into non-nuclear isotope separation. An earlier story indicated that a small number of centrifuges at Fordow would separate “stable” isotopes — “stable” here means non-radioactive. The nuclear fuel company Urenco has a side business that sells stable isotopes, so it’s not a crazy idea. It’s a little hard to tell from the fact sheet, but that seems to be what has happened. The IAEA will still have access to the site to make sure that it’s only used for non-nuclear purposes. The heavy-water reactor at Arak, meanwhile, will apparently be redesigned so that it “will not produce weapons grade plutonium.” There are real benefits to redesigning the reactor to produce less plutonium, though the fact sheet isn’t clear about the nature of the redesign. Iran also committed to ship the spent fuel from the reactor out of the country and to refrain “indefinitely” from reprocessing or reprocessing-related research. The terms “reprocessing” and “reprocessing research” are not defined, but if the goal is to make Arak no scarier than, say, the light-water reactor at Bushehr, they’ve succeeded.

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